

SOVIET ESPIONAGE

The remarkable
story, based on
original sources,
of the vast Soviet
spy apparatus

by **DAVID J. DALLIN**

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An atomic scientist in the West confesses to working for years on behalf of the Soviet Union. A code clerk in the Russian Embassy in Ottawa is responsible for the temporary destruction of a widespread spy apparatus in North America. These events disclose only a small part of a carefully constructed world-wide network, very likely the largest, and, despite many lapses, the most successful of its kind ever developed.

David Dallin has traveled to the centers of Soviet espionage activities in Western Europe, studied government and private documents, and interviewed many people who worked for or against the Soviet apparatus. From these records and investigations, he reconstructs the story of one of the most continuously effective operations in the history of espionage. This account of espionage in France, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States shows how the cloak-and-dagger contributes to Russian campaigns in peace and war.

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BY DAVID J. DALLIN

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To LILIA DALLIN

PREFACE

IN THE FRAMEWORK of Soviet foreign policy, espionage is more than the usual activity of foreign intelligence as practiced by other powers. Indeed, its importance is so great that no adequate understanding of the Soviet course in foreign affairs is possible as long as this phase of Soviet activity remains obscure. Soviet institutions abroad seem peculiar and enigmatic unless their relation to intelligence is understood. Some of the most startling turns in Soviet foreign policy and war strategy were in part at least the result of developments in the intelligence field—for example, the Soviet-Japanese pact of 1941, the Stalingrad victory, the attitude toward the atom-bombing of Hiroshima, and the present-day controversies within the United Nations over atomic weapons. A correct interpretation of current developments in Western Europe and the Far East is impossible as long as the nature and extent of Soviet secret intelligence operations, as important today as they have been in the past, remain unknown.

Never in history has there been a government which has placed greater faith in and greater emphasis on political *razvedka* (reconnaissance), and never has there existed such an insatiable and formidable quest for information from other countries. The phenomenon is rooted in the Soviet belief in the imminence, despite breathing spells of peaceful “co-existence,” of great international conflicts; it is also rooted in a deep-seated and realistic, though concealed, sense of inferiority in more than one sphere, a sense of inferiority that exists despite boasts and claims of great achievements. The Soviet leadership looks on the West with both hatred and awe, repulsion and admiration, an almost mystical sense of its power and an exaggerated image of its evils. Since the antagonism between “capitalism” and “socialism” is expected to deepen, the present period appears as part of a great world revolution which is at the same time a relentlessly continuing cold or hot war. Hence the ever-increasing importance which the Soviet leadership attaches to intelligence work of every kind and the

dynamism with which it maintains its unparalleled network of agents abroad.

Although it has built the greatest of all intelligence machines, the Soviet Union does not inform its own citizens of its achievements in this field. Indeed, espionage is officially considered an immoral, base activity to which only "fascist" and "semifascist" regimes resort. This attitude is a relic of prerevolutionary times, when Bolshevism itself was a part of the underground and had to defend itself against undercover agents and informants of the old Okhrana, the political police. A Soviet state does not resort to such disgusting methods of obtaining information. "Espionage," says the *Soviet Political Dictionary* (1940), "is one of the basic means used by capitalist nations in their fight among themselves, and in particular in their fight against the USSR. Foreign intelligence agencies began to send their spies into Soviet Russia immediately after its emergence. Foreign espionage in our country is closely tied up with diversionist and wrecking activities and is aimed at the undermining of Soviet military and industrial might." The Russian public is ignorant of the Soviet espionage affairs that have shaken the West in the last decade. Practically nothing has appeared in the Russian press about Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers or Igor Gouzenko; about Klaus Fuchs, the atomic scientist-spies in this country and in Great Britain, Richard Sorge and his ring in Japan, Colonel Redin, or Judith Coplon and Valentin Gubitshev; or about any other of the defendants in the sensational trials of the last few years.

When once in a while the word "espionage" is used in the Soviet press it is only in a defamatory piece about the attitude of the West toward Russia and the "people's democracies." In these instances the word is enlarged to cover any type of study of Russia by Westerners, including open and legitimate university courses and lectures. An American professor or lecturer (unless he is pro-Communist) is an "intelligence agent" if he engages in research on or discusses the Soviet Union.

When I started work on this book, its subject was to be the Soviet secret police at home and abroad. I felt that no one, including myself, had enough knowledge of this important hidden sector of Soviet life and government. While books describing the Soviet theater, law, economy, foreign policy, and other aspects of

Soviet Russia appear each year, almost nothing of a substantial nature has been published which describes and explains the workings of the huge Soviet secret agencies whose influence, reaching deep into every political sphere, has assumed historical significance.

The reason this particular area in Soviet affairs has been neglected, it appeared obvious to me, was lack of reliable information. A few memoirs written by former agents of the GPU, NKVD, and the Army's intelligence; a few magazine articles of a somewhat sensational type; a few books of a fictional character—this was about all that was available in either our libraries or those of Europe. No serious work with any claim to objectivity and accuracy could be based on the available material—or so it seemed.

After a year of work I arrived at the conclusion that there was so much information available in this field that it would require at least two volumes if the treatment were not to be superficial. In this first volume I have had to limit myself to espionage proper, meaning the gathering of secret information on foreign affairs by illicit means. Espionage directed against Russian anti-Communist movements abroad, against former Communist leaders, or against "deviators" or defectors had of necessity to be omitted—for example, the assassinations of Leon Trotsky and Ignace Reiss; the kidnapping of Generals Kutepov and Miller and Soviet defectors in Germany; the shadowing of Victor Kravchenko in this country and of Soviet officers in Europe; the recruiting of spies among Russian émigrés and immigrants; etc. A companion volume will be devoted to this phase of the activities of the Soviet police abroad.

This book deals first, and in chronological sequence, with the main prewar and wartime objectives of Soviet espionage—France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland. Next it takes up the postwar era, which was marked first by the emergence of the United States as the main target, second by the accession of the Soviet satellites as members of the Soviet reconnaissance bloc, and third by the re-emergence of Central Europe as an objective of spy operations. I have had to limit myself in this book to the most important areas of spy operations, omitting certain countries, important though they are, because it is far beyond the capacity of one man to explore the global dimensions of Soviet intelligence in its entirety. As far as the United States is concerned, the story is told

in some detail although some developments which are well known and still fresh in memory have had to be presented in abbreviated form.

The aim of the book is accurate description rather than the dramatic presentation of a "spy story." The work is based on a mass of evidence consisting of published and unpublished material and verified written or oral reports and statements. Reports of doubtful veracity have either been eliminated or, if considered significant, mentioned with some comment as to their veracity. From the multitude of espionage affairs of the last few decades I have included in this book only those which illustrate the distinguishing characteristics of the Soviet intelligence system and which may help us to understand its changing patterns.

Looking for truthful accounts, I have not discriminated, of course, among witnesses: persons from the extreme right and the extreme left, democratic leaders and governmental agencies of democratic countries have contributed. I had substantial assistance, in particular, from former leaders of the Comintern and the Communist parties of Europe and America, and I want to thank especially Jules Humbert-Droz, now in Switzerland, Jay Lovestone in the United States, Herbert Wehner in Germany, and a few others who prefer to remain unnamed. Outstanding former leaders of Soviet intelligence and Soviet agents abroad supplied important information—Alexander Foote, Igor Gouzenko, Alexander Orlov, Otto Pünter; others appear here under pseudonyms. The *Sûreté Nationale* and *Préfecture de Police* in Paris, the Ministry of Justice in Berne, the prefects of Geneva and Lausanne, and the German *Amt für Verfassungsschutz* assisted me with facts and figures; the United States Court of Appeals in West Germany, which has accumulated a mass of reports pertaining to my subject, permitted me to see a part of them and to use them for this book. In Germany former officers of the *Abwehr* and public prosecutors of the Nazi era as well as the new justice officers were among my witnesses; extensive *Gestapo* reports, when corroborated by other sources, helped me to understand Soviet espionage activity in Germany during the war. To all persons and institutions that have assisted me in this work with information, reports, and advice I express my deep thanks. I am greatly indebted also to the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of Chicago, especially to the late William Regnery who made this extensive work possible.

The sources of information are cited throughout the book; in cases in which the document or the author has had to remain anonymous, the source is indicated as a "D paper." Anyone who can prove his honest intentions and legitimate interest may have access to the latter. Fifteen years after publication of this book the "D papers" will be deposited with the New York Public Library.

Thus the history of important developments in the field of Soviet espionage has been checked and rechecked; more often than not it has been possible to verify even minor details. With all the caution and reserve appropriate to such a work, I believe that I have told the story of Soviet intelligence operations abroad as objectively and as accurately as is humanly possible under prevailing circumstances.

DAVID J. DALLIN

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CHAPTER 1

Origins of Soviet Espionage

1. THE OLD AND THE NEW

ALTHOUGH the intelligence network created by Russia just before and during the first World War was not greatly inferior to that of her Western neighbors and wartime enemies, the Soviet regime had to start from scratch to build up a new system. For reasons that lay in the realm of revolutionary emotions rather than practical requirements, the "old state machine" was to be destroyed to its foundations; only reluctantly and by way of exception were certain elements of the old agencies to be "made use of." The police and the espionage services were not among the institutions to be accorded lenient treatment.

Techniques, methods, and personnel of the new Soviet secret intelligence services were taken over from the underground experience and apparatus of the Russian revolutionary parties rather than from the old *razvedka*, the intelligence agency. Two generations of pre-1917 revolutionists had developed underground techniques to an unprecedented degree. "Conspiracy," which in its Russian meaning refers to the totality of rules of clandestine political activity, was habit and hobby to these revolutionists. The art of forging passports had been brought to the point of perfection; ciphers, though sometimes primitive, invisible ink, and telegraphic codes were abundantly employed; skill in smuggling literature and arms into Russia using "double bottoms" was well developed. Many of the terms now in use in the Soviet intelligence system originated in the prerevolutionary underground: *yavka*, a house or apartment where secret agents come to report; *dubok*, literally a little oak—a hiding place for messages; "illegal," a person carrying false papers; "hospital," prison; "illness," arrest; and so on. The leading personnel of the intelligence agencies abroad were recruited from

among the ranks of old Communists. It was a full decade before young officers graduated from the new intelligence schools could be dispatched abroad.

The first Soviet agency to carry on systematic intelligence operations abroad was the Cheka-GPU, under Felix Dzerzhinski; its Foreign Department (INO) was organized in 1921. About the same time other agencies entered the field. The People's Commissariat for War, under Leon Trotsky, set up its own espionage agency. The Foreign Office, under Chicherin and Litvinov, gathered secret political information from its official and semi-official representatives abroad. The Communist International, under Zinoviev, was a fourth organization with a dense network of channels to foreign countries and a center for the receipt of abundant political information from all important capitals. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, under Leonid Krassin, gathered information, chiefly on foreign economic matters, through its trade legations. The Central Committee of the Communist party in Moscow assigned agents to report from abroad on Soviet colonies and developments in the Communist world. In their feverish search for information, all these agencies maintained their own secret organizations and engaged in espionage.

From the very beginning and down to this day two of these agencies have performed the bulk of all espionage work: the Foreign Department of the secret police, and the main intelligence department of the General Staff of the Army.

The first of these—the Cheka and its numerous successors (all of which I shall refer to here as GB) *—was established to perform

* The Cheka (Chrezvychainaya Komissiya po Borbe s Kontr-revolutsiei i Sabotazhem—Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counterrevolution and Sabotage), organized on December 20, 1917, was soon renamed Vecheka (Vserossiskaya Chrezvychainaya Komissiya—All-Russian Extraordinary Commission). On February 6, 1922, it was reorganized into the GPU (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie—State Political Administration), and in 1924 OGPU (Obiedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Upravlenie—United State Political Administration).

The OGPU was dissolved in July 1934, but its functions were taken over by the GUGBEZ (Glavnoye Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti—Chief Administration for State Security), a department of the NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). On February 3, 1941, GUGBEZ was separated from the NKVD and elevated to the rank of a people's commissariat, the NKGB (Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti—People's Commissariat for State Security). On July 20 of that year, however, the separation was rescinded and the NKGB once again became part of the NKVD. In

the task of "fighting counterrevolution," including counterespionage; espionage abroad was not among its official assignments. Theoretically, the Cheka and its successors, although aggressive and terroristic, have been agencies of a defensive character as far as their official tasks have been concerned. They have been comparable theoretically to security agencies in other countries on the level of the FBI in the United States, whose targets are the political underground and espionage agents of foreign powers within their own country, and which do not number offensive operations and active espionage abroad among their tasks. When Lenin first proposed the creation of the Cheka, he advocated only "extraordinary measures against counterrevolution." Stalin likewise emphasized that "the GPU is the defense of the revolution against counterrevolution,"¹ sabotage, kulak mutinies, white guardist conspiracies. The pretense that the GB had only defensive tasks was maintained long after the new functions were added to the original ones.

The Foreign Department of the Cheka, the INO, was established in 1921 under the veteran Bolshevik Meyer Trilisser. By that time, remnants of the White armies, fleeing from Russia, had reached the Balkans, and a mass of civilian émigrés, politically very active, had congregated in Paris and Berlin. In an effort to disorganize the political emigration, and in particular to destroy the still existing anti-Soviet Russian military force, the Cheka dispatched agents, organized agencies, and recruited scores of spies and provocateurs from among the émigrés. This activity, although conducted on foreign soil, was still a basically defensive operation—the "fight against counterrevolution."

April 1943 GUGBEZ again became NKGB. In March 1946, when all Soviet commissariats were renamed ministries, the NKGB became MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti—Ministry of State Security) and the NKVD became MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). On March 15, 1953, with the rise of Lavrenti Beria after Stalin's death, the two ministries were reunited, MGB becoming for the third time part of MVD. On March 13, 1954, two months after Beria's execution, State Security was once more separated and renamed KGB (Komitat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti—Committee for State Security), under Gen. Ivan Serov.

This involved sequence of naming and renaming is not without political significance, but the multitude of names applying to one and the same agency would confuse the reader. Throughout this book, therefore, the agency will be referred to as GB (Gosudarstvennaya Bezopasnost—State Security), except when use of the precise title is considered necessary.

Soon, however, the INO and its agents abroad began to transgress the demarcation line between defensive and offensive intelligence and turn their attention increasingly to political information on foreign powers and behind-the-scenes developments. With things still in flux in the Soviet, agents performed all kinds of "conspirative" functions. The new "residents" of the GB (agents assigned to reside in a foreign country) served the Comintern in its underground traffic. They were in close contact with the new Communist underground in various countries; they transported arms; they helped to organize T-groups (terror) and D-groups (diversion) to work in the cause of the "imminent" revolution. Not until the middle 'twenties did bureaucratic order, efficiency, and precise assignments replace the revolutionary chaos of those initial years. Espionage of all kinds was also among the GB's preoccupations: espionage against Russian émigrés, general surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad, and espionage proper against foreign countries. Soviet embassies and diplomatic missions served the GB for underground purposes.

From the early and middle 'twenties on, the GB has regularly carried on extensive espionage activities against foreign governments and their agents. In the following three decades there were numerous reorganizations, transfers of departments and sections from one agency to another, and partitions, fusions, elevations, and demotions. But never has the GB stopped its offensive intelligence operations against the non-Soviet world.

The second Soviet agency with intelligence functions was a department of the General Staff of the Red Army, the "Fourth Department," later named GRU (for Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie—sometimes referred to as Razvedupr—meaning Chief Intelligence Administration). Created by Trotsky, it was frankly and avowedly *the* espionage agency of the Soviet government. Although never discussed in the Soviet press and avoiding publicity, it did not conceal its purposes and functions. When contacts with Soviet intelligence became imperative for foreigners, as, for instance, during the second World War, the GRU and its chiefs acted officially as the opposite numbers of the American and British intelligence agencies. The first chief of GRU and its head for fifteen years was Jan Berzin, an outstanding personality and adept organizer, who started as Comrade Berzin, became Commander

Berzin, then General Berzin, and ended as defendant Berzin, who was sentenced to death and executed.*

In its organization and activities the GRU is not unlike military intelligence departments of other countries. Its main organs abroad are the military, air, and naval attachés and their staffs. Among its divisions in Moscow are "direction of agents" (abroad), selection and evaluation of information, radio communication with agents, coding and decoding, "diversion," false documents, and others. A number of persons whose names are well known in this country have belonged to the GRU: Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs, Richard Sorge, Bruno Pontecorvo, and their Russian contacts—Anatoli Yakovlev, Valentin Gubichev, and a long list of others.

There has never been a distinct dividing line between GB functions and those of the military GRU. As a matter of course, armies and navies, mobilization plans, and new weapons come within the province of military intelligence; pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet trends, agreements, and secret treaties come within the province of the GB. Actually, however, the fields of activity have always overlapped and jurisdiction has not always been precisely defined—a circumstance not entirely unintentional.

The GB has always had the right to "screen" all other Soviet agencies, recruit informers from among their personnel, and plant its own men in them whenever it deemed this necessary. When it suspects disloyalty it makes arrests and metes out punishment. The Army † has been no exception, and its units are permeated with GB informers. There is not a single battalion or officers' club which does not have its "inside" GB informers. This is true also

* Like the GB, the GRU has changed names in the course of three decades, although these alterations had less political significance. It was successively called Registration Department of the Red Army, Second Bureau of the General Staff, Fourth Department, Seventh Department, and finally Chief Intelligence Administration of the General Staff. Naval Intelligence, as a separate agency, emerged in 1940.

Among the four divisions of the GRU the most important, and most pertinent here, is number one—the "operational," which controls espionage abroad. The First Division is subdivided into eight sections: 1) Western Europe; 2) the Middle East; 3) America, the Far East, India; 4) procurement of intelligence material of a technical nature, in particular new weapons; 5) acts of terror abroad, sabotage, kidnapping, etc.; 6) false documents and new techniques of espionage; 7) intelligence operations of separate Soviet military districts situated at the frontier; 8) codes and ciphers.²

† The term Army as used here embraces other military forces as well; in Russia the land forces greatly outnumber naval and air units.

of the GRU, the Army's intelligence organization abroad. The GB abroad keeps close watch on the personnel of military intelligence—military attachés, their aides and agents, their correspondence, and their social contacts, as well as on all underground agents of the Army. The Army does not have equal rights with the GB; it cannot penetrate GB units or watch them, nor can it arrest, try, or punish. It has always been subjected to terrorism without having the right to take countermeasures. Clandestine military agents daily risking their lives in underground work abroad live under the relentless, harassing vigil of the rival agency.

Rivalry and antagonism between the Army and GB are almost as old as the Soviet state itself. The GB is the agency of coercion and terror, feared by all and hated by most; the Army is the institution for the defense of the country. The activity of the GB is directed at the Russian foe of the dictatorship, that of the Army against the foreign enemy. The Army, based on universal conscription, embraces all persons of military age; the personnel of the GB are selected in accordance with special requirements. The Army is the mass; the better paid GB is the privileged group. Even under its Communist leadership, the Army embraces the people; the GB is the stern whip held over the people. The Army, which is recruited mainly from the Russian peasantry, has a better understanding of mass needs than any other agency, has always resented the police apparatus, and has never felt enthusiasm for the unpopular collective farms.

For a long time Stalin maintained a kind of balance between the Army and the GB; the rivalry between them, which extended also to their respective intelligence organizations abroad, was in line with his general tendency to incite mutual suspicion and rivalry among his men and his agencies. It was impossible for Stalin to give way to the Army, for a victory of the military in their conflict with the GB would imply a relaxation of strict party rule and endanger his own position. But it was also impossible to throw the Army to the wolves of the GB, since the Soviet military force would be destroyed in the process. Up to the mid-30's GB and military intelligence "co-existed," and their external organs, overlapping and in fierce rivalry with one another, nevertheless were zealous and loyal. But Stalin upset the balance in 1936-38. The Tukhachevsky affair, the fabricated "plots" with their dreadful details, the thousands of military men arrested and deported

marked the victory and vengeance of the GB over its hereditary foe, the Army. In the purges that followed the Tukhachevsky affair a large number of the best military intelligence men perished, so that by 1938–39 a feeble and helpless GRU faced the victorious GB.

During the war years the Army was restored to an honorable place, and rivalry among the intelligence agencies abroad had to cease. Cooperation between GB, GRU, and agents of the Comintern was prescribed and carried out. When the war ended, a combined Committee of Information (KI—Komitet Informatsii) emerged, in which the GB and GRU were required to cooperate, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The experiment was not considered successful, however. In 1948 the GRU was restored to its old place, and in 1951 the KI again became part of the GB.⁸

Since 1945 the GB has in general retained ascendancy over the Army; the outward manifestation of this was the elevation of GB chief Lavrenti Beria to the military rank of marshal and the adoption of more impressive-sounding military titles for GB personnel. One aspect of the growing role of the GB in the decade following the war was the increase in activity of GB espionage abroad, which exceeded that of the intelligence system of the Soviet Army.

The peculiar character of Soviet intelligence is seen in the fact that at the very top it has always been centered in the Central Committee of the Communist party. From the GRU of the Army's General Staff, from the GB's Foreign Department, from the Ministry of Trade, from its own agents in foreign countries, the huge Central Information Department of the Politburo-Praesidium has been obtaining a wealth of information which since the mid-20's has without doubt exceeded that obtained by any other government, and which has continued to increase. During Stalin's reign this Central Information Department was part of Stalin's own chancellery; his aide, Georgi Malenkov, was its guiding force for many years.

Soviet intelligence organs abroad consist of the officially recognized Soviet embassies and legations and a large number of clandestine groups and individual agents.

A Soviet embassy, a fountain of information, is a four-in-one,

sometimes a five-in-one, organization. Both Soviet intelligence agencies have their representatives within it: the military GRU, whose agent is the military attaché, and the GB, whose representative is one of the embassy's "secretaries," counselors, or attachés. Usually other Soviet agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and, of course, the Communist party, have their representatives among the personnel of an embassy; they, too, often perform clandestine tasks. Although the agents are theoretically members of the embassy and often have diplomatic immunity, they are subordinate to their Moscow superiors and are actually independent of the ambassador; each has his own staff, code, budget, and secrets which he is forbidden to share with any of his colleagues. Official titles, assumed for the benefit of the counter-espionage agencies, are often misleading: humble "doormen" are sometimes important representatives of the party's Central Committee; "secretaries" serve as go-betweens in contacts with less exposed agents; diplomatic couriers are, without exception, members of the GB. The military attaché and the intelligence officers of the embassies and consulates carry on their activity through a network of secret agents of local origin. A code of behavior has been elaborated to guide the diplomatic and consular personnel in their contacts with their agents; the rules cover behavior on meetings in theaters, in cars, at dinners. A small number of agents have direct contact with Soviet officials, but the rank and file of espionage agents work through liaison persons, the "cutouts" or "go-betweens."

In addition to the official Soviet representation, and sometimes unknown to the military attaché and other members of the embassy, a number of Soviet agents, working in a foreign country, with their own networks and resources, subagents, funds, and channels out of Moscow, constitute an important part of the Soviet apparatus. Agents of this class perform manifold tasks. Their reports enable Moscow to verify information coming from other sources; in case of war or the breaking off of diplomatic relations, they continue their work and serve as nuclei of an underground network; in addition, they are better hidden from the police, since shadowing of diplomatic personnel by the police, as practiced in many countries, would not lead to these individuals and groups. Before the Soviet government had received recognition and before the first Soviet trade agencies began operation, this kind of in-

telligence was the only kind possible. During the war of 1941-45 it reached large proportions, especially in Switzerland and Germany.

There is a widespread notion that in every country or group of countries a single "chief of Soviet espionage" conducts operations. This is the case only in extraordinary circumstances, such as time of war, when communication with Moscow is irregular. Normally Moscow insists on direct subordination with no autonomous "chiefs" in between. The Soviet system of intelligence, based on centralization and absolute control by Moscow, does not allow any autonomy to its agents.

As we have seen, many of the rules of conspiracy and techniques of espionage were taken over from prerevolutionary practice and refined and improved. New techniques and scientific inventions, however, have been adopted to serve intelligence purposes.

Nicknames have remained one of the simple safeguards employed by the underground "apparat." All nicknames and numbers are assigned by the "Center" in Moscow—either the military espionage center or the GB. This precaution is necessary to avoid duplication. Agents and subagents know one another only by their nicknames; for obvious reasons it is strictly forbidden to inquire as to real names.

Among the new terms that have come into use are "music box" for a radio transmitter, "roof" as a cover for illegal activities; a passport is a "shoe," passport fabricators are "cobblers." The local Communist party is sometimes the "corporation"; the other Soviet intelligence agency in the same country (or in the same embassy) is "the neighbor." Nicknames of countries vary: Germany may be "Jersey," France "Florence," Britain "Brazil." The head of Army intelligence in Moscow is the "director," and his first assistant is the "commander."

It is a rule that agents must not visit one another in their homes or make telephone calls from home except to harmless persons and on innocent matters. No letter may be sent directly to the members of a group; all correspondence must go to cover addresses, usually provided by sympathizers who are not active Communists. Written messages must be destroyed as soon as possible (except, of course, in such places as the embassy offices). Accumulating documents and keeping diaries constitute criminal acts.

A meeting between two Soviet agents usually occurs in a crowded place such as a museum or a post office. If the meeting place is a street corner, it is in a well-populated section and at a time of day when one would not be noticed by passers-by. Punctuality is important; an agent must not wait at the appointed place too long; if the other party is late, he leaves after a short wait and returns later. The "parol," or password used by two secret agents, is a pair or two pairs of sentences: "How is Elsie?" "She is fine." Or "What is the shortest way to the Strand?" "Come along, I'm going that way." For female agents costume is often prescribed in addition, as "black hat" or "brown handbag."

Correspondence about intelligence matters must be conducted in code. Every section of the service abroad, every legal and illegal group, has its own code. Within the framework of a single embassy four or five codes are sometimes in use. Care is used in their selection; since the counterintelligence agencies of all countries try to break the Soviet secret codes, they must be discarded at regular intervals and replaced by new ones.

Passport fabrication is another important element of *conspiratsia*. A large number of skillful "cobblers" have been educated in Moscow for this particular job, and even better ones, as we shall see, have been graduated from the German underground.

Among the new devices used by Soviet intelligence the most important are microphotography and short-wave radio.

Photography replaced the invisible ink which was in use earlier. In photographic workshops secret documents and personal reports are reduced to microfilm, which is easily carried to Moscow. Messages in code sent via the general cable facilities are another favorite means of communication. Official Soviet missions in foreign countries have the privilege of sending and receiving messages in code even if use of codes is generally prohibited in these countries. The central figure of secret liaison is the courier. The courier is better than the mails as a means of communication. He is familiar with all frontier regulations, contacts, and yavkas; if he should be caught, neither he nor the police will be able to decipher any messages found in his possession. Finally, a diplomatic pouch in the hands of a Soviet courier is the safest way of transporting the most secret messages to and from Moscow.

Radio came into use at the end of the 1920's both for legitimate

communication between the Soviet government and its representatives and for exchange of messages between secret agents abroad and their headquarters. Compared to the other devices, however, the use of short-wave radio for underground purposes involved great danger to the agents. Since the improvement by counterintelligence of the technique of so-called radiogoniometry, which can lead the police to the secret transmitter, a secret agent who knows a safe and simple way of reaching an embassy, or can send a courier, prefers these means to radio. These considerations apply, however, only in peacetime; everything changes in time of war, when the superiority of radio for secret intelligence purposes becomes obvious. During the first World War, when short-wave radio was not yet in use by intelligence agents, a Russian spy in Germany had to send his messages to some point in a neutral country (Denmark or Sweden) for transmission to a Russian legation, whence they would travel to St. Petersburg; but letters going abroad from Germany were censored, and travelers were screened and sometimes searched. A message from the German to the Russian capital sometimes took so long to reach its destination that strategic information might lose its significance before it reached the Russian General Staff.

The situation during World War II was very different. Within minutes a detailed report about an imminent German attack or a crucial development in the German government would flash from Berlin or Geneva to Moscow, across fighting fronts and burning cities. The facilities available to spies in previous times were poor indeed in comparison with modern short-wave facilities; the spy who used to cross front lines disguised as a shepherd, carrying a scribbled message in his cap-lining, has been replaced by the radio man who in a city far from the fighting fronts stays up nights sending and receiving and coding and decoding messages for the espionage apparatus. The tasks of counterspies have changed too. Counterespionage must now monitor short-wave communications in the air, record mysterious ciphered messages, try to break codes, and locate the sending stations with the help of modern instruments. In the tense cold and hot war between spies and counterspies, new methods and devices are continually being invented: the spy's radio changes its location regularly so that the police arrive too late; the radio is installed on a moving boat; it is set up in a nearby neutral country; and so on.

The greatest danger in the use of short-wave radio for espionage is that when the police have caught a spy they may use him as an agent against his own country. In the chapters dealing with Soviet intelligence in the second World War we shall hear of a number of Soviet spies arrested in Germany or in German satellite countries who were persuaded by threats of prompt execution to mislead the General Staff in Moscow by sending reports dictated by the German Abwehr.

During the 1920's the Soviet Union lagged far behind many Western countries in the field of radio and in particular in the use of radio for intelligence purposes. There was more than one reason for this. Despite the fact that a Russian physicist was among the first inventors of radio, technical development in the field was slow in Russia in comparison with the rapid progress in the United States and Britain; even Germany, whose progress was slower than that of the two Anglo-Saxon countries, was far ahead of Russia. The aftermath in Russia of the first World War and the rupture of scientific and technological ties with the West slowed the pace of progress.

The state of affairs is illustrated by a letter of Lenin to Stalin written on May 19, 1922. On that date a short news item from England appeared in *Izvestia*, entitled "Improvement in the Field of Radio-Telegraphy." It read: "London, May 4. An English engineer has discovered a device to keep telegrams transmitted by radio secret. Experiments conducted between London and Birmingham have yielded excellent results: the telegrams reached their destination in good order without having been intercepted."

The possibilities of use of the new invention in war electrified Lenin: "Today's *Izvestia*," he wrote Stalin, "reports on a British invention in the field of radiotelegraphy; the invention helps to transmit radiotelegrams secretly. If we could buy this invention, communication by radiotelephone and radiotelegraph would achieve greater importance in the military field." *

* This was part of a letter dealing with radio in general. Lenin considered the radio valuable as a potential means of propaganda; in particular it would make possible direct communication with millions of people all over the country. "Because of the absolute unfitness, even perniciousness, of the majority of the admittedly bourgeois professors of social science, we must make an effort to have our few Communist professors capable of lecturing on the social sciences deliver their lectures

Radio was first used in the Soviet Union by the naval and air forces, and in training for military reconnaissance since the 'twenties. About the same time the two other intelligence agencies—GB and the Comintern—were turning their attention to it. Short-wave radio was introduced in 1927. Among other radio schools in Russia there was a special school, affiliated with the Comintern and part of the large Political School established on the grounds of a former landed estate near Moscow, which trained people to serve the intelligence agencies. Six months' training in a special radio school was considered sufficient to produce a radio technician. The GB set up its own radio stations in Rumania, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, Switzerland, France, Holland, and Germany, in addition to a number in the Near East. GB messages from the Balkans or the Near East to Moscow sometimes had to travel a complicated route: for instance, via Vienna, Leipzig, and to Abo in Finland.*

Military attachés were in a position to use the radio facilities of the embassies; frequently they had their own sets of transmitters and receivers, as well as technicians. Despite the principle of separation of powers, under which all Soviet representatives abroad had worked since the end of the 'twenties, the official Soviet radio operated by the military attaché often carried espionage reports from the underground. Such messages were delivered to the attaché in code. (It has been characteristic of the Soviet intelligence system that its official representative was often left in the dark as to the contents of messages he was himself dispatching.)

The second World War brought a boom in all radio departments of Soviet intelligence agencies. After the crisis in October 1941, when the German army approached Moscow and the military intelligence center had to move to Kuibyshev, the radio office grew rapidly in size and importance. Radio communication with Soviet

in hundreds of places all over the Federation. Therefore I think we should not spare expense for the installation of radiotelegraph communications and the production of efficient loudspeakers. I suggest an extraordinary appropriation, up to 100,000 gold rubles, out of our gold reserves." (Lenin, *Works*, 33, 323-4.)

* This method of involved radio communication was widely used. Messages for Moscow from Cairo were sent to the intelligence agent in Rome, thence to Berlin, to Denmark, to Finland, and finally to Moscow. This circuitousness, however, involved a considerable loss of time; to avoid it, important messages—more than half of all those sent—were made incomprehensible to outsiders and dispatched through the general telegraph facilities. (D papers, Dd 1-6 and b 327-34.)

spies abroad was a matter given particular attention. The ORD (*Osobyi Radio Divizi6n*—Special Radio Section) was organized to operate a number of short-wave transmitters near Moscow, in particular one located on the Vorobiovy Gory (later renamed Leninskye Gory), where the ORD office was camouflaged as a gold research institute.

Transmitting sets were usually operated by military radio technicians who knew all the tricks of short-wave communication; some of them were later sent abroad as agents. The majority of all Soviet agents over the world were communicating with this huge and expanding headquarters. The staff of the *Radio Divizi6n* included coding specialists; short-wave technicians, who were responsible for assigning wave lengths and schedules to "correspondents" abroad; persons assigned to arrange call signals, which changed every day. In another building in Moscow, not far from the Byelorussian railway station, a workshop was maintained where miniature radio sets for secret agents were developed and tested.⁴

2. THE DUAL ESSENCE OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

The network of Soviet intelligence agencies abroad constitutes an arm of foreign and military policy, and as such it is comparable to analogous agencies of other powers. It is, however, also part and parcel of the international Communist movement, and in this it is a unique intelligence system.

As a conventional weapon of a national government, Soviet espionage has always been directed against countries and regimes which appeared most dangerous to the Soviet state. Although in principle every nation is a target of Soviet intelligence, and although Soviet agents are active in almost every country, only a few countries have been in the front row. The spotlight of Soviet intelligence moves from one to another as the general situation changes. Poland and Rumania, neighbors and potential enemies since 1918, were important early targets. The Baltic countries, too, served as an observation point during the early Soviet period. In Iran and Turkey, the Soviet's neighbors to the south, where Russian behind-the-scenes activity encountered strong British counteraction, Soviet activity was extensive. In the East, Harbin and Shanghai were stations of espionage in this initial era. Somewhat later Japan began to come into the limelight.

In the forefront, however, were Paris and Berlin. While Germany served as the main observation post in the West, the big target, between 1920 and 1933, was France. At that time the strongest power on the continent, France was the actual leader of the 1919-20 Allied intervention. She supported Poland's war against Lenin's Russia and financed the rearmament of Russia's neighbors. It was obvious that if a new conflict should break out France would maintain her role as the leader of the anti-Soviet campaign.

The spotlight was turned away from France in the mid-'thirties, after the Soviet-French alliance had been concluded and Germany and Japan had emerged as the powerful enemies. During the war years Germany was of course a primary objective of Soviet intelligence, but at the same time another nation—the United States—was moving more and more into focus. Since 1943-44 the latter has been a prime target, and the concentration of industrial, atomic, and political espionage against it has been unprecedentedly intensive. As the United States assumed the position of a leading anti-Soviet power, no capital of the world rivaled Washington as a target of Soviet intelligence operations, although Western Germany and Japan, re-emerging under American protection after the war, again became important objectives of Soviet espionage. For more than a decade now the United States has been a focus of Soviet reconnaissance, and apparently it will continue to be for a considerable time.

As a component part of the Communist movement, Soviet intelligence is built on the belief in Russia's unique and supreme role in the struggle to abolish capitalism and build a new and better social system throughout the world. Civil war is generally the best soil for espionage, and the international Communist movement, which is a latent or open civil war on an international scale, constitutes the most fertile field for underground intelligence operations in favor of the Soviet Union.

Two firm principles have been part of the theory and practice of the Communist International since its earliest days: the belief in the urgent need for an underground ("illegal") Communist organization in every country, and in the duty of every Communist party to support Soviet Russia by all possible means. These two principles were not necessarily interlocked, at least not in the days of Lenin and Trotsky. It became Stalin's task to combine them

into a new system, which was to serve as the ideological basis of a far-flung network of Soviet espionage. The duty to perform intelligence services for the Soviet Union was, of course, implied.

The first statute of the Communist International drafted by Lenin in 1919 (the so-called "twenty-one conditions for admittance") contained the provision that "Communists *everywhere* [*italics are mine*] are obliged to create a parallel underground apparatus which should help the party to fulfill its duty toward the revolution"; the Communist underground network was to be built up not only in police states and autocracies but in the democratic nations too. Neither Lenin, however, nor the Congress of the International which adopted this principle had in view outright espionage work for Russia; the underground party was necessary, they believed, to the cause of the imminent world-wide social revolution—to store arms, transfer funds, maintain ties with the armed forces, keep printing presses in readiness for an emergency, fabricate false passports, and so forth. Since some Communist parties did not live up to the expectations with regard to "underground" organization, the Comintern later conducted a drive for the so-called "bolshevization of Communist parties," that is, the inculcation of true revolutionary spirit.

At the start, Soviet Russia was only *primus inter pares* in the ranks of Communist parties; her interests were not considered paramount and she did not exact sacrifices on the part of the other component parties of the International. Although aid to Russia, including the furnishing of confidential information, was a matter of course, systematic espionage for Moscow was not considered a regular duty or preoccupation of Communism abroad, and no one wanted the new Communist underground to become a tool of Soviet intelligence operations. In particular, Leon Trotsky, people's commissar for war, despite his vital interest in the new intelligence department under Jan Berzin, and greater familiarity than others with the internal life of Communist movements abroad, was averse to combining Communist work with espionage, as we shall see in the next chapter. Trotsky knew that a Communist party, although it accepted "directives" and funds from the Comintern, must maintain the principle of independent policy based entirely on the views and interests of its members, and that nothing could be as detrimental to such independence as revelations of espionage by a

Communist party in its own country in favor of a foreign government.

A main tenet of Stalinism—if there has been a distinct Communist trend that can be called Stalinism—was priority of Soviet Russian interests and subordination of personalities and parties to the needs of the Soviet Union. After his assumption of full power in 1926–27, Stalin stressed more than once the “serious obligation of the proletarians of other countries toward the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR,” and in particular their duty to propagandize for “direct defection of the armies of imperialism” to the side of the Soviet Union,¹ implying, of course, intelligence services to Russia.

Strengthening the USSR, increasing its power, ensuring its victory in all spheres and in every sector of the struggle, coincides fully and inseparably with the interests of the toilers of the whole world in their struggle against the exploiters. . . . Assistance to the USSR, its defense, and cooperation in bringing about its victory over all its enemies must therefore determine the actions of every revolutionary organization of the proletariat, of every genuine revolutionary.²

Trotsky's reluctance to involve the Communist underground in espionage operations was incomprehensible to Stalin, who considered it a sacred duty of every Communist party to make all possible effort to supply Moscow with secret information. The gathering of secret information, often regarded as a base occupation, must be seen as noble and lofty if it serves the needs of the Soviet land. It was Stalin who brought about the marriage of the Communist underground of the West with espionage for Russia.

If there remained any doubts in the minds of the Soviet leaders as to the wisdom of the marriage, they concerned only practical matters. Since it was inevitable that from time to time cases of Soviet espionage would come to light in almost every country, precautions had to be taken to minimize the involvement of the Communist party in the inevitable scandals. The risk of such involvement was of course no reason for abstaining from espionage activity, and Stalin never agreed to relieving the satellite parties of their espionage tasks. The utmost concession that he made was

a partial formal separation of the Soviet intelligence apparatus from the Communist party: contacts between party and apparatus were to be kept at a minimum, and it should never be possible to prove collaboration. The Communist party must be protected; it must, in fact, remain ignorant of the apparatus's activity.

The compromise scheme for collaboration between party and apparatus provided for the assignment to "special services" of one prominent and reliable member—usually one of the leaders—from the politburo of every large Communist party. This person was designated after negotiations with Moscow. One of his chief duties was to cooperate with Soviet intelligence agents; he would also assist in other functions, mainly the selection of new intelligence personnel for the Soviet agencies. He was not, however, to keep his colleagues in the Politburo informed on this particular aspect of his activities. Thus the rest of the party's leadership would be able to deny knowledge of or ties with Soviet espionage. Party members sometimes hear rumors and have suspicions, but hearsay and suspicion cannot serve as a basis for indictment or prosecution.

The outward and formal separation of Soviet intelligence from the local Communist parties has been consistently maintained since the mid-'twenties, was emphasized in directives from Moscow after the numerous arrests of intelligence agents in Europe in 1927, and was enforced in the United States during the last war.

In this scheme of things a Communist party leader in the West assumed a peculiar and ambiguous position. On the one hand he was the proud "leader of the toiling masses" of his country and had nothing but contempt for the "reptile" members of the government of his nation; on the other, he was active in the obscure underground where he had to comply with the wishes of a foreign intelligence and to help find recruits for its espionage work. The humble position of the Communist leader in relation to Moscow was a part of Stalinism: the leader of a Communist party had to realize and acknowledge his subordination to a higher authority. Lest he develop into a Tito, a Kostov, or a Gomulka, he must constantly give proofs of his loyalty by doing any work demanded of him for the greater glory of the Kremlin.

This was the Communist-leader type as he emerged under Soviet regimentation in the 1930's. In the chapters that follow we shall see the role of Jean Cremet and Jacques Duclos in France and of Hans Kippenberger in Germany as members of the politburos of their

respective parties and agents of the secret intelligence apparatus of the Soviet Union. In Switzerland the efficient Soviet spy group of World War II was completely separate from the Communist party, but Léon Nicole, the Communist leader, supplied the group with radio operators, couriers, and funds, as the Swiss spy trails revealed.* A similar situation prevailed in Canada, where the two Communist leaders Fred Rose and Sam Carr served as recruiting agents for Soviet intelligence.³ In Poland "the Communist party put a number of its members at the disposal of the Soviet apparatus. One member of the Central Committee of the Communist party served as liaison with the Soviet apparatus. At meetings of the Central Committee he reported on the activities of the Soviet agencies insofar as they related to developments in Poland."⁴

Among Communist party leaders of this type Earl Browder, chief of the United States party from 1930 to 1945, occupied a prominent place. Closely connected with the American "residents" of the Soviet secret service, he not only was aware of their spy work in this country but assisted them loyally.† In addition to Browder, Joseph North, editor of the *New Masses*, "was always on the lookout for good Communists who could be used on Russian intelligence work."‡

* See Chapter 5, below.

† He used to give the Soviet espionage agency in the United States "all the help we needed in getting contacts for information gathering in Washington. In return, he wanted to see the data we were collecting down there so that he would be *au courant* with the situation. . . . Earl Browder, surrounded by power-hungry rivals, knew he must keep one jump ahead of them to stay in his precarious position. . . . By having access to inside information on the policy of the United States government—information which he knew was also going to the Soviet Union—he could guess what Moscow's next move would be and swing in the right direction." Elizabeth Bentley, *Out of Bondage* (New York, Devin-Adair, 1951), pp. 185-6.

‡ "The type of American they wanted was a person absolutely impeccable. They wanted a person whose background was so sound from every point of view, morally and every other way, that nobody would ever suspect him of being a spy: the type of person who any day could get a recommendation from his Sunday school teacher or college professor or, if it was a woman, from her Girl Scout leader. Every person they picked up came from the Communist Party via these lookouts. Joe North was one; Grace Granich was one; Intercontinent News was another lookout; the American League Against War and Fascism was another; people like Earl Browder, and so on." Elizabeth Bentley before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, May 6, 1950, p. 1854.

The majority of Soviet intelligence agents have usually been either card-carrying party members or sympathizers, or, in the most important cases, persons who have purposely separated themselves from all Communist organizations. The Russian terms *svoi* and *nash*, meaning "he is one of us," are applied to all these groups and indicate the willingness of the individual to submit to orders and discipline. *Chuzhoi* (alien) is a person serving the Soviet agency for other than ideological or political reasons. Usually the term is applied to those who are spies by profession, avocation, or for gain. As we shall see, Soviet intelligence has employed a number of *chuzhoi*'s in the past, and certainly quite a few are serving Moscow at present.

It would be futile to try to describe a "general type" of Soviet intelligence agent. Among the thousands of agents recruited from many countries over three decades there have been almost as many varieties as are to be found among human beings in general. Compared to the conventional type of spy, a Soviet agent is distinguished by a higher degree of political intelligence and better knowledge of international affairs, and his ideological and emotional ties with a powerful political movement create a sense of self-esteem and moral superiority. With the exception of Soviet spy-bureaucrats who work abroad under cover of diplomatic immunity and never risk more than expulsion from the country in which they are working, Soviet underground agents have more than average audacity and sangfroid, and often tend to adventurousness. Those who survived their period of probation and remained at their jobs have been men and women who were prepared to take chances, lead uneasy lives, endure head-hunts, and suffer penalties for which neither their salaries nor the prestige they were accorded in the files of Moscow was adequate recompense. The continual tension and ever-present danger occasionally culminate in an explosion if an underground agent, disillusioned and disappointed, turns against his government and becomes an enemy as dangerous as he had been devoted before.

It is a principle among all branches of Soviet intelligence that an agent, whether *nash* or *chuzhoi*, must be paid. The approach to each, however, in this respect is quite different.

With regard to the "alien," the only question is how much. Frank about the nature of his interest in spying, the agent makes

his demands, and the buyer of his services tries to drive the best possible bargain. If an arrangement is concluded, the agent works for pay and only so long as he is paid. His salary, or his lump sum payment, varies; if the agent is a government official, his pay is a kind of bribe. The Soviet spy Rudolf von Scheliha, a Nazi diplomat, received thousands of dollars in payment for his services. Rudolf Rössler, the successful Soviet agent in Switzerland, received a monthly salary amounting to 7,000 Swiss francs (about \$2,000).

A nash agent, on the other hand, offers his services or accepts an assignment out of motives which the West sometimes calls "idealistic." At the start of his career in spying he is usually employed and earning a salary, and has no thought of spying for financial gain; the very idea of earning money in this way is sometimes so repellent that no experienced recruiting agent would propose remuneration at this first stage. In Moscow's view, however, such a state of affairs is abnormal and to be tolerated only in exceptional circumstances. An agent who works without pay feels independent and can give up his spying activities whenever he desires; he might reconsider his decision and reveal his activities to the authorities, minimizing his guilt by stressing his "idealistic motives."

A paid agent, however modest his remuneration, is a *serving* person, a subordinate, a dependent individual. He is expected to be humble, obedient, and silent; his decisions and moves must be discussed and approved before he can take any action; receipts bearing his signature can be produced and used to coerce him if he should desert the Soviet service. He is firmly in the hands of his employer.

The technique of inducing the nash agent to accept money has been developed over decades. After the initial stage of service without pay, the new spy is reimbursed for his "expenses" for travel, meals, etc. Why should the agent working without pay not accept these small amounts? Later, a modest sum is offered in "recognition of services." The day may then arrive when a monthly salary is proposed, if the agent is worth it. If he continues his service beyond this point, the nash agent becomes accustomed to receiving a salary. He expects it, and of course he needs it. In the personnel records of Soviet intelligence a pertinent, often cynical, note appears to the effect that the agent in question is

checked "financially secure but takes money," or something similar.*

In cases in which outright payment is impossible—for example, an agent, even after a considerable period, might refuse it—gifts are usual. The advantage of giving costly gifts to agents lies in the fact that reciprocation is impossible and the agent is thus put in the humble position of being a recipient of favors. The rugs which played such a prominent role in the Hiss trial were gifts of this sort. Cash remuneration to such important government employees as Alger Hiss, Henry Julian Wadleigh, Harry Dexter White, and Abraham George Silverman was out of the question. Four valuable rugs were presented to them by Boris Bykov of Soviet intelligence. The philosophy behind the presentation of the gifts was cynically stated by Bykov himself: "Who pays is the boss, and who takes money must also give something."†

In another case it was a Persian lamb coat and an air-conditioning unit, when "Bill," the Soviet intelligence agent, tried to persuade Elizabeth Bentley to accept pay for her services:

* The quoted remark appeared on the personnel card of Sam Carr, the Canadian Communist leader, in the military attaché's files. *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 104.

Earl Browder received gifts regularly directly from the NKVD: "several jars of Russian caviar and a bottle or two of Scotch (all provided by the N.K.V.D.); Raïssa [Browder's wife] received bottles of imported cognac, and Earl's brother Bill several quarts of Canadian Club whiskey." Bentley, *Out of Bondage*, p. 210.

† The Christmas holidays were not far off. "What shall we give the sources?" Bykov asked. "Shall we give them a big sum of money?"

I was horrified. "Money!" I said. "They would be outraged. You don't understand. They are Communists on principle. If you offer them money, they will never trust you again. They will do nothing for you."

"All right, so they are Communists," he said. "but it is you, Bob, who do not understand." He spoke with a patient cynicism that pled with my stupidity, which baffled him. "*Siehst du, Bob,*" he said, "*wer auszahlt ist der Meister, und wer Geld nimmt muss auch etwas geben*—who pays is boss, and who takes money must also give something. . . ."

I said to Bykov hopelessly: "You will lose every one of them."

He shrugged his shoulders. "Then we must give them some costly present," he said, "so that they will know that they are dealing with big, important people. You will buy four rugs, big, expensive rugs. You will give White, Silverman, Wadleigh and *Der Advokat* each one a rug. You will tell them that it is a gift from the Soviet people in gratitude for their help." Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (New York, Random House, 1952), pp. 414-15.

"How about \$50.00 a month?" he asked.

I stared at him in surprise. Why should he offer me a salary when my income was adequate for my needs? I shook my head but he persisted.

"Well," he said suavely, "if that's not enough, how about \$100.00?"

When I again refused, he raised the offer to \$200.00 and finally to \$300.00 a month. Just what is going on, I wondered; could it be that they are trying to bribe me? I turned on Bill in a fury.

"What kind of a racket is this where they pay you for doing your duty?" I demanded.

For a moment he looked as if I had struck him in the face; then he looked away and said nothing. But this did not end the matter. After several long battles on the subject of my accepting a salary, Bill shifted his point of attack. He was, he said, in the fur business. He would like to present me with a Persian-lamb coat. When I turned him down on this, he came up with the idea that he wanted to get me an air-conditioning unit for my apartment. He was, he said, worried about my bad sinus trouble. . . .

"Bill," I asked, "is this your idea or were you told to do this?"

He looked away from me. "No, it wasn't my idea. I never do anything on my own." Then, very bitterly, "I'm only small fry; they can kick me around all they want to."

Later, when Miss Bentley was about to turn her back on the Soviet service, she met "Al" (Gromov) of the Soviet embassy:

"Let's have no more nonsense about this," he said in a menacing voice. "I have \$2,000 right here in my pocket. It's part of your salary. You're going to take it now! If you don't, I shall be forced to the inescapable conclusion that you are a traitor!"

I started to refuse, then stopped myself. I had been told not to arouse Al's suspicions, and I must hold to that line. This is a showdown, I thought. If I don't accept the money, he will know that something is wrong. Much as it went against the grain to let the Russians think I could be bought, I must give that impression. I forced myself to smile lightly.

"Don't be silly, Al," I said, "of course I'm not a traitor. Come to think of it, I could use a little extra money." ⁵

In a report to Major Rogov of the Soviet embassy in Canada, the recruiting agent David Lunan said, in April 1945, concerning the prospective spy Durnford Smith of the National Research Council: "'Badeau was very disturbed when I brought up the subject of payment. I think he felt that it brought the subject of his work into a different (and more conspiratorial) focus.' " ⁶ Three months later, however, Rogov met the new agent Badeau-Smith personally; after the meeting Rogov noted in the record: "'Handed out 100 dollars; he took the money readily.' " ⁷ On Badeau-Smith's regular "registration card" there appeared the entry "Needs periodic assistance"—despite the fact that his pay from the Canadian government was \$300 a month.

CHAPTER 2

France before the Second World War

1. COMMUNIST RELUCTANCE

THE extent and quality of Soviet espionage in various countries and at various periods spring from the dual nature of its organization. In some cases and in some countries in which the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy required extensive networks of secret intelligence, the quality and size of the Communist movement permitted activity only on a level far below the desired minimum. In other cases—for example, in certain small countries—Soviet requirements did not call for the use of all the available facilities. The work in France provided the first demonstration of the antagonistic nature of the two factors governing the Soviet espionage system.

As far as the requirements of foreign policy were concerned, France became the most important target of Soviet espionage as soon as the civil war ended in Russia. French arms and financial aid had saved Poland in 1920; France had been Rumania's ally and protector against Soviet Russia; and it was France that had blocked the road from Moscow to Berlin up to 1923, when a Soviet-German military alliance against the West was the immediate Soviet goal in European affairs.

France emerged from World War I as *the* great power in Europe. Her army was by far the largest and best equipped in the world; her war industry was expanding and improving. Progress in aviation, chemical warfare, and new artillery was being stimulated; a new navy was being built. In international affairs the predominance of France was felt everywhere in Europe: from Madrid to Warsaw, from Oslo to Bucharest, the foreign ministries had to consult Paris before making any important decision. Paris also became the capital of influential Russian émigré groups advocating belligerence toward Moscow.

The interest of Soviet intelligence in France was a twofold one: there was the natural interest in the actions of the nation which was the Soviet's most powerful political enemy, in its military forces, the location of its armies, its mobilization plans. And there was the interest in obtaining knowledge about new techniques and inventions of the French war industries to serve as models for Russia, where arms production, which had resumed almost from scratch, was being rapidly pushed forward. The Soviet's hunger for information on military techniques, combined with its dream of a powerful army, soon led to the Rapallo agreement and clandestine collaboration with Germany. Germany herself, however, was lagging in military development. From the early 1920's, when power relations on the old continent were changing rapidly, France was in first place.

The French Communist movement, at least during its first decade, was neither numerous enough, strong enough, nor intellectually prepared for the role assigned to it in meeting these requirements and expectations of the Soviet homeland. The organization which had called itself Communist since the Congress of Tours in December 1920 consisted in the main of former members of the Socialist party and former "Social Patriots" and "reformists." The majority of French Communists of this period, although they were full of admiration for the revolution that had occurred in Russia, were not of a standard Communist revolutionary type. Unlike Germany and other countries of Central Europe, France had not experienced an upheaval after the first World War, and her institutions and policies had retained an organic continuity. The mass of French suddenly-turned-Communists was not "Bolshevik" in the exact sense of the term; it was not ripe for either a great Soviet-type revolution, underground activity, or espionage.

The leading parties of the Communist International sensed something alien in French Communism of that time. "The French party," Trotsky wrote in November 1921, "always stood somewhat apart from the life of the International."¹ Only a little later the *Communist International* referred to a "conflict" with its French section:

Between the French Communist party and the International a serious conflict is developing.

The resolutions adopted in common with the representatives of the French party . . . are not being carried out or put into practice in France.

Obligations formally and solemnly assumed are not being carried out in France. The press of our French party does not reflect or represent the ideas of the Communist International on the most burning and important questions of present policy. The Central Committee of our French party does not follow the Comintern line in its work.

A succession of letters conveying suggestions and advice of the Comintern went unanswered by the French Communist party.²

The centrist majority, led by Ludovic-Oscar Frossard and Marcel Cachin, and embracing the bulk of French Communists, never accepted, except in solemn resolutions, the principle of a commanding Comintern and obedient national Communist sections; least of all were they willing to accept this humble position for their own party, bearer of revolutionary traditions and heir of the Paris Commune and Jean Jaurès. They believed that the International should be an alliance based on the independence of the component parties.

Opposing this moderate course, a leftist, more orthodox-Communist minority, led by Boris Souvarine, Alfred Rosmer, Fernand Loriot, and Pierre Monatte, sought better relations and closer ties with Moscow but no more. With the help of the Comintern, the leftist faction gained decisive influence in the party and for two years, beginning about the end of 1922, dominated it. But during that era neither "leftism," subordination to the Comintern, nor the setting up of an "illegal" party implied willingness to perform secret reconnaissance activity for Moscow.

During the first five years of the Comintern Leon Trotsky was one of the great authorities on French affairs. It was Trotsky's ideas concerning France and Trotsky's conception of the role of a world-wide International that sometimes determined the Comintern's course in this respect. A leftist himself and a close friend of the leaders of the French leftists, Trotsky refused, however, to compromise the national Communist parties by requiring of them dubious services to Russia. In his capacity as people's commissar for war, he likewise refrained from coupling Soviet espionage with Communist parties, their central committees, or their

leadership. Sometime during this early era Soviet intelligence had recruited Robert Pelletier, an editor of *l'Humanité*, for spy service; Pelletier collaborated with Col. Octave Dumoulin, editor of *Armée et démocratie* and a well-informed writer with abundant sources of information. The party's leadership, when it learned about these operations, promptly and emphatically prohibited them as far as Pelletier was concerned:

Trotsky forbade the mingling of Razvedka activities with Communist action. He demanded strict separation of one from the other because the requirements of a state and the tasks of a revolutionary party are quite different things . . . When the case of Robert Pelletier . . . was discussed in the Politburo, it was disclosed that Pelletier was involved in espionage activities and was connected with Colonel Dumoulin, editor of *Armée et démocratie*. How did we find this out? I believe it was through Victor Méric, Dumoulin's comrade in the 14th section of the Communist party and contributor to his magazine. In the Politburo I suggested that Pelletier be requested to choose between *l'Humanité* and espionage: to hold both jobs at the same time was impossible. Rosmer agreed with me and told us that Trotsky had demanded a clear-cut separation between the party and the Soviet intelligence service. The Politburo unanimously accepted our proposal. Pelletier left *l'Humanité* and became one of J. Cailloux's collaborators. He died, as far as I know, in the 'thirties.*

Things began to change rapidly when Trotsky was eliminated from leadership and his political friends in France were expelled from the party. The ascendancy of Stalin brought a tightening of the Comintern reins, the unscrupulous use of other Communist parties for the needs of the Soviet government, and the expansion, with the help of the "brotherly" organizations, of all forms of intelligence activity. When Jean Cremet, member of the French party's Central Committee, became chief of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, Stalin, as we shall see later, proposed that the supreme leadership in France be entrusted to four persons, one of them the spy Cremet.

* Statement of Boris Souvarine, D papers, FRe 27. Alfred Rosmer has confirmed the correctness of Souvarine's statement.

There was more than one reason why the three Soviet intelligence machines—the GB, the GRU, and the Comintern's OMS—set up their chief European agencies in Berlin rather than Paris. One was the unsatisfactory state of affairs within the French Communist party, which was discussed above; another was the fact that a large number of prospective intelligence agents spoke German but not French; also, Berlin's geographical position in relation to Moscow was important; and finally, Germany was weak and friendly, while France was strong and menacing. Espionage scandals in Germany were not likely to result in international conflicts; about France Moscow was not so sure. If the worst happened, Germany could be induced to trade a few Soviet agents caught in the act for German nationals arrested (for this purpose) in Russia; it was doubtful whether Paris would be as amenable to this kind of blackmail.

In this early era of Soviet intelligence, therefore, many agents working in France, Belgium, and Holland were subordinated to Soviet intelligence officers and military attachés in Berlin; they dispatched their reports to the German capital, whence an uninterrupted stream of information moved to Moscow by air, rail, courier, and later short-wave radio.

The human resources of Soviet intelligence in the first years were poor. There were no "graduates" of intelligence schools because there were no intelligence schools in the Soviet Union, and there were no schools because there were no teachers of intelligence work. The small "cadres" available for the task in France were Russian Bolshevik sympathizers who had lived in Paris before the revolution, spoke French, and were in general equipped for this particular task. Almost all the adherents of Lenin and Trotsky had returned to Russia in 1917, and because of the great dearth of personnel in Russia second- and third-rate personalities occupied the new important posts; few could be spared for intelligence missions abroad.

The initial personnel of the Soviet intelligence agencies in France was recruited mainly from among the natives of Russia's western provinces, Poles, Balts, Jews; Russians ("Great Russians") constituted a minority among the Soviet agents of this era. From about 1924 on, a few trusted men from Moscow, with direct ties to Berlin, funds, false passports, and codes, operated the intelligence machine in France. To do their job, which called for collecting

data, obtaining documents, observing the inside of factories, interrogating soldiers and engineers, and a multitude of other activities, they needed assistants and subagents, and these had to come from the French Communist party. The services of French Communists in substantial numbers were indispensable, and the relationship between the French Communist party and Soviet intelligence agencies became one of the most important and difficult issues for both Soviet intelligence and the Comintern. It was a problem which was not and could not be satisfactorily solved.

In espionage, as in economic enterprise, the accumulation of resources is the first crucial task. In the beginning there are timid conversations and exploring of the ground, frustrations, and failures. In its search for suitable agents in France, Soviet intelligence sought the help and advice of reliable persons who traveled to and from Paris; it sounded out French Communist trade unionists, used Russian émigrés, etc. It will probably never be possible to unravel the mesh of contacts, moves, and countermoves involved in the creation of the first Soviet intelligence agencies in France. In addition to the few who entered the Soviet service, many gave occasional assistance.

French aviation, and in particular military aviation, had attracted Soviet attention since the early 'twenties. Aviation was still a novelty in Russia, and every new design and gadget was of great interest. Soviet intelligence in France devoted much energy and some of its best men to this vital field. A number of French and Russian "militants" furnished information. Among these were Henri Coudon and his sweetheart, Marthe Morrisonnaud, who were soon arrested for having taken a secret report on a special aviation problem; and the Russians Ustymchuk ("Bettemps") and Vladimir Kropin, who were arrested for concealing arms and using false papers.³

Among trade union leaders Joseph Tomasi, secretary of the Syndicat de la Voiture et Aviation (Car and Aviation Workers' Union) and member of the Communist party's Central Committee, was in a position to supply information and help find agents in the aviation industry. In late 1924, while the counterespionage service was looking for him, he left for Moscow and never returned. (He died in Moscow in May 1926.) It is doubtful, however, whether Tomasi rendered more than occasional service to Soviet intelligence.

A more fortunate agent was a Russian émigré from Siberia, Jean Moiseew, who was one of those who did not return to Russia after the revolution. He had migrated to the United States in 1907, but four years later came to France where he became a partner and presently owner of a machine shop in which a score of workers, mostly foreigners, were employed. The shop was flourishing when the revolution broke out in Russia. While his friends and spiritual leaders were leaving Paris for Russia to take part in the historic events, Moiseew remained in France. Unsited to the role of a leader of a spy ring, he arranged contacts, recruited other operators, and occasionally used his shop as a cover for underground activity. For two decades, from 1920 to 1940, Moiseew, under the name of "Stone," was a figure in the Soviet underground in France. At times his services were highly essential. His name came up in several espionage affairs in the 'twenties and 'thirties, but he escaped arrest until the outbreak of the war in 1939.⁴

The Soviet intelligence apparatus in France in this early period was built on a narrow base and remained a chaotic and inefficient organization until Jean Cremet, a ranking member of the party's leadership, breaking with the tradition and principles of the preceding era, took on the cares and burdens of a chief organizer of a Soviet underground network.

Cremet, who began his career as a Communist Youth leader in the Loire Inférieure, advanced to become secretary of the influential shipbuilders' union in St. Nazaire, which itself was of special interest to Soviet intelligence. In addition, he served as one of the secretaries of the metalworkers' union, also an important point for gathering information on French war industries. When Cremet assumed his new assignment as an underground organizer in 1924, the Comintern, with the intent of enhancing his social standing in France, suggested that he stand as a candidate for the fourteenth district of Paris in the municipal elections. He was elected, but spent little of his time with either the City Council or the Communist party's Central Committee; his colleagues at party headquarters were surprised and indignant when told Cremet was "gravely ill," because they knew this was a clumsy excuse.

Cremet succeeded in building up a large network of espionage in arsenals, naval dockyards and ports, and war industries all over France. His secretary and common-law wife, Louise Clarac, was his most important assistant. A number of agents and subagents sup-

plied information from Versailles and reports on the location of powder factories, projectile depots, arms, ammunition, vehicles, the shell plant at Vincennes, production of gas masks, the Institut Aérotechnique, experiments with new long-range guns at the camp at Satory, and the plants at Penhoët in St. Nazaire (hydroplanes, armor plate, submarines, etc.). Cremet made frequent trips to Moscow to report personally; his written reports went by courier via Berlin. The original plan was to transmit information to Moscow by special air service, but this proved too expensive, and short-wave radio was not yet in general use by Soviet intelligence.

A fact of which the French Communist party was unaware but which Stalin knew well was that Cremet, dependent on Moscow, was more reliable than the majority of the party's other leaders. In the search for leaders for the French party, which had been going on for years in the Comintern, Stalin considered Cremet a good choice. On March 6, 1926, in his first appearance before the French Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Stalin modestly apologized for "insufficient knowledge of the French situation." But this was no reason for him to refrain from giving instructions and selecting leaders for Paris. "I have just had a talk with Cremet," Stalin told the Comintern, and said that Cremet had reported to him concerning the rightists in the French party and trade unions. To fight the rightists as well as the ultra-leftists, Stalin suggested the formation of a leading group of four French Communists, and named Pierre Semard, Jean Cremet, Maurice Thorez, and Gaston Monmousseau. The suggestion was of course accepted. In June 1926 Cremet, French chief of Soviet espionage, was elected to the Politburo of the French Communist party. Neither the party's leadership nor his trade union was aware of precisely what activity Cremet was engaged in during this period of 1924 to 1927.

Cremet in turn was not aware that French counterespionage had long been watching him and his assistants, had obtained copies of some of his reports, and was preparing to move.

2. JEAN CREMET AND THE CRISIS OF 1927

Following the British and Italian lead, France recognized the Soviet regime in 1924. At the end of that year Soviet representatives began to arrive to man the embassy as well as Torgpredstvo, the

trade agency of the Soviet Union. The work of the intelligence departments, among them the GB and the Army's GRU, was greatly aided by the new facilities available to them through the embassy and trade legation. Both the GB and GRU had their envoys in the embassy; and the diplomatic pouch, couriers, and codes were now at the disposal of the intelligence machine. Meslanik ("Dick") was chief of espionage for GRU.¹

Gathering of information by a member of an embassy staff is complicated by the fact that, since he is an official appointee known to the counterintelligence service all his movements and contacts can be watched. This is why the secret intelligence apparatus was still needed in France, as in other countries, after diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. Liaison between embassy and intelligence consisted of only one or two trusted agents. In 1925 the Soviet government sent to Paris Uzdanski-Yelenski, a man of about forty-five and a veteran intelligence officer—if such can be said to have existed in this young agency. Uzdanski had served in an intelligence post in Warsaw and been expelled by the Polish government in 1924; in 1925 he was transferred to Vienna, from which point he controlled secret intelligence activities in the Balkans. With this record, Uzdanski came to Paris—a significant promotion for him.²

Under the name of "Bernstein" Uzdanski lived the free life of an artist. His wife's positions in the Soviet embassy and trade legation served as explanation of his frequent visits there. Stephan Grodnicki, a Lithuanian "student" in Paris, aged about twenty-five, was appointed "Bernstein's" first lieutenant, with the responsibility of meeting the French agents, receiving their written reports, and turning them over to "Abraham Bernstein."

From "Bernstein," through Grodnicki, the French underground apparatus received its precise assignments. Information was requested on French artillery (guns and shells), new formulas for gunpowder tanks (a novelty for Soviet industry), gas masks, airplanes, naval construction, movement of troops, etc. An attempt was made to plant agents posing as designers in the tank research office at Versailles, the military academy, the arsenal, and the establishments at St. Cyr, the French West Point. "Bernstein's" activity was an effort to build up an espionage network on an unprecedentedly large scale.

An ingenious plan was put to work at Versailles in the Centre d'Etudes Militaires. A group of Communist party members work-

ing as typesetters in the print shop collected proofs of all papers set up at this center of French military science, including confidential documents. The group worked effectively from 1925 to the end of 1927.

During this period the "questionnaire," a dubious method of gathering information, was widely used in France, as it was by other Soviet apparats during the first fifteen years. Engineers and experts of Russian war industries back home were asking a host of technical questions. The lists of questions from Russia were turned over by military intelligence headquarters to the military attachés, who had them translated at the embassies. Neither the attachés themselves nor anyone on their staffs was able to answer the multitude of specific technical questions, so the "questionnaire" was "descended"—as the term went—into the depths of the network. "Bernstein" would receive it at the embassy, rewrite it, and distribute copies to his agents. This procedure was certainly not in accord with the rules of conspiratsia: sometimes the questionnaires, written or rewritten in longhand, proved revealing when they fell into the hands of the French police.

It was not long before reports from various sources began to reach the Sûreté Générale.

In 1925 Louise Clarac contacted M. Rousset, an old Communist with personal connections at the arsenal of Toulon, and asked him to fill out a questionnaire dealing with naval artillery. Rousset reported her request to the police.

"I saw [Rousset testified later] that there was no question of trade unionism or labor movement in it. It was plainly an attempt at espionage in which I was expected to collaborate. Disgusted by a party which encourages such an activity under the pretense of 'protecting the Red Army' and 'the defense of the working class,' I denounced these facts to M. Borelli, special commissar in Marseille. He advised me not to turn down Louise Clarac's offer in order to be able to unmask her. So I handed over some documents. I also sent papers to Cremet. According to his instructions I sent them, under sealed envelope, through another party member."³

In another incident, which occurred in October 1925, a member of Cremet's group, Singré, was told to meet Cremet's assistant, Pierre Provost. Singré, a mechanic at the Versailles arsenal and

secretary of the Communist trade union association in Versailles, was asked a number of questions by Provost about such matters as production of gunpowder and military vehicles. He was surprised; it was obvious that none of the questions had anything to do with trade unionism. The explanation given was that they pertained to the "defense of workers." Singré decided to report the incident to his superiors at the plant. As a result, the police supplied him with documents to be turned over to Provost and instructed him to maintain the contact.⁴

At about the same time Mr. Cochelin, Communist militant active in Versailles and St. Cyr, was requested by the Cremet apparatus to furnish information on tanks, gunpowder, and so on. He tried to get out of this, but the request was repeated by Sergeant, another member of the Cremet group and Communist city councilman in St. Cyr: "Sergeant told me, [Cochelin testified later] 'I am connected with an organization in the embassy; Soviet citizens are active in the group, their chief is a woman [obviously Louise Clarac].'" Cochelin reported to the secretary of the War Ministry, and once again a report on the espionage ring came to the *Sûreté Générale*.⁵

In 1925-26 the climate all over Europe was favorable for Moscow. In France, where hopes had run high during the era of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, the government hesitated to proceed against a large Soviet organization with roots in the embassy. There was, of course, the danger that important military secrets might be revealed to Moscow, but Paris preferred to try to mislead the Soviet intelligence organization rather than suppress it. False reports concocted in the War Ministry for this purpose were turned over, through collaborating subagents, to Louise Clarac, Cremet, and Provost; how many other, legitimate, documents reached the embassy nobody knew. Military counter-espionage was the responsibility of the War Ministry, of which Paul Painlevé, the famous mathematician, was the head.

The decision to put an end to these activities came in 1927. This was the year of great disillusionment about Soviet policies all over the world, the year of Britain's break with Moscow, Chiang Kai-shek's turning against the Communists, and general disappointment over trade with the Soviet Union. On February 5, 1927, cautious Cochelin, who had consistently refused to cooperate with Cremet, accepted a "questionnaire" from one of Cremet's lieu-

tenants, and a few weeks later he contacted Stephan Grodnicki to hand over the answers (which had been prepared in the War Ministry) and receive a new questionnaire. The police observed the meeting with Grodnicki at the Place de la Madeleine, saw Cochelin hand over the papers, and followed Grodnicki to his subsequent meeting with "Bernstein." The papers were found in the latter's possession when the two men were arrested on April 9, 1927.

The arrests created a sensation in France which was enhanced in the next few days when a number of other persons were arrested and scores of "suspects" were summoned for interrogation. More than a hundred individuals were involved in this largest espionage affair to be uncovered since the war. "Documents found," the police announced, "show there is in existence a vast espionage organization, far greater than any discovered since the war. Many persons, by money, were induced to give information of great value." ⁶ The affair was detrimental to Soviet prestige; after so many proclamations of the new respectability of the Moscow government, its peaceful intentions, and its "*désintéressement*" in the internal affairs of other nations, the emerging picture of a huge espionage network and its wide-scale cooperation with French Communism served to vitiate the many diplomatic achievements of the preceding years. In fact, the great search of Arcos (the Soviet trade agency in London) in May was to a large extent the result of the French affair.

The attitude of the Communist party, exposed now as a partner and agent of the espionage apparatus, was defiant in the extreme. (The party's tactics in this first case set the pattern of behavior in similar occurrences later.) Behind the defiance of the party, however, there was great confusion; severe action by the French government was expected, as well as a reprimand from Moscow. The leaders of the party tried to put a good face on the matter but they could not conceal their anxiety. Active party workers realized that the matter was straight espionage.⁷

In public the party appeared bold and unconcerned: no espionage existed; the information gathered by Cremet's network, the questionnaires, the confidential documents, were all needed in connection with a trade union project, namely, a large-scale plan of "industrialization," and obtaining information for this purpose

was a highly patriotic task. This was also the contention of the defense in the ensuing trial: it was all in the name of trade unionism, "defense of class interests." "What about the gas masks?" the president of the tribunal asked defendant Provost. To which the alert Provost replied: "It is because in Germany and America gas masks are used during certain strikes." ⁸

Then the party went over to the offensive. In an appeal signed by a special "action committee," the party attacked the French government for its "war preparations" and "French capitalism" for its efforts to encircle Russia and worsen the living conditions of the workers. The espionage trial, they contended, was a pretext and a fabrication. "The entire working class will answer the government with the demand: complete amnesty." In St. Cyr, one of the centers of the espionage activities, the City Council, which was dominated by the Communists, put up huge posters denouncing the "fantastic accusations and lies" as well as the "agents provocateurs." "So far as we are concerned," the appeal concluded, "we wish to stress that our comrades did nothing unworthy and we continue to maintain our respect for and our confidence in them."

At the conclusion of the trial eight persons were convicted, among them the two direct Soviet agents, "Bernstein" and Grodnicki, and of the French defendants, Cremet and Louise Clarac (both of whom had left for Russia) and their chief lieutenants. The sentences were not severe, however: Stephan Grodnicki, characterized by the court as "young and elegant and one to whom delicate assignments were given," was sentenced to five years, "Bernstein" to three years, one of the French agents to sixteen months, and another to three months. The sentence read in part:

Since at least 1924 an espionage system has been established in France under the guidance and for the benefit of a foreign organism, the seat of which is Moscow . . .

It is beyond any doubt that a foreign government sends to us for political purposes its agents and money to obtain from workers, even from government workers, the most complete and the most secret data on the production and operations of our important defense machinery.

Betraying and renouncing their own nation under the pretext of fictitious concerns about working conditions, allegedly

striving for a better future on an international scale, they have devoted themselves, body and soul, to that government; they forgot what they owe to France . . .

The convicted agents were taken off to their various prisons, served their terms, and disappeared from the political scene for a long time. Two of them, Pierre Provost and Georges Ménétrier, reappeared after the second World War in various important Soviet intelligence posts.

The fate of the French chiefs of the network was tragic. For two years after they left France Cremet and Louise Clarac lived in Moscow as "political émigrés." Allegedly employed in the Co-operatives Section of the Comintern, Cremet actually continued to serve the French section of Soviet military intelligence and later was sent on a secret mission to the Far East. There, in 1936, he disappeared. A rumor originated in Moscow that he had fallen overboard from a ship and could not be saved. Actually he was "liquidated" by the GB on the Portuguese island of Macao, near Canton, on his way to China.⁹ Louise Clarac, in 1934, was ordered to leave Russia; she returned to France, where she lived in hiding for a long time, engaging in no activity for either the Communist party or Moscow.

A nest that survived Cremet's arrest by only nine months was the group of Communist typesetters in Versailles who have been mentioned before. Hundreds of confidential and secret papers came to the print shop of the Military Studies Center, concerning which the personnel of the shop, partly civilian and partly military, were of course under obligation to maintain strict secrecy. About ten men, members of the Communist cell of the plant, had been persuaded to turn over proofs of all documents passing through the compositors' room to Jean Rougeayres, a tax collector and subagent of Louise Clarac. To Communist zeal there was added, in this case, a second stimulus: considerable payments for the valuable information. The soldier Marcel Pillot, an intermediary, earned 400 francs a month; Rougeayres received larger amounts and accumulated his savings in a bank. The work, which started in 1925, went on smoothly. No suspicion fell on the operators until one day, in November 1927, a corporal from the Centre Aéronautique reported to the authorities an offer made him by Rougeayres to pay for information and documents on the state of

French mobilization and on the French air force. Rougeayres was arrested. He confessed and revealed the names of his subagents as well as his superiors; he also told the Sûreté the full story of his group's activities. All his assistants were arrested; his Russian chief, however, the mysterious "Paul" who had taken over after Louise Clarac's escape and whose name and address nobody knew, was not apprehended.¹⁰

Again the Communist party took the offensive. *L'humanité* denounced all the accusations as false and the whole affair as a maneuver of the government to get votes at the elections: "On the eve of the elections all means are good for the bourgeoisie to try to deceive the working class and to discredit Communism by presenting it, as they usually do, as a 'foreign agent.' " ¹¹

This second case uncovering Soviet intelligence activity, which was brought to trial in March 1928, did not provoke as much passion and excitement as had the Cremet case. The trial was held behind closed doors, and few details of the evidence filtered through to the press. The eleven defendants, sentenced to from six months to five years, were all French Communists; not a single Russian was involved. *L'humanité* proclaimed the right of Communists to conduct espionage: "Militant [Communist] and revolutionary workers have the indisputable right to know about the machinations of their national imperialist government against them." ¹²

The Cremet scandal in France was one of a long series of sizable spy operations all over the world which came to light about the same time.

The history of Soviet secret intelligence abroad has been a succession of achievements and failures, victories and defeats. During the year 1927 there occurred the first of the three major setbacks that marked its course; the second took place in 1933-34, and the third in 1949-50. The three years 1924 through 1926 were rich in Soviet diplomatic successes: recognition by the big powers, England, Italy, and France; and establishment of Soviet embassies and consulates in almost every country of Europe. With the same methodicalness that has since marked the Soviet course, the favorable international climate was abundantly made use of to expand the intelligence activity. The network of espionage spun so rapidly during Stalin's first years of power soon covered most

European countries and the Near East. A crisis was inevitable.

Late in 1926 Rudolph Gaida, celebrated hero of the Czechoslovak Legion, famous from its Siberian days, was arrested in Prague as a member of the Soviet secret service.¹³ In March 1927 former White Russian general Daniel Vetrenko was arrested in Poland as the head of an important Soviet spy ring.¹⁴ A week later compromising documents were found in the office of the Soviet-Turkish trade corporation in Istanbul; one of the corporation's chiefs, Akunov, was found to be connected with espionage on the Turkish-Iraq frontier.¹⁵ Three days later the Swiss police announced the arrest of two Soviet spies, Bue and Euphony, who had worked under the ringleader Friedberg, a Dane, who managed to disappear.¹⁶

In May of the same year, in Kovno, the Lithuanian general Kleszinski was arrested in the act of handing over secret military documents to an official of the Soviet legation.¹⁷

In Vienna, an employee of the Soviet legation, Bakony, was found to be the chief spy for Moscow. A Hungarian by birth, son of a prominent leader of the Kossuth party in Hungary and a naturalized Soviet citizen, Bakony had established contact in Vienna with employees of the Foreign Office and was getting secret information for Moscow until the affair was discovered in May 1927.¹⁸

The raid on the Soviet consulate in Peking, in which the police gathered rich booty, occurred on April 6, 1927. Four days later the "Bernstein"-Grodnicki-Cremet affair exploded in France. Finally, on May 12 another storm broke in England, where the Arcos affair, which revealed operations of Soviet espionage in Great Britain, led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between London and Moscow.

The damage done to Soviet standing in the international field was great. To Stalin, the succession of arrests and trials was one of those inevitable *provals* (calamities); there was no reason, however, to withdraw secret intelligence forces. The only inference drawn by Moscow from the incidents was the need of more caution and prudence and stricter enforcement of conspiratsia.

The world-wide fiasco of Soviet intelligence involved three elements: the Soviet diplomatic agencies, the Communist parties, and the spy underground. These were now ordered to divorce themselves from one another and to proceed separately.¹⁹ The embassy

in Paris was instructed to deny any ties to and keep aloof from current espionage affairs; it was to cut off all ties to Communist organizations and stop direct financial assistance to them. Documents accumulated in the embassies by military intelligence and GB were to be screened and part of them shipped to Moscow and part destroyed. These instructions were dispatched to all Soviet missions abroad.*

3. "GENERAL MURAILLE" AND JAN BERZIN

The failures of 1927 had put an end to the careers of two important agents: "Bernstein" was serving a three-year prison sentence, and Cremet was in Moscow. Another French-Russian pair of leaders rose to head the Soviet's French apparat.

On the Soviet side, a new, remarkable personality took over the reins: this was the man with a dozen aliases ("Paul," "Henri," "Albert," "Boissonas," and many others), of which the most striking and most inaccurate, that of "General Muraille," remained in the memories of his numerous collaborators. "Muraille" was of course a cover name which sounded French to French ears, and the rank of general did not exist in Russia at that time. Actually a former commissar in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, he shifted to military intelligence work in the ensuing years of "peaceful co-existence," gladly adopting a high military title to inspire respect and confidence.

As chief of an extensive intelligence network, "Muraille" was perhaps the most intriguing character in the long line of Berzin's envoys in France. "An amazing man, an adventurer of a high or-

* In mid-1927, G. S. Agabekov, former GB official, reported: "An instruction reached the embassy, trade legation, Razvedupr and GPU [in Teheran] to examine all their archives and destroy documents which could compromise Soviet activities abroad. The embassy and trade legation started immediately to examine the archives and selected huge piles of papers for destruction. For a whole week these papers were burning in the yard of the embassy . . . The GPU received stricter orders—Moscow told it to destroy the entire archives and in future to keep correspondence of the last month only; even this correspondence had to be kept in such a place and under such conditions that the compromising material could be destroyed swiftly in case of a raid on the embassy . . . The first circular from Moscow was followed by a second. The employees of the embassies and consulates were strictly forbidden to maintain connection with members of the local Communist organizations." G. S. Agabekov, *GPU* (Berlin, Strela, 1930), pp. 141-2.

der," a leading French Communist of that time said of him. To "Muraille" "direct action"—war, revolution, barricades—was everything, political movements almost nothing. History, in his view, is made on the battlefield, not in parliament; agitation and propaganda are infinitesimal in significance compared to guns and torpedoes; consequently parliamentary and other leaders working publicly actually play a secondary role, whereas underground operators, leaders of armed insurrections, prospective commanders of a revolutionary army, and, along with them, heroic spies, are the real moving forces in history.* His ideas deviated somewhat from the classical tenets of Marxism, but he was born to work in an underground.¹

A Bolshevik of the Leninist old guard, "Muraille" was about forty-five years old in 1929. He had known prison and exile in Siberia in prerevolutionary times, had lived in Switzerland as an émigré, and since the Soviet revolution had traveled all over the world. In the mid-'twenties he had gone on intelligence missions to China. He came to France often, spoke French like a *paysan de l'Auvergne*, and had nothing but contempt for the leaders of French Communism, particularly the "self-admiring, petit bourgeois" Maurice Thorez. The French Communist party, in his opinion, was not revolutionary enough.

"Muraille" had an ability amounting almost to instinct for eluding surveillance and deceiving the police. He was involved in the Cremet affair of 1927 but escaped when Grodnicki and "Bernstein" were seized. He was named as the receiving end of documents at the printers' (Rougeayres) trial in 1928, but he could not be found. For three years the authorities continued to receive reports from various provinces about the visits of the mysterious "Paul"; occasionally they even had an address, only to find when they arrived there that he had "just left." More than once his agents and assistants were arrested and sentenced to prison terms, and some escaped to Russia; but "Muraille" never came into the hands of the police. Among his French collaborators, most of them young enthusiasts, this battered veteran, Red Army "general," and shrewd adversary of the police was an object of respect coupled with fear; even the rough-hewn features of his homely face somehow fitted

* In Paris "Muraille" financed the magazine *Le militant rouge* to popularize Russian and German experience in the techniques of revolution and street fighting; the publication lasted eighteen months.

into the picture. In his contacts with the heads of the Communist party "Muraille" tried to present his activities as completely innocent. The Cremet affair had been a lesson, and Moscow's orders were strict: all illegal intelligence operations were to be kept at a distance from the Communist party.

In this era of frequent changes in leadership, "Muraille" had to deal with whoever was at the helm of French Communism. In 1928-29, with Moscow's blessing, the "opportunist" set led by Marcel Cachin and Jacques Doriot had to give place to another group headed by Henri Barbé. Barbé, a young engineer and devoted "militant" who had already served a year in prison and was now "illegal," took over as liaison with the Comintern. He traveled to and from Moscow and was "Muraille's" contact in the Politburo.

"Muraille's" assignment, he told Barbé, was to select able young men and girls from among the Communist youth to go to Russia for a year's study at a Soviet school, after which they would gradually assume posts as the leading cadres of the party. Such action on an international scale was not illegal, and the Politburo of the French party gladly agreed to assist. Barbé put the "General" in touch with various youth groups of the party, and the circle of "Muraille's" contacts grew rapidly.²

It was not long before the party leadership learned that "Muraille's" objectives were not as harmless as they had assumed. From various sectors reports began to come of espionage activities; the young men recruited by Barbé saw no reason to conceal facts concerning their activities from their party leaders. It was not easy to steer the course between Moscow's demands and the dangers facing the French Communist party.

"Muraille's" curiosity was as ramified and complex as the military science and war industry of our century. Almost every department of the Soviet General Staff looked to France for the answers to its queries, and "Muraille's" network was working to obtain information on the French aviation industry and air force; latest models of machine guns and automatic rifles; the French navy (in the Mediterranean ports of Marseille, Toulon, and St. Nazaire "Muraille" maintained groups of agents who reported on construction of torpedoes, submarines, entanglement nets, etc.); military supplies going to Poland and Latvia.

The war industry of the Lyon area was of paramount interest to "Muraille." In Lyon his agents managed to steal blueprints of

airplane designs which were returned after "Muraille" had made copies of them. When the theft was discovered, only one of his aides was seized; the others managed to escape abroad.³

In the process of gathering information in certain ports, "Muraille" systematically shifted his agents from one spot to another. For example, he sent Louis Monnereau, a metalworker from Paris, to Nantes with funds sufficient to open a fish business. A sign reading "*arrivages directs*" adorned the new fish stand. To purchase the "*arrivages*" Monnereau had to travel to the ports of the North Sea, whence he returned with reports. This kind of fish trade continued for several years.⁴

Another of "Muraille's" agents was Vincent Vedovini, secretary of a Communist cell in Marseille among whose members were a few engineers of the naval arsenal. Vedovini supplied information on the chemical plant, production of torpedoes, new machinery for submarines, etc. Early in 1930 "Muraille" asked him to fill out a new "questionnaire" (written in longhand) pertaining to destroyer artillery. Vedovini, by now disgusted with spying, turned the questionnaire over to the police.⁵ "Muraille" managed to escape abroad at the last moment. He returned, however, and was arrested in April 1931.

The investigation and trial of "Muraille" lasted five months; guilt was established beyond doubt by written documents, the testimony of Vedovini, and other proof. There was no way of making a serious denial of the charges; on the other hand, a Soviet intelligence agent could not admit to having engaged in espionage. "Muraille's" defense consisted of a "sentimental" explanation of his doings in France: it was all part of a love affair, and "Muraille," being a gentleman, could not divulge the details. This was to become a standard defense of intelligence agents to explain their secretiveness. In the United States, in 1949-50, Judith Coplon used the method to explain her meetings with the Soviet agent Valentin Gubichev; in England the German spy, Lt. Norman Baillie-Stewart, did it in 1933, making statements containing indecent details about his alleged love affairs.

"Muraille" claimed he was a writer and needed information for a novel, which he had spent some four years gathering all over France. When asked where his manuscript was, he said it had been left in Germany. Where in Germany? That he could not tell for "sentimental reasons." The police and the court were unaware that

"Muraille's" wife, Louise Duval, lived in France, was in close touch with her husband, and performed liaison duties in the intelligence network. She, too, displayed ingenuity and eluded the police for several years until, in 1934, she was denounced by two other agents and arrested. Two passports, notes in shorthand, and a large sum of money were found in "Muraille's" pockets when he was arrested. He could not, for sentimental reasons, explain where the money had come from. Vedovini of course recognized "Muraille," but "Muraille" denied ever having seen his agent. The defense resorted to by "Muraille" would today hardly impress the public, the press, or a court of law, but in France in 1931 it did. His sentence was only three years in prison.⁶

"Muraille" served his term in Poissy, was expelled from France on his release in 1934, and departed for Russia. The fate of this remarkable man is not known. Among French Communists the rumor circulated in 1938, during the great purge in Russia, that "Muraille" had gone out of his mind, some reports having it that he feigned insanity to evade prosecution and some that he had really become insane.⁷

"Muraille's" activity had caused concern to the Communist leadership in France; his arrest created a new compromising situation.

In 1931 Henri Barbé was called to Moscow to report on the situation which, in Soviet and Comintern eyes, was anything but satisfactory. Barbé went to see top Comintern men Piatnitsky and Manuilsky to tell them all about "Muraille's" exploits and methods. His carefully prepared and documented report, however, failed to make an impression. Piatnitsky proceeded to explain the importance of the intelligence work abroad: "Regrettable as it is" that the Communist parties are involved in affairs of this kind, the work must continue. Piatnitsky then contacted Jan Berzin, and Barbé was invited to come to the office of the supreme head of Soviet military intelligence.

Barbé hoped to find sympathy on the part of this old Bolshevik and disciple of Lenin who had lived abroad for years and certainly should be able to understand the needs and the woes of Communist parties. Like so many other non-Russian Communists, Barbé had underestimated the evolution toward a new political egoism that had occurred among the Russian leadership—a kind

of nationalism which demanded sacrifices by every party and every individual party member for the sake of the first socialist state. How could Berzin refrain from using French Communists as intelligence agents? Was he to man his network abroad with Russians only? The apparat would be reduced almost to zero. Was he to follow the example of other countries and limit himself to the trivial type of hired spy? The effect would be the same.

Next morning [Barbé relates] two officers of the Red Army called for me at the Lux Hotel. We crossed Moscow in a car and arrived at a large building that did not have any special sign to indicate its identity; this was the headquarters of Soviet military intelligence.

I was led into a large room with huge maps of Europe and Asia on the walls. At the desk stood a man of about fifty in military uniform, on his tunic two Red Banner decorations. The husky man was about five feet, eight inches tall; his skull was shaved. He looked at me with lively, piercing blue eyes. This was General Berzin, the head of the Intelligence Service of the Red Army. The General spoke French fluently. He was animated, a bit nervous.

Berzin greeted me cordially, shook my hand, and ordered tea and pastry. Then he started a long talk about the importance of information and intelligence work for the defense of the Soviet Fatherland . . . He gave me to understand that he was aware of the attitude of the French Communist leadership toward the use of party members for Soviet intelligence work. He admitted this might inconvenience us, but he could not do without it.⁸

The long conversation ended with a surprising offer to Barbé himself to enter into a "closer relationship" with the Fourth Department and to start working under its direction. This was too much for the actual (though not formal) general secretary of a large Communist party.

I was stunned [Barbé relates] by this proposition. I explained why we reject such espionage methods; I cited the tradition of the French labor movement against engaging in this kind of activity. I concluded by asking the General to stop recruiting agents from among our militants. It was also obvious that I was declining the offer made to me personally.

Red-faced and infuriated, Berzin declared that if I refused to understand the importance of the work, others would not. I had not, I felt, won a friend in General Berzin; just the opposite was the case. Saying goodbye to me, Berzin asked me to think it over once more.

No agreement was reached in Moscow. When Barbé returned to Paris, "André," member of the Soviet embassy and Berzin's envoy in France, met him to ask for his definitive answer to the suggestion of his chief. The idea was that from now on espionage in France would be controlled by the two—"André" and Barbé.

I replied that I was beginning to get tired of all these stories; I repeated the decision of the Politburo. André burst out laughing. "You cannot be serious," he said; he certainly intended to continue in the old way, and he renewed Berzin's offer to me in a concrete form: André wanted the two of us to meet regularly to ensure coordination of action. I refused categorically. He then said he would do without me and deal with other leading party members.

This was the end of direct negotiations. For a while the French Politburo even took the offensive and removed from responsible party posts a few Soviet agents known to it. Strangely enough, there was no immediate reaction on the part of either the Comintern or the embassy; everything appeared to be quiet. The Politburo soon became aware that in its midst two comrades were already doing what Berzin had proposed to Barbé: Jacques Duclos and André Marty were working for Soviet intelligence.

Henri Barbé had to be removed. A systematic subversive activity was initiated in Moscow. When the time arrived to eliminate him from the party's leading body, the espionage issue was of course not mentioned. On the other hand, no real explanation was offered of precisely why the "Barbé-Celor group," whose rise to leadership had been supported by Moscow, was now to retreat. What the press in Moscow and Paris told its readers was oddly lame and vague: the sins of the Barbé-Celor group, wrote the *Communist International*, were those of "group spirit," "sectarianism." "It is a conspiratorial group . . . its policy does not correspond to Comintern tactics . . ." Things might have taken a different turn for Barbé had he been willing to assume the role offered him by Piatnitsky

and Berzin. Three years later, in 1934, he broke with the Communist party.

Barbé was replaced by Maurice Thorez, while the "special services" were entrusted to a new star rising in the French Communist firmament—Jacques Duclos. The accession of Duclos meant that all resistance had been broken and the French Communist party would from now on comply with every Soviet demand. Duclos proved efficient, loyal, and obedient, and he remained the head of the French organ of Soviet espionage much longer than his predecessors.

Like Barbé, Duclos had come to the Communist party after a number of years in the Communist Youth movement, where he had been, from his early years, involved in illegal operations. He had been in frequent conflict with the law, had escaped abroad, had taken advantage of amnesties and parliamentary immunities. His rise began in 1926, when, as a "Youth leader," he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist party; simultaneously, as a protection in his "antimilitarist" work in North Africa, he was elected to Parliament. Within the Communist party he was at first a supporter of Barbé. In 1931–32, when Barbé had been shaken off, Duclos became a member of the Politburo and took over the "special services" as well.

From that time on Duclos was involved in practically every affair of Soviet espionage in France; only parliamentary immunity and the lenient attitude of France toward pro-Soviet activities saved him from long prison terms. He never published denials or legally prosecuted anyone who accused him openly of being an agent of Moscow intelligence.

In 1937, after the assassination of Ignace Reiss, the dissident GB man, in Switzerland by Soviet agents, and the theft of Leon Trotsky's documents from a scientific institute in Paris, Trotsky became convinced that Duclos, the "old GPU agent," had had a hand in these incidents. On November 12 of that year he sent a cable to Premier Camille Chautemps from Mexico: "In connection with the murder of Ignace Reiss, the theft of my archives, and similar crimes, permit me to insist on necessity of interrogation, at least as witness, of Jacques Duclos, vice-president of the *Chambre des Députés*, an old GPU agent.*"

* When this cable was published in France, Leon Sedov, Trotsky's son and closest collaborator, did not agree with his father and wrote him from Paris (this was the

Nor did Duclos react when the *BEIPI* (*Bulletin de l'Association d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales*) stated in its issue of July 16–31, 1952: "The Duclos affair has existed for twenty years. For twenty years Duclos has been publicly accused of being a 'co-author, an accomplice,' and leading figure in Communist espionage in France for the benefit of the Soviets. For twenty years there has not been a reasonable doubt about it."

Duclos' unprecedented twenty-year record as confident and agent of Moscow was due to the extraordinary ability of this man to couple the pose of a fighter against the "capitalist French government" with humble subservience to Moscow, to bear every humiliation if it came from the Soviet side, and to cover up any act of espionage if committed by Soviet intelligence. Duclos belongs to the new generation of Communist leaders, loyal, obedient, and always ready to serve, the type which has supplanted the old type of thinking, debating, and learning Bolshevik.

4. THE HEYDAY OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN FRANCE

The period from 1928 to 1933 was the heyday of Soviet intelligence activity in France. As was usual in the ramified espionage affairs, only a small part of the GRU's activity was revealed at the trials or in French police reports. Most of the personnel of Soviet intelligence escaped arrest and notoriety. In addition to the ap-

last letter to his father before Sedov died): "I think it was an unfortunate move. The form of it—an appeal to Chautemps—and its vagueness, lack of evidence, as well as the fact that Doriot has been repeating the same thing for a long time . . . is damaging." (Jacques Doriot, former member of the Politburo, having become head of a French fascist group, had been insisting for a number of years that Duclos was an agent of the GPU. Sedov was shocked by the coincidence.)

But Trotsky knew more than his son thought he did. In a letter written on February 13, 1938, which reached Paris after Sedov's death, he replied: "The denunciation of Jacques Duclos is certainly well founded. The fact that Doriot denounced him is quite natural; it is not Doriot the fascist but Doriot the former member of the Politburo of the French Communist party who has exposed him. It is absurd to feel paralyzed by this kind of consideration. The fact that Jacques Duclos did not win the majority [of votes] at the election for vice-president of the *Chambre* is due to the cable from Trotsky [Trotsky sometimes referred to himself in the third person] to the Premier." D papers, Tr 1.

Trotsky was mistaken, however, about the theft of his documents in Paris in November 1936. It became known later that a Russian Trotskyite, agent of the Soviet police, had performed that operation.

parats of Soviet military intelligence, the GB, as always, carried out extensive operations, and Paris had become one of its chief centers outside Russia.

A "yavka" which served the needs of various apparats was set up in the atelier of Roger Ginsburg, an architect, in the Rue de la Seine in Paris. Soviet agents passing through Paris came to the atelier for passports, money, and safe shelter. Jan Valtin describes it:

The *atelier* was spacious and light. New steel furniture upholstered in bright colors, stacks of blueprints, bookshelves, office machines, maps, a vase full of yellow flowers, reproductions of famous paintings on the walls and a bronze miniature of the Laocoön Group on a pedestal in a corner, gave the place a mixed flavor of cold efficiency and cheerful warmth. R. W. (Roger Walter) Ginsburg was an architect, a thorough-going European of undefinable nationality. He had a charming young companion, a native of Alsace and a linguist of mark . . .

This architect's office . . . was probably the most cosmopolitan rendezvous of the Soviet secret services in Western Europe. . . . No incriminating written material, other than that which callers could carry in their pockets, was ever allowed to litter the *atelier*. For each branch of his department Ginsburg maintained a separate apartment in adjoining houses, the tenants of which were Party members assigned to serve the *Apparat*.¹

The Paris Sûreté, Jan Valtin remembered, supposed to be so shrewd, was a laughingstock in Ginsburg's atelier.

One of the most important phases of Soviet espionage of that time was tied up with the growing rabcor movement, which had advanced from the mid-'twenties to the early 'thirties and then receded. The system of "worker-correspondents" (in the Russian abbreviation, rabcor) originated during the first years of the Soviet regime. When the majority of Russian newspapers went out of existence, the old journalists quit their profession or were ousted, and dozens of new newspapers were established. Lenin's party launched an appeal for the raising up of a new, loyal generation of writers out of the ranks of the working class. The old journalism had been pro-capitalist, reactionary; an entirely new, progressive stratum of political writers and newspaper correspondents had to be created. Russian workers were advised to prepare themselves

for the task by writing reports on local economic and cultural affairs, criticisms of local Soviet officials, and so forth. The response was enthusiastic; thousands of young people joined the movement, and newspaper editors set up special departments for sorting and editing the material received.

Few of the stories sent in by the rabcors, however, were suitable for publication in the press: zeal and devotion were not a substitute for the systematic education which is the first requirement of a good writer, and in the turmoil of the first years of the Soviet regime it was not possible to provide the young rabcors with systematic training. Their reports were usually full of bitter comments about and negative judgments of one or another Soviet administrator. Denunciation of personal or political enemies was becoming an important characteristic of the rabcor stories. Articles containing such denunciations were forwarded by the editors to the GB, the public prosecutor, or the party's Control Commission for investigation of the complaints.

As the movement grew, the by-product became the primary goal, while the goal of education of new writers from among the *rab-sel-cors* (worker and village correspondents) receded into the background. The rabcors had become unknowing tools of the Soviet government's policy.

"With the aid of the rabcors," wrote M. Rafail, a rabcor organizer, in 1925,

the public prosecutor acquires a most powerful and efficient apparatus to fight crime and abuse. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection [a department of the government] possesses in the form of rabcors a sensitive controlling instrument . . . The activity of the rabcors' organizations must be closely tied to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Public Prosecution . . . In 1925, 1662 persons were convicted and sentenced to various punishments on the basis of the selkor reports.²

A violent controversy broke out in the late 'twenties between Stalin and the "rightist opposition" (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, and others), who wanted the rabcor movement to serve its proper educational purpose. Stalin of course won out.³

Encouraged and financed by the government, the organizations of the rabcors grew by leaps and bounds. As they developed, their

function as auxiliary organs of the police and suppliers of material for "purges" became paramount. In 1925 the roster of rabcors numbered 140,000; in 1928, 500,000; in 1930, 2,000,000. In 1933 Stalin reported to the party Congress that there existed at that time "over three million rabcors." Conferences of rabcors from all parts of Russia were held from time to time, and *Pravda* published supplements devoted to rabcor affairs.

In those days every Russian innovation was hailed by Western Communists as a great "achievement" and enthusiastically imitated. To the newborn Communist press in Europe and America, which badly needed writers and correspondents, the rabcor system recommended by the Comintern seemed to be the answer. Since the mid-'twenties the Communist parties of Germany, France, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and a number of smaller countries have fostered the rabcor movement.

Outside Russia, too, the by-product proved more essential than the declared aim—except that in the West the rabcors, instead of serving the needs of the GB, could be made to work for other important institutions: Soviet intelligence departments. Thousands of Western rabcors were employed in strategic places—munitions plants, aviation depots, the army and navy, postal and telegraph offices. The reports they sent to their party newspapers could be considered merely journalistic efforts, and correspondents would be unaware precisely who would be the ultimate link in the chain of readers of their reports. The great advantage of the rabcors as a cover for espionage was their appearance of legality: there could be no objection to a worker writing to his newspaper about happenings in an industrial plant. Even a rabcor who broke the rule of secrecy and sent reports from a military establishment could honestly deny any link to foreign intelligence. In fact the rabcors were unaware that in a number of instances a Soviet intelligence agency was the recipient of their reports.

In Germany the rabcor movement developed under the name BB (*Betriebs-Berichterstatter*). On the eve of the Nazi accession to power it numbered thousands of members; we shall see later how well it served the needs of Soviet intelligence. The *Daily Worker* in New York claimed 800 rabcors in 1934; the British *Daily Worker*, 600. *L'humanité* had 1,200 rabcors in 1928 and 4,000 in 1934, according to the *Small Soviet Encyclopedia*.

Maria Ulianova, Lenin's sister, an enthusiastic spokesman for

the international rabcor movement, published a book in 1928 entitled *The Rabcor Movement Abroad*, in which it was pointed out that the rabcor movement in France lagged several years behind that in other countries. Only twenty industrial units were "represented" at the first conference of rabcors held in Paris in October 1924, and in the period after 1924 the movement almost disintegrated. Its real upsurge in France occurred after the Cremet affair. The idea that a large phalanx of young workers, hitherto "exploited by capitalism" and "kept in the dark cellars of civilization," would rise up to replace the traditional decadent intelligentsia (including the Communist intelligentsia) influenced the young neophytes. The Utopian hopes of sincere Communism were obvious in the primitivism of the rabcor movement. "When the rabcor movement develops," wrote *Cahiers de Bolchevisme*, "newspapers will be filled with rabcor reports."⁴ The drawing power of the rabcor movement in France during its first stage is seen from the fact that 60 per cent of the 3,000 rabcors in 1929 were non-Communists, most of them young trade unionists.⁵

Soviet intelligence watched the growth of the French rabcor movement closely, financing it and encouraging it in various other ways. A special commission of six appointed by "Muraille" and Jacques Duclos to read and classify the rabcors' reports was headed by two important personalities—Izaia Bir, secret agent of Soviet military intelligence, and Duclos himself; among the others were Philippe Logier, Gaston Venet, and Riquier (sometimes called Regnier). Whenever the author of a rabcor report appeared useful for Soviet intelligence, members of the commission established the ties. In the editorial office of *L'humanité* three Communists, André Raymond (grandson of the former chief of police Louis Lepine), Paul Marion, and Michel Marty (brother of the Communist leader André Marty), were assigned to sift the rabcors' letters and reports.

A special role in this numerous group of rabcor organizers and secret intelligence officers was played later by Riquier, the young Communist student who was appointed by Duclos to serve on *L'humanité* as a link with the Soviet apparat. In addition, Riquier was made editor of a special *Bulletin d'information* on French imperialist war preparations; in case of a police investigation the Bulletin could also serve to explain how and why reports of a military nature happened to be found in Riquier's possession.⁶

The stories sent to *L'humanité* by rabcors from all over the country were sorted and some found their way into the columns of the newspapers; those, however, which contained facts and figures on subjects of interest to Soviet intelligence were directed into channels leading to the Soviet military attaché. The military attaché, or, to be accurate, the man in the embassy who served as Berzin's envoy (there was no official military attaché until 1933), studied the correspondence; if a report appeared to have substance and interest he dispatched his aide to meet the rabcor and obtain more information. "The rabcors never realized," one of their leaders said, "that this part of their activity could be considered espionage." ⁷

The rabcor sector of Soviet espionage in France might have remained unknown had it not, in 1932, been denounced to the police by one of its important agents. At this time the receiving end of the rabcor organization, assigned to receive and digest reports of military interest, was the Bir-Strom, better known as the "Phantomas," group (Phantomas was a character in a popular mystery novel of that time). A prominent part of Soviet intelligence in France, the "Phantomas" group was important in more ways than one.

Izaia Bir, chief of this apparat, had been a member of the Soviet intelligence service since the late 1920's. A native of Poland, he had been deprived of his Polish citizenship for evading military service, and came to France to study engineering in Toulouse; then, starting his intelligence career, he worked first in a chemical, next in a metallurgical, plant. In 1929, when he had advanced to become head of a subagency of Soviet espionage, he was only twenty-five years old; the youth of the members of this group (Bir was the oldest among them) was one of its interesting aspects.

Bir lived in a modest hotel room, received no mail and almost no visitors; observing instructions strictly, he arranged his numerous *treffs* (Soviet intelligence term for rendezvous) in parks and cafés. His ability to elude observation and reappear unexpectedly was what earned him the appellation of "Phantomas." The police reported later, not without a trace of admiration, how "Phantomas" cleverly changed busses to shake off shadows, and how well he knew which buildings had rear gates through which one could disappear. He wrote his reports at home and never went to the embassy. The young girl who visited him once a week after eleven

o'clock at night was his liaison. "Lucy" took all the necessary precautions not to be seen in his hotel and, in fact, was never found by the police. At the hotel her night visits were assumed to be part of a love affair.⁸

Bir's chief assistant was Alter Strom, twenty-four years old at the time this apparat was started. Strom belonged to the considerable group of Soviet agents who had been born in Poland or Rumania and who as children were taken to Palestine when their families emigrated to that country in the 1920's. As the youth grew older his vague pro-Communist sympathies ripened into fanatic devotion. He dreamed of returning to the great world outside to put his faith and abilities into action. He gladly accepted the offer to embark on the dangerous road of espionage. Between 1928 and 1932 these young men one after another returned to Europe. We shall find members of this group in various posts of the Soviet apparat in the 1930's and down to the ill-fated days of the Rote Kapelle in Belgium and France in 1941-42.

Strom, who had worked as a laborer in Palestine during the preceding five years, came to Paris in 1929. He lived there with two other Palestinian Communists, Savanko and Ella Rozhenski; when these two were expelled from France by the police for Communist activity, Strom, who had never joined the Communist party, continued to live in Paris as a "student." Actually he had become assistant to Izaia Bir.⁹

Bir and Strom obtained their information either through *L'humanité* or, in the provinces, from local Communist chiefs who in turn obtained the reports from local workers. The data collected by Bir and Strom related to a variety of subjects of interest to Soviet military intelligence; according to French official sources these included the size of French armed forces abroad, production of war material and arms, ordnance stores at Brienne-le-Château; the artillery *parc* of St. Eulien, the torpedo tube devices used on first-class submarines, the 50-mm. cannon set up by naval artillery, and so on.¹⁰

The system worked satisfactorily for about a year. Riquier, who obtained his material from *L'humanité* as well as directly from the rabcors, regularly turned part of it over to "Phantomas" and Strom. The flow of reports was abundant, and the *Bulletin d'information* actually published three issues.

After a while young Riquier realized that his activity was being

used in the service of an espionage organization; he decided not only to give up the activity but to inform the authorities. In February 1932 he got in touch with Charles Faux Pas Bidet, a high official in the Paris police, and laid bare the entire activity in so far as it was known to him. It took the Sûreté, which of course wanted to catch the entire apparat, five months to disentangle the knot, since Riquier knew neither the names nor addresses of the Soviet members of the apparat. While its investigation was still in progress a theft of important secret documents occurred in a war plant in Tours: designs and blueprints of a new air force machine gun disappeared. An investigation conducted secretly by two police officers from Paris * revealed the typical procedure: the designs had been stolen by Communist workers, turned over to the party secretary at Tours, and eventually reached "Phantomas."

In June of the same year Riquier turned over to Bir a set of "secret documents" (given him by the police); a few minutes later the police discovered them in Bir's possession. Bir was arrested. Now one of the curtains hiding the rabcor network was lifted. Along with Bir, Strom and five French Communists were arrested; over sixty searches were conducted. Jacques Duclos, who knew that his role in the affair had been revealed by Riquier, left France in haste. He lived in hiding until the amnesty of 1933.

After another five months of investigation and trial the court sentenced the two Soviet agents, Bir and Strom, to three years' imprisonment—a sentence which became almost standard in Soviet espionage cases in French courts. The French agents were sentenced to terms of from thirteen to fifteen months. In its decision the court stated in part:

Izaia Bir was the head of an espionage organization in Paris; the task of this organization was to gather documents regarding war industries and in general all information on the state of national defense . . . He gathered reports of the worker-

* An amusing incident in connection with this investigation made Paris laugh. The two officers, who lived in Châtellerault for over a month while they were making their investigation, communicated with their superior in Paris by telephone, using code terms of course. Their talks were overheard, and the local police, suspecting illicit trade dealings, summoned the two officers to appear before the "commissaire." At first they pretended to be honest salesmen; later they revealed their names but not a word about their real mission. They had no confidence at all in the police!

correspondents, known under the name of "rabcors" . . .

The documents found in the possession of Bir and his accomplices reveal the existence of a vast network of industrial and military espionage which was active in various places, working at the instigation of foreign Communist organizations.

The court concluded:

Bir and Strom are real and very dangerous spies . . . The other defendants, French citizens and Communist militants, have, in a way, permitted themselves to be dragged into it by criminal propaganda of foreign origin . . .¹¹

The "Phantomas" case was closed, but the silent battle between the Soviet apparat and French counterespionage went on unremittingly.

Since 1927 the Fourth Department had acquired experience, trained new personnel, and greatly improved its techniques; the assistance given by the French militants was growing from year to year; important information was going to Moscow via all possible channels, and the Soviet General Staff was in possession of essential material for evaluating the components of France's military strength and for penetrating at least some of her deepest military secrets.

The French public was not aware how far the Soviet apparat had penetrated. From time to time a "spy" was caught, tried, and sentenced; sometimes entire "nests of Soviet espionage" were seized. Excitement over these incidents usually lasted a few days and then the affair was practically forgotten. The public was inclined to overlook the fact that the arrest of a foreign agent after years of espionage work in France meant that during that time a foreign power might have acquired a fund of information, a whole sector of French defense might have been laid bare to foreign eyes, and it would be years before the labels "confidential," "secret," and "top secret" would again have real meaning.

It was also significant that the uncovering of espionage affairs in those years was usually the result of accident: a traveler aroused suspicion by his nervousness; a briefcase containing stolen documents was lost; a building went up in flames. Had it not been for

such accidents the agents uncovered in them might have continued their activity for months and years; the rest—the great majority of foreign agents—proceeded undisturbed.

In April 1932 an Italian traveler, Enrico Vercellino, arriving from Switzerland, aroused suspicion at the frontier by his nervous behavior, and was arrested. Messages in code, secret documents, and a large sum in United States currency were found in his luggage. In Paris it was learned that Vercellino had been serving as a courier for the Soviet intelligence apparatus in France and had made regular trips between Paris and Berlin. It was also found that he had dispatched abroad through Switzerland a number of secret documents relating to French defense; they contained answers to the well-known Soviet questionnaires on war industry and aircraft construction.¹²

A month after this incident, during the parliamentary elections, a large non-Communist meeting took place at the St. Nazaire naval base. Toward the end of the meeting a fight broke out when Henri Gauthier, a well-known Communist from Paris, asked for the floor; in the mêlée that followed Gauthier escaped, leaving behind his briefcase. The police found its contents to be a multitude of papers dealing with French arsenals, submarines, cruisers, aviation plants, etc. Gauthier disappeared.¹³

In August 1933 a fire broke out in a house in Paris in which one Lucien Duquennoy was severely burned; he was taken to a hospital. The police were astounded to find among his belongings saved from the fire several revolvers, cartridges, and dozens of booklets, labeled "secret," published by the Ministry of War and dealing with new machine guns, 37-mm. guns, heavy artillery, tanks, cavalry, flak artillery, mobilization plans of the French army, and other matters. One hundred and fifty secret instructions of the Deuxième Bureau (Intelligence) of the French general staff were also found, along with an excellent map of French frontiers published by the German general staff. When he had recovered sufficiently to be able to talk, Duquennoy explained that he had a passion for collecting; the maps he needed in connection with his bicycle tours . . .¹⁴

In one case the police systematically shadowed a man named Cassiot and arrested him as he was leaving the building of *L'humanité*. A passport in the name of "Faillard" and numerous military documents were found in his possession. In a file bearing

the inscription "Préfecture de Police, Military Papers" were found plans and photographs of fortress constructions, documents relating to navy and army units, and lists of secret correspondents. Perhaps the most interesting document was a detailed French memorandum on the Red Army, stolen from the French general staff. The general staff in Moscow, having received the memo was now in a position to evaluate the intelligence of the French intelligence agencies.¹⁵

The Cassiot affair occurred in July 1929, at the beginning of a large operation of the government against the "antimilitarist" activity of the Communist party. Arrests and investigations proceeded over a period of four months; a number of high party leaders were indicted, among them Marcel Cachin, André Marty, Jacques Duclos, and Jacques Doriot. In all, 160 persons were involved and about 20 were arrested, most of them on charges not of espionage but of instigation to overthrow the regime. Among those indicted were Pierre Provost (he had managed to escape in 1927) and four editors of *L'humanité*, the latter accused of having published data on arsenals and war industries.

Antimilitarism was both a Communist movement and a cover. As a legal movement it developed, from the late 1920's on, in congresses, meetings, and in the press; unlike the bureaucratic and dull "peace" campaigns of our day, the movement was fresh, interesting, and, though silently guided by the Comintern, outwardly non-Communist. The "Antimilitarist" (AM) section of the KIM (Communist Youth International), on the other hand, embraced more than merely propaganda groups: "cells" in the armed forces were associated with this underground work as technical preparation for the "imminent" social revolution in various countries. With these as its special functions, AM could well hide in its folds a few cells working for Soviet military intelligence; the needs of an antiwar campaign served as an explanation of interest in documents, reports, and installations of a military nature. In a number of European countries Soviet intelligence acted through AM and partially financed it.

In France the antiwar movement had had a good start by the end of the 1920's. In addition to its propaganda function it served to enhance the stature of Russia and soothe the consciences of those who had to render espionage service for the "only" antimilitarist power in the world.

In the years between 1928 and 1933 a group of able agents was gradually assembled in France. The expanding network reached proportions unusual even for the large Soviet apparatus. When it was shattered in 1933-34 the official lists showed 250 men and women involved. As always, a large number remained undiscovered.

Lydia Stahl, one of the most interesting personalities of the Soviet secret service, was among the "old hands" in France; she had got out in time, in 1928, and gone to New York, where she lived until the echoes of the debacle had ceased. Then Moscow ordered her back to resume her activities in the country where she had served before.

Lydia Stahl was one of those secret agents who turned to espionage in their maturity as a result of tragic experience. She was born Lydia Chkalov in Rostov, in the south of Russia, in 1885. Her husband, Stahl, was a wealthy member of the Russian nobility. The Stahls lost their estates in the Crimea in the revolution, emigrated to the United States, where Stahl went to work in the Stock Exchange, and were naturalized. (Lydia's "American passport" was to prove an important asset.) When their only son died in 1918, Lydia, grief-stricken and lonely, returned to Europe. She made friends with the Communists and lived in Paris as a typical Russian university student of old times: her apartment was small and mean, she dressed poorly; with her tousled hair and worn-down heels she gave the impression of untidiness. During the 1920's she established a well-equipped photography studio in Paris where secret documents were copied. These she took to Berlin concealed in a belt around her waist. Her status as a student, however, was not simply a cover for underground operations; she had a real interest in the sciences. She had studied medicine in the United States and law in France, but she switched to oriental languages, apparently in preparation for service in the Far East. (She was studying a Chinese grammar at the moment of her arrest in December 1933.)

Lydia's *ami* from 1923 on was the French professor Louis Pierre Martin, former attaché of the Naval Ministry and officer of the Légion d'Honneur. They lived separately, however. Martin tried to impress those about him by his way of life—the quiet life of a professor who every summer went to his father's estate in Perigord for his vacation.¹⁶

Another veteran of Soviet intelligence in France was the retired

Col. Octave Dumoulin, regarded as a military expert, editor of *Armée et démocratie*, who, as we have seen, had been active in Soviet intelligence as early as 1923-24. Having lived for a time in Moscow, Dumoulin posed in France as a neutral expert on military affairs, in no way connected with Communism. His position as editor of a publication devoted to military affairs made his interest in this field understandable and his quest for secret data almost legitimate. Nobody was interested enough to investigate the source of the 4,000 francs which he received monthly for his publication, allegedly from unnamed friends. So well was Dumoulin protected by his "journalism" that his real occupation long went unrevealed.

Another "American passport" holder in the ring was Pauline Jacobson-Levine of New York. In New York Pauline had been the tenant of "the Gallery," the underground meeting place described by Whittaker Chambers.¹⁷ A few "Rumanian passports" also played an important role. Their holders stemmed from Bessarabia, until 1918 a Russian province; having automatically become Rumanian when the territory was annexed by the Bucharest government, the Bessarabians made abundant use of the non-Soviet color of their identification papers. Benjamin Berkowitz, paymaster and financial operator, and his wife; Vatroslav Reich, the chemist; Baila England; and a few others among the Soviet agents in France were natives of this Russian-Rumanian province.

The tasks of the ring were manifold. Some of its members were assigned to gather information on the army, location of army units, mobilization plans. Others concentrated on individual industrial plants and obtained detailed figures regarding military production. Correspondence of the military agencies was of particular interest, and hundreds of letters were stolen, copied, and forwarded abroad. The French engineer Aubry, an employee of the War Ministry, and his wife supplied information on gunpowder and explosives. Lydia Stahl once managed to ship to Berlin a complete machine gun of the newest type.

One of the most important assignments of the ring was to obtain data on poison gas and bacteriological warfare, a field in which Russia had started to work. Moscow pretended to know "for sure" that a new, mysterious, and powerful gas had just been invented, and it sought the formula. In this field the chief informer was the Bessarabian Vatroslav Reich, an employee of the government

biological and chemical laboratory, who smuggled documents out at lunch time, photographed them hurriedly in the apparat's atelier, and had them back in the files before the other employees had returned to their desks and retorts. By 1933 documents fully describing French scientific work in the development of different kinds of war gas were in the possession of the group.¹⁸

A number of agents were busy with technical work, such as photographing and shipping documents and other items. Benjamin Berkowitz, a "businessman," and his wife, a "painter," were the paymasters and among the ring's "elite." Marjorie Switz, the school-teacher Madeleine Mermet, and the Salzmann couple were trained photographers. The Bessarabian girl student Baila England installed in her home an unusual kind of furniture with secret panels and drawers, false bottoms, and so on. Large numbers of eggshells were later found in the home of the Switzes; each had a small hole at one end punctured in a special way.

Technique and conspiratsia were the pride of the ring. The members of this group, unlike other Soviet secret operators, were given numbers in addition to cover names to make discovery of their identity more difficult. Good salaries were paid them regularly. Moscow's concern for the group was obvious. Its members were forbidden to meet privately; their favorite place of rendezvous was the Trocadero aquarium. All lived modestly in inexpensive hotels, spending little; nobody could question the source of their income. When traveling in trains, however, and especially when carrying important material, it was their practice to buy all the seats in a compartment so that they would have the compartment to themselves. They also had a good cover for their activity—they were students, businessmen, or artists.¹⁹

This Paris group was actually run from Berlin. Berlin was, as has already been mentioned, the intelligence "center" for Western Europe until 1933. Keeping leaders of Soviet espionage out of the country in which they were actually operating was a precaution often taken. An outstanding Soviet agent in Berlin, the Yugoslav Markovich, was the real leader of the French network up to August 1933, when he was succeeded by "the Aviator."

"The Aviator," Robert Gordon Switz, was an American, son of wealthy parents living in East Orange, New Jersey. He had been educated in both the United States and France, and France became a second homeland for him. Switz was typical of a large

segment of the liberal elements of his generation who combined the lofty humanitarian principles, pacifist tendencies, and "anti-fascism" of the Communist movement with a profound ignorance of Soviet reality. In Switz's case there were the added elements of the liberal traditions of his family and his own thirst for adventure. In New York he and his wife Marjorie were at home in the Greenwich Village milieu of leftist intellectuals. In 1931, having accepted the tenets of Communism, "the Aviator" gladly took on the dangerous job of a secret agent of Moscow. "I was tired," Switz stated later, "of doing nothing, tired of leading the life of a young man of easy money. In the Soviet spy organization in New York and Washington they saw how keenly interested I was in the Russian experiment. I really was a Communist idealist. It was arranged for me to go to Moscow to be initiated into the movement. I went there in the guise of an aviation instructor."²⁰

In Moscow Switz grasped as little of Communist reality as had hundreds of foreigners before and after him, and when he returned home to start his new line of activity his faith was still unshaken. As a cover he took a position as a sales representative of MacNeill Instruments, Inc., manufacturers of aircraft instruments. According to a statement of a member of the firm, "he never sold anything." Switz married Marjorie Tilly, who was nineteen years old at the time of her marriage. The young Mrs. Switz not only joined the apparatus but quickly achieved rank.²¹

In 1931-32 the Switz couple was given training in photography in the United States in order to be able to replace the veteran Lydia Stahl in that country when she was ordered back to Paris. Numerous documents began to pass through their photographic laboratory. Among Switz's more important exploits in America was the Panama Canal affair:²² Soviet intelligence received through Switz highly secret United States Army documents, including the plan of Fort Sherman and the "White Plan" of Canal Zone operations in the event of riot or revolution.

In July 1933 the Switz couple was ordered to Paris to take over one of the apparatus. Events had made it urgent that the intelligence work in France be separated from the Berlin headquarters because under Nazi rule Berlin could not continue as the center of Soviet spy rings in Western Europe. The West European Bureau of the Comintern moved to Copenhagen; Soviet espionage networks in the various countries had to devise new methods of communicat-

ing with Moscow. In August 1933 the Soviet chief of the French group, Markovich, came to Paris to turn over part of the machinery to Switz. Switz was introduced to the most important of his future collaborators and assistants. "Please," Markovich told him, "pay particular attention to Aubry—poison gas."²³

By that time the French police had been alerted to the activities of the expanding Soviet underground. In 1933 counterespionage discovered a connection between Lydia Stahl and Ingrid Bostrom, who had been involved in an important Soviet espionage affair and had been arrested in Finland. Miss Bostrom, one of Lydia's best friends, told the Finnish authorities about Lydia's activities, her unhappy life, her devotion to her work as a secret agent. Starting from this point, French counterintelligence investigated and discovered the large network of which Lydia Stahl was an important member.

Switz was observed by the police when he kept an appointment with Markovich, who was known to the police. Markovich escaped arrest; the Switz couple remained in Paris and continued their dangerous work. A few days before Christmas 1933 a mysterious man (a Soviet agent on the French police force?) telephoned Switz and advised him that if he did not leave immediately he would be arrested. Switz stayed. The next day the police arrived. In his room they found correspondence of the French War Ministry, a letter written by the War Minister himself, and two memoranda dealing with weapons and military service; all of these documents were marked "confidential." At the time of the search Switz had in his possession one of Dumoulin's secret reports, which had been photographed on very thin paper by Marjorie Switz; it had been rolled up and placed inside a cigarette. When the police entered, the alert Mrs. Switz lit the cigarette and smoked it to the end.

Along with the Switz couple, ten other persons were arrested, among them some of the leading Soviet agents—Lydia Stahl, Louis Martin, Benjamin Berkowitz, Madeleine Mermet. In accordance with their principles, they denied any guilt; they did not know one another; Lydia Stahl had no idea what Louis did in his office; besides, she said, Louis was an anti-Communist émigré from Latvia. But Mlle. Mermet could not explain the presence of a short-wave radio transmitter in her home, nor could Switz explain from whom he had received the 19,000 francs found in his room.

French public opinion took the sensational news without be-

coming greatly excited. Hitler had been in power in Germany for almost a year, and attention was focused on the Nazi government. Following some hints from the Soviet embassy, a part of the French press surmised that the twelve arrested spies, whose names were unknown and among whom were no Soviet citizens, were working for Berlin. It was not long, however, before this comforting myth was dispelled. Though much remained to be revealed, there was no doubt of the Soviet connection.

The police fumbled in the dark for almost three months. The arrested spies did not confess, and the evidence gathered by the prosecution was incomplete. The turning point came with the occurrence of an unusual incident in the French consulate in Geneva. Two parcels containing four roles of film, mysteriously left at the consulate, came into the hands of the prosecuting authorities; the text of the photographed documents, written in skillful code, could not be deciphered. But Switz's fingerprints were found on the films, and two hairs in the parcel were found to be Marjorie's.

There was no longer any point in making denials, and Switz began to talk. He had already suffered some disillusionment about the great cause * and he saw no reason for being a martyr; also, French laws permit considerable leniency toward a spy who is willing to assist the prosecution in uncovering other agents. Marjorie followed her husband's example. Now the prosecution was armed for a new blow at Soviet espionage.

Three days after Switz's confession there were more arrests: Colonel Dumoulin, engineer Aubry, Vatroslav Reich, and many others. Quantities of explosives, chemicals, and documents were seized. By the end of March 1934 the large ring had been smashed. Five other members of the group followed Switz's lead and confessed in order to ameliorate their own sentences. In the Moscow sense it was a case of complete "demoralization." Mlle. Mermet told about her radio transmitter and camera, Reich and Aubry about their reports on chemical and germ warfare. The snarl was unraveling. One arrest followed another. By July, 29 persons had

* A year later Switz stated in a press interview: "Once we arrived on this side of the Atlantic [summer of 1933], I suffered a great shock. I was disappointed to learn the contemptible character of the men who were to work with me. Instead of the fervent idealists I had expected to find working for the cause, I found a set of men who thought of nothing but of what they could get out of it. I wanted to back out, so great was my disgust, but something inside of me made me go on. . . ." *New York Times*, April 19, 1935.

been formally accused and 200 others were being investigated.

For the Switzes, life in jail while awaiting trial was not intolerable. They had become good friends of the investigating officer, André Benon.

He said it was easy to see that the Switzes "are intelligent, well reared, and a couple of good education . . . I always have them both come to my office rather than one at a time . . . This is because they have no other place to meet, and I always give them a chance to be alone as long as possible. After all, I try to be human . . . There are spies and spies . . . I mean by that spies who have it in their blood, while others are apt to be drawn into something they do not understand until afterward." ²⁴

The Soviet government, in the face of the many revelations and confessions, was defiant. TASS stated on March 30, 1934, that all the spy charges were "based on slanderous inventions"; *Izvestia* threw out hints about German involvement, and then took the offensive:

It is quite possible that this time the French police have really discovered one of the numerous national or international spy organizations working for the benefit of one or many and against one or many capitalist countries. . . . In rightist French circles, where many have refused up to now to reconcile themselves to the strengthening of French-Soviet relations, it appears tempting to inflate the case of the *imaginary* "Soviet espionage" and thus distract attention from the Stavisky case and their part in it. . . .²⁵

A year passed before the trial could take place. Meantime the political climate had changed: France was about to become Moscow's ally, and Premier Pierre Laval was about to go to Moscow to sign the agreement. It would be embarrassing to stage, at such a moment, a sensational trial against a Soviet espionage network in France. The Foreign Office minimized the affair. The proceedings were secret; only a few witnesses, most of them police agents, were called to testify. Six of the defendants confessed and incriminated the others, and in general the morale of the defendants was low. The sentences were not severe.

Lydia Stahl, self-confident, stubborn, and defiant during the pro-

ceedings, broke down when she heard a five-year sentence pronounced against her. (The appellate court later reduced it to four years.) According to a press report, "Madeleine Mermet, the young photographer, who had borne a child in prison, heard her three-year sentence pronounced, leaned over and whispered to her baby and rocked it in her arms." Colonel Dumoulin and Berkowitz were each sentenced to five years. Ten unlocated defendants were sentenced in absentia to five years each. Only four of the defendants were acquitted.

Although the guilt of the Switzes was "recognized," the court decreed "exemption from punishment" for the help they gave France in tracking down the spy ring. The Switzes, who had every reason to fear reprisals, immediately went into hiding.

5. FRANCE IN THE NAZI ERA

The accession to power of the Nazi party in Germany in 1933 meant the beginning of the end of French predominance in Europe; it also meant the end of France's primary role in Soviet intelligence operations. It took Moscow a whole year, however, to realize the meaning of the upheaval in international relations and to draw conclusions. Until 1934 Stalin, reluctant to discard his favorite plan of a Russian-German bloc to oppose the West, tried to proceed along the anti-British and anti-French road. So many Soviet successes had been achieved, and so many German leaders, generals, and politicians had been won over, that Stalin refused to accept Hitler and his violently anti-Soviet course as final. He was inclined rather to view the Nazi regime as interim, an experiment that would promptly provoke popular resentment and revolutionary movements; in such terms the Nazi victory was even a welcome event.

As long as this state of uncertainty continued there was no reason to reduce the importance of France in the scheme of Soviet intelligence. Only a reorganization, a shifting of the order of command, seemed necessary. The German capital had to be abandoned as the center of Soviet intelligence, a place it had held for over a decade. The agency in France had to be detached from Berlin and put into direct connection with Moscow. The huge scope of this reorganization can be realized if it is borne in mind how many central and subsidiary agencies, covers, and fronts had been built up in Ger-

many in the Berlin era—shops that dealt in false documents, facilities for financial transactions, radio and courier communications, and so forth.

In the meantime the great upheaval in the relations between the European powers was taking definite shape. After a relaxation of the tension between France and Russia, the Soviet-French treaty was signed in May 1935; two months later the policy of “united fronts” was proclaimed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. In France a new government had emerged which was supported by the Communist party.

France began to be rapidly retired from the front line of Soviet intelligence targets; the huge networks of the “Muraille”-Switz type were no longer necessary. As far as political developments were concerned, the Communist leadership, part of the governmental coalition, was in a better position to report and evaluate than were a few underground spies. As for war industry secrets, Soviet attention had shifted to the United States and Germany, countries which in the Soviet view were now more advanced than France. Although espionage was not abandoned, measures were taken to prevent public scandals which could aggravate the Soviet Union’s newly won position of respectable ally of France.

Among the apparatus of Soviet military intelligence of that time one deserves attention because of its leaders, who later acquired great prominence. The head was a veteran Communist GRU agent, the Hungarian Alexander Rado, who had fled from Nazi Berlin after a long period of activity in Germany. In 1936, in Paris, he established a press agency as a cover; to make it appear more genuine, the *Agence* employed two writers, one of whom was Arthur Koestler, at the time still a loyal Communist.

We produced [Koestler recalls] three or four stencilled broadsheets a week in French and German, which were sent to French, Swiss and Austrian newspapers. . . . It struck me, however, as slightly odd that I did not know exactly which newspapers were our subscribers. I asked Alex once or twice, but each time he answered casually that the agency was still in its trial period, and that we were sending the bulletin to a great number of prospective subscribers on approval. I thought he had a reason not to disclose the business aspects

of the agency, and among Party members one never presses a question.

I was also a little puzzled by Alex's rather detached attitude to the whole enterprise. . . .¹

Rado's heyday, however, came somewhat later, when he was transferred to Switzerland, where, as a "resident," he performed an extensive espionage job during the war.² Koestler became a top-ranking ex-Communist writer after the war.

The French government was friendly and considerate. From time to time it discovered cases of excessive curiosity on the part of people connected with Moscow; it did not want these episodes to grow into important affairs and it avoided, as far as possible, any prosecution. The kidnapping of the White general, Evgeni Miller, in Paris was traced to the GB; the assassination of Dmitri Navashin, a former Soviet official, was attributed to it; the murder of Ignace Reiss in Switzerland was committed by a group of Soviet agents dispatched from Paris; there were a number of other incidents. French authorities continued to keep hands off, an attitude which was part of the general tenor of French policy of that period: "reasons of state" prescribed friendly relations with Moscow; three or five or ten spies, or cases of kidnapping, appeared insignificant in light of the great issues involved.

In one typical case these reasons of *haute politique* led to a minor conflict with Switzerland. When the assassination of Ignace Reiss was investigated in both Switzerland and France, the Swiss authorities were surprised at what they considered a strange attitude on the part of the French. In his summary of January 2, 1938, R. Jacquillard, head of the Swiss Sûreté in Lausanne, cited instances in which the French police failed to comply with, or acted contrary to, his requests: on November 9, 1937, he had informed the Paris police that the NKVD agent in Paris, Sergei Efron, was involved in the murder; then, Jacquillard complained, Efron escaped; he asked Paris to investigate the Grozovsky couple, Soviet officials—and Mr. Grozovsky left France; when the Swiss authorities, in possession of convincing proof, requested the extradition of Lydia Grozovsky to Switzerland, the French set her free on bail, and she escaped abroad in a Soviet embassy car.

In Western Europe war on espionage was mounting in the late 'thirties. In the main the target was German and Soviet espionage;

attacks against Italian and Japanese intelligence operations were less intensive. Counterespionage agencies were being enlarged; police were becoming more alert; new laws providing for severer penalties were promulgated. In France, however, increased measures were taken only in regard to German and Italian agents. In July 1938 a new law enacted by the Parliament introduced the death penalty for espionage in peacetime. In March 1939 the first death sentence against a German spy was carried out in Metz; three other spies were executed before the outbreak of the war. There were no cases of Soviet espionage, however, among those prosecuted at the time. The more menacing the German danger became, the more appeasing was the attitude of the French government toward Soviet policies.

CHAPTER 3

Germany before the Second World War

1. GREAT EXPECTATIONS

THE place of Germany in the framework of Soviet intelligence was different from, in some respects even opposite to, that of France.

For a decade before the first World War France had been the most active among the big powers as far as espionage in Germany was concerned; at the same time German espionage was more active in France than in other countries. Among the 135 men and women convicted of espionage in Germany from 1907 to the outbreak of the war in 1914, 74 were French, 35 were Russian, and 15 were British. In the four years 1914-18, of the 310 treason cases tried, 175 involved persons accused of espionage for France, 55 of espionage for Britain, and 55 of espionage for Russia.¹

This situation continued for several years after 1918. With Russia entirely out of the picture and British interest in German military affairs greatly diminished, France remained in the number one position among the powers seeking information on Germany. Now, however, emphasis was not so much on revelation of German military and naval secrets—there were no longer many such—as on information concerning the military potential of Germany in the broadest sense, including secret data on inventions of German industry.

In fact, German strength and prospects of rehabilitation lay entirely in the industrial sphere. Germany had suffered no destruction of her cities during the war, and the German economy was rapidly rising again to a leading position in Europe. New industrial giants—first among them the chemical trust—were being added to the list of the huge industrial concerns of prewar times: Krupp, AEG, and others. The French General Staff as well as individual industrialists exerted strenuous efforts to obtain information about

the technical progress of their enemy of the past, their rival of the present, and their potential foe of the future.

To Russia the German army of the 1920's presented no menace, and the German navy and air force at that time were practically nonexistent. Whereas France was viewed by Moscow as the center of anti-Soviet plots and conspiracies and the heart of the future war against Russia, of Germany Moscow expected, at least until 1925, that the revolution, broken up in 1919, would soon flare up again, that a Soviet Germany would then ally herself with the Soviet Union, and that a war with France, in which German military force would fight on the Soviet side, would become inevitable. Therefore, in its sizable underground activity in Germany the Soviet government concentrated on preparation for general strikes, civil war, street fighting, and supplies of arms rather than on a search for military secrets through espionage.

The highly bellicose Communist International, which had just been formed, was living through the phase of its history which might be termed its German era: it staked everything on the "imminent" revolution in Germany. Its strategy and tactics were part of the preparation for the German revolution. The Red Army, moving from Russia, would have to break through to "join hands" with the new German revolutionary force; the Polish Communist party would make the operation possible by instigating a revolutionary upheaval; a war with France would "inevitably" follow, and it would be the task of French Communism to paralyze French military efforts; in Germany a Soviet government would emerge in which Russian help would consist of political alliance, arms, training, secret police, and the building of intelligence—all of this according to the Moscow pattern.

Germany was the great hope, the center of attraction. German was the prevailing language in use in the Comintern, and the Russian leaders—Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin—addressed the congresses in German. Posters displayed in the streets of Moscow proclaimed "The German October is at the gates."

Within less than a year the dream began to materialize—or so it seemed. When Poland attacked Russia in the spring of 1920, and when, after an initial retreat, the Red Army turned back the Polish troops and approached Warsaw, the situation seemed ripe. A Communist "Polish Government" under Felix Dzerzhinski was set up. The peace with Warsaw proposed by London was rejected

by Lenin, and not until the Soviet Army, defeated in the "Vistula miracle," turned back, did the war end. Trotsky was one of the very few Soviet leaders who opposed the interpretation of the "social revolution" as a march through Poland into Germany.

The failure in Poland did not discourage the Soviet leadership, however, as far as the German "marchroute [itinerary] of the revolution" was concerned; as a matter of fact, the conviction that the great upheaval was still imminent made the unfavorable terms of the peace treaty more tolerable since, in view of the inevitable new conflict, the treaty was only a "temporary" one.

In the following three years, 1920-23, Moscow did what it could to prepare for a successful coup in Germany. It was during these years that the INO (the Foreign Department of the GB) emerged and expanded rapidly; that the Fourth Department of the Army was organized; that communications with Germany by mail, telegraph, railroad, couriers, and diplomatic pouch became routinized; that a Soviet embassy and trade mission were again set up in Berlin. In this period also the Soviet-German treaty, inaugurating an era of close collaboration, was signed at Rapallo and started to bear fruit. The furthering of collaboration in the field of arms, and the efforts to win German officers over to the anti-French, pro-Russian side were the tasks of Trotsky's Fourth Department. If these activities were in the nature of intelligence work, they were not espionage in the exact sense of that term.

In 1923, when Germany's Ruhr province was occupied by France and inflation in Germany reached a peak, the impatient Soviet leadership considered the situation ripe for a new great offensive, to proceed after the only available pattern, the Russian one. Scores of Soviet agents, most of them non-Russians, from the Comintern as well as from various Soviet departments, were dispatched to Germany. At their head were a few men selected by the Russian Politburo, among them Alexis Skoblevsky, who was assigned to take charge of military preparations. A former worker from Latvia (his original name was Rose), with a record of successful leadership in the Russian civil war, Skoblevsky headed a newly formed German "Military-Political Organization" (MP), a kind of a general staff for a German army. Skoblevsky's aide in Hamburg was Hans Kippenberger, eventual leader of the German underground. The country was divided into six military districts, each headed by a German Communist, with a Russian "adviser" located at an

inconspicuous place; the Soviet "general" Stern (known later, in Spain, as "Kleber" and in the United States as Zilbert, and executed in Russia in 1938) was adviser for the Northwest district; Alexei Stetski (also executed in 1938) was the Russian opposite number of Erich Wollenberg, the German leader of the Southwest.* This system of maintaining Russian officers and advisers in a foreign country was applied a year or two later in China during the Borodin era. The Russian GB men helped to organize a comparable agency in Germany consisting of an M-service (military), N-service (intelligence), T-service (terror), and Z-service (infiltration of other parties and organizations). The operations of these services, which included attempts on the lives of German military leaders and assassination of "traitors," reached considerable proportions in the period that followed.

Finally, several hundred Red Army officers were sent to Germany to help organize and lead the German military force: "Assigned to their posts, the men proceeded to them in various disguises and then reported extensively to their Russian superiors, the residents of the OMS (secret liaison agency of the Comintern) in the Russian Embassy."²

A selected group from the Army's intelligence department arrived in Berlin, Essen, and Leipzig. Among these intelligence agents was young Walter Krivitsky, officer of the Fourth Department, who later defected from the Soviet ranks. Krivitsky stated later that the plan provided for setting up "three types of organizations in the German Communist Party; the Party Intelligence Service working under the guidance of the Fourth Department of the Red Army; military formations as the nucleus of the future German Red Army, and *Zersetzungsdienst*, small units of men whose function was to shatter the morale of the Reichswehr and the police."³

* Erich Wollenberg, *Der Apparat* (Bonn), pp. 9, 10, 15. Felix Neumann, a German Communist who later joined the Nazi party, played a considerable role as liaison and "man of confidence" of the Soviet leaders in Berlin: "He used to enter the Soviet embassy," reports Erich Wollenberg, "on Unter den Linden with an empty briefcase while I waited in the nearby café Kranzler; he returned with dollars and other foreign exchange." D papers, b 250.

† In hard cash the abortive uprising had cost the Soviet treasury about \$1,000,000, most of it for buying arms in Germany and neighboring countries. Statement by Ypsilon, D papers, XYZ 93.

The whole operation collapsed in October. The strikes and uprisings were failures, the Army remained loyal to the government, and the "revolution," limited to an uprising in Hamburg, was suppressed without great effort. The Russian Communist advisers returned to Russia without glory. A revision of the entire geographical pattern of the world revolution began; soon China was to replace Germany as the greatest hope of the Communist world.

Soviet military intelligence made use of the lessons it had learned from the abortive efforts of 1923: a new agency, for intelligence and espionage proper, went to work in Germany. It was in a position to operate, under Soviet guidance, with the substantial help of a cohort of young underground leaders: Kippenberger, Zaisser, Illner-Stahlmann, Sorge, and others.

Upon one branch of the Soviet government the costly experiment of 1923 was not entirely wasted. That was the Military Intelligence Service. When we saw the collapse of the Comintern's efforts, we said: "Let's save what we can of the German revolution." We took the best men developed by our Party Intelligence and the *Zersetzungsdienst* and incorporated them into the Soviet Military Intelligence. Out of the ruins of the Communist revolution we built in Germany for Soviet Russia a brilliant intelligence service, the envy of every other nation.⁴

One of the goals of the Soviet military intelligence apparatus in Germany was to search out industrial secrets which might be relevant in one way or another to the military field. Germany could furnish hundreds of military secrets which could be valuable for the re-emerging war industry of Russia; her nonmilitary economy was also an object of envy and a pattern for imitation. Like France, therefore, Russia was interested mainly in German industry, and the targets of French and Russian intelligence in Germany were often the same. More than once when foreign spies were caught in Germany it was not clear at first whether France or Russia was the patron. Within a few years, however, the Soviet agencies outstripped the French; in the early 1930's the great majority of cases of industrial espionage by a foreign agency which came to light in Germany were operations guided by a Soviet intelligence agency.

Since 1928, when the era of the five-year plans began, the Soviet Union had been in a stage of industrialization which was tantamount to militarization. Germany was the closest and most logical field for observation of industrial methods which could be imitated in the effort to replace the obsolete Russian technology. What Russia was able to get legally by contract—German engineers to work in Soviet plants, German advisers, and a few German industrial “concessions”—was an infinitesimal item in Stalin’s large-scale expectations and projects. Operation Soviet Intelligence was the obvious answer, and since the primary aim of Soviet industrialization was technical equipment of Soviet heavy industry and the armed forces, the German industries on which attention was to be focused were the chemical industry (first of all I. G. Farben), the steel and iron industry (Krupp, Rheinmetall, Borsig, Mannesmann, and others), the electrical industry (Siemens, Telefunken, AEG), and the aviation industry.

Special attention was also paid to scientific research establishments such as the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut and the Luftfahrt-Forschungs Institut. Scores of Soviet sympathizers and helpers were found among the staffs of these learned bodies, where new ideas were born, developed, tested, and put to work. Often Moscow knew about a new German invention before it went into serial production in Germany.

German industry tried hard to check industrial espionage by its own means. A pioneer in this field was I. G. Farben, which set up a special office for this purpose under a few expert detectives, in Leverkusen. Soon the Union of German Industries (Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie), which estimated losses through espionage at 800,000,000 marks (\$190,000,000) a year,⁵ joined I. G. Farben as representative of the rest of the affected firms. These counterespionage efforts were not very successful—perhaps because the Soviet apparat managed to plant a girl secretary in the special office established to fight espionage.⁶

Within a few years the rapidly mounting volume of Soviet industrial espionage in Germany had become an avalanche. Never had there been such a tight network of mass espionage as that set up by the Soviet Union within German industry in the period 1928–32. In the late 1920’s police headquarters in Berlin established a special division to fight industrial (and other nonpolitical)

espionage all over Germany. It listed approximately 330 cases in 1929 and over a thousand in 1930.*

The years from 1926 to 1932 were the era of Soviet-German political collaboration, when the Berlin government tried to minimize or conceal evidence of Soviet espionage rather than take offensive action. Spy trials, in which the guiding hand of Soviet representatives might be revealed, were held behind closed doors.

The rapid growth of Soviet intelligence operations was paralleled by the rising of the Nazi tide.

Considerable facilities existed in the Germany of the democratic era (1919-32) for recruiting personnel for Soviet espionage. In this defeated nation, with its unstable governments, its Black Reichswehr, its Fememords (political assassinations), and its putsches, the Communist movement was on the rise and political passions blazed. Hundreds of ardent young converts could be easily recruited into the various apparats of both the German Communist party and Soviet intelligence. Remuneration for espionage and the prospect of jobs in Russia served to attract engineers and workers to the large network.

Ample diplomatic facilities were also available in Germany. The governments of Moscow and Berlin resumed semi-official relations in 1920, and for a time the Berlin embassy was used to serve all kinds of needs of the intelligence network. Besides, the Handelsvertretung (trade legation), with its huge offices in the Lindenstrasse, became a cover, in fact the most important shelter, for dozens of Soviet agents coming to Germany on missions for the GB, the Fourth Department of the Army, or the Comintern. The "reception commissions" of the trade legation, whose members traveled all over Germany to receive ordered goods, often engaged in industrial espionage on a large scale.

In German Communist slang the Soviet secret apparats of the GB and the Fourth Department were called "the two girls"—"Grete" for GB and "Klara" for Krasnaya Armiya (Red Army). The two agencies worked separately and were in touch with one

* On the basis of official data, the Nazi author Adolf Ehrt reports that no less than 111 cases of treason were tried in Germany between June 1931 and December 1932; almost 150 persons were found guilty, during that period, of betrayal of military secrets. The years 1931 and 1932 do not fall into the Nazi era; however, Ehrt's figures must be taken with caution. Adolf Ehrt, *Bewaffneter Aufstand* (Berlin, 1933), p. 64.

another only at the very top of the Soviet hierarchy in Berlin. In addition to the "two girls" there was the large agency maintained by the Comintern (working mainly in Berlin), the OMS (*Otdel Mezhdunarodnykh Svyazei*, Department of International Liaison of the Central European Section of the Comintern), with its remarkable passport and radio facilities and a score of couriers.

Despite inevitable casualties, the three Soviet apparats which had emerged in the early 1920's proved successful. They reached the peak of their success in 1930-32.

2. THE HANDELSVERTRETUNG AS A COVER

Like Arcos in London, the Soviet trade legation or Handelsvertretung in the Lindenstrasse was a mammoth foreign trade agency whose trade turnover amounted to hundreds of millions of marks a year. The operations of the Berlin Handelsvertretung were vital for Russia as well as for certain branches of German industry. The political significance of the agency was enhanced when part of the trade in arms, too, was concentrated in the hands of its special "Engineering Department." Since export of arms from Germany was prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, this department, supervised by the Soviet military attaché personally, worked in secrecy and was never mentioned in the press. It was the best organized and most efficient of all the divisions of the legation. Among the customers of the Engineering Department were the well-known I. G. Farben, Krupp, BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke), Junkers, and other German firms. The trade legation opened branches in Hamburg, Königsberg, and Leipzig; three other subagencies were opened, but these soon had to be closed.

Besides these legitimate and semilegitimate operations, the Soviet trade legation in Berlin had the task of sheltering among its hundreds of employees a number of agents whose real assignments had nothing to do with trade or economic affairs and whose superiors in Moscow were not in Mikoyan's People's Commissariat but in the GB and military intelligence. This aspect of the Soviet trade legation's operations involved taking chances and endangering the smooth working of commercial agreements, but once the necessity of an all-embracing intelligence system was recognized, there was no better way to hide the special agents than in the folds of the trading companies.

Experienced GB men headed the "Personnel Department," which took care of "security" matters. They gave instructions in such techniques as how to destroy waste paper without throwing it away, and how to hide secret documents so that nothing would be found in a police raid. Employees of the trade legation were checked and rechecked by the Personnel Department so that no one disloyal to the Soviet regime could sit at a desk in the legation's offices. The German personnel of the legation were checked by the Central Committee of the German Communist party. A far-sighted precaution was taken when the large building in the Lindenstrasse was rented. The yard at the rear led to a building in the Ritterstrasse. With funds provided by the GRU the two Loewenstein brothers, jewelers by trade and reliable agents never openly connected with the Communist party, rented the store in the Ritterstrasse and set up in business as Gebrüder Loewenstein. From the rear yard of the legation building it was possible to enter the store of the Loewensteins and to disappear in the Ritterstrasse.

Abundant use was made of the available facilities by both Soviet intelligence and German Communism. About 50 per cent of the local secretaries of the Berlin Communist organization, among them a number of agents of the underground groups—the T-, the M-, the Z-services, etc.—were legation employees. In this indirect way the Soviet government maintained a large part of the German apparat.¹

In 1924 the trade legation became involved for the first time in a political affair, and its premises were searched by the police. The case concerned one Hans Botzenhard, a railway engineer, who had been discharged for Communist activity. The present president of East Germany, Wilhelm Pieck, helped him obtain a job with the trade legation in Berlin. After a probationary period of a few months he was sent by two officials of the Soviet embassy to work with the highly clandestine "Military Apparat" of the KPD (German Communist party). In 1924 Botzenhard was arrested in Stuttgart and sent under police escort to Stargard, passing through Berlin on his way north. Walking along the Lindenstrasse, he persuaded the two policemen who were escorting him (they were in Berlin for the first time) to stop for lunch at a "restaurant." When they entered the "restaurant" (the legation office) Botzenhard shouted, "Comrades, I am Botzenhard, I am employed here. These

two policemen are taking me to Stargard." * Immediately he was surrounded by a crowd of Soviet employees, separated from the policemen, and quietly let out through the back door. The police conducted a thorough search of the building but of course found nothing substantial. In their interrogation of those on the premises they were surprised at the large number of employees who held privileged "service" passports. (Possession of a "service" passport does not necessarily imply that the holder has diplomatic status.) After the search had continued for two hours Foreign Minister Stresemann ordered the police to withdraw.²

The Botzenhard affair grew into an international conflict. Nikolai Krestinsky, the Soviet ambassador, took the offensive and launched a strong protest with the *Auswärtiges Amt* (the foreign office): the trade legation, he insisted, being part of the embassy, was extraterritorial and outside the jurisdiction of the police; consequently an apology was due from the German government. In the meantime he had stopped all commercial transactions of the legation in the obvious expectation that German industrialists would exert pressure on the Foreign Office and make it soft to the Soviet demands. With the same intent Moscow ordered Krestinsky to return "to report." His departure increased the tension. Next day the German Communists called a strike of 300,000 miners in the Ruhr, one of the proclaimed aims of which was to "protest against the search in the *Handelsvertretung*." In Moscow a huge street demonstration of 250,000 took place at which Krestinsky was present. Finally Moscow "categorically insisted" on the privilege of extraterritoriality for its trade legation, and after almost three months of negotiations a "protocol" was signed. The German government apologized for the raid and announced that the police officer responsible for it had been discharged from his post. In future, the protocol provided, part of the *Handelsvertretung* and a number of its leading officers would enjoy extraterritoriality. These far-reaching concessions were due primarily to Stresemann's general course toward a Russian-German collaboration, but at the time there still existed, not only in Germany but everywhere, ignorance and misconceptions about the real motives of the Soviet insistence on diplomatic privileges for its trade legations. Public opinion was inclined to believe that this demand involved mainly

* According to another version, Botzenhard pretended to faint in front of the trade legation and was carried inside by the police and passers-by.

an issue of prestige and that it was not wise to offend a government which had plainly been rendered sensitive by foreign intervention and nonrecognition. At this time almost every trade agreement with the Soviet Union made important concessions in this respect: the Italian, British, and Baltic agreements stipulated that a number of high officers of the trade legations should enjoy diplomatic privileges, while the premises of the legations, or a portion of them, were frequently recognized as a part of the embassies.*

The KPD expelled Botzenhard as a spy, and a conflict broke out between the KPD and the Russian-led "terror group" in Germany about the attitude to be taken toward him. Since he was likely to be rearrested, and could divulge compromising dealings of the Cheka (T-group), the latter decided to kill him. Everything was prepared for the assassination when the police, having learned his whereabouts, arrested Botzenhard. He confessed only as far as minor issues were concerned. To prevent greater revelations, the Cheka got in touch with him in jail and sent him food and other gifts. The result was that Botzenhard was reticent at the trial. In June 1925 he was sentenced to three and a half years at hard labor.³

The trade legation maintained a coding department for its communications with Moscow, the existence of which it did not have to hide since secrecy was officially required in view of the multitude of "commercial secrets." In another department of the legation a large high-speed photo-printing machine was installed. (Similar equipment was in use at the provincial branches in Leipzig, Hamburg, and Königsberg.) An illustration of the efficiency of this piece of equipment and the use to which it was put is the following story: In 1932 the Polizeipräsidium of Berlin prepared a 500-page report describing the underground network of the Communist party. A copy of the report was sent to the public prosecutor. On its way from police headquarters in the Alexanderplatz to the courthouse in Moabit the report passed through the

* Another prominent case was the police raid on Arcos, in London, in May 1927, in search of a stolen secret document; this raid led to a rupture of Soviet-British relations lasting for two years. The document sought was never found, however, because hundreds of documents could be quietly burned before the police could break down the heavy doors to the inner sanctum of Arcos. Despite the failure, "the evidence now in the hands of the authorities proves," Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin announced on May 24, 1927, "that both military espionage and subversive activities throughout the British Empire and North and South America were directed and carried out from Soviet Houses." *Times* (London), May 25, 1927.

trade legation, where it was photographed. It arrived at its intended destination only two hours behind schedule. From its contents the heads of the Passfälscher-Zentrale learned how little the police really knew about the party's secret operations and personnel.⁴

Several members of the "Grete" and "Klara" organizations traveled over the country with identification papers issued by the trade legation. In the numerous espionage cases that came before German courts during the period evidence pointed to the Handelsvertretung. The defendants in these trials, some of them top men in Soviet espionage and the Communist underground (Dienstbach, Glebov, Mashkevich, Smirnov, Lebedev, Arbusov, and a host of others), had been at one time or another on the payroll of the Handelsvertretung, although they hardly ever visited the premises after "go papers" had been issued to them. Secret agents repeatedly entered Germany and obtained documents as employees of the legation. For a few weeks the secret agent would live in one of the large boarding houses in which Soviet officials resided; when everything was in order, he "submerged," as the saying goes—disappeared from sight—and another, a really important man, arrived who assumed his name and address and papers. Thus the police could never suspect the existence of the double. This particular trick was known as *Operation Umsteigen* ("transfer").

The German police tried hard to recruit informers from among the employees of the Handelsvertretung and to plant their own agents in the trade legation agencies. They did not succeed, however, because the precautions taken by the Soviet experts in underground operations made it almost impossible. "The police did not have agents in either the Soviet embassy or the Handelsvertretung," reports Hans Peters, formerly with *Abteilung IA* (Political Division) of the Berlin Polizeipräsidium. The Soviet police "closely observed the way of life of every official and used to rotate their employees; to us, on the other hand, the recruiting of an agent required considerable time, and before we enlisted him, he had to leave."⁵

Since 1926–27 the best brains and substantial funds had been assigned to industrial espionage, this most important of the tasks of the military intelligence apparat in Germany.

The two Mashkevich brothers, from Baku, were at the head of

the industrial espionage operation in Germany from 1928 to 1934. Successful in their fight against counterespionage, they were never discovered and quietly left Germany in 1934, after five years of activity. With the Mashkeviches worked Lebedev, Smirnov, and one illegal named "Oscar." With the exception of "Oscar," all these "aces" of Soviet intelligence used the trade legation as a cover. In 1929 Boris Bazarov, a rising star of secret intelligence, was transferred to Berlin from the Balkans; his aide, Mikhail Samoilov, was assigned the sole task of organizing industrial espionage. When Samoilov was suddenly recalled during the sensational I. G. Farben espionage affair in 1931, Bazarov and his wife were for several years the most important agents of the Fourth Department in Berlin; they later came, in a similar capacity, to the United States.

Among the GB chiefs in Berlin was Gottwald, inspector of Soviet personnel, who was responsible for checking on the loyalty and conduct of all officials, and for hiring and firing. More important, actually the head of the GB in Germany for many years, was Ravich, who was also on the payroll of the trade legation. Ravich, a quiet, reasonable, amiable man, was an interesting personality. He had fought in the civil war in Russia, gradually climbed the hierarchical ladder in the GB, and was now one of the venerated (later destroyed) "old Bolsheviks." He was about forty toward the end of the pre-Nazi period. Never overbearing despite his high position, sound in judgment, taciturn, and impenetrable, he was the almost perfect underground leader. Among his assignments was the setting up of cover organizations. With Ravich's assistance Karthals, a "Grete" agent, opened a typewriter shop which served not only as a meeting place for his couriers but as a means of conveying secret documents concealed in the rubber cylinders of the typewriters. This ingenious trick was never discovered by the police.⁶

Below the upper echelons of Soviet officials was a small working group of reliable German organizers, all of them Communists of long standing, all of them trustworthy.

Fritz Burde ("Dr. Schwartz") supervised this network from 1929 to 1932, when he was transferred to China. A former German worker from Hamburg, a "slim, smooth, smiling young man of thirty, blond, with an open face and frank eyes."⁷ Burde was one of those able underground "activists" who were accorded the honor of advancement into the ranks of Soviet intelligence. He ended his

wanderings in the "fatherland of proletarians," where he was executed in the purge. One member of Burde's network was the young Communist enthusiast Arthur Koestler, a writer for the liberal *Vossische Zeitung* and a secret member of the Communist party of Germany. Koestler's services to Soviet intelligence were based on his position as foreign editor of this influential newspaper. He had access to virtually all information of a confidential nature coming to the office of the paper and reported regularly to Burde. After only a few months of such service, however, Koestler was denounced as a Communist to his superiors at the *Vossische Zeitung* and was discharged. He retired from intelligence activity but maintained his status as a secret party member and went to Russia to write a book on *Russia as Seen through Bourgeois Eyes*.⁸ Somewhat later, as a refugee from Germany, Koestler joined Alexander Rado's ring, as we have seen above.

Burde's successor, Wilhelm Bahnick, a graduate of the Moscow Military-Political School, remained at his post until 1935 and was transferred to Spain, where he became a casualty in the civil war. Johann Liebers served as Bahnick's first lieutenant in Germany until 1935, when he was assigned to China; Wilhelm Thebart, another Military-Political School graduate, was in charge of industrial espionage in central Germany (Saxony and Thuringia); engineer Erwin Kramer served the apparat as an expert on tanks and railroads; and there were many others.

Under the guidance of the German assistants of the Soviet chiefs, a number of experts and scientific workers were giving information on their particular fields: chemistry, metals, railways. A smaller number of skilled workers sometimes joined in the espionage activities.

Use was made of the Communist Student Organization (Kostufra), whose members within a few years would be manning German industry and educating a new generation. There were the Klub der Geistesarbeiter (a leftist union of intellectuals) and a number of similar associations analogous to the "professional" group in the Communist underground in the United States. Klaus Fuchs, eventually convicted in Britain as an atom spy, belonged to one of these "professional" groups in Germany in 1932-33. Hans Reiners, a former member of the apparat, estimated that 5 per cent of the teaching staff of the Technische Hochschule in Berlin, the largest and best equipped of German engineering schools, were

being used by the Soviet network, most of them without knowing it. "The apparat," Reiners said, "was ramified and ubiquitous; it had helpers in all professions, even among cleaning women and errand boys, some of whom were paid, others not . . . The budget ran to 30,000 to 40,000 marks monthly; in addition 5,000 marks a month came from 'Grete.'" *

Other motives than Communist convictions sometimes brought people into the espionage network. With the most innocent of intentions, German scientists were carrying on correspondence with colleagues in Soviet universities, others were "correspondent-members" of a Soviet learned society. The VOKS (Association for Cultural Liaison with Foreign Countries) in Moscow, which served as a tie between Soviet science and its friends abroad, was closely supervised by the GB. The names of all German correspondents were noted and political attitudes were checked; some of these "correspondents" were approached in one way or another.

Finally, some agents were lured by financial considerations. Weak characters, adventurers, unlucky gamblers, persons inclined to minimize danger, debt-ridden individuals, persons too much involved in love affairs were agents or potential agents. Some were caught and tried, others attempted to return to private life. The names of the latter were not forgotten in Moscow, and sometimes, after a period of quiet retirement, these people were reminded by Moscow's agents of their past and had to face unhappy alternatives.

Another abundant source of "industrial spies" was the contingent of "Russia-goers"—engineers and workers who tried to find employment in Soviet industry. At the beginning of the "industrialization" era the high salaries offered to top engineers and workers appeared very attractive; later, during the depression, thousands of unemployed Germans wanted to go to Russia. Their written applications were processed by Ravich's GB office, but only a small number were found acceptable.⁹ One of Ravich's agents, pretending to represent a private employment agency, used to insert advertisements in the newspapers urging persons looking for employment in the Soviet Union to communicate with him via a given box number. Letters received in reply to these advertisements

* D papers, b 357. In addition to the Technische Hochschule as a site of technical and military espionage, Reiners mentions the following scientific institutions: Kaiser Wilhelm Institut, Staatliches Materialprüfungsamt, Waffenprüfungsamt, Herz Institut für Schwingungsforschung, and Forschungsanstalt für Luftfahrt.

were turned over to Erich Steffen, a German agent of Soviet military intelligence, who sent them to Ravich. Out of the mass of responses Ravich selected those of persons employed in plants of particular interest to Russia. These applications were processed, the political views of the applicants were checked, and if the findings were satisfactory the applicant was told by the "employment agency": "If you can connect us with a man from your industrial unit willing to collaborate with us after your departure, you will be hired to go to Russia." The success achieved by this method was considerable.

Last but not least, a rabcor group was created in Germany similar to those which emerged elsewhere during that era under the guidance of the Comintern and with the financial assistance of Soviet military intelligence; at its head, in the initial period, stood Bela Vago, a Hungarian Communist, employee of the trade legation and Soviet intelligence agent. The worker-correspondents (BB's) started their movement about 1925 and soon grew to larger proportions than elsewhere outside of Russia. *Rote Fahne* in Berlin and the provincial Communist newspapers encouraged and incited the "writers" from the industrial units, who, in their Communist and anti-employer zeal, revealed comings and goings, technical developments, and new work methods. The reports of the BB's were expertly sifted and checked, and if a report appeared significant enough it was turned over to the intelligence men.

Soviet sources indicate that great progress was made in the German BB movement between 1926 and 1932. "Of all capitalist countries where the BB movement developed," wrote Maria Ulianova, "Germany was one of the first." In June 1928 *Rote Fahne* listed 127 BB's, a month later 227. By the end of 1928 there were several thousand rabcors in Germany.¹⁰

In addition to the Handelsvertretung, separate "trading companies," often referred to as "mixed" Soviet-German firms, emerged in specific fields—Derop for oil, Deruluft for aviation, Kniga for books, etc. Each of these served also as a cover for one or the other of the "two girls"—rarely for both simultaneously. The division was logical; Red Army intelligence was to use Derutra (Deutsch-russische Transport Gesellschaft), Derop (oil), Garantie-und-Kredit-Bank für den Osten A.G. ("Garkrebo"), Abnahmekommissionen (reception commissions) of the Handelsvertretung; TASS (the press agency), while the GB was installed in Kniga (the book firm), Vostvag (East-West Trading Company), Intourist (foreign

tourist travel), film companies, TASS. The TASS agency alone was used by both "Grete" and "Klara."

3. GERMAN EFFICIENCY

The relationship between Soviet intelligence and the Communist party in Germany was in form and principle the same as in France; in practice, however, there developed in Germany a significant deviation from the French pattern.

In principle the KPD was obliged to appoint a highly placed, trusted man as liaison to the Soviet apparat—a man capable of controlling important sections of the underground, including semi-military and terrorist activities, stores of arms, espionage, and counterespionage, and capable also of keeping the many secrets which, if divulged, could seriously compromise the Soviet government. Because of the unique importance of the position, the selection of a leader for each country called for collaboration between Moscow (ostensibly the Comintern) and the local Communist party. Once appointed, the liaison man had to be shielded and defended by his party to the last. To provide him immunity, he would get elected to parliament; if necessary, a bodyguard would be assigned to accompany him on his trips; and the best lawyers, of course, would defend him if he fell into the hands of the police. The liaison man was aware, however, that if he should "deviate" he would be liquidated before he could talk. In France the position of liaison between Communist party and Soviet apparat was held, from the early 'thirties on, by Jacques Duclos; in the United States, until 1945, it was held by Earl Browder; in Germany, up to 1933, by Hans Kippenberger.

Moscow's German pupils proved better prepared for liaison assignments than many from other "brotherly" parties. With their proverbial precision, discipline, and incomparable technical skills, the German members of the apparat were quick to learn the methods of conspiratsia; indeed, they improved upon them, and in more than one way outdid their teachers. It was no accident, for instance, that the best passport workshops supplying the GB, Red Army intelligence, and the Comintern in Western Europe were those set up in Berlin; that the counterfeit money, which was on one or two occasions printed to meet an emergency, came from Germany; and that the headquarters of the KPD, the Karl Lieb-

knecht Haus in Berlin, with its hidden rooms, cellars, and signal system, became a pattern for other capitals.

The German Communist apparat started early to produce agents capable of conducting secret intelligence operations.¹ Some of them rose in the ranks, entered the Soviet service, and were dispatched to other countries where they made abundant use of their German citizenship for the Soviet cause. Those of them who remained loyal to Stalin rose to high positions in the Fourth Department of the Red Army, and those who survived the second World War are now among the elite of the German Democratic Republic.

Hans Kippenberger was one of the leaders for a decade up to 1933, and from 1929 to 1933 was the chief of "special services" (the M-apparat) in Germany. He came from the Communist Student Organization, of which he was the leader, and he retained to the end the traditional outward traits of an idealistic student. With his flashing dark eyes and narrow forehead, this slender youth was the embodiment of the fanatic when he joined the Communist party underground in Hamburg.² The leading position which he soon attained in various apparats made him the center of clandestine activities, including, of course, intelligence operations for his German party as well as for Moscow. He was sought by the German police in 1925-27, and for a time lived as an illegal. He was nominated by his party for the Reichstag, was elected, and, protected now by immunity, he emerged into the open. The Reichstag military committee, of which Kippenberger was a member, was an excellent observation point and offered opportunities for direct contacts with the generals and admirals of the Germany military forces, then in process of being resurrected. These contacts were later to prove fatal for Kippenberger; when he fled to Moscow during the Nazi era, he was declared to be a German spy and was executed in the great purge.

As is often the case with leading "practicians" of the Communist parties, Kippenberger was not outstanding as either a political or an ideological leader; even as an organizer he was inferior to his aide Leo Flieg, liaison man between the German underground and the OMS. Flieg, too, was called to Moscow during the Nazi era and executed.

Among the generation of hybrid German-Russian underground operators were many promising young men, most of them graduates

of one of the special schools in Moscow; some of them attained special fame or notoriety.

One of the most important among them was Richard Sorge, whose exploits as a Soviet spy in Japan did not become well known until long after his death. An attractive, tall, and well-built man, Sorge was liked everywhere; even his slight limp contributed to make him interesting. "There was something of a German officer of the Hussars in Ika," one of his friends recalls. ("Ika" was Sorge's nickname among his intimates; his wife, Christine, was called "Ikaret.") "He drank rather heavily and held his liquor well. He made friends easily and everybody was glad to see him." At the Social Research Institute in Frankfurt, Sorge did not prove to be much of a scholar, and neither his studies on anti-Semitism nor his little book *Akkumulation des Kapitals* was notable.⁸ Sorge was another instance of an eminent underground "practician" and successful spy with no political or philosophical talents.

Sorge entered the Soviet intelligence service in Germany in the late 'twenties, went to Moscow as a correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, thence to China, and finally came to control the fabulous Soviet espionage ring in Japan in 1935-41. He passed as a conservative and a Nazi and was let into all the secrets of the German embassy. He recruited as agents several Japanese Communists in and around the Tokyo government. His reports to Moscow in the crucial era of 1937-41 were of historical significance.

Another of the remarkable figures in this Russo-German intelligence group was Wilhelm Zaisser, until recently police chief of East Germany but now ousted from his high posts. Zaisser's activity as a Soviet intelligence officer, which extended over several decades, took him to China, Asia Minor, and Spain before he returned to his fatherland after the war, a naturalized Soviet citizen, to become a member of the Communist government.

Tall, with an interesting face, intelligent and courageous, and fluent in many foreign languages, Zaisser had the qualifications to enable him to rise high in the Communist firmament. In his younger years he was a teacher in the Rhineland and then a soldier in the Kaiser's army, in which he advanced to the rank of lieutenant. He was stationed in Russia when the November revolution broke out. Inspired by the mass movement, he joined the ranks of Bolshevism and remained a devoted Communist from that

time on. He was a member of the Spartakus Bund in Germany and played a leading role in the Communist movements in the Ruhr in 1923. After a course of training in Moscow he became an authority on methods and techniques of civil war.

About 1925 Zaisser joined Soviet military intelligence and went to China as its agent. In Shanghai he founded a chapter of the conservative German Stahlhelm (whose president in Germany was General Hindenburg), enjoyed the respect and confidence of diplomats and officers, and was in a position to furnish Moscow valuable information. When Gen. Hans von Seeckt, former chief of the German army, visited Shanghai, he stayed at Zaisser's home.⁴ From Shanghai Zaisser went to Manchuria, then to Asia Minor. In the late 'thirties he emerged as "General Gomez" in the Spanish civil war. From Spain he went to Russia.* Even at the peak of his career in Germany, around 1950, "an atmosphere of distance surrounded him," a report from the East zone said.

Because he does not speak in the familiar tone of his comrades, some of them resent his haughtiness. Wherever Zaisser, with his distinguished figure, and his strikingly beautiful and elegant wife appear, they attract attention. Frau Zaisser has a thin, oval face, and her large almond-shaped eyes look out on the world with confidence and calm. Her black dresses with white trimming are evidence of her good taste . . . The attitude of the Zaisser couple toward Soviet officers as well as German leaders is self-confident. With Soviet generals Zaisser converses as a colleague, with those of lower grade he has a rather condescending attitude.⁵

When Zaisser was removed from his post in East Germany in 1953, the Communist press charged him with "Social Democratic tendencies." In relation to a man with Zaisser's past this allegation is absurd; his only "deviations" were his independence and self-respect—traits which sometimes give rise to Titoism. Indeed, if conditions in East Germany permitted the emergence of a German Tito, Zaisser would be the best candidate for the post.

Another noteworthy member of this outstanding group was Arthur Illner-(Stahlmann) a less attractive type of intelligence agent, brutal, ruthless, egotistical. A carpenter by trade, he ad-

* The story of Zaisser's rise and fall during and after the war is told in Chapter 8.

vanced in the ranks of the "Arms Apparat" of the Communist underground, was sent to Moscow for training, and upon graduation from the Moscow school was sent to China as an agent of Soviet intelligence. In the International Brigade in Spain rumors connected Illner's name with the kidnapping and liquidation of non-Communists and "deviationists." From Spain he returned to Moscow, whence he was dispatched to Sweden in the summer of 1940. From his residence in Sweden Illner ran the tiny intelligence network in Germany during the first stages of the war. From 1945 on, Stahlmann worked in a department of the Central Committee of the SED which dealt with clandestine communications (embracing traffic of persons, material, and money) between the SED in East Berlin and the leading organizations of the Communist party of West Germany. In 1951 Stahlmann went over to the Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung (IWF) where his activities were mainly in the field of intelligence.

Another agent of the Soviet apparat in Germany was Ernst Wollweber, today minister of state security in East Germany. Ernst Friedrich Wollweber, son of a poor miner, had himself been a longshoreman in his younger years. Drafted into the Kaiser's navy in 1917, the nineteen-year-old seaman was already a member of the Socialist Youth organization, which, however, was too moderate for his taste; he soon went over to Spartakus, embryo of the German Communist party. His revolutionary exploits began in November 1918, when his cruiser, the *Helgoland*, lay in the Kiel Canal, and the young rebel, impressed by the history of the mutinies in the Russian navy, hoisted the red flag over the ship and headed the revolutionary processions in Kiel, Bremen, and Wilhelmshaven.

In the early 'twenties Wollweber was sent to Russia for study at the new Military-Political School; he returned a trained Communist underground leader. In 1928 he was elected to the Prussian Diet and in 1932 to the Reichstag. His real rise, however, started during the Nazi era, when he attained the stature of "the most expert saboteur the world has ever seen," as the press labeled him.

A number of other beginners in that initial era of German Communism, members of the then just emerging Soviet apparat,

have occupied posts of importance in the German Democratic Republic—among them Erich Mielke, who murdered two German policemen in 1931.

The German contribution to Soviet espionage during its first decade was enormous, exceeding in quantity the contribution of all other non-Russian components of the apparat abroad; in quality it exceeded even the Russian core itself.

The Berlin workshops for the manufacture of false passports were unique in history. In forging passports, certificates, or other documents neither the espionage headquarters of the various belligerent powers nor the prerevolutionary underground in Russia, which in its decades-long history attained great skill in this field, could approach the Berlin Pass-Zentrale, which was a marvel of skill, precision, and imagination. It survived not only numerous raids of the police but even the efforts of the Gestapo. To appreciate the scope of its activity it is enough to know that approximately 2,000 passports had to be on hand at all times, that a collection of 30,000 rubber stamps was maintained, and that the personnel of the Pass-Apparat in Germany and abroad in 1931–32 numbered 170 men (few women were employed in this activity).⁷

The German Communist Pass-Apparat, as old as the party itself, was founded in 1919–20, in a climate of civil war and “imminent” revolution. It was small, primitive, and poor. In 1921 it was discovered by the police. Reorganized, it developed rapidly from 1923 on, and despite the fact that from 1924 to 1932 no less than four police raids supposedly destroyed the accumulated documents and the apparat itself, it grew to unprecedented proportions both qualitatively and quantitatively in the decade from 1923 to 1933. At that time there was one passport shop in Moscow, one in Berlin, and a third in the United States, but the Pass-Zentrale in Berlin surpassed them all in efficiency. For the stream of important Soviet agents en route to the West, Berlin was the first stop. Here they had to “get out” (*aussteigen*) of their Soviet documents, if only because the police everywhere were paying special attention to travelers with Soviet documents. They were provided with new passports bearing fictitious names and a “legend”—a new biography—which they had to memorize to the smallest detail. On the return trip they turned in the false papers and received back the genuine ones.

The same procedure was often followed in the case of foreign Communists, in particular those on their way to Russia. To conceal the fact that they had traveled to the land of the Soviets, their passports, on which a German or Czech visa was the last item, were retained in Berlin, and they continued their trip carrying fabricated documents. When they returned from Russia they were handed their original passports, which could now serve as evidence of their having been in Germany all the time.

The soul of the Pass-Apparat in Berlin was a group of five to seven men, artists in their profession, devoted to their jobs; German typesetters, engineers, printers, their skill was far greater than that of any others in the extensive Comintern underground. In Moscow they were held in such high esteem that some of their sins and breaches of rules of conspiratsia were repeatedly forgiven by their exacting chiefs.* It would have been simple to order this group of artists in passport forgery to Moscow, but this would have meant destroying the network and killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.

In 1932 the leading group of German Communists, numbering about 600 persons, were ordered to prepare for illegality; all were provided with false passports and new fictitious addresses, although they continued to live in their usual homes. At the time of the 1932 Reichstag elections they registered twice, once under their real names and a second time under their assumed names; they were instructed by the apparat to vote twice, in order to avoid possible questions. They complied with the order.

In 1933, at the moment of Hitler's seizure of power, the apparat was in possession of over 5,000 passports, among them, in round numbers, 75 Swedish, 300 Danish, 75 Norwegian, 400 Dutch, 100 Belgian, 300 Luxembourgian, 400 Saarlandian, 200 genuine Swiss and 700 falsified, 300 Austrian, 600 Czech, 100 Danziger, 1,000 genuine German, and about 500 German passport forms.⁸

The Pass-Apparat was formally attached to the German Communist party and indirectly to the Comintern. Its personnel con-

* In the circles of the Pass-Apparat it was well known, for instance, that the talented passport specialist Walter Tygör was in love with the wife of the engineer Richard Quast, and that Mrs. Quast, a teacher of gymnastics, shared her favors between them. The happy trio were seen together frequently—a grave infringement of the basic rules of conspiracy. Under ordinary circumstances the GB would have stopped the affair, but in this case nothing of the sort happened. D papers, b 310.

sisted of two distinct groups: the chiefs and the workers. The chiefs, who gave the orders, were expendable, but the artisans could not be replaced.

Supreme head of OMS (secret liaison of the Comintern) was Osip Piatnitsky; Mirov-Abramov, his aide in Berlin, served also, from about 1926 on, as chief of the Pass-Apparat. No changes in personnel of the apparat could be made without his consent. Leo Flieg was assigned by the German Communist party to head the passport center; he served from 1923 to 1935. Two young men, Richard Grosskopf and Karl Wiehn ("Turgel" and "Schilling"), just out of the Communist Youth League, were assigned about 1923 to serve under Flieg; they, too, remained with the apparat for a decade, until the end of 1932. In 1933 both were arrested; they spent about twelve years in concentration camp.

It is hard to imagine the intricacy of the problems involved in the operations of a Pass-Apparat. To be "good," a false passport must secure its bearer against pitfalls and correspond to his personality in every respect. In the Pass-Apparat they used to say "a passport must fit like a suit made by the best custom tailor." If a Western Communist was to be supplied with a passport, the first question was what nationality he should assume. The passports of some countries were considered better than those of others; for instance, neutral Switzerland was favored since a Swiss passport holder could cross most European frontiers without a visa. Danish and Swedish documents were also good. British passports, while excellent, were difficult to fabricate. Polish and Baltic passports were disliked because they aroused suspicion of the police, who sensed something Russian in these documents. German Communists who knew no other language than German preferred passports of the Saarland, the population of which is German-speaking, and which afforded easy access to various countries.

It was important also to know what languages the future passport bearer could speak fluently, since the finest passport could become a trap if its holder did not speak his "native" tongue. Let us say he speaks German and it is decided to supply him with a passport "issued" in Munich. Hans Reiners, a former passport expert of the Comintern, describes the procedure:

We have, of course, the German passport form and proceed to fill it out for the newly born Mr. Mueller from Munich.

But we must bear in mind that one day Mueller may come to Munich and his papers will be thoroughly checked by the police. What kind of ink is being used in Munich for passports? What is the name of the officer who signs passports? We instruct our agent in Munich to inquire; then we receive from him the signature of Schmidt, the police chief—not an easy operation. Coming now to the date of issuance, there arises a new problem: we have to be sure that Mr. Schmidt was not on vacation or ill on the day when the passport was “signed” by him. Also, in some countries a police stamp is affixed to the passport as a receipt for the fee paid, and these stamps, too, must be forged.

Finally one or two rubber stamps must be affixed to make the passport valid, and this is a new source of worries. Stamps vary from one city to another and change from time to time for a number of important or unimportant reasons. Therefore a huge collection of rubber stamps from hundreds of cities and towns is necessary.

With these operations completed, the job of manufacturing a passport has only started, however; the most difficult part lies ahead. Mueller cannot simply emerge into the world supplied with only a passport; he must be armed with all the basic documents to enable him to confirm his identity, such as a birth certificate, employment record, social security book, etc. This set of personal identification papers is termed a collection, and to make a collection complete one must be a historian, geographer, and expert in knowledge of police habits.

If the birth certificate must show that Mr. Mueller was born in Ulm in 1907, the Pass-Apparat must know what form was used for such certificates in that city four or five decades ago, what terminology was in use there at the time, what Christian names were popular in that part of Europe and which names would sound alien. Ivar would have sounded strange in Ulm, and Sepp would have sounded strange in Hamburg or Copenhagen. The most important precept is: make him an average person, one in a hundred, with no distinguishing marks that could be remembered by police, passers-by, or traveling companions.

Finally there is the stamp question. What kind of stamps

were used in that place at that time? Was a lion, a bear, or an eagle depicted on the coat of arms of the town? Knowledge of heraldry was required, and volumes on this subject stood on our shelves.

The Pass-Apparat rarely furnished a marriage certificate to a client. It was unwise to involve a second person in an underground affair unless the man and woman were to be groomed as a couple for a particular job, for instance, as storekeepers, innkeepers, and the like. All, however, needed employment certificates since the first question asked by the police everywhere is where you work and in what capacity. In this connection it was a principle never to describe a person as a salaried employee or worker since men in such occupations have to be at their jobs, and a check on their stated place of employment would reveal the falsity of the documents. The occupation of peddler, free-lance writer, or artist was better suited to the passport requirements of an underground worker since persons in these occupations are free all day and need not account for their movements and actions.

An average of 400 sets (collections) of documents were prepared by the Berlin Pass-Apparat every year from 1927 to 1932; a part of them were manufactured to be held as a reserve; about 250 were supplied each year to other apparats. In 1933 the demand increased greatly, of course.

Once the "collection" is ready, an additional precaution must be taken. When Ivar Mueller goes on his first trip across a frontier his passport must not look new. If a passport is shown on which a number of visas or frontier stamps confirm that the traveler has been checked, rechecked, and found in order, police will pay less attention than if a new document is presented. This is why the Pass-Apparat placed a number of false visas and frontier stamps on the passport. The route that the traveler had supposedly followed was carefully considered—everything must fit logically into the "legend" which he was to memorize.⁹

In addition to passports which were complete fabrications, the apparat had a large store of genuine documents, bought or stolen from the police headquarters of various countries. These were either blank forms or passports already issued. The blank forms

were used cautiously by the Zentrale; the live passports had to be doctored: the photograph of the original bearer of the passport had to be removed and another substituted, while the stamps which partly covered the photograph had to be imitated. The genuine passport was, of course, more reliable, but great skill was required to alter it.

The supply of blank passport forms was not inconsiderable and was obtained by various means. The wife of a Berlin Communist named Hoffmann worked as a cleaning woman at police headquarters and was in a position to steal passports from time to time. In Basel Max Habijanec, the police official whose story is told in Chapter 5, supplied the Communist underground with excellent Swiss passports. In one instance a large batch of passports was received in Berlin from Prague. The Czech police in 1932 had prepared a memorandum on the Communist underground which the GB was eager to obtain in order to find out how much the Czech authorities knew. Police headquarters of Komotau, where the document was thought to be, were broken into. The burglars were disappointed not to find the memorandum, but they did find and steal 1,500 passports. These Czech documents, much favored by the underground, were in use until after the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Barthou in October 1934, when it was found that the Ustashi (a terrorist underground organization in Yugoslavia) were likewise using false Czech documents. The police all over Europe became very much interested in bearers of Czech passports. From French frontier points the Pass-Apparat received a report that the police were beginning to wonder why so many Czech citizens who spoke no Czech were crossing the German-French frontier. It was decided to withdraw about 200 Czech passports and issue others in their stead.

For a time in the early 'thirties two Saarland police officers, both members of the Deutsche Front (Nazi), sold passports to the Communist apparat. One had the passport forms, the other the passport stamps, and they conducted the business jointly. The price charged by these two unimaginative Nazis for a passport bearing a stamp was about two marks (50 cents). One day they informed the apparat that they would not sell passports in quantities of less than 500. To keep the pair in business, the Zentrale bought a thousand Saar passports, of which 700 were immediately destroyed. No sooner had this auto-da-fé been accomplished than a demand for

an additional 100 Saar passports arrived. Again 1,000 had to be purchased, of which 800 were destroyed.

The passport workshops and stores were decentralized and scattered throughout Berlin. Only the three or four leading men mentioned above had knowledge of the entire operation; the workers were familiar with but one or two addresses.

The Pass-Apparat had six separate workshops.

The printing shop possessed (in 1932) 1.7 tons of various kinds of type, including some peculiar styles which were needed for "old" certificates. The two typesetters working in the shop were serious, well-educated men, reliable in every respect. The chief compositor was a German Communist, Duehring. They devoted all their time to the Pass-Apparat and were well paid. Their own false papers identified them as salesmen and students of a technical school.

The noisy printing presses were located in the cellar of a cabinet-maker's shop in the Wedding section of the city. Once a week, or even less frequently, when the two men arrived to operate the presses in the cellar, the cabinetmaker upstairs set all his machines in motion.

A third workshop made reproductions of genuine documents and signatures. A large expensive camera was installed for this purpose; of all Soviet and Communist agencies in Berlin only the legal trade legation possessed a better one. Walter Tygör ("Walter Wolf"), assigned to this workshop, was an expert in all phases of passport forgery.

The special workshop for rubber stamps was located in a rubber workshop because of the extremely strong and unpleasant odor of boiling rubber. "We used to say, 'look for a spot where we can stink along,'" one of the former members of the apparat recalls. The owner of the rubber shop was a Communist who carried no membership card, a cautious man whose main client was the Kommando Wecke, a troop of the Berlin police. The engraver König was the owner of a shop in Neuköln. His prestige grew from year to year. After twelve years of service in Berlin he was sent to Moscow to work in a similar passport shop there. When the Nazi party came to power and König's son was arrested, the father, in Moscow, was removed from his post, as a security risk, and was later arrested.

In addition to its regular personnel, the apparat secretly re-

cruited two engravers employed in the largest German stamp-making shop, the Stempel-Kaiser, which supplied stamps to all government agencies. These men systematically prepared duplicates of all stamps of any significance made for the government. This fortunate situation ceased, however, about the end of 1932, when for various reasons the agents refused to continue to help. There was also the Windus stamp shop in the Hermannplatz, whose proprietor, the Communist Windus, gave great assistance to the Pass-Apparat.

The huge reserve of rubber stamps was stored in various hiding places, each holding the set of stamps for a particular country or province.*

Two identical workshops concentrated on "basic documents," such as birth, baptismal, and school certificates. One of these shops could continue to operate if the other should fall into the hands of the police, since the forms used by both were hidden in three or four different places.

A special shop was kept busy falsifying genuine passports. An expert designer at this shop copied the stamp markings after removal of the original photograph. Pages were sometimes removed from the passports and falsified ones substituted; new visas were inserted. The man responsible for this activity of the apparat was Richard Quast, nicknamed "Abel." This kind of workshop was usually set up in a shoe repair shop, from which people are frequently seen emerging with small parcels under their arms; some of the cobbler's instruments, such as the eyelet machine, and dyes are also used in the manufacture of passports. This, incidentally, is why throughout the Communist underground specialists in the false passport business are called "cobblers."

The Pass-Zentrale maintained agencies all over Europe. It was "based," as the term went, in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Saarland, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig. Germany itself was divided into 24 districts in each of which the Pass-Apparat had four or five agents; in Berlin there were 10. In the 11 countries about 20 agents were busy. Along with the workers of the central Pass-Apparat this made a total of about 170 men, in addition to a number of temporary unpaid assistants.

* When the Soviet-German war started, in 1941, the German government announced that in the cellar of the Soviet embassy the police had found metal seals inscribed "Consulado de la Republica de Chile en Breslau." DNB, Aug. 5, 1941.

The agents in the provinces and abroad who endeavored to obtain genuine passports from sympathizers (but, for obvious reasons, not members of the Communist parties) or through "front" organizations were sometimes very successful. To serve the party, sympathizers would apply for passports and then turn them over to the apparat. At times the supply of "genuine" passports obtained by this method was considerable. The second task of the provincial agents was to observe the passport departments, obtain forms and signatures, and notify the center of every change in passport regulations.

The reserves of stamps, passports, and other documents were hidden in the most unlikely places. One supply was located in the pedestal of the large telescope at the Berlin Observatory, under the care of Hermann Dünow,* an underground Communist; another was kept in the desk of a manager of the Dresdner Bank; a third in the Nazareth Church. Even greater ingenuity was required, as we shall see, to ship this voluminous loot abroad during the Nazi era.

No less than five raids were made by the police on various premises of the Pass-Apparat before the Nazi era. It was inevitable that some of the hundreds of false passports in circulation should fall into the hands of the police, that investigations would follow, and that despite all precautions one or another of the workshops would be discovered. The arrest in Vienna in 1929 of Klose, courier of the apparat, with a bag full of passports in his possession, was a severe blow.¹⁰ Three German travelers, arrested at the Dutch frontier in January 1932, turned out to be Soviet citizens carrying false passports. At about the same time the Soviet trade agent Chubar-Onisenko was arrested in Hamburg; five false passports found in his villa pointed to an excellent, though unknown, workshop of false documents.¹¹ In December 1932 a woman tried to cross to Holland by car; because her passport was false, she was arrested along with her "chauffeur," Pauker (husband of the future Rumanian Communist leader Ana Pauker).† Their passports emanated, the police discovered, from the passport apparat in Berlin.

The results of the police raids on the premises of the Pass-

* Alias "Konrad," "Reich," "Reinhold," "Dr. Stuttner."

† Denounced later by his wife to the GB as a Trotskyite, Pauker was executed about 1937.

Apparat were meager. In November 1932, however, the police made a great catch when they raided an apartment in the Kaiser-Allee. There they found hundreds of passports of various countries, American passport forms, birth and school certificates, and other documents; hundreds of rubber stamps, including those of the police of Ankara, Sofia, and Amsterdam; and facsimiles of the signatures of chiefs of Scotland Yard and other British police heads. From notes found in the apartment it was evident that about 1,500 passports had been given out in the last six months.

There have been found in the forgery atelier 2,000 rubber stamps, 600 passport blanks, 35 partially completed passports, 807 passport photos, 716 fee stamps, 300 official documents, 72 receipt forms, 57 tax stamps, 165 certificates, 700 police forms, 30 employment books, and 650 letterheads of various firms.

This forgery Zentrale is, no doubt, the largest of all forgery shops uncovered in Europe since the war.¹²

Karl Wiehn and Erwin Kohlberg were arrested in the raid. However, only a fraction of the apparat's reserves was lost in the police action; all other workshops continued to do their job.¹³

The Nazis' coming to power was a heavy blow to the Pass-Zentrale. In April 1933 a new stockpile of rubber stamps and passports was discovered by the police, who arrested Richard Grosskopf. Along with Wiehn, Grosskopf was sentenced to twelve years and remained in a concentration camp until 1945.¹⁴

Another mishap followed soon after. Alfred Kattner, who had been working in the Liebknecht Haus offices of the Communist Central Committee in Berlin and had known many underground figures, betrayed his comrades to the Gestapo. (Kattner was assassinated by his comrades.)¹⁵ Among those he betrayed was the man in charge of the passport stockpile in the Berlin Observatory, Hermann Dünow. At the Observatory the Nazi authorities were surprised to discover not only a multitude of passports but also signatures of the treasurer of their party as well as membership cards and forged receipts confirming payment of Nazi membership dues.

Although this loss was not fatal, the situation had become ominous. In the upper circles of the Pass-Apparat it was decided to remove the stock abroad, to Saarbrücken in the Saarland, which

at the time was under French control. In 1934, after more than a decade of successful operation in Berlin, the workshops, tools, and reserves of stamps and passports were transferred to the Saar. To make the transfer possible it was necessary to remove the rubber parts of the stamps from the handles in order to pack them in suitcases with false bottoms; documents and stamps were placed inside the round legs of tables made especially for this purpose; ink of various sorts was shipped in glass tubes in chests of drawers. The plan to ship all movable equipment of the Pass-Apparat concealed inside articles of furniture proved impossible, however, and midway in the operation it was decided to divert part of the shipment to a hideout at a frontier crossing. With the assistance of an engineer employed at a stone quarry situated at the Saar border, a Communist who was familiar with the habits and methods of the customs officers, the rest of the equipment was uneventfully moved out of Germany. Along with the material a few specialists also came to Saarbrücken, where the workshop resumed its activity. Conditions in the Saar, however, began to deteriorate. Nazi influence and espionage were growing, and an early occupation of the area by Germany seemed likely; finally in 1935 the Saar voted to rejoin Germany. Moscow ordered the whole "reserve" of passports moved to Russia; other papers and stamps were sent to Paris.

Removed from Germany, the Pass-Apparat never again attained its old glory. When the Spanish civil war started in 1936, a new source of passports opened up: not only Communist volunteers but thousands of sympathizers were induced, under various pretexts, to turn their national passports over to their chiefs. The apparat collected, studied, and set aside for its agents excellent British, American, Canadian, and other documents. This stock, consisting of thousands of passports, met almost the entire need up to the outbreak of the war.¹⁶

Nor did a Communist Pass-Apparat comparable to the old one emerge anywhere in the West after the war. With the empire of the Soviets expanding into Berlin there was no longer need for a risky and complicated Pass-Apparat concealed in the underground and challenging the authority of various countries. Now a German workshop for the manufacture of false documents could be established (under police protection) in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

Of the old guard Osip Piatnitsky, head of the Comintern's ramified Department of International Liaison, which embraced also

its intelligence sections, was executed. His right-hand man, Mirov-Abramov, who had controlled that network in Western Europe, was likewise put to death; so was Leo Flieg. Richard Grosskopf, however, is today on the payroll of the political police; Tygör and Quast, inseparable, are working in the headquarters of the SED (Communist party of the Eastern Zone); Hermann Dünow is inspector of the Vopo (People's Police). König, Duehring, and Karl Wiehn seem to have missed the bus and are somehow out of touch with this business of legal forgery run by a group of law-abiding counterfeiters.

4. INDUSTRY AS A TARGET

Growing in personnel and volume of activity from year to year, Soviet industrial espionage always followed the same pattern: it was overtly based on the local Communist units and supervised by a few German Communists; it was controlled from behind the scenes by a few anonymous Soviet agents in Berlin. The elaborate laws of conspiracy could hardly be followed under these conditions; on the other hand, precautions seemed less important because the existing German law, with its mild punishment for industrial espionage, did not cause the work to be considered dangerous. German criminal law recognized espionage solely in relation to military secrets; in cases of industrial espionage, only the provision relating to unfair competition, which carried a maximum punishment of one year, could be applied.

One of the first cases of industrial espionage was the Knöpfle affair, which reflected the main features of Soviet espionage in Germany at that time. The head of the apparat was Hans Barion, official of the Central Committee of the Communist party in Berlin and paymaster of the group. His chief agent for the Southwest was Karl Kölzer, employee of the local Communist party in Düsseldorf; Kölzer in turn appointed the worker Albert Knöpfle, chairman of the Communist organization in Auweiler, to conduct the operations in Leverkusen, where one of the best equipped chemical plants of I. G. Farben was located. Considering his assignment purely a party matter, Knöpfle turned to five or six other workers, party members and sympathizers, for information on secret processes, samples, and designs. The material obtained went to Kölzer, and from Kölzer through Barion to the latter's Russian superior.

In this way the machinery of the Communist party was made to serve the needs of Soviet espionage. No secret was made of the fact that Russia was the receiver of the espionage reports; on the contrary, this aspect of the operation was openly and frankly discussed among all participants. How great was the Soviet interest in the German chemical industry is seen from the fact that at the same time the Communist cell was at work for Knöpfle another Soviet espionage ring emerged at the Leverkusen I. G. Farben plant under Georg Herloff, a foreman there. Planning to go to Russia himself and promising good jobs in Russia to other technicians and workers, Herloff gathered secret information from non-Communist sources which he turned over to Soviet representatives. Activity of this sort could not long remain a secret, and early in 1926 about twenty men and women were arrested. Tried in May of that year, they received mild sentences—from three months to a year.¹

The mingling of Communist party activity with espionage was obvious in another case of that period, that of Willi Kippenberger, brother of Hans, the future leader of the Communist underground. An unstable young man, member of the rightist Ehrhardt Brigade after the war, married to a second wife without benefit of divorce from the first, Willi was now ready—this was in the mid-'twenties—to obey the orders of his Communist brother. He took a job with a chemical plant at Bitterfeld, where he procured secret designs which he copied and delivered to Hans. Denounced and arrested, Willi Kippenberger was sentenced, in October 1926, to four months.

Before the revolution the large Solvay chemical plant at Bernburg, near Dessau, had had a branch in Moscow. The Russian branch had been nationalized in 1918 and was now to be reconstructed and modernized under the first five-year plan. The best way to accomplish this would, of course, have been to get in touch with the executives of Solvay in Germany, who possessed knowledge of both the Russian plant and new production techniques. Since the Soviet government had refused, however, to discuss old claims, the logical means of collaboration were barred. Instead Moscow decided to lure from Solvay an old and experienced chemist, who knew all the new formulas and secrets, to head the Russian plant. Luri, a Moscow agent, approached Herr Meyer of Hamburg with an offer of a position as general manager of the

Solvay plant in Russia at a salary of 5,000 rubles a month, a rent-free residence, and 4,500 rubles for travel and moving expenses. In his formal "application" for the post Meyer had to divulge to his potential Soviet employers commercial and technical secrets of Solvay, and before leaving for Russia he tried to persuade a few others to help him in the intelligence job. He was denounced, arrested, tried, and sentenced to four months (four months having become the standard term in convictions for industrial espionage).²

In October 1930 the private detective office of the Krupp works in Magdeburg (the Gruson Werke) detained the designer Kallenbach and discovered in his briefcase secret documents, texts of patents, and designs of new machines. It came out during the investigation that Kallenbach and two other engineers were supplying their former superior, engineer Russki, who was about to leave for Russia, with essential information, and that Kallenbach himself was preparing to leave for Moscow within a fortnight. The sentence was the usual one—four months for Kallenbach and a shorter term for the others.³

This type of espionage was becoming commonplace. There was, for instance, the Russian engineer Feodor Volodichev, employed with Siemens and Halske, who supplied designs and samples of microphones and teletype machinery to a branch of the trade legation; two very young German employees served as his aides. "The designs found in Volodichev's possession were of the most recent innovations in telegraphy; they are of inestimable value for German industry," an expert testified in court. The court was lenient, however, and sentenced Volodichev to one month and ten days.⁴

Engineer Wilhelm Richter, an executive of the Polysius cement plant near Dessau, was persuaded by Soviet representatives to supply secret plans and designs for a similar plant being built near Moscow in the late 1920's. Richter used to go frequently to Moscow and finally quit his job in Germany at the end of 1930. After his departure, loss of secret papers was discovered. Richter was arrested in January 1931.⁵ In September 1931 Karl Liebrich, chemist at a scientific laboratory in Elberfeld and member of the KPD, was sentenced to four months for industrial espionage.⁶ In Rotweil three workers, Robert Molt, Julius Schätzle, and Adolf Koch, were trying to obtain industrial secrets concerning the production of rayon and gunpowder for a mysterious "Georg," a Communist

from Stuttgart.⁷ Charlotte Land, member of a shop committee of a chemical plant in Berlin, who gathered secret information on the chemical and metallurgical industries, was arrested and tried in March 1932.⁸ For army purposes, the Telefunken Company had invented a knapsack telephone, an important improvement unknown elsewhere. One of Telefunken's employees, Seiffert (now mayor of Luckow in East Germany), delivered photostats and samples to the Soviet experts even before mass production had started.⁹ A sample of a new crankshaft produced by Rheinmetall came into Soviet hands at the very start of production, through the devotion of a Communist worker.¹⁰

The Soviet trade legation was involved in one way or another in a large number of espionage cases. Each time its name was mentioned in the press in such a connection, it promptly issued an emphatic denial: "In no connection whatsoever" or "The persons are completely unknown to the legation." The legation was not bothered by the authorities, but its regular denials ceased to impress the public. The press began to publish them under ironical headlines: "The Expected Denial" or "The Inevitable Denial."

In the Lippner affair in Berlin in 1931 the trade legation was in the limelight. The Austrian engineer Lippner, hired by the legation (in Berlin), was assigned to do research on gasoline. Acting on behalf of the legation, a man named Glebov conducted the negotiations with Lippner and signed the contract with him. A few months later "Glebov" approached the gasoline expert with the urgent "suggestion" that he procure certain secret data pertaining to his field from the I. G. Farben plant in Friedrichshafen. Lippner immediately quit the legation and sued it for payment of the sum provided for in the contract, 9,000 marks. In its answer the trade legation told the court that "Glebov" was "completely unknown" to it and that any document signed by "this person" was not binding. It was obvious that "Glebov" was an assumed name. "Glebov" was not found, and in the meantime his assistant, who had been summoned to testify in court, left hastily for Russia. The press reacted with indignation and hostility; even newspapers friendly to Moscow were critical: "Is it not time," the *Frankfurter Zeitung* asked, "that less politeness and more energy were shown?"¹¹

The turning point was the Steffen-Dienstbach case in 1931. Up to that time public opinion in Germany, prompted and assisted by the Foreign Office, tended to view Soviet spy affairs as separate

episodes, not necessarily connected with basic Russian policy. Soviet policy, which since 1926 had been friendly toward Berlin, should, it was felt, have precluded large-scale espionage activity in Germany; "exceptions" served only to "confirm the rule." When the Steffen affair—the "great affair" of Soviet espionage—exploded, however, and its extent and ramifications became known, there was no longer room for doubt or complacency. The Soviet Union, it was obvious, was making use of the favorable status of Soviet-German relations to promote an intelligence operation on a formidable scale. The standard applied in other countries was out of place here: in the Soviet-German scheme the more "friendly" the relations between the two powers, the more deeply Soviet espionage penetrated.

The Chemical Trust (I. G. Farben) was once more the target, and Erich Steffen was the German chief of the apparat. He was the leader of the RGO (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition) in the chemical industry, a large Communist organization devoted ostensibly to trade union problems and the fight against the Socialist Free Trade Union Federation. A convenient "front" for industrial espionage, the RGO was used by Steffen as a center of ties and contacts with his agents all over the country. Both Steffen and his wife were employed at the Soviet trade legation. In addition, Steffen had been in charge, since 1930, of screening German "Russia-goers," another phase of industrial espionage. A few years before, Steffen had been involved in a case of unfair competition involving the recruiting of German specialists for work in Russia in a new thermometer plant in competition with German firms. Steffen's main collaborators were German Communists; for example, Eugen Herbst, Communist member of the Bavarian Landtag, and his subagents were Communist engineers and workers: in Ludwigshafen, where one of the chemical plants was situated, his confidant was Karl Dienstbach. Local Communist leader and member of the RGO, Dienstbach had been discharged by the management of I. G. Farben but kept his contacts and agents in the chemical plants in Hoechst, Frankfurt, Cologne, the Ruhr area, and other places—a total of about twenty-five men.

As a member of Steffen's service, Dienstbach approached his numerous contacts with highly technical questions about industrial secrets—and usually got the answers. From bitter experience, particularly in France, the lesson had been learned that the long

comprehensive "questionnaires" from Moscow might betray the agents at an early stage of the operation; in Germany the involved questionnaire was now divided into a number of separate queries. Combined, the answers supplied the necessary information.

The main danger, however, lay in the very size of the apparatus: the number of sources invited to answer questions grew beyond the limits of prudence and soon reached huge proportions. Among Dienstbach's contacts and sources was the stenographer Heinrich Schmid; among Schmid's contacts was the worker Karl Kraft. When Schmid asked Kraft for information on formulas for carbolic acid and ammonium, Kraft reported the matter to his superiors; on their instructions he continued his relations with the Soviet network. Within two months of the time Kraft had first been approached—March–April 1931—Dienstbach, Steffen, Schmid, and a large number of other engineers and workers had been arrested, tried, and convicted. In Steffen's house secret chemical formulas were found, and in his notebook the names and addresses of his subagents. His savings bank book revealed that in a period of three months he had deposited 24,000 marks (over \$5,000).

"For a considerable time," the official announcement said, "the authorities have been aware that persons belonging to the Communist party of Germany had established contact with employees and workers of the larger factories in different German cities, under the pretext of finding better positions for them in Russia. The real intention, however, was to obtain valuable industrial secrets in this way."¹²

After a month in jail Dienstbach confessed and revealed all espionage activities known to him; what he could not know, however, was the Russian part of the network. The prosecution decided to make a search of the Soviet trade legation in order to establish the names of Steffen's Russian superiors, but the Foreign Office refused to give its consent for such a search. In the meantime the trade legation published a wholesale denial: "Persons named in connection with this affair or those arrested are unknown to the trade legation. Nor do there exist any relations whatsoever, either direct or indirect, between the legation and the persons named in connection with this case."¹³

Actually the legation was greatly concerned about the arrested men: what if they, too, should start to divulge secrets? The apparatus drew the appropriate conclusions, and "Alexander" was assigned

to take care of the arrested. A short, round-faced man a little over forty, whose real name was not known, "Alexander" was an important agent of Soviet military intelligence in Germany, occupant of a back room in the embassy on Unter den Linden; he was neither a military attaché nor a member of the attaché's staff; his special field was the underground network. He used the greatest possible "conspiracy" precautions; for example, he could never be reached on the telephone directly; his business friends had to call the embassy and leave their names, and some time later "Alexander" would call them back; his whereabouts remained unknown and conversations could not be eavesdropped upon, even by a GB-screened Soviet official at the switchboard.¹⁴

"Alexander" organized and financed the defense of the Steffen group under the cover of MOPR (International Labor Defense). He engaged a Communist lawyer as defense attorney. The attorney could visit the embassy and travel all over the country without arousing suspicion. There was an engineer in Aachen, for instance, who might cause trouble if he chose to testify frankly; the attorney traveled to Aachen, promised the engineer a good job in Russia, and bought his silence. Another trip was made to Nuremberg for a similar purpose. "Alexander" was most concerned, however, about Steffen himself. Steffen was talking freely during interrogations, was sending notes (called *Kassibers* in the underground slang) to his fellow defendants which were much too frank. These *Kassibers*, containing names of other persons, became known to the prosecution. "We call it industrial help, not espionage," read one of Steffen's *Kassibers*—which at a stroke destroyed one of the main arguments of the defense. The defense had maintained that there was not a shred of espionage in the operations of the group and that the defendants were interested only in working conditions in the chemical industry; the written reports found in their possession, they claimed, were destined for the trade union publication *Der Fabrikarbeiter*. Since the Steffen affair was purely a case of industrial espionage, the sentence was again of necessity a lenient one: Steffen, Dienstbach, and Schmid were sentenced to ten months and the others to four months in prison.¹⁵

Although the prosecution appealed the sentence, it was not long before the convicted men were free; but now the Soviet heads of the apparat were concerned about the stability and reliability of the Steffen couple as espionage agents. It was feared that if they

should be arrested again they would reveal too much. On instructions from "Alexander," the Communist lawyers tried to persuade the Steffens to go to Russia, but they refused categorically because Frau Steffen had Nazi relatives in Germany. (She later joined the Nazi party.) Finally Steffen agreed to go to Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, following the prosecution's appeal, the Steffen-Dienstbach case was tried again. Only one of the defendants, Oelenschlager, whose role was a minor one, appeared, so the new sentences, three years in prison for each of the three main defendants, were never carried out. In Prague Steffen was persuaded to go to Moscow. He was liquidated in the purge.¹⁶

One result of the public clamor over the Steffen affair was an increase of sanctions against unfair competition. On March 9, 1932, President Hindenburg signed a "decree on the defense of the national economy," which increased the penalty for communication of industrial secrets to unauthorized persons to a maximum of three years' imprisonment, except that for a defendant who was aware the secrets were to be used abroad the penalty was to be five years. The new sanctions, enacted April 1, 1932, remained in force until the Nazi government again increased the penalty and introduced capital punishment for industrial espionage.¹⁷

Close connection between the Communist party's espionage organization and the Soviet apparat was the general rule, but in no case did the shortsightedness of this peculiar system of espionage become as plain as in the affair of the Bitterfeld I. G. Farben. At the end of February 1931 there arrived in Bitterfeld from Berlin an authorized "representative" of the Central Committee of the German Communist party, who was introduced as "Georg." Seven persons—a carpenter, a bricklayer, two metalworkers, a locksmith, and two unskilled laborers—all of them local Communist leaders, were summoned to a secret meeting at the home of a sympathizer. (The most zealous among them was the electrician Friedrich Thiele, member of the party for a decade and chairman of the workers' shop committee, whose salary was 38 marks [\$9] a week.) "Georg" addressed the meeting as follows: ¹⁸

Russia must be saved from war. For this purpose the Soviet Union is compelled to build up her armed forces and protect herself from military assaults. The Soviet Union must also be

enabled to fulfill her five-year plans, thus to become economically self-sustaining and, in particular, fully independent of German industry. To achieve this goal the Soviet Union must be in possession of all prerequisites for the production of machinery as well as chemicals, such as gas, phosphorus, light metals, etc. It is the task of the KPD members to find out in the places where they are working what kind of machinery and instruments are used, as well as other details.

Special attention must be paid to the chemical industry, which can be put on a war footing within twenty-four hours. This must be prevented in the interest of Russia. Russia's needs for her five-year plan and her war industry are great. Not only production methods but sources of raw material and markets must be minutely studied. This can be achieved by obtaining railway listings of incoming and outgoing freight cars, which usually contain information on the origin of the raw material and the destination of the manufactured goods. Nobody should be afraid to do this kind of reconnaissance work. Anyone who gets into trouble will immediately be sent to Russia.

The representatives of the KPD are in a position to get access to all industrial plants and find out anything they want to know. In Kiel, for instance, a clerk working for one of the engineers told us what kind of material was used for the construction of the Panzerkreuzer A and about the new guns charged and discharged by electric power. Though the clerk was fired for looking into secret documents, nobody has ever suspected him of spying.

Finally "Georg" suggested establishing close contacts with employees, especially with chemists, and hinted at possible financial arrangements, including a monthly salary for agents. Then he asked for a plan of the plant, which Friedrich Thiele, as chairman of the shop committee and in position to do so, offered to procure. Next, four men were assigned to spy in their particular section of the plant: the bricklayer Muller in the power station, the laborer Elze in the light metal shop, the laborer Gruner in the yard, and the foreman Bley in the phosphate section. Before leaving the meeting "Georg" gave instructions on how to deliver the gathered information: "If something must go by mail, never use

the address of the KPD Zentrale in Berlin; if mailing the material is risky or if the package is too bulky, Thiele personally must bring it to Berlin."

Then "Georg" moved on to nearby Wolfen for a similar Communist espionage meeting there.

The Thiele group began its work, and some progress had been made (a sample of graphite had been procured), when news of the Steffen-Dienstbach arrests arrived. It was not long before the Thiele group, too, was arrested. The investigation was a prolonged one and the trial took place after the penalties for industrial espionage had been increased. The real culprits, including Steffen and "Georg," escaped punishment; the naive conspirators went to jail, some for three years and some for longer periods.

5. MILITARY TARGETS

Although industrial espionage absorbed the main energy and the bulk of the funds of Soviet intelligence in Germany, purely military targets were not neglected. While the acting Soviet agency in both fields of reconnaissance was the GRU, espionage agency of the Red Army, the goals and methods applied in each of these fields were different.

Among the greatest coups of the GRU in pre-Nazi Germany was the case of General Hammerstein and his daughters, all very pro-Russian though in different ways. Gen. Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, descendant of a long line of military leaders, had occupied high military posts and became chief of the army's high command in November 1930. A man of conservative views, he was, in line with the prevailing trend among officers and generals of the pre-Nazi era, in favor of collaboration with Soviet Russia in the military field. He made trips to Russia during those years and met Soviet generals and envoys. The Hammerstein daughters were much more pro-Communist in their attitude than their father.

Werner Hirsch, editor of *Rote Fahne*, whose mother, a friend of the Hammersteins, came from aristocratic Prussian circles, became a teacher of the girls.

The two girls, to whom their father was lovingly devoted, were quick to grasp Hirsch's teaching. According to him, the revolutionary front on which it was their duty to fight was the

writing desk of their father. For years they had been stealing and photographing the documents they found on the desk of their father. They had listened to all the conversations that went on in their father's house, and reported loyally to their teacher. They were among the best agents of the Communist secret service in the German army.¹

There was no sharply drawn line between industrial and purely military espionage. The aviation and shipbuilding industries, for example, which attracted Soviet attention and Soviet spies, were important from the point of view of war potential, and intelligence operations here combined industrial espionage with espionage "proper." There were a number of similar industrial-military areas which were targets of reconnaissance operations.

Because Soviet military aviation was still in its infancy in the mid-'twenties, uncovering German aviation techniques became one of the most important objectives of military intelligence. Engineer Alexandrovski, assigned to collect all possible data from and about the German aviation industry, arrived in Berlin from Moscow in 1927. His right-hand man was the Latvian Eduard Scheibe, employee of the Soviet trade legation and a go-between for various sources. Alexandrovski's main hope, however, was a young German engineer, Eduard Ludwig, an able aviation specialist who had gone to Russia in 1924-25 to work in the Moscow office of the German Junkers plant. While he was in Russia the Soviet authorities had hinted at a possible appointment as a university professor if he returned. Back in Germany, Ludwig continued to work in aviation, systematically changing from one job to another, so that after two years he was familiar with all operating aviation plants—Junkers at Dessau, Dornier at Friedrichshafen, and the Aeronautical Research Institute in Berlin-Adlershof.

At the end of 1927 Ludwig was informed by the Soviet embassy that a post in Russia would soon be available for him and that in the meantime he should "cooperate" with Eduard Scheibe. In compliance with this request Ludwig started to take home secret documents of the Aeronautical Institute (mainly dealing with airplane motors), which he turned over to Scheibe. Scheibe delivered them to the photographer Ernst Huttinger, and the photographs of the documents found their way to Alexandrovski. When the security officers of the Institute discovered the loss of the docu-

ments and designs, the evidence led to Ludwig. Ludwig, Scheibe, and Huttinger were arrested in July 1928. Alexandrovski disappeared and the Soviet attaché Lunev hastily left Berlin. The Soviet Embassy issued the typical denial:

The information in today's newspapers that an arrested employee of the Aeronautical Research Institute, suspected of having sold important documents to a foreign power, has acted in the interests of the Soviet Union and was connected with Soviet missions does not correspond to the facts. The news reported by an evening paper that the recall of the former military attaché Lunev is directly connected with this affair is also false. Mr. Lunev's recall, furthermore, was reported to the German authorities at the end of February.²

In court the defendants tried to advance the argument which two decades later became popular in atomic espionage affairs: science is international and Russia must not be discriminated against. The court disregarded this. "Though scientific institutions exchange their findings and experience on an international scale," the sentence read, "the defendants were not entitled to betray to the Russians what should not be revealed to them." Since the case was considered a military espionage affair, the punishment was severe: five years for Ludwig, six years for Scheibe, and three for Huttinger; Alexandrovski was never found.³

In another industrial-military espionage case, bullet-proof glass was the target, for the Soviet Union, still unable to produce this kind of glass, was dependent on costly imports, and in addition risked supplies being cut off in case of war. In 1930 a young Communist chemical engineer, at the British-financed Neutex Glass Company at Aachen, Theodor Pesch, was turning over secret documents and samples to Soviet intelligence agents. The Soviet trade legation, involved in the affair, on April 27, 1931, issued an emphatic denial: "Neither the Legation itself nor its members had any relations whatsoever to these persons." The court recognized extenuating circumstances in favor of young Pesch and sentenced him to two months' imprisonment.⁴

In 1928-29, when Germany was in process of building her first postwar cruiser (Panzerkreuzer A), the project immediately became a target of major importance for Soviet espionage, and more than one intelligence group was assigned to it. One spy ring was to

obtain all details of naval artillery designed and manufactured by the Rhenische Metallwaren und Maschinenfabrik in Düsseldorf. No sooner had the order for the construction of the cruiser been signed by the German government than an intelligence group of technicians and designers, under the engineer Willi Adamczik, began to steal the new designs. Adamczik's main helpers were two other technicians, the brothers Rudolf and Erwin Gross. The group worked without hindrance for half a year and were not caught until March 1929.*

No sooner had this spy unit been arrested than another, more powerful, emerged to spy on the progress of the cruiser. A group of German Communists in Bremen and Hamburg, the great port cities with large dockyards, were assigned to this task under the supervision of agents in the trade legation. A man going by the name of "Herbert Snger" was placed at the head of one of the special apparatus, composed of six or seven men, to gather information on the new cruiser. The leader of the apparatus, actually more important than "Snger," was Lothar Hofmann ("Hans Richter," "Dr. Schwarz"), an underground espionage worker of long standing and a man of great intelligence who had been active as a secret agent in the Far East, France, and Belgium. Transferred back to Germany, he became one of the chiefs of espionage, his field extending far beyond the shipbuilding industry. Another member of the group, Richard Lehmann ("Rowold"), had a large modern photo-copying shop installed in his cellar.⁵

The cruiser affair would have fallen in the crowded category of trivial espionage cases had it not been for the fact that in the last stages a war developed between the spy group and German counterespionage. In February 1930 Hans Schirmer, a somewhat unstable Communist short-story writer who was not always loyal to his party, decided to get in touch with the Soviet espionage apparatus and did so in a way which might be called clumsy had it not, in the end, turned out to be so efficient. In February 1930 he wrote a letter to the "Communist Spy Center in Hamburg." The envelope was addressed to "The Communist Party Center in Hamburg, Valentinskamp"; inside was another envelope addressed to "The Chief of the Espionage Division." The inside envelope bore the note: "If the addressee is not present or if there is no such per-

* Adamczik was sentenced to six years at hard labor, Rudolf Gross to three years' imprisonment, and Erwin Gross to six months.

son, please return the letter unopened to the above address." The letter ran as follows:

As a former employee of the naval dockyards in this city, I have the best possible connections with the employees as well as the military personnel of the dockyards. I would be in a position to supply information of particular interest to you and would be grateful if you would let me know when and where we could meet to discuss this matter.

Soon an answer came from Hamburg, typed, and signed in pencil "Herbert Sanger":

I have read your letter with interest and would like, before getting in close touch with you, to obtain more information in order to be able to decide whether your connections are really sufficient.

No address was given and so Schirmer once more mailed a letter to the "Espionage Division of the KPD in Hamburg":

I read your letter with interest. I must inform you, however, that it is impossible for me to write you in greater detail and I must ask for an appointment.

Three or four weeks later an answer from "Sanger" arrived:

As an exception I agree to meet you on Sunday. I will be expecting you in the waiting room of the main railway station: black topcoat, sport cap, a handkerchief in my hand. Best regards . . .

The meeting took place. Schirmer repeated his statement about his contacts in the naval dockyard and the navy. "Sanger" said that "they" had their own good contacts with the Ministry and in Kiel and that many navy officers were easily accessible. Naturally cautious and suspicious, "Sanger" did not immediately accept Schirmer's offer; his interest, he maintained, was purely political, and what he wanted information about was the political trends among the officers and men and the names of disliked officers. Nothing substantial came of these first contacts except that Schirmer was given a cover address for correspondence. For several months no progress was made.

In October of that year Schirmer went to the counterespionage

agency of the navy and reported his contact; his services were accepted. In agreement with the ND (Nachrichtendienst), Schirmer again got in touch with "Sänger," offering information and documents of substantial interest. From then on, Lothar Hofmann, the actual head of this espionage project, was active in the Schirmer affair. Supplied with faked designs and documents by the ND officers, Schirmer delivered these to Hofmann, each time receiving from Hofmann from 50 to 300 marks. After the documents were photographed in Lehmann's cellar, they were returned to Schirmer, and by Schirmer to counterintelligence.

In May 1931, after the ties of the Hofmann group were traced by counterintelligence, the ring was arrested. Tried in April 1932 behind closed doors, the members of the group were sentenced to long terms—Hofmann to four years at hard labor, two others to two years.*

How many other Soviet espionage groups were active in connection with the German cruiser is of course not known. It seems certain, however, that when the Panzerkreuzer was launched a description and photographs of many of its essential parts lay on the desks of the General Staff of the Red Navy.

The assassination of a Soviet spy by the GB on Austrian soil, which occurred about this time, attracted general attention in Central Europe and helped to aggravate the political situation. The victim, Georg Semmelmann, had worked for Soviet intelligence in Germany for eight years, ostensibly as an employee of the Soviet trade legation in Hamburg. On secret assignments of his GB chiefs, Semmelmann traveled to Moscow and all over Europe and sometimes performed dangerous operations, such as freeing the Communist editor Otto Braun and his wife Olga Benario from jail in Berlin in April 1928. He had stood trial more than once, served time in jail, been expelled from various countries. In the spring of 1931, after this long service, Semmelmann lost the confidence of his superiors for reasons which were

* This was not the end of Hofmann's Communist career. In 1941, when Denmark was occupied by the German army, he was arrested, taken to Germany, and sentenced to death. He was not executed, however. What he did while in prison has never been revealed, but after his release in 1945 he was not admitted back into the Communist party; he remained "isolated" for three years. Since 1948 Hofmann has been back in the good graces of Moscow and the East German government. D papers, Di 71.

not revealed.* The angry and unscrupulous Semmelmann intended to sue his former bosses—which would have been tantamount to divulging GB secrets to the public. He did not sue, but he did write a letter to a newspaper in Vienna proposing a series of articles covering:

General information on the setup of Soviet espionage and counterespionage: recruiting of agents.

A KPD deputy of the German Reichstag head of the recruiting division for Russian military and industrial espionage.

Disposition of agents (and their functions) at espionage centers in Berlin and Vienna.

False passports center (the role of the KPD).

Securing of faked jobs (support by the KPD and the Soviet trade legations).

Working methods of Soviet military intelligence; jurisdiction of spy centers at the Soviet embassies in Berlin and Vienna.

Detailed account of Soviet espionage in Europe, etc.⁶

The GB learned about Semmelmann's plans immediately; a death "sentence" was a matter of course. On July 27, 1931, Andrei Piklovich, a Serbian Communist, allegedly a medical student, entered Semmelmann's apartment and shot him. Piklovich was arrested by the Austrian police.

The Piklovich trial took place in March 1932, and its outcome was as significant as the assassination itself. The prosecution maintained that Semmelmann was "executed" because he "had known too much" and that Piklovich had "committed a calculated murder." Piklovich did not deny his deed nor was he remorseful; he declared his "war to the end against capitalist rule" and his "non-recognition of the tribunal"; if Semmelmann were alive, many "proletarian fighters" would have been betrayed and would now be dead. Meantime a campaign in Piklovich's favor was staged by Moscow. The Communist press and its sympathizers demanded his acquittal, and a cable from Henri Barbusse to the same effect was read in court.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. In such cases a two-

* It is likely that since the girl he had just married was unknown to his superiors Semmelmann had become a security risk.

thirds majority (eight out of ten) was required for a verdict of guilty: five of the jurors refused to condemn Piklovich and he was set free.

6. THE NAZI ERA

As early as May 1932 Moscow had begun to reckon on a possible shift in the German regime. Even before President Hindenburg entrusted the Reichskanzlei to Adolf Hitler, the Comintern advised the German Communist leadership to prepare for a period of illegality and provide alternative residences and false documents; at the same time the Soviet agencies in Germany were ordered to sort out their papers, ship to Moscow whatever was expendable at the moment, and store other documents in bank vaults rented by "private people." This foresight, based on the underground's decade of experience and on the strict rules of conspiratsia, now bore fruit.

Despite the fact that the seizure of power by the National Socialists did not entail many casualties for the Soviet apparat, the position of Berlin as the foremost Soviet shelter in the West declined rapidly. As the Versailles era was coming to an end for Europe, so was the Berlin era for Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet underground, not so much because of police activities against Soviet institutions and the Soviet underground as because of the destruction of the German Communist party. Despite the strict separation of the Soviet apparat from the German party, the KPD was the soil that nourished the apparat; it was the base for recruiting agents, the point of convergence of various channels, ties, and networks. No Soviet espionage of any significance is possible without assistance from local Communists, and certainly no espionage on the scale of that conducted in Germany in the early 1930's.

The Nazis' suppression of the German Communist party, often by the use of inhuman methods, was thorough and swift. Within three weeks of Hitler's coming to power, the fortress of the KPD—the Karl Liebknecht Haus, with its subterranean shelters and passageways and its ingenious alarm system—had been searched and closed. Arrests by the hundreds followed all over Germany. The party leadership, equipped with documents which had been prepared well in advance, began to emigrate to Czechoslovakia, France,

and Russia. Among those seized, the Gestapo found quite a few who were ready to denounce their associates in order to save their own lives, and as a result of these denunciations new blows were heaped on the party and in particular on its underground agencies. Hans Kippenberger escaped abroad, as did almost all the other leaders of the German and Russian-German apparats; the majority of them soon reached Moscow.

The new government directed its fury against German Communism; the Soviet official and illegal organizations were a lesser target. The Nazi regime did not intend to start out with a conflict on an international scale; the plan elaborated well in advance by the Hitler group called rather for rearmament as a prelude to a great offensive. The regime thus continued to recognize all privileges of Soviet institutions in Germany, and the German police—those inherited from the Weimar era as well as the newly created Gestapo—were surprisingly ignorant concerning the activities of the various Soviet apparats. Groping in the dark, they tried to obtain information on “the Russians” from German Communists, now being arrested by the hundreds, many of whom were beaten in an effort to make them confess. Often these prisoners revealed to the Gestapo details about the German underground, its leaders, organization, and methods. Despite all the pressure applied, however, there was little they could disclose about the Soviet apparats. In most cases they knew “a man named Boris” or “a girl named Olga.” Although they had “treffs” with agents at fixed times and places, they did not know the addresses of their Russian chiefs.

“We were quite successful,” reports a police officer of the Nazi era, “in breaking up the German Communist machine; we learned everything about the AM [“Antimilitarist”] and similar apparats, and destroyed them. But it was a long time before we started to comprehend things in the Soviet networks. We were confused by cover names; we were unable even to identify a person; today she is Klara, tomorrow Frieda, and in another section of the city her name is Mizzi. We were often at a loss.”¹

Between March and May 1933 the new police swooped down on some of the Soviet agencies which were serving as a cover for “Grete” and “Klara,” but nothing of importance was found. At the end of March the Düsseldorf, Cologne, Cottbus, Kassel, Munich, and Nuremberg offices of Derop, the oil syndicate, were raided, and several days later the Berlin office. A few of the German em-

ployees were arrested. A week later a search was conducted of the office of the trade legation in Leipzig (only the Berlin headquarters of the trade legation enjoyed immunity from search) and of the Soviet Employees' Club in the same city. A second raid on Derop on April 26 was followed by the dismissal of its managing personnel, the appointment of a "commissar" (legally Derop was a trading company subject to German law), and the arrest of twenty German Communist employees. Soviet ships in German ports were thoroughly searched. The offices of Derutra (German-Russian Transport Company) in Hamburg and Stettin were raided.²

In Moscow, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov registered a protest with the German ambassador against the "inhuman treatment" of Soviet employees in Germany, while the Soviet press warned Germany that trade reprisals would follow. *Za Industrialisatsiu* (*For Industrialization*) advocated "a change in our economic relations with Germany, no matter how valuable those relations have been to both countries." It suggested "developing imports from France, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other countries . . ." Soviet Ambassador Lev Khinchuk protested to the Foreign Office in Berlin, and was received by Hitler. The official German position was conciliatory: "The police action in Berlin was a matter of internal policy only, its purpose was to purge *Derop* of its Communist elements; the German government is very much interested in the preservation of normal relations between Germany and Russia, and particularly in the development of Russian trade."³

Whatever the future for Soviet-German trade relations, the Soviet underground in Germany could not continue in the old form and on the old scale.

It would not be long now before the Gestapo, having learned some lessons, would plant its agents in all Soviet institutions and deal hard blows to the most sensitive and important parts of the network. The Berlin heyday was over, and a closing up was imperative.

"Bruno" (Grünfeld) arrived from Moscow with the assignment of reorganizing—actually winding up—the intelligence network. The real purpose of the operation was to cut off the infected organs, eliminate suspects, remove those who might be endangered, and take over the rest of the shrinking Soviet apparat in Germany. The task was not easy to accomplish under the vigilant eyes of the

German police, but Grünfeld was not caught. Moscow, however, was dissatisfied with his reports (he was also spending too much money in the "fascist capital"), and soon dispatched another agent, Dr. Gregor Rabinovich, a high official of the GB, to complete the task. (This was the same Dr. Rabinovich who soon afterward came to the United States to prepare for the assassination of Leon Trotsky and who operated there as head of the Russian Red Cross.) *

Dr. Rabinovich's task in Berlin was to reorganize the apparat and check on its personnel rather than to gather information. The operation was an instructive episode in which once again the whole structure of Soviet institutions was reflected: the GB stood over military intelligence just as it stood over all other Soviet agencies; it was the GB that selected personnel, initiated the setting up of secret agencies, and supervised their activities.

From among the remnants of the old group in Soviet military intelligence, industrial espionage, and the BB (or worker-correspondents), Dr. Rabinovich selected about twenty-five persons for "Klara" (Military Intelligence). Early in 1936 the work of reorganization was finished, and even the name BB went out of circulation. Rabinovich left Germany, to reappear soon in New York.†

In the fall of 1935, after the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, the so-called "Brussels Congress" of the German Communist party convened in Kuntsevo, a small place near Moscow. The pretense that the congress was held in Belgium was deemed necessary to counteract accusations that all Communist policy is decided in the Soviet capital, and also to avoid possible

* Louis Budenz, who for a time worked with Rabinovich in the United States, describes the eminent GB man: "There was a sadness but also an intelligence in his deep brown eyes that immediately impressed me. His excellently tailored but conservative clothes enhanced his appearance of stability and solidity. He might easily be some recently arrived European business man—and that was supposedly his role, I was afterwards informed." *This Is My Story* (New York and London, Whittlesey House, 1947), p. 254-5.

† Before he left, a former member of the apparat relates, Rabinovich arranged a small conference of his leading German lieutenants. To escape observation the group met in Copenhagen, all carrying false passports which described them as non-German nationals. Their somewhat boisterous conduct attracted the attention of the Danish police, who arrested and searched them. German money, including "tourist marks," was found in their possession. This the police took as proof that they were dealing with so-called "Valuta-Schiebers," a gang of black marketeers. All of the group were expelled from Denmark to the respective countries listed on their passports. It was not long before they were back in Germany. D papers, b 336-9.

conflicts with the German government. (At about the same time a congress of the Chinese Communist party, held near Moscow, was officially announced as having taken place "somewhere in China.") Members of the German congress, dissatisfied with Russian underground methods, decided to undertake a thorough reorganization: Kippenberger's old network was to be dissolved and new German groups, working in the Nazi underground, were to be given a greater degree of independence. In addition, Meyer Trilisser, the former GB leader, told the members of the German congress that all mass Soviet espionage networks in Germany (BB and others) were being abolished. It appeared that the trend toward "autonomy" from Soviet overlordship had won out.

Before the congress ended, however, Walter Ulbricht, more pro-Russian than any among the German Communist leaders, started to organize a new apparat for Moscow. Within a year of the close of the congress the old relationship in Germany was being restored, although on a smaller scale, under pressure from Moscow. One after another Communist émigré leaders in Moscow began to disappear in the cellars of the GB. Hans Kippenberger, the most prominent and valuable satellite of Moscow, accused of having given information to the British and French,* was among those executed.

Only a comparatively small Soviet apparat now remained in Germany; the greater part of the network had either been dissolved or moved abroad. The OMS had moved with the Comintern's West European Bureau, the WEB, to Copenhagen; the passport apparat had gone to the Saar, and Soviet military intelligence to Holland and France; the party leadership had migrated part to

* This was one of the standard accusations whenever a person disloyal to Stalin or who deviated from Stalinism had to be liquidated. Herbert Wehner, prominent German Communist of the 1930's, now a leader of the German Social Democratic party, considers it likely that, with Moscow's consent, Kippenberger was actually connected with British and French agencies, and that in order to secure hiding places, etc., he gave the British and French information on political developments. Wehner himself returned from the "Brussels Congress" to the West as a member of the Central Committee of the KPD and lived in Sweden during the war. In 1942 a member of the Soviet consulate in Stockholm asked Wehner to turn over the addresses of all his friends in Berlin; the intent, obviously, was to use them for espionage purposes. Since such disclosure would almost certainly have resulted in death warrants for many of these friends, Wehner refused. A few days later he was denounced by Soviet agents to the Swedish police as a "dubious person." He was arrested and tried behind closed doors. Sentenced to a prison term, he was not released until August 1944.

Prague and part to Paris. Soon these groups began to feel insecure in their new domiciles: the Saarland was a favorite locale of Nazi espionage; Prague was under severe pressure from Berlin; in case of war, Copenhagen and Amsterdam might fall before the Soviet apparat had a chance to depart. Gradually men and groups began to move to France. In 1937 splinters of various Soviet groups gathered in Paris for "regrouping." This did not contribute to the apparat's efficiency.

The decline reached crisis proportions when the great purge of 1937 began to devour the veterans of the intelligence service in Russia as well as abroad. One after another there occurred the assassination of Ignace Reiss on Swiss soil; the defection of Alexander Orlov and Walter Krivitsky in Paris; * the execution of Soviet military attaché Vitovt Putna, who had been recalled from London. A majority of the best agents were recalled to Russia; few of them ever returned to the West. The apparat was almost paralyzed.

But even in the gloom of the purge years some striking successes were achieved by Soviet intelligence in regard to Germany. Penetration of the German embassies in Japan and Poland opened up sources of highly important information. In Tokyo Richard Sorge was in a position to inform Moscow concerning German policies, German-Japanese relations, and, in particular, Germany's war plans. In Warsaw Soviet intelligence obtained access to the German embassy's counselor Rudolf von Scheliha, a non-Communist career diplomat who became an important spy of the old classical type. Member of a noble family of Silesia, an officer in World War I, Scheliha entered the diplomatic field and had served in Warsaw since 1929, gradually advancing to the rank of counselor. His salary and the considerable income of his wife were insufficient to cover his large expenses, his gambling losses, and his expensive love affairs. In a moment of financial troubles of this kind he began to sell diplomatic secrets to two buyers—London and Moscow. It is impossible to say which was the first to enjoy his collaboration, although it appears that Russia was first on the scene.

In the mid-'thirties the German journalist Rudolf Herrnstadt, formerly a writer on the liberal *Berliner Tageblatt* and friend of its well-known editor Theodor Wolff, migrated to Warsaw. Under

* The activities and tragic end of Ignace Reiss and Walter Krivitsky deserve more detailed consideration. Two chapters dealing extensively with their fate are to be included in a forthcoming work of this author.

Wolff's assignment Herrstadt had worked as a correspondent in Prague and Warsaw, had visited Moscow, and had gradually developed into a "salon Communist," a type common among intellectuals at that time. When the *Berliner Tageblatt* was forced to change its line and its personnel in 1933, Herrstadt lived in Poland as a journalist and was in touch with the Soviet embassy there. He also became friendly with Scheliha. As the counselor was complaining about his financial difficulties, Herrstadt suggested a deal with a Soviet agent in Warsaw. The deal was consummated.⁴

This was in 1937, the year of the Anti-Comintern Pact and continuing rapprochement between Germany and Poland, when Göring was making "courtesy" and "hunting" visits to Warsaw. Collaboration in the diplomatic field was accompanied by close contacts between the police departments of both countries, particularly with respect to counterespionage and anti-Soviet measures. Scheliha, whose cover name was "the Aryan" supplied information to the Soviet side on the German-Polish negotiations in Warsaw, the Three-Power Pact, the expected participation of small nations in the German-led coalition, and so forth. Realizing that Scheliha's interest could be sustained only by a good salary, Moscow, in February 1938, paid him \$6,500—a sum unusual in the budgets of Soviet intelligence.

On the eve of the Polish-German war Scheliha was transferred to Berlin to a post in the Foreign Office. His services to the Soviet apparat continued. To facilitate contacts, Herrstadt recommended his girl friend Ilse Stöbe as a secretary for Scheliha. Ilse had formerly been an employee of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. Early in 1941 she obtained a position in the Foreign Office, and collaboration between Scheliha and Soviet intelligence became a simple matter. A short time before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war the Soviet embassy paid Scheliha 30,000 marks through the good offices of Ilse Stöbe. The collaboration, which continued for several years, proved fatal for both, as we shall see.

This book has dealt thus far with the agencies of Soviet headquarters abroad in their capacity of intelligence agencies only; we have not discussed their terrorist and sabotage activities. From about 1925 on, when Stalin arrived at the conclusion that a "temporary stabilization of capitalism" had set in, "direct action" and revolutions were no longer "imminent," and technical preparation

for upheavals—caching of dynamite and arms, and acts of sabotage—became secondary to other tasks. The situation changed in the 1930's. First the new regime in Germany and then the civil war in Spain were interpreted in Moscow as the prelude to world war; bloody fighting was expected soon to replace the cold war of the preceding decade. As in the early 'twenties, "diversion" and terror seemed to be called for. Even before the Spanish war broke out, developments in Germany gave rise to terroristic tendencies among some remnants of the old German underground.

"Diversion" became the springboard in the career of that prominent figure in the Soviet-German apparat—Ernst Wollweber, today minister of the interior of the German Democratic Republic. The story of Wollweber, who started out as a seaman in 1917 and rose to be a member of the Reichstag in 1932, has been told in an earlier section.⁵ He continued his advance in the Nazi era as an underground operator working for mixed Soviet-German apparats. The former seaman's power center and main arena of activity was the ISH (Seamen's International), a trade union organization of a political type and atypical aims. No other trade union organization, in Moscow's eyes, rivaled the ISH in importance, since in case of war the seamen's union was in a position to sabotage transport of troops and arms sent against Russia, and in peacetime a strike of seamen might exert political pressure; in connection with transport of secret communications, espionage reports, or couriers, the ISH was essential. According to Jan Valtin, a former member of the "Politburo" of ISH,⁶ this trade union was in reality a "masked continuation of the Comintern's Maritime Section" and as such was receiving a monthly subsidy of \$52,000 from the Soviet Shipping Trust (the Trust serving, of course, as a cover for the Comintern's West European Bureau). The Seamen's International had branches in 22 countries and 19 colonies; it employed 15 "political instructors" and operated 47 international clubs in various ports. The chief of ISH before the Nazi era was Albert Walter, a reliable German Communist; behind the scenes Ernst Wollweber wielded the strongest power.

Wollweber did not take immediate flight after the Nazis came to power. He tried to preserve and regroup the Communist underground, an effort in which he displayed energy and courage. Long after the top party leaders had reached safe havens abroad, and hundreds of the minor leaders had been imprisoned, he was still

traveling over the country to meet his comrades and salvage what could be saved. Although he was not successful, his prestige, in Moscow's eyes, grew immensely during those months when his colleagues were escaping one after another to the Soviet capital.

Only thirty-five at the time, Wollweber had developed into a clever, daring, and ruthless leader of the underground. He never spoke at public gatherings and never wrote for the press. He was brutal, a heavy drinker, a "practician" par excellence. When he spoke, Valtin recalls, "each word seemed to come out in a slow sullen growl. He gave the impression of being a man who was never in a hurry, who was utterly without fear, whom nothing could surprise, and who had stripped himself deliberately of all illusions." ⁷

Early in 1934 Wollweber, who had previously been called to Moscow, returned with new assignments: in addition to his tasks as a member of the Comintern's West European Bureau in Copenhagen, he was to start a new apparat of diversion, with recruits from the seamen's union, intended to operate mainly against the Soviet Union's potential enemies, Germany and Japan. The apparat was to be kept at a distance from all Communist parties; ^{*} its members were not to be permitted to carry membership cards of any of the Comintern's branches; it was in no way, not even financially, to be connected with the German KP. The apparat's supporters and financiers were the "diversion" departments of the Soviet government.

Wollweber's apparat ("Wollweber's League," as it was called later in Scandinavia) embraced a group of from twenty to fifty men carefully selected by the chief himself, mainly Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes but including a few German Communists. Among the latter were Waldemar Verner (now head of Maritime Police in East Germany), Heinrich Schramm, Karl Bargstädt, Adolf Baier, Rolf Hagge, and others. The special task of the "League" was sabotage of Axis shipping. In the fall of 1933 the harbor police in Rotterdam made the first arrest of a Wollweber agent. At the time of arrest the agent was carrying a sack of dynamite. The following year an Italian ship, the *Felce*, was sunk in the Gulf of Taranto. In 1935 information obtained in connection with the sinking of the Japanese ship *Tajima Maru*, out of Rotterdam, led to Wollweber.⁸

In 1937, when Germany began to ship war material to the

^{*} However, the Swedish Communist leader Sven Lasse Linderöth, member of the Riksdag, was let into the secrets and played a prominent role.

Francoists in Spain, Wollweber's "diversion" increased considerably. The operation was to extend beyond direct German-Spanish shipping to all freight lines which supplied Germany with essential war material. Power stations in Sweden (which supplied Germany with iron ore) were made the targets of explosions. In Hamburg Wollweber had the support of a still existing Communist group of about twenty men and women with Dr. Michaelis as its leader. The group informed Wollweber on events in the shipping world, outgoing vessels, cargoes, etc. In 1937 the group was arrested and twelve of its members were executed.⁹

Explosions on ships increased in number. The usual procedure was to place a quantity of German dynamite in the hold of the ship, between the hull and the freight, and to set the timing mechanism to explode the dynamite when the ship was on the high seas. Explosions occurred on the Dutch *Westplein*, the Japanese *Kazi Maru*, the German *Klaus Böge*, the Rumanian *Bessarabia*, the Polish *Batory*, and many others; some were destroyed completely. In certain cases the explosion was timed to occur when the ship reached the Holtenauer floodgates or the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal so that the crew, among whom were some Communists, could be saved.

In a memorandum of June 10, 1941, to his chief, Minister Heinrich Himmler, reporting on the Wollweber group, Nazi Chief of Police Reinhard Heydrich stated:

The following cases of sabotage must be attributed to the group of Communist terrorists spread all over Europe:

16 German ships

3 Italian ships

2 Japanese ships

Two of the best of these ships were completely destroyed. The criminals first tried to destroy the ships by fire, but since this means did not always cause a total loss, they have begun recently to use explosives . . . They had their main footholds in the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reval, and Riga.

The Communist sabotage groups formed in Holland, Belgium, and France and operated under the direction of the Dutch Communist Josef Rimbartus Schaap, head of the Inter-Club in Rotterdam. Under his immediate command was the former head of the RFB (Rot Front-kämpfer Bund) in Ham-

burg, Karl Bargstädt, who took care of the technical side of the operations. Explosives used for these purposes were sent from northern Scandinavia disguised as minerals . . . One of the most important couriers of explosives was the Dutch Willem van Vreeswijk . . .

Investigation by the police resulted in the arrest of 24 Communist terrorists, among them the head of the Dutch sabotage group, Achille Beguin, and the head of the Belgian group, Alfons Fictels. Schaap was arrested by the Danish police in Copenhagen on August 1, 1940 . . .

Wollweber organized footholds on the Baltic islands of Dago and Oesel. His collaborators were supposed to go into action only in case of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union or in case these islands were occupied by German troops or the German navy. Sabotage was to be directed against submarine bases, airports, and oil depots.¹⁰

A principle of Wollweber's "conspiracy" was to remain independent of any other underground network. He avoided, as far as possible, contacts with other apparats and he never asked the help of other groups to obtain passports or couriers. He sought to obtain a peculiar authority for his own group.

"We were in possession of a great variety of false passports," reports one of Wollweber's collaborators, Ignatz Müller,

which at first were made in Paris. As the apparat grew in size, this means of procuring passports became rather inconvenient, and besides the passports were not always suitable for the person in question. I myself therefore had to produce all documents for the agents working under my command. In this way the number of persons who were let into the secret was reduced to two.

At our conferences usually not more than two or three persons were present: the chief, one of my men whom the chief wanted to meet personally, and myself. I received my assignments directly from Wollweber and often I had to make long trips to meet him. The place of our meetings depended on the weather: on a nice day we walked for hours in the suburbs, we met on excursions, etc. Usually my reports were made orally since we tried to avoid paper and ink as much as possible. The chief kept everything in his memory. All my

agents, experts in one or another field, proved very courageous in the Spanish civil war. Often I faced the difficult problem of how to groom these simple workers so that in their dangerous missions they would look like well-to-do, well-educated persons.

Often we had to go to Germany for observation or information, and in these cases the schedule of the trip was worked out in advance in all details. We had to mail postal cards to an address in Denmark from each of the places visited. If the postal card did not arrive on time it meant that something had happened to the traveling member of the group and another was to be sent in his stead.

Suppose a trip was to be made to Germany from Norway. Our man was first sent to Denmark to receive a false Swiss passport and other papers to prove that he was traveling back home from Norway and must pass through Denmark and Germany. While "in transit" through Germany, he stopped to carry out his assignment (for instance, in connection with a certain ship in a harbor), and then continued on to the French or Swiss border. In case he was observed or his identity discovered by the German police, he was to escape abroad, or at least mail a postal card bearing a message which had been worked out in advance.¹¹

A newspaper report later published in Sweden stated:

Each member of the group had at least one cover name; there were numerous contact people, secret hiding places and odd identification methods. Letters and reports were usually written in invisible ink, lemon juice or onion juice. Sabotage and blasting techniques were taught as well as the manufacture of time bombs and mines. Agents learned various ciphers and all of them knew that "meat" and "pork" meant dynamite, "Lappish knife" meant time bomb, "fish scales" meant a member, etc. The language was not always elegant, but it was clear and practical.¹²

The purge in Moscow and the resulting chaos paralyzed Wollweber's activity for half a year. For approximately five months his connection with Moscow was broken despite the fact that the latest order from the Soviet capital had been to increase the "diversion" activity.

I had quite a few orders and I made serious preparations, but our plans could not be carried out because our funds were exhausted. We had to reduce our apparatus and wait. After five months Wollweber, very depressed, discussed with us whether or not to dissolve our apparatus altogether. He sent an agent to Moscow and advised him to contact Georgi Dimitrov; the courier was to tell Dimitrov that Wollweber wanted to know whether he was to liquidate. The comrade returned three days later. He told us that Dimitrov at first could not give him a definite reply and asked him to remain one more day. The following day the courier was told to inform Wollweber that he was to dissolve his network. The same night, however, Wollweber was informed that a new order had arrived directing him to continue his work: our first courier to Moscow was purposely misled into assuming that we were stopping our activities.¹³

In the spring of 1940, when German troops occupied Denmark and Norway, many members of Wollweber's network were arrested. Twenty of them, accused of twenty-one acts of sabotage, were tried in Copenhagen in July 1941. Since May 1940 only neutral Sweden had been able to serve as a base of network operations. The Swedish branches of the "Wollweber League" (in Stockholm and other cities), which had started their activity in 1938, continued to operate until August 1941, when an unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up the Finnish ship *Figge* in a Swedish port. The arrests which followed soon after put an early end to the group at a time when it was needed more than ever because of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. Several members of the "League" confessed, and it was not long before its general organization was revealed. A large number of its members, however, succeeded in escaping.

Wollweber himself was arrested at the Swedish border in May 1940. This was the first arrest for this veteran underground activist. The charge against him in this instance was that he carried a false Danish passport in the name of "Fritz Koeller." He was sentenced to six months in prison. Before the expiration of the term, however, his Swedish group had been arrested and his role in it revealed. In a new trial, in which a few of his German and Swedish aides were also defendants, Wollweber was sentenced to three years

in prison. The German government asked for his extradition and the Swedish government agreed to turn him over at the end of his prison term. Death by guillotine for Wollweber seemed a certainty. But his protectors in Moscow perpetrated one of their shrewdest tricks: the Soviet embassy in Stockholm informed the Swedish authorities that Wollweber was a Soviet citizen, had embezzled Soviet funds, and was being sought by Soviet justice; his extradition to Russia was demanded. Whether or not the Swedish minister of justice believed this tale, he acted upon it, and in November 1944 Wollweber, the most successful and ruthless of Communist terrorists, boarded a plane for Russia, where rewards were bestowed upon him. His next assignment was a highly confidential one in the new Soviet domain, the future German Democratic Republic.

7. THE HITLER-STALIN PACT

During the "pact era," from August 23, 1939, to June 21, 1941, Soviet intelligence policy with respect to Germany was not uniform. On the one hand there was the desire to maintain friendly relations with the Berlin government; on the other, nothing was harder for Stalin's regime to bear than abstention from intelligence activities and the gathering of secret information in the friendly Nazi country. But the Soviet-German friendship, both on the diplomatic plane of ambassadors and counselors and in the clandestine sphere of spies and secret agents, was a short one.

Soviet-German relations began to deteriorate after the fall of France in the summer of 1940; as relations worsened from month to month, the Soviet espionage agencies engaged in intelligence activity on a growing scale. Following the end of the great purge, the fall of Yezhov, and the appointment of Beria as head of the NKVD, two of Beria's new, rapidly advancing lieutenants were appointed to posts in Berlin—Vladimir Dekanozov, chief of the NKVD Information Department, as ambassador, and Bogdan Kobulov as a counselor of the embassy. Like Beria, both men were Georgians. The history of these three men was closely linked in the subsequent thirteen years and ended with their execution in December 1953.

Dekanozov came to Berlin as Soviet ambassador in November 1940, when the "Barbarossa plan" had been practically perfected. The attack on Russia was to be launched the following spring.

Unlike his modest predecessor, Shkvartsev, Dekanozov went in for large receptions at the Soviet embassy in the German capital and "official life" on a grand scale in order to make contacts. The young "counselor," Vladimir Semionov (today vice-minister of foreign affairs), was among the hosts at receptions. Counselor Kobulov, a shrewd and lively man—"the Asiatic politician type," the Germans said of him—approached persons in the German government and received an invitation for himself and five TASS men to accompany a group making a semi-official trip to occupied territories in the West and Czechoslovakia. The German hosts did not realize until the interesting trip was over that their invited guests were a Soviet NKVD expedition. Kobulov, who enjoyed the privileges of extraterritoriality, set up a kind of espionage center in his apartment and looked for assistants among foreign correspondents in Berlin. He extended his network to the German-occupied territories, Poland and Czechoslovakia. According to a report of German Chief of Police Heydrich, twelve clandestine radio transmitters, set up in Czechoslovakia by agents of the Soviet embassy in Berlin and the Soviet consul in Prague, were discovered by the police of these countries, and sixty persons were arrested.

In Berlin Kobulov was assisted by the Soviet military attaché Tupikov and the latter's aide, Colonel Skorniakov; Shakhanov, chief of Intourist in Berlin, was in close contact with Kobulov. Tarasov of the TASS press agency and attaché Levrov in the embassy were also GB men. An intelligence agent working in the embassy under the cover name "Alexander Erdberg," in return for radio transmitters turned over to the leaders of the future Rote Kapelle, obtained the latter's promise of collaboration in case of war. We shall see later how this important network developed from June 1941 on.

Vitold Pakulat, a Lithuanian of German descent, was sent to Germany as a spy after Lithuania was occupied by Soviet forces. His assignment was to set up a clandestine radio and organize a *pied-à-terre* for "illegal" Soviet agents. Arrived in Berlin, Pakulat got in touch with both the Soviet embassy and German counter-espionage. Following Soviet instructions, he rented an apartment in which a large radio transmitter was installed. He bought a small hotel where Soviet agents passing through Berlin could stay. The police were kept informed of all his moves. By his Soviet superior he was instructed to try to establish contacts with skilled workers

in war industries and to obtain pertinent information; he was to set up "letter boxes" at secret places where letters and documents for other agents could be held. Pakulat used the services of an engineer of Siemens (likewise provided by the police). To his Soviet superiors Pakulat reported that he had assembled a network of sixty reliable Germans and had ordered them to describe (obviously as possible bombing targets) strategically important sections of German cities, etc.

Another Soviet radio, according to Heydrich's report, was set up in Danzig; it was connected with a network of secret informants on political and economic affairs. The German police were surprised at the frequent trips made to the Baltic port by "a radio expert of the Soviet embassy" whom they were shadowing, but soon two members of the Danzig network betrayed this station to the police and it was suppressed. Heydrich concludes his report with the statement that "one could continue this citation of incidents indefinitely."

In April 1941 a Czech agent of the GRU by the name of Shkvor confirmed a report that the Germans were massing troops at the Soviet borders and that the huge Skoda arms plant in Czechoslovakia had been instructed by Berlin to stop filling orders for the Soviet Union. This intelligence report was submitted to the members of the Politburo, including Stalin, of course. Stalin, according to the testimony of Ismail Akhmedov, put his decision in red ink: "This information is an English provocation. Find out who is making this provocation and punish him."

To discover the culprit, Maj. Ismail Akhmedov, chief of the Fourth Section of GRU (espionage dealing with new weapons) was sent to Germany, where he joined the sizable group of GB and GRU "residents." Akhmedov traveled to Berlin under the name of Georgi Nikolayev and in the convenient guise of a TASS correspondent.

. . . I came to Germany [he testified later] at the end of May 1941. Saturday, June 21, 1941, we got another information that the Germans were going to declare war on Soviet Russia the next day, that is Sunday, June 22. That was sent immediately to Moscow headquarters and reported to Dekanozov, who was ambassador of Soviet Russia in Berlin . . . Dekanozov, who was the right hand of Stalin, still did not believe in that infor-

mation and we were ordered to forget it and go to a picnic party the next day, but that picnic did not take place because at 3 in the morning, that was Sunday morning, Dekanozov was called to Von Ribbentrop and delivered note about declaration of war by Germany.*¹

In 1939-41 there became available for Soviet espionage service in Germany a unique and abundant source of human material—the “returners” from the East. A number of agreements arrived at as a result of the Soviet-German pact of August 1939 provided for exchanges of populations; German Volksdeutsche residing in the Baltic states, Poland, and other Eastern territories were to be sent to Germany and Austria in exchange for a similar shift of Russian population from the West to the East. The operation, which began at the end of 1939, lasted throughout the following year and was nearly completed when the war broke out. On the Soviet side it was carried out by the GB. About half a million Volksdeutsche moved to Germany in the course of the exchange.

For Soviet intelligence new vistas had opened. Here was a large group of persons who, with very few exceptions, would not be suspected in Germany of Communist sympathies; this mass of people would be dispersed through all the provinces of the Reich and among all social layers. Even if only a very small fraction of these migrants could be persuaded to undertake intelligence work for the Soviet Union they could make an enormous contribution, and if, out of these hundreds of thousands, a hundred, or even a few score, would continue intelligence activities their contribution to both military intelligence and the GB could be invaluable.

The GB, however, did not foresee the difficulties involved in such a vast espionage project. By what arguments could a person leaving Russia for good be persuaded to maintain ties with Russian authorities and engage in secret work for them? In some instances the GB promised generous remuneration, in others it resorted to

* When the war broke out, Akhmedov was transferred from Berlin to neutral Ankara to organize espionage in Turkey, mainly against Germany. Ordered to return to Moscow in May 1942, he defected from the Soviet service and stayed in Turkey for eight years. He found his way back to Islam, assumed the Turkish name Ege, and devoted himself to fighting Communism. In October 1953 Akhmedov-Ege testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate, and made an interesting and substantial contribution to our knowledge of Soviet intelligence.

intimidation. In some cases it threatened to bar emigration; in many cases relatives who remained behind were declared responsible for the conduct of the newly recruited spies. According to German sources, about 50 per cent of the returners were approached by the GB in an attempt to enlist them for espionage work. Even if this estimate was an exaggerated one, the operation was still huge in size. From all available accounts and reports it appears that the officers of the GB, who had always found it easy to recruit secret agents at home, and were apparently ignorant of conditions abroad, exaggerated their power and were naive in expecting the Volksdeutsche to fulfill these obligations.

In fact, many hundreds of the returners agreed before they left Soviet soil to work for Soviet intelligence. Arrived in Germany, however, and fearful in their role of Soviet spies, they rushed to the authorities to report and shake off all suspicion. Their stories were collected by the German authorities; when the war began, these stories served as impressive anti-Soviet propaganda.²

It is impossible, of course, to state whether every GB-recruited German spy revealed his story to the German police. It is significant, however, that among the hundreds of Soviet agents caught in Germany or her satellites during the war and among those Soviet agents who are known to have escaped arrest and imprisonment there was not a single German of "Heim ins Reich" origin.

CHAPTER 4

The War Years in Europe

1. ON THE EVE

IN Russia, in 1937-38, there was in process the most extensive and bloody of all the purges in Soviet history. Military intelligence, part of the suspect Red Army and dedicated by the very nature of its functions to conspiracy and secrecy, was hardest hit by the purge. Stalin almost destroyed the Razvedupr. Jan Berzin, chief of military intelligence, and his assistant, Alexander Korin, were executed, along with a large number of other "traitors" and "spies." Hundreds of official and secret agents were called home "to report"; many were dismissed, deported, purged, or executed; military attachés and their assistants and agents never returned to their posts; some members of Soviet secret services abroad, in fear for their lives, joined the ranks of the "nonreturners" and either "submerged" in a foreign country and disappeared or tried to save themselves by appealing to the public opinion of the West.

The international situation was ominous, with Nazi Germany rapidly expanding, and Moscow had fewer illusions about forthcoming developments than did the democracies. Stalin kept repeating, both in public and private, that "the second World War has already started." The blind madness and irrational destructiveness of the purge operations were in striking contrast to this realistic evaluation. At the end of 1938, when the storm was over and Beria had succeeded Yezhov, Russia's position vis-à-vis Germany and Japan had been substantially weakened; her intelligence apparatus had been broken and there was no reserve of fresh blood for a strengthening infusion.

The training of intelligence agents is a complex and time-consuming task, but a new generation of intelligence agents had to be trained as quickly as possible. Young Communists considered

fit for the peculiar duties of secret agents were relieved of the jobs they were holding, sent to the intelligence schools for training, and then dispatched abroad. Around the end of 1938 numbers of new Soviet agents began to arrive in various European countries, the Far East, and the United States to fill the gaps; some of these were officers of the Red Army retrained for the new job, supplied with false papers, and posing as citizens of some country other than Russia. (It is a cardinal principle that a secret agent abroad must never attract attention as a Russian.)

The main target was Germany, but caution was necessary. Stalin wanted to avoid giving the Führer a pretext for creating new tensions or for an armed attack, and discovery of a network of espionage might provide a cause for challenge. The German Communist party, the main source of rank-and-file German agents, had been almost destroyed, and the Communist groups still in existence were often corroded by agents provocateurs. There remained in Germany from former times a few scattered agents in loose contact with the Soviet apparat, who, as we shall see, had continued their operations; their accomplishments, however, were not of primary importance.

The Center in Moscow reverted to the technique, in use since 1933, of penetrating Germany by means of a network of Soviet agencies located in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland—all small democratic countries through which there was a heavy daily flow of travelers east and west, and with capitals situated near the German frontier. Belgium and Holland also served as points of observation of Britain. Thus the initial scheme provided for no extensive networks in Germany but secret apparats in Brussels, Amsterdam, and Copenhagen, and a reserve apparat in Geneva, in addition, of course, to the network in Paris.

By the eve of the war Paris, Brussels, and Geneva had become the most important locales of Soviet intelligence. Of the agents working in these capitals some remained through all the war years in the countries to which they had been assigned and played their roles in the great events that followed; the majority, however, became casualties of the war. There were among them expert coders and decoders, technicians, couriers, liaison men, "mail boxes," informants, etc. The complete list included old hands in Soviet espionage as well as newcomers, apprentices, and a number of young women with personal ties to members of the apparat who

served mainly as couriers and *svyaznyie* (liaison persons). Along with hard-boiled "activists" and Communists who had ostensibly broken with the party, a number of sympathizers worked for Soviet intelligence; some of these were unaware of the part they were playing in it.

It is impossible to determine precisely how many people were directly or indirectly involved in the apparat. Some idea may be gained, however, from the following approximate and incomplete figures on those agents of Soviet intelligence who became known in five countries of Western Europe in the crucial years 1939-44:

Switzerland	60
France	39
Germany	42
Belgium	15
Holland	12

Complete lists would no doubt show a considerably higher figure.¹

Leopold Trepper, alias "Jean Gilbert,"² a forceful and interesting personality, was eventually to head Soviet espionage in the West. One of ten children of a poor Polish-Jewish salesman, he had joined the Communist ranks in his youth. He enrolled as a student at Cracow University but was unable to continue his studies because he had to look for a job. He went to work in a locksmith's shop, then in a steel factory in Kattowice. He was arrested for Communist activities and spent eight months in prison; after his release he emigrated to Palestine, where he worked as a laborer and continued as an active Communist militant. A year later he was again arrested and expelled from Palestine.

With this impressive record behind him, young Trepper came to Paris and there joined the Soviet espionage apparat. In 1932, when arrests of agents shattered the network in France, he fled to Russia with his wife; he was then twenty-eight years old. With little general education and insufficient experience in foreign service, he was only an able and promising "candidate." During the next five years he received, in Russia, systematic education in the universities and training in a special school for foreign service. His training included instruction in intelligence work, foreign languages, and general political affairs. Trepper emerged from this training an outstanding Soviet intelligence officer. Cool-headed,

quick at making decisions, and with a taste for adventure and a belief in "inevitable sacrifices" and the unimportance of the individual, he was well fitted to assume a high office. His audacity was remarkable. He once managed, for example, to appear at a Nazi celebration of the victory over France in the summer of 1940; along with a group of invited guests he was taken on a guided tour and shown so many of the details of the German break-through that he was able to prepare and send to Moscow a secret eighty-page report on German strategy. In another instance, in Brussels during the war, he entered the house in which his radio station was located, unaware that the German police were there; he pretended to be a rabbit peddler and imitated the calls and gestures of one with such perfection that the police did not detain him. He was the only Soviet agent not picked up by the police on this occasion. But his outstanding feat, which will be recounted later in detail, was his handling of the Gestapo after his arrest.

The fact that Trepper remained loyal to Stalin throughout the difficult purge years made him the logical successor of the unfortunate agents who were discarded during that era. Few Soviet agents were being sent abroad in 1937, when Trepper was dispatched on a mission to France; on his return he was appointed to his new high post in Belgium.

Second to Trepper in the espionage network in Belgium and France was the Latvian Victor Sukulov, a Red Army officer and captain in the International Brigade in Spain. Considerably younger than Trepper, Sukulov was a man of different character. Small in stature, with a long narrow head and thin hair, he had neither vitality nor attractiveness; in routine work and daily life he appeared uninteresting, even dull. But when a strong emotion or an idea took hold of him, or an important project was looming, he seemed transfigured; he became excited, his dark eyes glowed, he became a vibrant personality.³

In 1929, when Sukulov was eighteen, a book by N. G. Smirnov, *The Diary of a Spy*, came out in Moscow. It was a fictional story about Edward Kent, a cold-blooded and ruthless but successful British spy. Sukulov was so impressed by the personality of Kent that he assumed his name. Among his collaborators, and later among the Germans, he was known as "Kent." ⁴ Soviet intelligence supplied Sukulov with a Uruguayan passport in the name of "Vincente Antonio Sierra," which suited him well; during the

early years of the war he traveled in Europe as a neutral Latin-American. According to the original plan he was to go to Denmark in 1939 to organize a new apparat there to penetrate Germany. On his way from Paris to Copenhagen he stopped over in Brussels for a few weeks; the war broke out before he reached his destination, and he was ordered by the Director to remain in Brussels. (All other agents in the West were also ordered to remain at their posts and maintain close ties with the Soviet capital; no withdrawals or repatriations were permitted.) Sukulov was supplied with funds for the purchase, for cover-up purposes, of a business dealing in trenchcoats and, later, of a contracting firm of which he became the executive. As a well-to-do businessman, Sukulov lived in a luxurious villa in the Avenue Sieghers with Margarete Barcza, a beautiful young Czech, widow of a Hungarian émigré. Although Margarete was not directly involved in Sukulov's activities, she was nevertheless to play a fateful role in his life in the subsequent years.

Four other agents arrived to take up posts in the Belgian apparat. To the police as well as to their co-workers their names sounded Dutch, French, Spanish: "Charles Alamo," "Desmets," "Anna Verlinden," and Rita Arnould. Actually they were either Russian, Polish, or German; their common language, as was the case throughout this apparat, was German. "Charles Alamo" was the Russian Air Force lieutenant Mikhail Makarov, of Moscow, a relative of Vyacheslav Molotov (presumably his nephew) and chief operator of the radio transmitting and receiving station; his responsibilities also included coding and decoding messages. "Desmets" was actually Anton Danilov, a Russian officer; his function was to maintain liaison with other Soviet stations and agents in Belgium and Holland. He had come to Paris from Moscow; in France he worked for intelligence for a short time under cover of the Soviet consulate, and was then transferred to Brussels, to become submerged in the underground.⁵

A few days after the outbreak of the war in the West there arrived in Brussels one Col. Konstantin Yefremov (in Russia he had had the title of "military engineer"), an expert in poison gas. Yefremov's original task was espionage in the chemical industries of the Western nations; later his assignment was changed to embrace all fields of military, political, and economic intelligence. Yefremov was an artist in conspiratsia. Disguised as a Finnish

student, "Jernström,"⁶ he played his role perfectly; when he was arrested later, the Gestapo noted that "his camouflage embraced everything—down to the last button on his underwear."⁷

The intelligence officers arrived in Brussels one after another in rapid succession and settled down: Trepper on March 6, 1939, Sukulov on July 17, Yefremov on September 6, Danilov and Makarov a few days later. They constituted the kernel of a new network of Soviet military espionage; large numbers of agents recruited mainly from among the local Communist reserves worked with and under them.

Part of a villa located at 101 Rue des Attrebates in Brussels-Etterbeek was rented to serve as "office" of the apparat. The owner of the villa was an elderly Belgian widow so naive that the German police released her soon after the headquarters was raided.

Of the two women in the Brussels network, Rita Arnould, an unhappy, weak-spirited young German, acted as manager of the unusual office. A close friend of Isidor Springer, the German "activist," she had joined the Communist movement during her university years. Later she met an elderly gentleman named Arnould, married him, and broke with Communism. Arnould died in 1940, during the war, and Rita was left a widow. She renewed her friendship with Springer, half-heartedly resumed activity in the Communist underground, and performed her duties as manager of the office. The main trait of Rita's character was her helplessness; she was easily influenced.

The second female member of the secret agency, "Anna Verlinden," called "Juzefa" (her real name was Sophie Poznanska), was of Polish-Jewish origin. In addition to her duties as code expert, she was in charge of the amazing stock of filled-out and blank passports, invisible ink, rubber stamps, and so on which were part of the agency's paraphernalia. These supplies, carefully accumulated for the apparat by a special agent, Abraham Raichman, were kept in a closet the door of which was concealed behind "Anna's" bed. Without family or close relatives, "Anna" was aware of her tragic situation as a Soviet spy under the Nazi occupation.

Of the agents of lesser rank, one was the above-mentioned Raichman, a Pole who was an artist in the creation of false passports; his companion Malvina Gruber served on occasion as a courier and cutout. (According to Malvina's own statement, she had crossed the Swiss border ninety-eight times during the period of her activity

in the apparat, i.e., 1941–42.)⁸ Another was Isidor Springer,⁹ a German Communist who had ostensibly broken with his party, who worked at the diamond exchange in Antwerp, his business connections served as sources of information on Belgian economic affairs. Springer's friend Leo Grossvogel was the creator of cover "companies"; Leo's female companion Simone Phelter, employee of the French-Belgian Chamber of Commerce, served as a courier between the Belgian and French apparats. The radio technician Augustin Seseé, the "musician from Ostende," with his transmitter and receiver always ready for action, was kept in reserve during the early period of the apparat's existence. So were Otto Schumacher ("Roger") and Herman Isbutsky.

A few men from the Comintern's OMS (the secret Department of International Liaison) working in the West were ordered by Moscow to transfer to the military intelligence apparat. One of them, the German Communist émigré Johann Wenzel, in Brussels, joined the Trepper-Sukulov apparat, in which he soon rose to a position of great importance. His thorough knowledge of Soviet radio techniques earned him his underground title of "professor";¹⁰ his cover name was "Ostpreusse-Hermann."¹¹ Sought by the Gestapo since 1933, Wenzel had escaped to Moscow. He returned to the West in 1936 as one of the best and most trusted men of the Comintern. In Brussels from 1937 on he headed a small apparat serving the illegal needs of the Communist parties—passports, visas, mail addresses, information, etc.; he had contact with a group of Dutch Communists. When he transferred, as instructed, to Soviet military intelligence, he took with him his small precious group of expert agents: his friend Germaine Schneider ("Schmetterling"—"the butterfly"), an adroit courier to other countries; Germaine's former husband, Franz Schneider; and Abraham Raichman.¹²

The network was ready for action when Belgium was invaded by German troops in the spring of 1940, but nothing happened. The system had been set up for the eventuality of a Soviet-German war, and it would have been an error to reveal its existence too early. It continued to be "dormant" for another year.

The "dormant" stage was a period of undisturbed building up of the organization in Belgium as well as elsewhere in Europe. In Holland, also invaded by Germany in the spring of 1940, a smaller Soviet espionage network was organized by Johann Wenzel

and the Dutch Communist Anton Winterink. This apparat began its work in 1941. It had its own radio station, but its staff, including couriers and liaison agents, did not exceed twelve, and its messages to Moscow consisted mainly of reports on local affairs, for example, German troop movements in Holland, economic developments, and so forth.

Anton Winterink, formerly connected with Rote Hilfe, the Comintern's "Labor Defense" agency for helping Communist in jail or prison, quit that front organization and withdrew from the Communist movement when he was ordered by the Center to join the Dutch apparat. Wilhelm Vogeler, trained by "Professor" Wenzel, became Winterink's radio operator; Luterman, Nagel, Gouloose, and Hendrika Smit became active members of Winterink's agency. Three people—Maurice Peper, Jacob Hilboling, and the latter's wife Hendrika—served as liaison between the headquarters in Brussels and the Dutch branch.

The role of France in the framework of Soviet intelligence grew considerably during the years of Soviet-German friendship, 1939–41; soon the Paris agency overshadowed the one in the Belgian capital. In 1938, when the plans were laid, Moscow could not foresee the events which later prompted it to shift its main forces to Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. The ingenious plan of having a Soviet intelligence agency working against Germany in a neutral country, far from the Gestapo and the Abwehr (German military counterespionage), could not be carried out if only because in 1940 the "neutral" countries had one after another been occupied. The Soviet envoy departed from Brussels, and with him the military attaché; thus the legal facilities of intelligence disappeared at precisely the time when they were needed to serve and save an underground network.

In June 1940 German armies moved into Paris, but half of the country, the unoccupied territory, remained under French rule. The Soviet embassy and the military attaché, with his codes and diplomatic appurtenances, moved to Vichy. The chaos of the "Vichy regime" proved advantageous for a team of experienced underground agents. After Belgium, the very size of the country was an advantage: in the departments of France the houses of hundreds of reliable party members provided facilities for sheltering agents as well as sites of new radio stations. Finally, sources of

information developed in France which in themselves would make a shift of attention to that country necessary.

Commuting between Paris and Brussels, Trepper concentrated more and more on the French capital. With the help of the veteran Comintern man Henry Robinson, his friend Leo Grossvogel, and his secretary Hillel Katz, Trepper organized his first headquarters in France. From 1940 to 1942 Trepper commanded seven networks of Soviet intelligence, each active in its own field and subordinated to its own chief.

The information gathered by the apparat in France was transmitted to Moscow in various ways. Until June 1941 the facilities of the embassy were available; after that time the underground radio stations in Belgium and Holland were at Trepper's disposal. In addition, two new radios were installed in France. One of these was entrusted to Dr. Herz Sokol and his wife Miriam, veteran Communists, refugees from Poland, and old hands at Soviet intelligence. When the war broke out, Dr. Sokol was interned as a foreign Communist; his wife, also a physician, had in the meantime received training in short-wave transmission, decoding of messages, etc. When Sokol was released from internment, the couple became the first wartime Soviet intelligence agents to have direct short-wave contact with the Center. The second radio station was organized, somewhat later, by Grossvogel in Pecq, near Paris, in the home of a French Communist couple, Pierre and Lucienne Giraud ("Robert" and "Lucie"). This station was operated by the Spanish refugee Valentino Escudero, who soon, however, became an agent provocateur and betrayed the station to the Germans. As a reward for this service, Escudero was appointed to a German agency; he later returned safely to Spain.

The Soviet apparats in Belgium and France took advantage of the "dormant" era to set up a number of fictitious trading companies in the Western countries.

Leo Grossvogel,¹⁸ an artist in creating fictitious commercial enterprises, was an old friend of Trepper and also a native of Poland. The two men had met in Palestine in 1929-30 and had returned to Europe to enter the Soviet intelligence service. In 1939 Grossvogel and Trepper established a textile firm in Brussels and Ostende under the regal name "*Au Roi du Caoutchouc*" (its official name in English was "Foreign Excellent Trenchcoats"),

with a capitalization of \$10,000. As is always the case with a front organization, a few respectable persons, some of them only sympathizers and others having no definite political orientation, were elected members of the board or given jobs in the enterprise; working with them in various posts were a few confidants of Grossvogel. The trouble with Excellent Trenchcoats, however, was that two of its most important officers, Trepper and Grossvogel, were Jews, in a Belgium occupied after May 1940 by German troops.*

For intelligence purposes Moscow found it necessary to penetrate the German agencies in Brussels and, most importantly, the OT (Organization Todt), a huge agency engaged in all types of military construction. Supplying the Germans with building materials was the means used to gain access to and win the confidence of the German officers of OT. The Soviet intelligence agency in Brussels proceeded to organize a new corporation, Simexco, incorporated in March 1941, in which Trepper and Grossvogel did not occupy any visible posts. Seven Belgian businessmen constituted the board; it is impossible to state how many of them were aware of the real purpose of the company. Although it existed for only a short time, Simexco proved to be a successful enterprise for Soviet intelligence.

Even more successful was a third trading company, Simex, created by Trepper in Paris somewhat later. Similar to the Brussels firm, Simex had a capitalization of 300,000 francs. Its real purpose, like Simexco's, was cooperation with German agencies, and especially OT, in France. Incorporated in September 1941, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, it was an interesting instance of work performed by the Soviet for the benefit of its mortal enemies.

Officially Trepper was not a shareholder in Simex. The incorporators were Leo Grossvogel, who had been transferred from the Belgian capital to Paris; Alfred Corbin, a recently recruited agent of lesser importance, who was the "director general" and principal shareholder; and Robert Breyer, a friend of Grossvogel.

* The seemingly large number of Jewish agents in the Belgian-French apparatus is explained by the fact that the services of Jews could not be used in the countries of the anti-Comintern. Having escaped or been withdrawn from Germany, Austria, Japan, and Italy (where Soviet intelligence had had no Jewish members since the late 'thirties), they had to be employed in Western Europe and in the Western hemisphere.

To enhance its prestige with the Germans, the company set up offices first in the Champs Elysées and, in February 1942, in the Boulevard Haussmann; a branch office set up in the unoccupied area of France provided a shelter for members of the apparatus who were fleeing from the German police. At the head of the Marseille branch was Jules Jaspar, brother of the former prime minister of Belgium and himself a former official of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jaspar had deservedly won the complete confidence of the Center.

The manager of Simex was "M. Gilbert" (Trepper). Commercial ties with the German authorities, who were new and inexperienced in French commerce and in need of goods and services, were easily established. The most important of these ties was again with OT, which Simex supplied with building materials. "M. Gilbert" and several others of the employees of Simex obtained permits to visit building sites to observe the progress of construction; a special permit allowed "Gilbert" to cross demarcation lines. The office personnel of Simex consisted of a staff of about seven persons of whom only three were aware of Simex's real activities—"Gilbert"; "Gilbert's" secretary, "André Dubois" (Hillel Katz); and "Gilbert's" private secretary, Suzanne Cointe, a French Communist for fifteen years. From two different but corroborating sources have come descriptions of the double life of the Simex operators.¹⁴

Behind the luxurious office of the manager was a smaller, hidden room whose existence was known to only two of "Gilbert's" assistants. It contained radio equipment, code files, and lists of addresses. A staircase led directly into the courtyard of another building. On a desk in the room stood the "warning transmitter," a piece of wireless equipment in the form of a column, containing a clock which had to be wound once every twenty-four hours. At regular intervals the transmitter gave signals to certain groups of Trepper's network. This instrument was constructed especially to give warning to the proper persons if something went wrong. If the signals should stop those at the other end would know that something had happened to their chief.

Simex actually won the confidence and commendation of the German authorities in Paris for its efficiency and the promptness with which it fulfilled its commitments. Had the Germans investigated before entering into commercial relations with Simex, they would have been surprised to discover among these "business-

men" a woman singing teacher, a sports writer, three persons from Russia and Poland, and a general management with rather insufficient commercial experience. But this was wartime, an emergency, and the German agencies had no time to give to investigations.

This, then, was the setup on the eve of the Soviet-German war: a number of espionage agencies with radio facilities and sources of information, organized but dormant, in Belgium and Holland; rudimentary apparats in France and Denmark; a few trading firms established as covers in Brussels, Paris, and Geneva; a promising start in Switzerland; and a group of enthusiastic but inexperienced operators in the German capital.

2. THE START OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN WAR

The German armies crossed the Soviet frontier on June 22, 1941. For the Soviet underground the time of trial had come.

Seen in historical perspective, the apparat, for all its faults and shortcomings, gave a performance that was remarkable and unique. A score of Soviet espionage cells scattered all over Western Europe, manned by men and women of a dozen nationalities equipped with radio transmitters and receivers, had waited quietly for a long time. With the first shot fired on a distant eastern frontier they began to tick in almost perfect unison, transmitting over the air waves information of paramount significance from all over Europe, including even Germany. Never before had espionage played as prominent a role in wartime as it did for the Soviet Union in 1941-44.*

The anti-German alliance of Russia and the West, rapidly forged in the summer of 1941, embraced all fields of war policy, including intelligence operations. However, the notion of the Great Alliance was not the same in the West as it was in the East; to Stalin, in particular, alliance was an expedient, limited in scope and duration. The aid the West was prepared to give was accepted as a matter of course, but no reciprocity was to be granted, least

* At the same time, Soviet short-distance espionage in the front areas, that is, radio communication between military spies and army headquarters at the front, guerrilla reports, etc., greatly increased. This phase of wartime tactical espionage, however, does not come within the scope of this volume.

of all in the realm of intelligence. The British agreed to carry and drop Soviet parachutists into Germany, and Soviet intelligence made use of this facility; the United States produced short-wave radio sets of higher quality than the Russian ones, and this item was included in the list of lend-lease supplies. But no Soviet intelligence agent abroad was permitted to reveal himself to and collaborate with his American and British colleagues. Moreover, when information of importance to Britain was obtained by Soviet sources in Switzerland, Moscow forbade its being turned over to the Allies.¹

Sincere collaboration between Soviet and American intelligence agencies during the war was impossible also because Soviet espionage was not limited to targets in the enemy countries. In fact, the United States as a target of Soviet espionage was growing in importance during the war, and with American loans facilitating the expansion of the Soviet apparatus, Russian and American agents of Soviet intelligence developed, as we shall see later, a number of extensive and highly successful networks in the United States.

An idea of the importance of the information sent by spies to Moscow at the start of the war may be gained from some of the hundreds of their messages of which the texts are available; a few examples are cited:

Strategical plans of the German armies, indicating the place of the forthcoming offensive, the strength of the German armies involved, etc.

Details of a forthcoming landing of German paratroop forces.

Relations between the Nazi government and the army leadership.

The whereabouts of Hitler and his headquarters.

The anti-Mussolini movement in Italy.

The policies of Britain and the United States. (Reports on these were anti-Western and often inaccurate.)

The strength of the German air force.

The fuel situation in Germany.

Chemical warfare methods in Germany.

Troop movements on the Belgian and French coasts.

Soviet headquarters deluged its agents with questions; to answer them the agents had to travel, make inquiries, and dispatch cour-

iers. Here are a few of the items of information sought by Moscow during the first phase of the war:

10.8.41. To Kent from Director. Need report on Swiss army, which is of interest in connection with possible German invasion. Size of army in case of general mobilization. Nature of existing fortifications. Quality of the ammunition. Particulars about air force, tank force, and artillery. Equipment of branches of the service.

To Kent in Brussels, August 29, 1941. Ascertain production capacity of German chemical warfare plants [poison gas]; [report on] preparations for sabotage acts in factories in question.

To Bordo in Brussels, April 13, 1942. Ascertain strength of German troops stationed in Belgium, their movements and new strategic disposition. Find out about Belgian plants producing tanks, aircraft and artillery supplies for Germany, as well as production capacity and kind of workers employed there.

To Tino in Amsterdam, May 1, 1942. Ascertain the political attitude and morale of German troops in Holland, which air force units are stationed in Holland and where. Ascertain types and production [of aircraft] of Dutch industry as of 15.6.42.

To Bordo 9.5.42. Ascertain production of Henschel plants in Kassel, in particular how many aircraft motors type A.B. 601 are produced, as well as the attitude of German and foreign workers.

May 31, 1942. Ascertain whereabouts of General Rundstedt and the three corps under his command in France.

June 27, 1942. Ascertain strength and composition of German infantry divisions in Normandy, Brittany. Ascertain location of German headquarters in Holland; whether government is billeted in city hall of Hilversum.

To Gilbert from Director. Check whether [General] Guderian really at Eastern front. Are the second and third armies under his command? Will the fourth armored army

belong to the army group under [General] Jodl's command, or will another armored division be attached to this army? Which one?

To Gilbert from Director. Did armored division No. 7 really leave France? Going where? When did the new staff of a German division arrive in Cherbourg? Number?

To Gilbert from Director. Report about 26 armored divisions being formed in France.²

The answers came, after a shorter or longer delay, depending on the subject of the inquiry and the steps necessary to obtain the required information. The greater part of the messages to Moscow, however, were in the form not of an answer to a question but of an original news report.

In the beginning, the summer of 1941, the Belgian group of agents was the most important. In the Rue des Attrebatés, where the best organized and well-staffed Soviet espionage network was centered, feverish activity replaced the monotony of the "dormant" era. The indoor group composed of the two women and the Russian officers were receiving a multitude of messages for Moscow from the two chiefs (mainly from the "Petit Chef," Sukulov), whose primary source of information was a group of about ten men planted in various strategic posts and able to get precious items of news from German as well as Belgian sources. Because the majority of these outdoor agents had no access to the radio station, the chiefs were on the move all day, collecting, digesting, and turning over the news to the Red Army men at the transmitter. At that time the Berlin group (whose activity is described below) had access to strategic information, but its technical facilities were less than perfect and the Brussels station therefore often served to relay the Berlin news, too; the Paris network, which had been set up in haste, was not as advanced as the model Brussels apparatus; and the Swiss apparatus had not yet been completely organized.

Both the Abwehr and the Gestapo were well aware of the existence of a Soviet espionage network in Western Europe, having intercepted, through their monitors, about five hundred coded messages in 1941. The codes were excellent and not even the best German experts were able to decipher the radiograms. German

agents spoke with awe of the ingenuity, size, and technical equipment of the Soviet network. The Soviet cover name for a short-wave radio set is "music box," and a radio operator is a "musician"; hence the name given by the Abwehr to the whole machine—*Rote Kapelle* (Red Orchestra); indeed, to the German authorities the network was like a group of able instrumentalists led by a talented conductor.

In Berlin, police and military counterespionage chiefs were becoming nervous. The knowledge that radio was carrying German war secrets abroad, that in their midst were groups of foreign spies operating without hindrance, and that they were impotent to do anything about it was humiliating. For a long time efforts to locate the spy ring had been fruitless; direction-finding instruments were still imperfect and slow. In the meantime the undecoded messages recorded by the monitors piled up in the Funk-Abwehr and other departments.

In the fall of 1941, as the result of a long search and investigation, the Funk-Abwehr learned that the main transmitter was located in the West, somewhere in Belgium. A group of Abwehr officers was dispatched to Brussels.

"Berlin was angry," relates Heinrich Hofmann, a former Abwehr man,

Every week new officers arrived in Brussels to prod us; it was of no avail. We were foolish enough to seek the Soviet agents among Belgian Communists and for this purpose infiltrated Belgian Communist circles. Our agents reported that all was quiet, the Communists were frightened and passive. We continued to look around in other Belgian cities, but again to no avail. Then we sent our agents into cafés, not knowing that at that time the Soviet agents in Belgium were meeting in parks, in department stores, in lavatories, but not in cafés. Meantime the systematic *Peilung* [direction-finder] was making progress; the Soviet transmitter was working for five hours every night [this was a grave mistake on their part], from midnight to 5 A.M. Five hours made our search easier, actually it meant our eventual success.

Then a great expert came over from Berlin; on the basis of our preparatory work, he had narrowed down to three houses the possible location of the station.³

On the night of December 13, 1941, a troop of soldiers and police officers, wearing socks over their boots, entered the three houses and found the Soviet short-wave station on the second floor of one of them. They arrested Mikhail Makarov, Rita Arnould, and "Anna Verlinden." A quantity of false documents, invisible ink of high quality, rubber stamps, and so on were found in an adjoining hideout; the code book, however, had been destroyed. This was the night the "Grand Chef," Trepper, entered the house during the searching operation, succeeded in passing for a rabbit peddler, and was let go. He immediately sent warnings to the other members of the Belgian apparat.

Sukulov, the "Petit Chef," a frequent guest at the Rue des Atrebatas, had to flee. He explained to his Simexco staff that since his "fatherland," Uruguay, was about to join the war against Germany (all this occurred a few days after Pearl Harbor) he could not remain in a German-occupied country. He left for the free territory of France.

Interrogated by the German agencies, Makarov refused to talk. "Anna Verlinden" committed suicide. The weak and unhappy Rita Arnould, in mortal fear for her life, consented to give information to the Abwehr. She betrayed Wenzel, "Kent," and others, and she turned over to the Germans a picture of the "Grand Chef." For a time Rita was permitted to live at a hotel instead of being kept in prison, but after a few months, when her usefulness was over, she was executed. Rita Arnould was the first in a long line of Soviet spies who served Germany against the Soviet Union.

What Rita betrayed, however, did not suffice to establish the details of the espionage machinery; the strict Soviet system of conspiratsia in this instance bore fruit: Rita had had her own tasks and assignments and had known only the men and the few addresses directly connected with her work. The German agencies were still in the dark.

In the heap of refuse found in the Rue des Atrebatas the Abwehr found a few small scraps of paper on which had been jotted some mysterious figures and letters; it became obvious that coding had been done in the house. For more than six weeks the best experts on Russian codes in Germany put their skill to work on these scraps, but their labor brought forth only one name, "Proctor," as a part of the code. Rita Arnould was again interrogated: What were the title of the books on the desks and shelves

in the apartment? Rita told what she could remember; the books were bought. One of them contained the name Proctor, and was obviously the code. This development occurred in the spring of 1942; in the meantime Moscow had changed the code, with the result that current communications were again a mystery to the German agencies.⁴

The breach in the Soviet apparat was soon repaired. With both Trepper and Sukulov in flight, Konstantin Yefremov (the Finnish student "Jernström") took over. Yefremov was a handsome, blond Russian officer, younger looking than his twenty-eight years, deeply devoted to Russia, where he had left his parents and young wife, who was a hard-working locomotive engineer. His new colleague in the network was Johann Wenzel, the "Professor," who was chief radio man in this second Belgian setup, although part of the abundant information was being diverted to France to be transmitted from there. The intelligence machine was again working, and German counterintelligence was again on its heels. Finally, in June 1942, the Germans located Wenzel's station, and on June 30 Wenzel was arrested. In his room the police found a number of messages in code and two in clear German.

Johann Wenzel, veteran KPD man, refused to collaborate with the Abwehr; he "would not compromise under any conditions."⁵ When, however, he was shown the old file containing records of his former activities, including the "arms apparat" of the KPD, and was told to choose between death and collaboration, he changed his mind and made a comprehensive statement involving his Soviet chiefs and colleagues, codes, regulations—the whole system of Soviet espionage. A Soviet agent of long and high standing, he had so extensive a knowledge of things that his usefulness to the Germans was great. Among other things, he revealed the Soviet code currently in use. The task of the Abwehr and Gestapo was made much easier.

The radio-monitoring units of the army and the police intercepted a great number of wireless messages which they succeeded in deciphering by means of the key revealed by Wenzel after an exhaustive interrogation by the police. From these messages important indications of the existence of a Soviet intelligence organization in Berlin were obtained. This made possible the arrest of the group headed by first lieutenant

Harro Schulze-Boysen of the Air Force Ministry and the *Oberregierungsrat* of the Ministry of Economy, Arvid Harnack.* *

Wenzel's betrayal opened the floodgates. From that time on blows rained on the Rote Kapelle everywhere from Berlin to Paris. Almost every arrest of a new group supplied the Germans with new traitors; every traitor revealed new names.

Abraham Raichman, the Brussels group's expert in false documents, was suspected by the police, though they had no real proof of his activities. To obtain Belgian passports Raichman, like Wenzel a Comintern man, established connections with a Brussels policeman, Inspector Mathieu, actually a German agent who pretended to be in sympathy with the resistance movement. Mathieu agreed to supply Raichman with real passports signed and sealed by the police. In July 1942 Raichman brought Mathieu a photograph of Konstantin Yefremov, chief of the Belgian apparat, who was in need of a Belgian passport. Yefremov was arrested July 30, 1942, in the act of receiving the false document from Inspector Mathieu.

It took time for the Abwehr to "break" Yefremov; he refused to answer questions or give information. Having learned of his strong attachment to his family, the Abwehr officers threatened, if he remained "stubborn," to notify his parents in Russia that he had not only been arrested but had betrayed Johann Wenzel (which was not true). Gradually Yefremov's resistance weakened; he began to enlarge on his statements; in the end this chief of the Soviet intelligence ring became a full-fledged collaborator. After a while he began to take a fancy to this work and to exhibit interest in it: "You are wrong," he would tell the Abwehr men when they were planning this or that action against a Soviet network, "you must do it another way . . ." His help proved invaluable. Among his most important pieces of information was the fact that Anton Danilov, his Russian colleague, was to take over the radio station after his (Yefremov's) arrest.

Among Yefremov's victims were also the liasons to the Dutch network, Maurice Peper and "Lunette." "Lunette" refused to talk

* Such behavior on the part of this important Comintern veteran may appear unbelievable, but secret and published reports in the possession of the author leave no shred of doubt not only that Wenzel collaborated with the Abwehr but that it was Wenzel who helped to destroy the network in four countries and seriously to mislead the Center in Moscow.

and was executed, but Peper agreed to help the Abwehr and betrayed the chief of the Dutch agency, the "blond giant," Anton Winterink. Winterink would not answer questions or even identify himself. It was a long time before the German officers learned his address, and when they arrived to search his house the radio had been removed and the code had disappeared. In the end, however, Winterink's resistance was broken. Reluctantly he accepted the German offer and started to work for the Germans. The Dutch network had ceased to exist.

A prominent Dutch Communist, the sixty-three-year-old former clergyman Kruyt, was sent from Moscow to England and thence to Belgium, where he landed by parachute in July 1942. His assignment was to join the Soviet intelligence group. (This was one of the instances of Soviet-British cooperation in intelligence matters during the war.) Kruyt landed safely with his radio set; three days later he was betrayed. He refused to cooperate with the Germans, took his poison pill, but was saved, only to be shot soon after.

Simexco was liquidated and its shareholders were deported to Germany, either to serve prison sentences or be executed as spies.

The Belgian and Dutch Soviet spy groups had been definitively destroyed, but not before they had rendered great service to the Soviet war effort.

3. THE "GILBERT" NETWORK IN FRANCE

Since all efforts had to be concentrated on the war objective, it was absurd to maintain parallel underground agencies such as the GRU, the GB, and the Comintern's underground. Their agents abroad were instructed to join the established apparatus. During the years of war a growing number of Comintern and GB men were in centralized intelligence.

We have seen how a group of Comintern men under Johann Wenzel entered the intelligence service in Belgium and Holland. The outstanding personality of this group in France was Henry Robinson, one of the last remaining members of the first brain trust of the Communist Youth League, the group that founded KIM (Communist Youth International) around 1920. In this group were also the Serbs Voja Vujovich and his brother Rada; the German Willy Muenzenberg; two Swiss, Jules Humbert-Droz and

Bamatter; and a few others. This was the first group of young revolutionaries, still unspoiled by power, compromises, and "strategic retreats," and not morally paralyzed by failures and secret doubts. Burning with enthusiasm and hatred, self-assured, daring, ruthless, and profoundly contemptuous of democratic institutions, they saw the law as empty words and the police as the enemy; all means were permissible if they led toward the goal.

Henry Robinson,¹ son of a well-to-do Frankfurt merchant, was about twenty when he joined the Spartakus Bund, the German forerunner of the Communist party, in 1918-19. Tall and slender, with dark, intelligent eyes, interested in all kinds of problems, Robinson was by nature the "practician." His specialty was conspiratorial work—procuring arms, setting up underground quarters, and deceiving the police; espionage was part of these activities, especially in that early period when all sorts of "special services" were still interwoven. Robinson's common-law wife at the time was Clara Schabbel also a member of the Spartakus Bund.* In the 'twenties and 'thirties Robinson served in various Comintern posts, mainly in Germany and France. By the end of the 1930's he was chief of the OMS bureau in Paris; he had wide connections in the French political world, Communist and non-Communist, and among his sources of information were some in the government, including the Deuxième Bureau (French military intelligence). At the start of the war Robinson, now forty-four and a French citizen, was the type of the Russian intellectual of the old school. He lived in an unpretentious room in a second-rate Paris hotel; books and papers in chaotic disorder covered his desk and filled his closets.

Close cooperation between Trepper and Robinson started soon after the establishment of the Vichy government. While Trepper's apparat had to keep away from the Communist party as well as other parties and political leaders, Robinson had accumulated friends and contacts in various camps; some of his agents were assigned to observe the activities of anti-Communist groups. Robinson's apparat included a few veteran agents in France and connections abroad who proved highly useful to Trepper's comparatively young agency. Among them were the engraver Medardo Griotto,

* After the couple separated, Clara continued to serve as a Soviet military intelligence agent. She died on the guillotine in Plötzensee prison in Berlin two decades later.

an expert in fabricating false documents; engineer Maurice Aenis-Hanslin, who was in a position to make legitimate trips to Switzerland during the war and thus maintain liaison with the Swiss network of Soviet intelligence; Louis Mourier, the "letter box"; and several members of the French Communist party, who were used for "special assignments." The collaboration of Trepper and Robinson lasted for about two years.

Another important group in Trepper's French domain was headed by Vasili Maximovich, a Russian émigré who had lived in France for two decades. Vasili and his sister Anna were children of a former Russian nobleman and general, Pavel Maximovich, who had migrated to the West after the civil war and died in poverty in France. Monseigneur Chaptal, bishop of Paris, who devoted himself to the care of needy foreigners, provided the means for the education of Vasili and Anna; with his aid Vasili was trained as an engineer and his sister became a physician specializing in neurology and psychiatry.

Russian émigrés in France, especially those of noble descent, were generally viewed as "whites," but the Maximoviches inclined to another political orientation; for a time they belonged to the new émigré group of Young Russians, which had a vague fascist-Communist program and connections in both the Nazi and Soviet camps. Never joining the Communist ranks and never appearing in the press or on a platform, the Maximoviches moved among the Russian front organizations comprised of former "whites" who were being patronized and discreetly financed by the Soviet embassy. After the Nazi victory in Germany in 1933 a number of such organizations flourished on French soil: the Returners, the Union of Defenders, and others. For the GB in Paris as well as for Soviet military intelligence—in general for all clandestine and dubious purposes—these organizations were a reservoir of potential recruits; in every bloody affair of those years evidence led to these "non-Communist" organizations.

In 1936 the Union of Defenders hired a small hall in the Rue Dupleix for meetings, dances, and so forth; its funds barely covered the small costs. One night a tall and rather stout well-dressed woman in her forties arrived in a fine car and told the union's members of her interest in their organization. She said she operated

a sanitarium for mental patients and was in a position to help the union financially. Now the union's quarters were painted, and rugs appeared on the floors; soon a union newspaper began publication. From time to time individual members received sums of from \$10 to \$15. Expenses mounted; from 1937 to 1939 these were covered from the profits of the "sanitarium."²

In 1939 a rumor spread among the union's members that "Anna's money smells" and that trouble was ahead, but nobody wanted to believe the "gossip." On the day the war broke out, September 1, 1939, almost all the members of the union were arrested, including the bountiful Anna Maximovich. Anna was able, however, to produce documents—the lists of the sick persons in her care—and was set free.

Vasili Maximovich somehow escaped arrest in the first raids of September 1939. Interned later in the camp of Vernet, near Toulouse, he mixed mostly with Spanish Communists fresh from the battles of the civil war. Among the Russians in the camp he associated with Herz Sokol, member of the underground group in France, who advised him to get in touch with Trepper when he was released.

In the summer of 1940 the German army occupied the north of France. When German military commissions went into the various camps to sort out laborers for work in Germany, the well-educated Maximovich was chosen to serve as interpreter for a high-ranking German officer. The officer, an anti-Hitler monarchist, testified to this "white" Russian émigré's loyalty to Germany, and Maximovich was released.

At his meetings with Trepper—as Trepper related later—hints about possible cooperation were made, and Maximovich offered his services. In accordance with the rules, Trepper inquired of Moscow. He was advised by the Director to be cautious and to use Maximovich if he had interesting connections. Working from then on under Trepper's guidance, Maximovich developed his own ties in German circles; among the employees of German agencies whom he met was Anna-Margarete Hoffmann-Scholtz, a secretary at the Military Administration of Paris.

A maiden lady of forty-four of a "*gute deutsche Familie*," Miss Hoffmann-Scholtz was apparently giving up hope of arranging her private life satisfactorily when the "Russian nobleman" ap-

peared on the scene. Vasili was not exactly glamorous—he was thirty-eight, on the heavy side, with swollen legs—but to Anna-Margaret marriage to him would be the fulfillment of a dream.

New vistas opened for Soviet intelligence. Trepper inquired of Moscow, the Director gave his blessing, and Anna-Margarete Hoffmann-Scholtz, full of happiness and hopes, celebrated her betrothal with a large, brilliant company of violently anti-Soviet Germans and Russians.

Maximovich made abundant use of his new situation. He obtained a permit to visit German headquarters at any time, and soon the girls and young officers at headquarters were his friends. "Before long," the German investigator later stated, "Maximovich knew all about the proceedings and methods; he reported to the chief of Soviet espionage." "Hoscho" (this was Anna-Margarete's name in Trepper's apparat) had no secrets from Vasili; her girl friends, too, were ready to share some secrets with the interesting couple.

Later Anna-Margarete was appointed to a confidential position on the staff of the German consul general in Paris. Maximovich's messages to the apparat, based on German reports, covered a large number of questions of great interest to Moscow: the attitude of the French people to the occupying power; data on the economy of German satellites; data on recruitment of manpower, concentration camps and their inmates, and so on. A confidential German report on Ambassador Abetz' trips was stolen, copied, and the copy dispatched to the Soviet capital; various other documents were supplied by "Hoscho," copied, and returned after a few hours; German forms used for various purposes were stolen by the group.³ Among Maximovich's most important contacts were two interpreters working for the German commandant in Paris; through them Maximovich obtained exact reports on German divisions in and around Paris, their movements, equipment, and supplies, and on military forces in France in general.

Another member of Maximovich's group was the German Käthe Voelkner, of Danzig, secretary to the German chief of *Arbeitseinsatz* (manpower procurement) in France, whose office was situated in the Chambre des Députés. A successful artist-acrobat, she had traveled all over Europe, including the Soviet Union, with her manager Johann Podsiadlo, who was the father of her two children. When the war broke out in 1939, she was in Paris, where she and

Johann would have been sent to an internment camp had it not been for the help they received from the Soviet apparat. The apparat hid them, and they lived quietly in a poor workers' district of Paris. In these months of the "phony war" Johann Podsiadlo and Käthe Voelkner learned typewriting and shorthand. When the Germans were looking for office workers to man their multitude of new agencies in France, the two obtained jobs, Käthe as a typist and Johann as an interpreter in the office for manpower (the so-called Saukel-Organization). Agencies like this, closely related to the German war effort, served as a source of intelligence for Maximovich.

One of Maximovich's friends was a German officer, an adherent of the old dynasty, who was involved in vague anti-Hitler plans for a monarchical upheaval. Soon clandestine moves of the German monarchists became known to Maximovich and Trepper. Moscow's appeals to the anti-Hitler German officers, and the course taken by the Free Germany Committee in general, were at least in part based on knowledge of the situation thus obtained.

Finally, the ties connecting Maximovich with Monseigneur Chaptal and the Catholic Church permitted him to report on developments in Rome and the political course of the Vatican.⁴

When the war started Anna Maximovich, the physician, received her own assignment from Trepper, along with the necessary funds; she was to establish a new "sanitarium" for neurological patients and operate it for the benefit of the apparat. A piece of property belonging to a French noblewoman was found, situated at the demarcation line between occupied and unoccupied France. A rich farm around the sanitarium served as a source of food for the illegals whom the sanitarium sheltered and who possessed no ration cards. In a shrewd move, Anna engaged as her chief physician Dr. Jean Darquier, whose brother, Darquier de Pellepoix, served as commissaire générale for Jewish questions with Marshal Pétain's government. After the announcement of the forthcoming marriage of her brother to Miss Hoffmann-Scholtz, German officers began to visit the sanitarium. Personal ties were knit, confidence was established, and Anna was again in a position to help her brother in his intelligence work.⁵

Following the Abwehr operations in Belgium, mass arrests started in France.

The first important Soviet intelligence cell to fall into German hands was that of the Sokol couple and their short-wave radio. The location of the radio was discovered in June 1942 by systematic direction-finding procedures. When the Sokols were arrested, on June 30, it looked at first as if they would lead to Trepper, since the messages they had sent to Moscow must have emanated from him. But the Sokols, old Communists, refused to talk for a long time. According to certain reports,⁶ Dr. Herz Sokol was subjected to the ice-water bath torture, and his wife was offered the alternative of answering questions or seeing her husband shot in her presence. She began to talk. She told her interrogators what she knew about "Gilbert" (the name Trepper used in France) and his liaison officers. Fortunately for the apparat, she did not know Trepper's address, and her knowledge of conspiratorial affairs in general was limited. Shortly thereafter, either in Paris or in Germany, both of the Sokols were put to death.

Then the group of German officers of the Abwehr and police that had seized the Belgian network arrived in Paris, bringing with them a few converted Soviet agents, now witnesses against their comrades. The police operation, which began in October 1942, lasted about three months. By December approximately fifty persons, either members of the Soviet apparat or suspected of Soviet espionage, were in prison.

The main target of the German police was, of course, the "Grand Chef" himself, who they knew must be working somewhere in France; only his address remained a secret. Johann Wenzel, arrested in Brussels, confirmed that he had known "Gilbert"; he knew also that the "Grand Chef" was in Paris. But he did not have his address and knew of no way to ascertain it. Then Abraham Raichman, brought to Paris under police escort, tried to get in touch with his "Grand Chef" for the Abwehr. As a long-time member of the apparat, he appeared the one most likely to be able to discover Trepper's whereabouts. But the chief, obviously sensing danger, avoided contact. In the course of his search Raichman got in touch with a number of other Soviet agents and betrayed them to the Germans: for instance, the Griotto couple, his French colleagues in the manufacture of false passports; and Germaine Schneider, Wenzel's common-law wife and one of the most important couriers of the war years. (Germaine Schneider disappeared from Paris, however, and was not seized until later.) But

Trepper was out of reach; more than once invited through chain contacts to appear at a treff with Raichman, he never showed up.

Then Trepper's main cover, Simex, was betrayed to the German police. Maria Kalinina, a former "white" Russian, and later a pro-Communist, worked at Simex as an interpreter, and her son Evgeni served there as a driver; they betrayed secrets of the "trading firm" so far as they knew them. The German police, surprised to learn that the assiduously sought "Gilbert" was the manager of this firm, looked for him in the Simex offices only to find that he was no longer there. When his laissez-passier, the highly valuable paper which permitted him to travel freely everywhere, expired, the German agency requested him to appear in person to renew the document. He failed to show up. The agency informed Simex that a German firm wanted to buy 1,500,000 marks worth of industrial diamonds and wished to discuss the transaction with the manager himself. In vain. From the notebook on Trepper's desk at Simex, however, the Germans obtained an important item: the dates of Trepper's visits to a dentist. Here is a report of the Abwehr officer who conducted the operation, on November 16, 1942, that followed this discovery:

The dentist's office was situated in a large professional building near the Tuileries. A German officer was ordered to find out from the dentist whether he had a patient whose description corresponded to that contained in the warrant of arrest of the "Grand Chef." He went to the dentist and, imposing silence upon him, asked for his appointment book. The dentist admitted that he was expecting a visit from this patient the following day at 2 P.M.

Shortly before this time, German officers had taken up posts near the entrance to the building, on the staircases, at the elevator door and on the first floor, where the dentist's office was located. Although everything was carefully prepared, the backdoor delivery entrance was overlooked and left unguarded. The officers became worried when the man they were looking for did not show up at the main entrance. To find out whether he might have canceled his appointment at the last moment, two policemen entered the apartment and heard voices in the dentist's office. Could the man have entered the house unnoticed? When they saw a man sitting in the chair

in front of the drill they jumped to the right and to the left: yes, this was their man. "You are under arrest," they shouted. For a second he was disturbed, then he said, in perfect German, "You did a fine job." ⁷

Trepper was not sure at first how to behave and refused to answer questions. He was given three hours' *Bedenkzeit* (time for reflection), and changed his mind.

Trepper was, of course, aware of the seriousness of his situation. There could be no doubt that if he refused to collaborate the Abwehr would turn him over to the Gestapo, the Gestapo would apply all its means to force him to talk, and if he still refused he would be executed. Trepper consented to give information "insofar as his conscience would permit him to do so."

What he revealed, in the first hours, was his identity—his various names, his background, his service record, his travels in Europe, etc. Since talking was the only way to gain time, Trepper reluctantly continued to talk. He enlightened the Abwehr officers about certain principles and methods of Soviet intelligence. He talked more and more, but held interesting reports in reserve.

The prisoner was amazingly frank when he was making the statement about himself, his activities, and Moscow's methods of espionage . . . The interrogations and informal conversations with the "Grand Chef" were carried on daily, even hourly. He had always in stock a multitude of interesting stories and unexpected news. It sounded like a fairy tale when he related his connections with the Italian and Belgian royal courts or with royal circles in Germany, France, and Spain. He could even give information about the Vatican.⁸

The Germans, however, demanded names and addresses. He could not limit himself, they told Trepper, to generalities of Soviet espionage; if he wanted to live he would have to betray his friends and comrades, become a real collaborator.

Trepper telephoned his faithful secretary and assistant, Hillel Katz, asking Katz to meet him at the Madeleine subway station. When Katz appeared he was arrested and brought to face his "Grand Chef." Trepper ordered him to reveal to the Germans all the information he had; Katz obeyed, and in the end cooperated fully and turned in the radio set hidden in his home. His hope

that his life would thus be saved proved futile. His usefulness to the Germans was exhausted in a few weeks; he was deported to Germany and executed.

Among others, Trepper and Katz also betrayed Harry Robinson. Making use of a "mail box" an address used for secret correspondence between Trepper and Robinson, they invited the latter to a treff. On December 21, 1942, Katz was taken in an Abwehr car, along with two German officers, to the meeting place; he pointed to the waiting leader, for two decades an outstanding figure in the Comintern underground. Robinson offered no resistance, but Katz, according to the German report, "became a bit nervous . . ." ⁹ Robinson refused to reveal anything or to implicate anybody. He was deported to Germany and was certainly executed, no doubt after a number of *vershürfte Vernehmungen* (harsh interrogations) by the Gestapo.*

Next Trepper betrayed Vasili and Anna Maximovich, their entire network, and their connections in German military circles. Arrests followed in rapid succession: Alfred Corbin, the director of Simex, on November 19; Leo Grossvogel on November 30; Vasili Maximovich and his sister Anna on December 12; Maximovich's fiancée "Hoscho" about the same time; Johann Podsiadlo and Käthe Voelker on January 7, 1943.

When Germaine Schneider, the Comintern courier betrayed by Abraham Raichman, was brought to Paris and confronted the "Grand Chef," Trepper ordered her to talk. She obeyed and gave important information, in particular about the German Rote Kapelle network. The courier did not earn her freedom by these services, though she did save her life. She was deported in 1943 to the Ravensbrück concentration camp; when the war ended she emerged from the camp gravely ill and died soon after in a Swiss sanitarium.

Having destroyed the Paris network, the German police turned to the two other centers of Soviet intelligence in France, Marseille and Lyon. In 1941-42 Marseille, center of various international wartime networks, also harbored a prominent Soviet group headed by Victor Sukulov, who had fled from Brussels with Margarete Barcza and her child after the raid of December 1941. Another im-

* Curiously enough, his execution is not mentioned in any of the documents found in Germany after the war. It is believed by some that Robinson is alive and working for Moscow somewhere in the West. This is improbable, however.

portant personality there was Jules Jaspar, of the Belgian network, and the group included Marguerite Marivet, Alepée, and others.

Lyon, in 1941-42 a center of French resistance, had also gained importance as the location of a Soviet agency and a shelter for escaping intelligence agents. An interesting group gathered there: Jezekiel Schreiber, former member of the staff of the Soviet military attaché ("secretary for special assignments"), who was arrested by the Germans and escaped in July 1941, tried to operate a short-wave radio station in Lyon in 1942; Isidor Springer, the German Communist, had come from Brussels; Otto Schumacher, also a German Communist, and member of the Wenzel network, had come to Lyon when Wenzel was arrested; and there were others.

By the end of 1942 the German police had carried its spy-hunting operations into the "free territory," and the Soviet apparats were destroyed.

In March 1943 a German court-martial in Brussels tried the three Russian officers, Konstantin Yefremov, Mikhail Makarov, and Anton Danilov, the three successive operators of the Brussels station. Manfred Roeder, who had served as prosecutor in the trial of the German Rote Kapelle in December 1942,* presided at the trial.

Accused of espionage in the service of the Soviet Union, the defendants did not deny the charges; in addition to extensive statements and confessions, over eighty short-wave messages were in the hands of the prosecution. The officers behaved with dignity; they told the court they had been performing their duty and were prepared to die.

Military court procedure required confirmation by Hitler of the sentence of death pronounced against the three defendants; Hitler had delegated the function (in other cases as well as in this) to Göring; court president Roeder reported to Göring, pointing out that Makarov, being a relative of Molotov, might be of use to Germany when, at a later stage of the war, political conversations should start. The execution of Makarov was deferred;¹⁰ the other two defendants were executed at Fort Breda in Belgium in April 1943. Makarov was imprisoned in the Buchenwald concentration camp, according to Roeder, and removed to Italy toward the end of the war, along with a number of other prominent prisoners;

* See Chapter 6.

he traveled under the name of Kokorin. Early in May 1945 the *New York Times* reported that he had been liberated by the United States forces and repatriated to Russia.

After the trial of the Soviet officers, the court-martial moved to Paris, where another group of Soviet agents had been in prison since November–December 1942. Of these, Vasili and Anna Maximovich were sentenced to death and executed; Fraülein Anna-Margarete Hoffmann-Scholtz was sentenced to a term of six years at hard labor.

4. TREASON EN GROS

The arrest of Johann Wenzel in June 1942 had provoked a great commotion in the highest circles of the German government,¹ and the messages found in his apartment and his confession revealed the extent and vigor of Soviet espionage—the ramifications and multifariousness of its nests and sources of information, the accuracy of the information it amassed, and the degree to which it had penetrated the Nazi government. German counterespionage, which acted through a number of rival agencies (Abwehr, Gestapo, Sicherheitsdienst, and others), it appeared was less than efficient. Two top men of German counterespionage, Heinrich Himmler and Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, otherwise mortal enemies, found a way to compromise on the creation of a new agency, the Kommando Rote Kapelle (Rote Kapelle Squad), which was to embrace representatives of all the German counterespionage services. Granted wide powers, the Kommando extended its activity into Belgium, Holland, and France. Its chiefs were *Kriminalräte* Koppkow and Panwitz; Karl Giering headed the Kommando in Paris, and Harry Piepe played the leading role in Brussels. The first and immediate task of the Kommando was to destroy the Soviet intelligence networks; its second and long-range assignment was to utilize the converted Soviet agents and their radio facilities for a grand-scale intelligence offensive against the Soviet Union. In the two years of its existence, from the summer of 1942 up to the evacuation of France and Belgium in 1944, Kommando Rote Kapelle was at work in these countries.

The base of the Kommando's operations was the growing number of Soviet agents willing to collaborate. These included, in the early stage, the chief of Soviet intelligence in the West, Leopold

Trepper; Red Army men and intelligence officers Victor Sukulov and Konstantin Yefremov, seasoned Comintern men now in the services of military intelligence, including Johann Wenzel; the head of the Soviet network in Holland, Anton Winterink; the false passport artist and expert in underground techniques, Abraham Raichman.

To these main collaborators in the new German agency a number of others, of lesser importance, were added from time to time. All had been intensively interrogated, their confessions often taking several weeks. When the interrogations were completed, the Kommando had to decide what was to be done with the confessors. If they could be of no further use, they were brought before a court-martial, sentenced, and executed; or (most frequently in the case of Jewish culprits) they were deported without trial and exterminated; a small number were deported to a concentration camp.

The leaders—the “Grand Chef,” the “Petit Chef,” the Comintern men and a few others—were allowed to live if they agreed to collaborate; those who did work for the Germans against Russia worked mainly in the *Funkspiel*, or radio game, which will be described shortly. By this means a few former Soviet agents survived the war.

The story of Soviet agents working under German control, which reveals a morass of moral degradation and treachery at the top level, is one of the most shocking chapters in the three-decade history of Soviet intelligence. It was as if these men and women who for their cause had engaged in the most dangerous ventures, endured trials and imprisonment, and gambled with their very lives, had suddenly lost their human countenance and morality. High- and low-ranking agents, men and women of various ages, nationalities, and education, betrayed their co-workers, friends, teachers, leaders, principles, codes, and rules, along with the secrets of the sacred apparat.

To understand this phenomenon of sudden moral weakness and loss of fighting spirit which was the psychological prelude to surrender, we must also understand the general situation of that time.

This was the first phase of the war, a time of Russian defeats and German victories. In Germany and in the German satellite and German-occupied countries the day of Hitler's victory and the destruction of the Soviet government seemed near: “We have already won the war,” the Führer proclaimed, while the press and

radio agreed and the public generally believed. Millions of Red Army men became prisoners of war, a spirit of "defeatism" spread, and collaboration with Germany—some of it voluntary, some forced—was becoming a tactic of thousands of former officers of the Soviet armed forces. To the Soviet intelligence men, themselves members of the Soviet Army, the situation looked even more desperate than it did to the mass of ordinary prisoners of war. They knew that from October 1941 on their connection with their government had been broken off when most of the governmental agencies were being evacuated from Moscow. Funds were not forthcoming regularly, and when they did come they were insufficient. This attitude toward its intelligence arm, that weapon of tremendous power, was evidence of Russia's decreasing resistance and an omen of catastrophe. In such circumstances the alternatives for the intelligence agents, left to their own devices in the underground of an enemy country, were suicide or collaboration. Some refused to collaborate and went straight to their deaths; others chose collaboration.

Without faith there is no hero. When hope is lost and faith dwindles, the purely animal will to live sometimes takes on greater force. From beneath devotion and loyalty that have guided him through the dangers of the past years, there emerges the other side of the secret agent's nature—the instinct of self-preservation. The urge to live sometimes proves stronger than moral codes or instructions from the Director, the Center, or the party.

The old Russian revolutionary code adhered to for decades before 1917 prescribed that a party member who was arrested must refuse to testify. On this all parties of the left—Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and others—were in agreement. Their newspapers, whether printed abroad or in the Russian underground, regularly carried the admonition: "Comrades, refuse to testify." The proud image of a revolutionary refusing to cooperate with the tsarist police was of great propaganda value, but keeping silence about the party and its members had considerable practical meaning, too.

The Comintern inherited this code of conduct and made it obligatory for its members: never admit more than what "they" already know, consistently deny illegal political activity, and—the supreme precept—strictly avoid involving other persons.

One of the chapters in a booklet published by the German Com-

munists in Prague in 1935 is entitled "Precepts for the Conduct of Persons Arrested." Among the precepts are the following:

As a matter of principle, I do not divulge names, cover names, personal descriptions, addresses, or places through which comrades could be contacted . . .

I never admit my guilt in any offenses I am accused of, even if all evidence is against me.

When I am told that others have already confessed, I do not believe it, and if others have really confessed, I will call them liars, always denying everything . . .

If I am tortured, beaten, I will let them kill me, torture me to death, rather than betray my organization, my comrades.²

Deviations by Communists from these codes became frequent first in Japan in the late 'twenties and 'thirties when indicted party members often confessed and revealed what they knew. In the Nazi era in Germany, too, the conduct of a large number of German Communists during trial was far from that prescribed. The heroic era of Communism was over.

Pamphlets and articles dealing with these matters which were published after the war, mainly in the Soviet zone of Germany, emphasized the tortures applied to members of resistance groups, in particular Rote Kapelle members in wartime, and implied that the confessions were the result of Gestapo cruelty. This explanation is insufficient. The Gestapo undoubtedly used brutal methods, and was doubly cruel to Communists; as far as the Rote Kapelle is concerned, a special order prescribed extraction of confessions by any means. Some cases of torture of Soviet agents (Frieda Wesolek, the Sokols, and others) are known; others will never come to light. It is astonishing, however, that in cases of the most important betrayers and collaborators no traces of physical violence have been discovered: apparently threats and pressure sufficed in these cases. Sometimes the prisoner capitulated when the Abwehr officer threatened, "I will turn you over to the Gestapo"—the Gestapo representing the medieval sort of inquisition and death by torture. In other cases he broke down when informed that the Abwehr knew his real name and those of his friends, and that his friends had confessed. According to a former anti-Nazi Abwehr man, "the feeling that he had been under surveillance, exposed, that someone had already be-

trayed him, was usually so strong that the stunned man began to talk." ³

So unexpected and surprising, however, was the behavior of some outstanding Soviet agents that the German authorities at first refused to believe their eyes and ears. Having checked and convinced themselves of the truthfulness of the revelations of their new collaborators, they conceived the theory, to explain the strange behavior of their amenable prisoners, that they were acting with Moscow's consent and had received permission to extricate themselves from the noose by any means, even wholesale betrayal. But no such permission could ever have been given, least of all by the exacting and cold-blooded leadership of Soviet espionage. Were this theory correct, it would make incomprehensible the suicides of other Soviet intelligence officers following their arrest—Sophie Poznanska ("Anna Verlinden"), who hanged herself in the Brussels jail; Isidor Springer, who jumped out of a window of the Lyon prison. Nor would it explain why a large number of others went to their deaths refusing to talk.

The greatest successes of the Kommando, however, were achieved in the Funkspiel.

During the war more than half of the clandestine radio stations in occupied Europe—British, Soviet, and others—fell into the hands of German counterintelligence or the Gestapo. The Germans were often able to persuade arrested foreign radio spies, who were within a hairsbreadth of death, to continue transmission to their headquarters as if nothing had happened. The messages—which were misleading, or inquired about persons, addresses, couriers, parachutists, money—were composed, of course, by German intelligence; the answers betrayed the anti-Nazi underground to German intelligence. This "persuading" of foreign agents to change their loyalty was called *Umdrehen* ("turning-around") by the Abwehr.

One of the most successful chapters in the history of the German Funkspiel was "Operation Nordpol," which involved Holland and Britain. For 18 months during the war several agents of the Dutch émigré government in London, who had worked in the underground in Holland and had been seized by the Germans, were forced to continue radio communication with their headquarters

in England. A total of 14 radio stations set up by the Dutch agents now worked for the Germans. From London they received names of new agents to be landed by parachute in Holland, addresses of resistance leaders, arms, and dynamite. This operation enabled German counterintelligence to seize more than 50 British-Dutch secret agents, radio sets, machine guns, grenades, large quantities of ammunition, and clothing of various kinds. The operation has been described in detail in two books by former Abwehr officials,⁴ and the truthfulness of these reports was confirmed by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in the British House of Commons.

More extensive and more fateful Funkspiel operations were directed by the Germans against Soviet intelligence headquarters, although for more than one reason these have up to now been kept secret. Moscow has not revealed its war strategy or the details of its intelligence work abroad; besides, the story of a large number of veteran Soviet and foreign Communists serving the Nazis in the radio game would not enhance Soviet prestige.

Every transmitting agent has his own individuality, his own "signature," to use the technical term. He has longer or shorter intervals between words and sentences, he begins and ends his messages in a characteristic way, and his touch and speed are as different from another's as are his fingerprints or voice. The transmitting agent, in short, can be recognized by the text and form of his short-wave messages. If the receiving officer is alert he will recognize or suspect the genuineness of the sender. Most of the Soviet agents working as senders were well known to the Moscow headquarters; their teachers back home often remembered their personal traits and peculiarities. A new operator at the radio of an arrested Soviet agent might not only prove useless to the Germans but actually reveal to Moscow the break-up of the network. This was why the arrested Soviet agents had to be persuaded, or compelled, to continue at their radio jobs for the benefit of the Germans—so long, of course, as they did not try to deceive their new bosses by secretly transmitting warnings to Moscow.⁵

Despite the fact that the converted Soviet agent was closely watched while he was transmitting, there were devious ways of informing Moscow headquarters as to the state of things, such as using an old code, making absurd mistakes, or inserting or omitting certain letters or punctuation. In the end all depended on the volition of the Soviet agent in German service. To guard against the pos-

sibility of deceit, the Germans introduced the *Tonband* (tape recorder): the message composed by the collaborating Soviet agent was recorded and the recording was closely analyzed by German experts before it was transmitted abroad.⁶

It would not have been shrewd of the Germans to supply the enemy with false or misleading information only; this would soon have resulted in a breakdown of the operation. It was wiser to feed him real and interesting news, that is, to give away some well-guarded secrets, thus preparing the ground for a big lie.

One of the most significant Funkspiel messages was probably sent a few weeks after the Teheran conference.⁷ At this crucial moment of the war, the eve of the invasion of the Continent, Martin Bormann, one of Hitler's closest aides, was assigned to do an important job of misinforming, namely, to prepare a series of messages to Moscow on the international situation to be radioed from a former Soviet transmitter now working under the "Petit Chef" and controlled by the Kommando. In the first message of this series Sukulov informed the Director in Moscow that an official of the *Auswärtiges Amt* was prepared to supply secret information to the Soviet apparat. The Director of course asked for the name of this official, since Soviet diplomats who had left Berlin in 1941 were acquainted with the personnel of the German Foreign Office. The "Petit Chef" gave the name of a man well known to Moscow from the days of his service in Portugal and regarded as an opponent of Nazism accessible to Soviet overtures, who was now working in the *Auswärtiges Amt*. The Director consented. Now messages, signed "Kent," conveyed diplomatic news allegedly supplied by the disloyal officer of the German Foreign Office.

The details of this operation were typical of the Funkspiel system in general. The messages composed in Berlin contained accurate and significant news, sometimes including secret information of somewhat less than highest importance; there were no outright lies in the alleged reports of the diplomat from Portugal. Moscow undoubtedly checked and rechecked the reports and placed confidence in them. On one occasion a message to Moscow contained a genuine report by a neutral diplomat from London to his government which German espionage had somehow got hold of. The diplomat was informing his minister that the Western powers were disturbed by the rapid advance of the Red Army and that a secret meeting to discuss the situation had been arranged between British

and German representatives to take place in a neutral country. (It was hinted that the country was Spain.) In transmitting this report to Moscow only a few words had to be changed and a few sentences added. Simultaneously the Auswärtiges Amt let out some vague hints to the foreign press which could serve in Moscow as confirmation of the sensational news.

On January 17, 1944, *Pravda* carried the following cable under the heading "Rumors in Cairo":

Cairo. January 12. (From *Pravda's* own correspondent.) According to reliable information from Greek and Yugoslav sources, a secret meeting of two leading British personalities with Ribbentrop took place recently in one of the coastal towns of the Iberian Peninsula. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify the conditions of a separate peace with Germany. It is supposed that the meeting was not without results.

The British Foreign Office immediately denied the "news from Cairo"; moreover, London stated, there was no *Pravda* correspondent in Egypt and no such cable had passed through the British censor's office there. The message had obviously reached Moscow through channels that could not be disclosed and had been made to appear, by Stalin's press bureau, to have emanated from Cairo. TASS, the Soviet news agency, broadcast the British denial, adding some veiled hints about Franz von Papen's activity in Turkey. The true background of the story was never revealed.

The most important radio stations of the anti-Soviet Funkspiel were the two in Belgium, the two in France, and the one in Holland.

Johann Wenzel worked in the Weide station in Belgium, reorganized for him by the Kommando; Konstantin Yefremov—Bordo station—was in the Busche-Pascal group; Anton Winterink radioed from the Tanne station in Holland. Having no confidence in their Soviet intelligence aides, the Germans at first tried to do the sending themselves, using the Russians only to help set up the text of the messages. The Center was suspicious, however, and did not answer. As a matter of fact, there was a period of radio silence between the day of the arrest of the Soviet operator and the beginning of transmission under German control. The Kommando tried again and again, but it was several weeks before Moscow finally

responded. Still suspicious, however, Moscow demanded an explanation. "Where have you been all this time?" "How can you prove it?" Answers and "proofs" were, of course, at hand. Contact was resumed.

The Soviet operators were placed at the transmitters. Working under the watchful eyes of the German experts, they proved reliable and performed "honestly." Gradually some of the Soviet-German agents became enthusiastic about their work; the success of the game they were playing animated and encouraged them. "This passion for their job was becoming a mania," one report notes. Their living conditions were tolerable, they enjoyed some freedom, and their personal relations with the supervising German officers improved as time went on.⁸

For many months the new setup worked successfully for the Germans. The senders urged Moscow to greater activity—to dispatch new agents, to give addresses, etc. To find out whether Moscow was still suspicious, the Wenzel radio on one occasion asked for funds; £100 arrived via Bulgaria.*

In January 1943 Wenzel escaped; despite the friendly gestures on the part of the Kommando, he was well aware that his life was in danger, and he chose another kind of freedom. Working in his office under constant guard, he noticed one day that the key of the office door had been left in the lock on the outside. He jumped up and, before the guards could collect their wits, rushed out of the room, locked the door behind him, dashed down the stairs, and disappeared. According to some reports, he lived for a time in hiding in Belgium and Holland and when the war was over crossed over to England. In England, allegedly, he contacted Soviet intelligence, but his services abroad were rejected. Since that time all trace of Wenzel has been lost.⁹

His Weide station continued, however, to communicate with Moscow for another year, until February 1944; for a time the Center remained unaware of the deception. In January 1944 Weide asked for funds and Moscow replied that \$5,000 would be delivered; the Kommando took the necessary steps to have the Soviet courier arrested, but he escaped at the last moment. A month later the Kommando abandoned the Weide station, but the Center continued for another three months to call it regularly. Then the

* "We received a two-pound can of beans; inside we found £100 skillfully hidden." D papers, b 81.

Center instructed another Soviet short-wave station, Busche-Pascal, to find out what had happened to Weide. Busche-Pascal, which had been in German hands for over a year, answered simply that Weide "gives no signs of life."

Winterink continued to operate his Tanne transmitter under German control until March 1944,¹⁹ when he was suddenly ordered by the Center to go into hiding and join the resistance groups; he did so, escaping from the network of the Kommando.

In France two radio stations, the Eiffel station in Paris under the "Grand Chef" (Trepper) and Hillel Katz, and the Mars station in Marseille under the "Petit Chef" (Sukulov), were taken over by the Kommando. Katz was soon executed by the Gestapo; the "Grand Chef" and "Petit Chef" became the Kommando's greatest assets and continued to maintain ties with Moscow and receive directives. Moreover, Moscow helped establish contacts for Trepper with the radio station of the underground French Communist party; in this way the Germans succeeded in making a number of important arrests.

With the purpose of making inroads on the French resistance movement, the Kommando, with Trepper's assistance, resorted to a trick. Early in 1943 one of Trepper's radio sets went out of order. It could have been repaired easily, of course, by the technical service of the Kommando itself, but some ingenious *Kriminal-Sekretär* advised that Moscow be asked for help. This was a logical piece of advice, since only a loyal Communist radio man could be entrusted with the repair of a Soviet espionage set. Moscow supplied the name and whereabouts of "Comrade Jojo," head of a special radio shop which produced and repaired short-wave transmitters for the needs of the French Communist party. "Jojo" was arrested, along with several code experts, radio operators, and other technicians. In the course of the interrogations the Kommando received important clues concerning the French Communist underground short-wave network. This blow was a hard one for the French underground.

Living in a private home on Avenue Foch in Paris, in semi-liberty, though under close surveillance, Trepper was rarely permitted to walk in the streets. When an exception to this rule was made, he was escorted by two Kommando men. He was not allowed to visit his friend Georgia de Winter.

Gradually Trepper won the confidence of his superiors, and

the two-guard rule was relaxed. In June 1943, accompanied by *Kriminal-Obersekretär* Willy Berg, he was permitted to go to a pharmacy near the St. Lazare station to purchase some medicine; he managed to disappear from the pharmacy and escape. All efforts to recapture him were in vain. Willy Berg was punished, but Trepper was never seen by the Germans again.¹¹

Within a matter of minutes after his escape, Trepper was with Georgia de Winter, making arrangements to flee with her. For a short time they found shelter with Claude Spaak, brother of the well-known Belgian leader. Then they separated. Georgia was arrested in October 1943, held in the concentration camp at Ravensbrück, and returned to Paris after the war.¹² After the liberation of France Trepper made frequent visits to Paris but, obviously afraid of the French, he did not emerge from the underground. Called to Moscow in 1945, he never returned.¹³

The "Petit Chef," Victor Sukulov, was head of the network and radio station in Marseille after his escape from Belgium in 1941. Arrested by the Abwehr in November 1942, he staunchly refused to answer questions, declaring only, "I am a Russian officer; I don't deny having worked against Germany; I had to carry out my orders. You can shoot me."¹⁴ All efforts to persuade him were futile; hard prison conditions did not soften him.

Since his role in the Berlin group was already known from messages found in Brussels, he was flown to Berlin, where the trial of the Schulze-Boysen organization was in preparation, and jailed in the Gestapo cellar. Identified as "Kent" by members of the Berlin network, he still refused to supply any substantial information on the Soviet intelligence organization.

A few days after his arrival in Berlin Margarete Barcza, who had been arrested in Marseille, was brought to Berlin for interrogation. An order was given that she was not to be permitted to communicate with Sukulov.

To the surprise of the interrogating officer, Barcza was one day ushered into his office while Kent was still there. Kent behaved like a lunatic. In the presence of all the officials he embraced her with a passion and devotion of which only a Russian is capable. Then he turned to the Commissar and declared himself ready to tell everything. "But set her free," he im-

plored. "What do you know about Robinson, Jim, Rado, Lucy, Sisi?" "I will tell you everything! But you must set her free!" He dropped to his knees before the officer and cried like a child!¹⁵

After a few weeks Sukulov, accompanied by Margarete, was returned to France to begin working under the Kommando as head of the Marseille radio station. Here he proved to be of great value to the Germans because Moscow continued to supply him with important and secret information. At first Sukulov and Barcza shared living quarters in the office of the Fresnes prison, but this arrangement was not suited to Sukulov's new task of playing the role of a Soviet spy, so in March 1943 the two were moved to a private home in Marseille, where, though under close observation, they enjoyed comparative freedom.

Sukulov proved a most faithful servant to his new chiefs, and the services he rendered were numerous and significant; cooperating in Funkspiel was one of them.¹⁶ In the spring of 1943 Sukulov conceived a plan of making a reconnaissance for the Germans of the efficient Soviet intelligence network in Switzerland. In June of that year the Director informed both Sukulov and Alexander Foote (the latter in Lausanne) that a courier from France would arrive to receive from Foote money for the French apparatus. The courier arrived. Foote noted that he behaved in a strange manner. Foote relates:

The director had ordered me to have no conversation with the courier but merely to hand over the cash and go away. However, the courier handed over to me in his turn a large book done up in a bright orange paper and told me that between two of the pages I should find three ciphered messages which must be sent off urgently by radio to the Centre. He also said that he had valuable information which he wanted to get over and suggested a further meeting as soon as possible and named a place near Geneva—which was also very near the German-controlled French frontier.

All this made me very suspicious as such loquacity against strict orders was unusual in a Soviet agent. I began to suspect that perhaps the original courier had been arrested and his place taken by an Abwehr agent. The orange wrapping would serve as a convenient beacon light for anyone who was trailing

me home, and the meeting place near the frontier would serve admirably for an abduction in the best Gestapo traditions. As for the cipher messages—if these were also phony, then they would serve as admirable pointers towards identifying my transmitter. I had no doubt that the Germans had long been monitoring the network and if on one of the services that they were listening to they suddenly found the three messages they had planted it would at once identify that transmitter as mine.

I tried to dissemble my suspicions as much as I could and said that I could not attend a meeting that week as I had business elsewhere and so fixed on a meeting in a week's time. On leaving the rendezvous I hid the book as well as I could under my coat and returned home by a roundabout route, taking evasive action. In my next transmission I reported on this fully to the director and he agreed that I should not attend the meeting. As regarded the cipher messages, which were there as the courier had said, gummed between two pages and in a cipher that I did not know, the director asked me to send them over but so to disguise them with dummy groups and then by re-enciphering in my own cipher, that they would neither be recognizable as the original messages to the monitors nor serve as a guide to our cipher to the cryptographers.

When the courier returned, Sukulov realized that a mistake had been made by the inexperienced German, and so informed the Center.

A fortnight later the Centre informed me [Foote concludes] that my suspicions were correct and that the courier had been a German agent and that as I had been recognized by at least one member of the Abwehr I must regard myself in jeopardy and at least partially compromised.¹⁷

Among Sukulov's important services to German counterespionage was the betrayal of a large Soviet-French intelligence group headed by Soviet "general" Waldemar Ozols and the French resistance man Paul Legendre.

Waldemar Ozols, Latvian by birth and a Russian Communist for many years, had taken part in the Spanish civil war as a member of the International Brigade and had returned to France in 1939.

In 1940 the Soviet air attaché in Vichy, Volosiuk, instructed Ozols to start an espionage network which would operate independently of other groups of Soviet military intelligence and report directly to the attaché's office in the embassy. With the aid of his French friends Ozols recruited a group of five or six subagents and was soon submitting reports to the attaché in Vichy. On the eve of the Soviet-German war in 1941, before the embassy left France, Ozols received a radio set, a code, and instructions for direct communication with Moscow.

The Ozols group was not a great success, however. Deprived of its main support, the embassy, and with no real experience in underground intelligence work, it never became very active. There was no radio operator available; two important members of the group were arrested in 1941-42. Finally, in 1943, in order to revive the group, the Center established contact between Ozols and the efficient traitor, the "Petit Chef."

When the two men met, in August 1943, Sukulov asked Ozols to find sources of information "for Moscow" on political and military matters and to turn the reports over to him to be forwarded to the Center. Ozols' connections led to the French anti-German, mainly Communist, underground, and in particular to the sizable Marseille group of the "Mithridate" organization; the local chief of this organization, "Colonel Fernand" (actually Capt. Paul Legendre), moved to Paris, organized a new intelligence network there, and at the end of 1943 started to work for what he at first thought was the loyal Soviet apparat, as "agent 305." It is not certain just when Ozols and Legendre were enlightened about the real meaning of their performance, but in 1943-44 Ozols was working directly for the Kommando, and Legendre was collaborating with "Hotel Lutetia" (the headquarters of the Abwehr in Paris).¹⁸ Their connections with the resistance were the main assets of this group. The German police who were receiving information from the group did not arrest all the underground militants; instead they recruited its agents for their own work and even controlled a number of radios of the resistance group. It is paradoxical that when Allied troops invaded the Continent some French resistance radio stations working from behind the Allied lines communicated with German headquarters.

The Ozols-Legendre network, wrote Colonel Wedel of German counterintelligence, was "controlled by the RSHA [headquarters

of the Himmler police] and served to keep Moscow confident. In this way we succeeded in penetrating further into the organizations of the French Communist party and learning more about the kind of messages in which Moscow was most interested.”¹⁰

When the German armies withdrew, in the summer of 1944, the French authorities proceeded to arrest hundreds of collaborators, among them General Ozols and Captain Legendre. As we shall see below, on Soviet instructions both were soon released.

Victor Sukulov disappeared soon after the war. When the German armies withdrew from France, he joined the Kommando officers and retreated to the north, hiding from both the Russian and Allied authorities. Margarete Barcza, however, moved to Paris and then to Brussels to wait for Sukulov there. He visited her for short periods, between which he would submerge again. Eventually he went to the Balkans and perished somewhere, possibly at the hands of an avenger or a GB agent.

Among the other converted agents were the Raichman-Gruber pair, who had also denounced and delivered up a large number of their friends; their collaboration was so enthusiastic that it surprised and disgusted even the German officials. That they survived, however, was due not so much to their actual services as to the attitude of the Gestapo officer, Rudolf Radke, who interrogated them. Radke became very friendly with Malvina Gruber, and on the pretext that his investigation was not yet completed actually saved them from death.

When the Germans withdrew from France, Raichman was arrested, tried in Belgium for collaboration, and sentenced to a prison term of from 15 to 17 years; he is still serving his term. Malvina Gruber fell into Soviet hands and spent four years in prison. She was released in 1950.

CHAPTER 5

The Swiss Network in War

1. ALEXANDER RADO AND HIS APPARAT

UP to the start of the Soviet-German war, Switzerland's role in the realm of Soviet intelligence had been an unimportant one, and neither Moscow nor its agents in the West would have been likely to believe that little Switzerland would soon not only occupy an outstanding place in Soviet espionage but for a time even overshadow other countries. This is precisely what happened between 1941 and 1944, during the second phase of the war. As a base of intelligence operations against Germany, the Soviet network in Switzerland rendered better service to Soviet strategy than that in any other single country, and the contribution to the Soviet victory was of paramount importance; if, as Moscow claimed, it was Stalin's genius that won the war, he was at least ably aided by the Swiss network of Soviet espionage.

Of course there had been military intelligence and GB agents residing in Switzerland before 1941, but compared to their colleagues in neighboring Germany, France, and Italy, these men and women led rather quiet lives. Switzerland never joined in international coalitions, either anti- or pro-Soviet, or anti- or pro-Nazi. Her neutrality was no hypocritical term but a sincere principle in foreign relations. Tested and retested through centuries, Swiss neutrality had grown from a device to a doctrine, from a doctrine to a tradition. There was little to spy on, therefore, in Swiss diplomatic and defense areas, nor was there an extensive war industry to arouse the curiosity of a foreign agent. Such an agent caught spying in Switzerland, not against Switzerland but against another power, was usually expelled from the country. In only a few cases (mainly those involving Nazi spies) was sterner punishment meted out, and this because the Nazi spies were paving the way for a projected (though postponed) German invasion of Switzerland.

No official Soviet agents or military attachés were stationed in Switzerland because diplomatic relations between Berne and Moscow, broken off in 1923, were not resumed until after the war. Communications from Soviet intelligence in Switzerland to the Center usually went to the capital of a nearby country—Paris, for example—and thence to Moscow, and vice versa. This dependence on an outside circuit was another reason why Switzerland was in a provincial and secondary position in the framework of Soviet intelligence. In the late 'thirties the first Soviet short-wave transmitter was set up in Switzerland, but it was not kept very busy sending messages to Moscow.

Until 1936–37 the small network of Soviet military intelligence in Switzerland was headed by an intelligent, good-looking woman of about thirty, known in the apparatus as “Vera.”¹ Although her activities were not of great importance, she acquired useful knowledge of living and working conditions in the country, as well as friends who later became agents themselves. Following her service in Switzerland she had other jobs, eventually coming to the headquarters in Moscow. She met a tragic end in the terrible purge of the ranks of military intelligence which followed the revelations of the Canadian spy affair after the war.*

“Vera” was succeeded in Switzerland by several trusted agents, among whom one of the most important was Ursula-Maria Hamburger, who was the first to operate a Soviet radio from Switzerland. She and her husband, Rudolf, German Communists and old agents of Soviet intelligence, had had extensive experience in the Far East, Poland, and other countries.² Rudolf continued to work in China (where he was eventually arrested), but Maria was ordered to Switzerland to help rebuild the Soviet network after the great purge. Maria, whom Alexander Foote has described as “slim, with a good figure and even better legs, her black hair demurely dressed,”³ was one of the newcomers to the Soviet apparatus in the 'thirties, an intelligent and devoted person. Playing the role of a woman of independent means (her actual salary was 2,000 Swiss francs a month—\$460), Maria (“Sonia”) rented a villa at Caux, near Montreux, where she lived with her two children and a maid. From her home she operated the short-wave radio over which messages were transmitted to Moscow.

* See Chapter 8.

From time to time new untrained recruits with no specific assignments came to Switzerland to be tried out. From England came Alexander Foote, whose only qualification for intelligence work was his recent service in the International Brigade in Spain. Another new arrival was William Phillips, an underground British Communist. Then came Franz Obermanns, a German Communist carrying a Finnish passport. Obermanns, after a short period of uncompleted preparation, was arrested as a foreigner carrying false documents and interned for several years. In the midst of these trivial goings on the war in the West broke out, and activities of the network were reduced to a point even below the previous modest scale. Ursula-Maria Hamburger received instructions from Moscow to withdraw all her agents from Germany and herself remain quietly in Switzerland and train Foote and Phillips in short-wave transmission.

A cloud of uncertainty hung over Maria's network. Wireless communication with Moscow, which had not been frequent before, was now curtailed to one message a month, and reports were of a very general nature. Money ceased to arrive regularly. Foote recalls that in 1940 the Center even conceived the idea of moving one of the Swiss groups to Rumania, but this idea was discarded.

In December 1940, on the eve of the Swiss agency's boom era, Maria Hamburger was transferred to England to join the Soviet apparat there. Her activity in Switzerland had left no significant mark in the history of the Soviet network in that country. According to Alexander Foote, she served in England, at least for a time, as a channel for Klaus Fuchs's atomic reports to Moscow. She was never arrested and apparently escaped to the Eastern zone of Germany when arrest appeared imminent.

The military intelligence network in Switzerland achieved greater importance, somewhat later, under Alexander Rado.* Rado had been one of the younger members of the Hungarian Communist group under Bela Kun and Mathias Rakoszi, leaders of the abortive Communist revolution of 1918 in that country. Although he was only nineteen at the time of the developments in Budapest, the émigré Rado, in Moscow, a member of the venerated "old guard," enjoyed the confidence of his colleagues and moved in the highest circles of the Communist International; he enjoyed,

* Also "Albert," "Dora," "Kulicher."

in particular, the patronage of Comintern president Zinoviev. In 1919, at a time when all relations between Russia and the outside world had been broken off, this very young man was sent from Moscow to organize a branch of ROSTA, the first Soviet press agency, in Haparanda, on the Swedish frontier. Journalism combined with intelligence work, which was the essence of this first assignment, soon became second nature with Rado.

From the far north Rado was soon moved to Vienna, where he opened a ROSTA office; next he went to Berlin to study geography, which became his cover profession. As a learned geographer, he later wrote for geographic publications and became a "corresponding member" of the Royal Geographical Society of Great Britain. In 1933 he moved on to Paris, where he founded the Geopress, a press agency specializing in geographic material and maps related to current events. Funds for this were of course supplied by the Director.⁴

In 1936 Rado was sent to Switzerland as "resident director" of a small intelligence network. He brought with him his Geopress idea and, with an associate, founded the Geneva Geopress, which became important and widely known as the world moved toward wars, and maps of fronts and frontiers became urgently wanted commodities. Rado supplied maps relating to the Spanish civil war, Czechoslovakian problems, and other matters. When the war came, his Geopress agency became prominent.

During the war years Rado was in possession of abundant secret information, and his maps, reflecting his considerable geographical knowledge, were good. His reputation grew and he was highly esteemed in the Geneva community. Later, when he had to flee, voices were raised in indignation: How could the police suspect this pure scientist? "Various persons," the *Gazette de Lausanne* reported, "energetically protested against this offense to a well-known geographer whose presence had been an honor to Switzerland."⁵

In Switzerland Rado lived a quiet life with his German wife, Helene, also an ardent Communist and member of Soviet intelligence, and their two sons. Small in stature and rather stout, he did not suggest either a revolutionary or a spy; he could have been taken for a professor or journalist. In fact, Rado was not the type best fitted to be a secret intelligence agent; moreover, in the soft political climate of Switzerland he developed a taste for private

life and its pleasures. "Rado was not a hero," a former agent of the network reports. "He hardly was the stuff for a good spy. At a critical moment he would lose his nerve. The Swiss police, I used to tell my wife, must be inefficient indeed if they do not catch him." * Helene Rado proved more cold-blooded, consistent, and better suited to her peculiar occupation than did her husband.⁷

Rado's relations with Moscow became more and more ambiguous as the scope of the work in Switzerland increased. In time of war the position of a resident director of an espionage apparatus normally entailed a multitude of temptations and dangers, and distance from the Center and comparative independence of the agent were further conducive to risky ventures. Rado broke the strict Soviet rules more than once. Large sums of money passed through his hands. According to a standing order, agents abroad were required to obtain the Center's authorization for every item of expense and account regularly for funds expended. This system might have worked satisfactorily for a small agency in normal times, but in the case of the Swiss agency, which had expanded, as we shall see, all over the country and had a multitude of new sub-agents and sources, real accounting was impossible. Rado had to break the rule regarding finances and take upon himself more than was permitted. On the other hand, for purposes of a possible accounting in the future, he kept some records, a procedure contrary to the regulations. Later, in 1943, when the police searched the house of one of his radio operators,* they found a set of Rado's papers which revealed to the authorities the financial history of the network.

Rado's closest collaborators believed that he diverted to his personal use large amounts of Moscow's money; they even suspected him of putting big sums "aside" in order to "go private"—as the term goes—at an early date. Rado was not cautious either in his selection of personnel or in his relations with his agents. His love affair with one of his young women operators and their appearance together in restaurants were a blatant violation of the first rules of conspiracy.

Despite Rado's shortcomings, the zeal of his collaborators and his excellent sources of information marked his era as a period of outstanding successes of Soviet espionage in Switzerland. With the outbreak of the Soviet-German war the Soviet network in Switzer-

* See p. 216.

land began a formidable expansion. Supplied with funds, unhampered by the authorities, and not weakened by arrests of its members (arrests did not occur until much later), it outgrew in significance all other Russian and non-Russian intelligence agencies, including those in Belgium, the United States, Canada, and even Germany. An average of between two and three hundred messages went over the air waves to Russia every month, the greatest part of them dealing with decisions of the German government, military operations, the economic situation in occupied Europe, etc. Other messages reported on the internal affairs of the Swiss network.

To all appearances the Swiss Communist party (Party of the Toilers) and Rado's network were alien to one another. Soviet intelligence was strictly forbidden to mix with local Communist affairs, and members of the Communist party could not at the same time serve as Soviet spies. The Communist party was not only supposed to know nothing about Soviet espionage in Switzerland but bound firmly to deny any knowledge if suspicions were voiced.

Behind the scenes, however, another pattern of relations prevailed. The chief of the Soviet apparatus, Rado, had close ties to Léon Nicole and Karl Hofmaier, the leaders of the Communist party. They were most important to Rado as a source of new agents, recruited mainly from among "sympathizers," but were also helpful in financial matters. Here, in the highest echelons of the two organizations, the Communist party and Soviet intelligence, all the ridiculous pretense of "independence" was discarded. The leaders of both organizations, loyal servants of Stalin and his apparatus, assisted each other in every possible way. Sometimes financial aid for the party came through Rado's channels; at other times it was Hofmaier who had to find funds to "loan" to the Soviet espionage network.

There were about fifty agents attached to the network, each of whom supplied information on a particular field. Agents and sources were referred to in the messages to Moscow by their cover names, but contrary to the peacetime order the identity of certain cover names remained unrevealed to one or the other of them, and sometimes to both. As a matter of fact, Rado's best agents remained "unknowns" to the Director for a considerable time. "Werther" reported on the German Army; "Agnes" (Ernst Lemmer) was a

German journalist who served various foreign intelligence networks. "Luise" reported on the intelligence department of the Swiss general staff, "Feld" on groups of agents from Feldkirch, and so on. Two or three British secret agents were persuaded to work for the Soviet network. Two "Free French" agents also entered Rado's network.

The expenses of the Swiss agency were modest in relation to its size and importance. The main reason for this was that its members, with one or two exceptions, were considered to be acting as devoted Communists rather than professional spies and either were not paid for their services or received only small salaries. Notes of Rado found by the police throw light on the growth of the network and its financial condition. The following were average expenses for the periods indicated:

3,000	Swiss francs	in 1940
3,500	" "	in the first six months of 1941
11,000	" "	in the last six months of 1941
12,000	" "	in 1942
20,000	" "	in 1943 *

For the period April 1941 to August 1943 Rado's expenses, according to his records, amounted to only 320,000 Swiss francs.†

* At the official rate of 4.30 Swiss francs to the dollar.

† D papers, S 57ff. Alexander Foote states that he turned over to Rado about \$100,000 during the three-year period. D papers, b 861.

Salaries, according to Rado's notes, were as follows:

Rado, at first 1,270 Swiss francs a month, and beginning September 1942, 1,775 francs; from June 1941 to September 1943 he received a total of 40,850 francs.

Foote, an average of 930 francs a month; a total of 21,730 francs for 24 months.

Hamel and his wife (the radio operators), in addition to their income from the radio shop in Geneva, received from Rado only 150 francs a month and direct expenses; their total salary for 27 months amounted to 12,100 francs.

Margaret Bolli (the other wireless operator), 400 francs a month; a total of 8,350 francs for 21 months.

According to Foote, his own salary started at 650 francs a month, was raised to 870, and then to 1,300 francs. Margaret Bolli, he says, received 500 francs and later 800 francs a month, and the Hamels, although willing to work without pay, received, on Moscow's insistence, 1,000 francs. Christian Schneider ("Taylor"), the very important liaison between Rado and Rudolf Rössler, received a salary of 800 francs a month in addition to his expenses; this pay was promised him "for life" because he had turned down another job in order to undertake activity in the Soviet network. Actual salary payments, however, were far below the promised amounts; either Rado's funds were insufficient or, as his critics suppose, the trimming was part of his "financial policy."

It would seem that, having in its service such an excellent network, the Center would supply it with abundant funds, the more so since almost unlimited credits were open to the Soviet government in the United States. A strange ineptness and inefficiency, however, affected a large part of the Center. For long periods no money was forthcoming, and Rado's group was able to continue only through the ingenuity of its members, who managed to establish a golden tie between New York and Geneva.

In the end it was Alexander Foote who took it upon himself, in addition to his other duties, to arrange for transfer of funds from the United States to Switzerland. A number of trading firms with offices in New York and Switzerland accepted funds in New York for payment of corresponding sums—less a considerable commission for their services—in Switzerland. (During the war transfer of money to a foreign country without a special permit was prohibited in the United States.) In this way a total in excess of \$100,000 was transferred to the intelligence network in Switzerland between 1941 and the summer of 1943. The unofficial dollar exchange rate, at a low point during the war, was the basis in these transactions.*

For a time the transfers were carried out more or less satisfactorily, but in the middle of 1943 the chain was suddenly broken. Foote, playing the role of a British *grand seigneur*, in an attempt to improve the situation went to see a lawyer in Lausanne to ask assistance in the transfer of a considerable sum from the United States to Switzerland; to stress the legitimate character of the proposed transaction, he brought with him a British intelligence agent. It happened that the lawyer, Roger Corbaz, was the presiding judge of the Swiss Military Tribunal. (In this small country the post of presiding judge of a military court is not a full-time one.) Sensing something suspicious in Foote's story, the lawyer told his new client: "I will arrange the transfer if you will bring proof that the money, deposited as you say in an American bank, belongs to you, and that the affair is clean and honest." Foote never

"I knew, of course, about the operations of Rado," Foote says, "but I did not inform the Centre. Later in Moscow I was severely reprimanded for having withheld the truth from my superiors." (Foote in D papers, b 86off.)

* The dollar was worth 4.23 francs in January 1941, 2.93 francs in December 1941, 2.15 francs in May 1942, and 3.02 francs in December 1943.

reappeared.⁸ (Later Corbaz acted as judge in the espionage trial in which Foote and a number of his colleagues were convicted.)

Moscow failed to come to the rescue even when the situation became worse, and Rado had to go into hiding. Rahel Dubendorfer replaced him as head of the network. In despair about funds, she took the dangerous step of sending a cable in clear to Soviet agents in Canada making an almost literal demand for funds. This cable, as we shall see later, probably cost her her life.

In addition to the dormant "Station Paul," three short-wave transmitters were in operation in Switzerland during the war period. One of them, "Station Jim," was located in Alexander Foote's apartment. Another was operated by Edmond and Olga Hamel, who had been recruited on the recommendation of Léon Nicole, the Swiss Communist leader. A graduate of a radio school in Paris and a long-time "leftist" sympathizer, Edmond Hamel opened a radio shop in Geneva in 1933 which developed very satisfactorily. In 1939, on Rado's suggestion, Hamel built a short-wave set, placed it in a room above his shop, and took instruction from Foote in the Soviet techniques of sending and receiving. Later Rado rented a comfortable villa for the Hamels; the rent as well as the plentiful supply of delicacies and drinks was paid for by the apparat. The Geneva police in 1941 discovered the unlicensed short-wave set in Hamel's apartment. Never having suspected Hamel of espionage, they viewed this infraction of the law as a minor misdemeanor, and he was given a suspended sentence of ten days in jail. Had Rado followed the strict rules of Soviet intelligence, Hamel would have been permanently eliminated from the apparat. Instead, a new set, built by the Hamels and installed in their residence, soon took over a great part of Rado's communications with Moscow; it continued to perform its tasks until October 1943. The Center, pleased with Hamel's services, awarded him an order in November 1942.

The third radio was operated by Margaret Bolli ("Rose"), another example of Rado's lack of caution. When he first met her, in 1941, Margaret, then twenty-one, was a member of Nicole's party. Her friendship with Rado became very close, and he persuaded her to move first to Lausanne to learn short-wave techniques under the guidance of Foote and then to Geneva to work under himself. Beginning in 1942 Mlle. Bolli sent coded messages to Russia three times a week between midnight and 1 A.M.

The chief figures in the Swiss network, in addition to Rado and Alexander Foote, were Rudolf Rössler and "Pakbo."

2. SEMILEGAL SOVIET ESPIONAGE

It was the political position of small neutral Switzerland, between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, that accounted for her becoming the main source of information on Germany during the war. Indeed, the assistance rendered by the Swiss authorities and the cooperation of the British, American, and French intelligence services in Switzerland were what made Soviet espionage the success it was.

After the annexation of the Saarland, Austria, the Sudetenland, Danzig, and Silesia by Nazi Germany, the northern half of Switzerland was the last remaining independent area in Europe with a sizable German-speaking population; there was no question in Berlin but that sooner or later the "Südmark" would be incorporated into Gross-Deutschland. Stuttgart, the nearest large German city to Switzerland, was made the seat of various official and unofficial German agencies assigned to operate in the Südmark: to conduct propaganda, organize spying, and carry out acts of sabotage. Some German nationals living in Switzerland were organized into a section of the Nazi party; Swiss nationals with Nazi leanings were united into the *Nationale Front* and other organizations, all of them controlled and financed by Berlin.

In December 1945 the Swiss government published a factual report on German plans for and clandestine operations in Switzerland during the Nazi era. The report conveys a picture of a huge German machine—in many ways similar to a Soviet apparatus—penetrating, spying on, and preparing to occupy the country. Members of the German embassy in Berne, as well as members of the German consulates, had been assigned to espionage work to learn Swiss military secrets; radio and teletype machines had been installed; material for time bombs and a quantity of dynamite had been brought in from Germany. According to the report, the total number of persons arrested in Switzerland for espionage and sabotage (most of them working for Germany or Italy) was 99 in 1939, 310 in 1942, and 294 in 1944. In the seven years from 1939 to 1945 a total of 1,389 arrests had been made.

More than once Germany had been on the verge of attacking

Switzerland, and the fate of the small country hung perpetually in the balance. Despite the fact that the Swiss army was mobilized and supplied with new arms, there was no doubt about what the outcome would be if German divisions crossed the frontier.

Of all the German-speaking countries and areas in Europe Switzerland was the least sympathetic toward Nazi Germany, and the majority of Germans living in Switzerland were especially antagonistic toward Nazism. Efforts in the north to build up in Switzerland a movement like the Henlein movement in the Sudetenland were fruitless; pro-Nazi organizations in Switzerland remained small and could be suppressed, when necessary, by the police. This state of public opinion in Switzerland was one of the reasons why Germany delayed the attack from one year to the next. Actually it saved Switzerland from occupation and devastation.

The peculiar situation existing in the country made Switzerland a natural ally of Britain and France. There were no treaties of alliance between them, nor public pronouncements of cooperation, for Switzerland never abandoned the principle of neutrality. Political reality, however, is stronger than pacts and more eloquent than solemn declarations. Swiss public opinion was almost unanimous in its support of the cause of the anti-German coalition, and the government, although outwardly taking no sides, was naturally anti-Hitler. The general staff, attentively watching the preparations of the German armies, was ready to cooperate with and give aid to anyone capable of putting a brake on the expected south-bound venture.

The head of the Swiss general staff was "the General," as he was called in Switzerland—Gen. Henri Guisan, an authority on military affairs whose influence extended far beyond purely military matters. His ND (*Nachrichten-Dienst*, the Information Service of the Army), created in 1939, extended its ties deep into Germany, enjoyed good relations with the Western powers, and became one of the best informed intelligence agencies of the crucial decade. During the war the ND was situated in Lucerne, while the British intelligence service and the "Free French" (de Gaulle) representatives were located in nearby Zurich. The ND appointed a Swiss colonel to serve as liaison with the intelligence services of the Western nations. If this was a breach of formal neutrality, General

Guisan maintained it was necessary because an intelligence agency must obtain information wherever it can.

Soon the Soviet Union, though not officially recognized, became another natural ally of Switzerland; in fact, for a time the fate of the small nation hinged even more on Russian resistance than on the successes or failures of the Western powers. A German victory in Russia would undoubtedly lead to an early invasion of Switzerland; Germany's bogging down in the Russian steppes and forests and her growing losses could mean at least a breathing spell for the Südmark. Switzerland was interested in Russia's war, and that she would help Russia, if possible, was a matter of course. The only aid Switzerland could give, however, was by way of information and facilities for Soviet intelligence.

The Swiss military authorities were well aware that Soviet agents were at work in Switzerland, but unlike the police, they tolerated the situation and, although not directly, themselves supplied Soviet intelligence with information. They shared secrets not only with Zurich—that is, the Western powers—but also with Geneva, which was tantamount to Soviet intelligence.

Among the channels by which important information from Germany reached Soviet intelligence in Switzerland, the most significant—and the most mysterious—was Rudolf Rössler.

3. **RUDOLF RÖSSLER**

Today Rudolf Rössler, twice convicted as a spy by Swiss courts, vehemently denies ever having performed the functions of a spy. As a matter of fact, he not only performed espionage work for a number of years but was among the "master spies."

A quiet man of small stature, in his early forties at the start of the war, Rössler was the son of a forester in Bavaria. For a time he worked as an editor of an anti-Nazi newspaper in his home city of Augsburg and was also connected with a left-oriented theater organization, the Bühnen-Volksbund, in Berlin. In the Nazi year 1933 he emigrated to Switzerland, became head of the book-publishing house Vita Nova in Lucerne, and remained in this position for two decades. The political tendency of Vita Nova publications, at least in the beginning, was Christian antifascist rather than Communist. With the expansion of the Reich over Central Europe,

the number of anti-Nazi publishers rapidly diminished, and Rössler's *Vita Nova* in Switzerland became more and more successful. Rössler himself joined the leftist Catholic group, *Die Entscheidung* (Decision), in Lucerne, whose ideology was not Communist but "anticapitalist." In 1937 the Reich deprived Rössler of German citizenship.

Rössler had been in Switzerland for six years before he entered intelligence work. His doing so was a result of his close friendship with another eventual intelligence agent, Xaver Schnieper. Twelve years younger than Rössler and a Swiss citizen, son of a minister in the Lucerne Canton, Schnieper went to German universities to study, met Rössler in Berlin in 1933, and persuaded him to come to Lucerne. From then on Rössler the publisher and Schnieper the young journalist were a close-knit team. Like Rössler, Schnieper joined *Die Entscheidung*, which eventually served them both as a spiritual bridge to Communism.

In the spring of 1939, when war clouds were gathering over Europe and General Guisan was organizing the ND, Schnieper, then in military service, was taken into the ND. Intelligence officer Major Hausmann, one of the agency's first heads, asked Schnieper for names of suitable collaborators and sources of information; Schnieper recommended his friend Rössler.

Rössler (whose nickname in the apparatus was "Lucy," from Lucerne) entered the intelligence service of the Swiss general staff in the fall of 1939 and started to work, actually, for the entire Western bloc, making use of his excellent connections in Germany, which he never divulged either to his Swiss superiors or to any other intelligence service. Liaison officers connected the Swiss ND with British and French intelligence. The Czechoslovak military attaché Sedlacek ("Uncle Tom"), assigned to report to his émigré government in London, was a regular guest at the ND outfit.¹

Up to the spring of 1941 only the Western agents were exchanging information with the Swiss ND; the Soviet, tied to Berlin, was excluded. Moreover, for Berne, the Soviet Union was officially nonexistent and no Soviet envoys or military attachés were there to take part in the exchange of information. The situation began to change in May-June 1941, when the German attack on Russia was drawing near. In March of that year Sumner Welles, American undersecretary of state, had warned the Soviet ambassador in Washington about the forthcoming German invasion; in April

Winston Churchill had done so publicly. Information to the same effect had reached Moscow from Japan. Full details of the imminent attack had been known in Lucerne. With the knowledge of his superiors in the Swiss ND, Rössler contacted the Soviet agents in the Swiss underground.

Christian Schneider, a former employee of the International Labor Office and a friend of Rössler, found his way to Rahel Dubendorfer, an officer of the ILO and a member of Soviet intelligence. Rahel ("Sisi" in the apparat) established the tie to Rado, and from then on served, along with Schneider, as liaison for Rössler. In addition, officers of the Swiss ND were in touch with the de Gaullists in Zurich, and the de Gaullists, in turn, had their own Communist contacts.

About a month before the German attack on Russia [Otto Pünter relates] a de Gaullist connected with the Swiss ND came to tell me that, according to reliable information obtained by the ND, the German attack on Soviet Russia would be launched on June 15. The ND looked for a way to inform Moscow of this. I went to see Alexander Rado and repeated to him what I had been told about the German schedule. Rado was somewhat skeptical, however, and asked me, in turn, to check the source of the news. I did so and was told that a serious and well-informed man was the source of the information.²

Later the same source (Rössler) reported that Berlin had postponed the date to June 22.

Thus Rössler's career as a Soviet spy started with the tacit consent of the Swiss general staff, and no doubt with the knowledge of British intelligence chiefs in Switzerland.

The technique of Rössler's collaboration with Rado's apparat was as follows: Rössler would write his messages in clear and turn them over to Rado in Geneva through a liaison. Rado coded them and directed one of the three radio operators to transmit them to Moscow; sometimes Foote did the coding. Moscow's messages for "Lucy" had the same handling in reverse.

Moscow was at first highly incredulous about the accurate and abundant information coming from "Lucy." It suspected that "Lucy" was an agent of the German Abwehr planted in Switzerland to lure Soviet intelligence into a trap by furnishing correct

information and then, at a crucial moment, misleading the Soviet High Command and administering a decisive blow to its armed forces. Gradually, however, the Center became less suspicious, then interested, and finally excited about "Lucy's" unusual performance. This was the only case in which Moscow agreed to cooperate with an agent—who was soon receiving as high as \$1,700 a month for his services—about whom and about whose sources it knew little. Pertinent questions were asked by the Center more than once, but Rössler consistently refused to answer them.

Rössler's performance was, in fact, magnificent. No sooner had the war started on the Eastern front than he began to supply regularly, sometimes daily, accurate data of extreme importance: on Hitler's strategic plans; on the strength and composition of the German military, air, and naval forces and weapons of all kinds; even on information in the possession of German intelligence relating to Soviet countermoves. He was in a position to answer Soviet inquiries about particular German military units, German generals, Hitler's headquarters, and a host of other matters of fateful significance in the war.³

Rössler's information, writes Alexander Foote,

at least all that which passed over my transmitter, had a suffix of one code group meaning "Urgent decipher at once." In fact in the end Moscow very largely fought the war on Lucy's messages—as indeed any high command would who had access to genuine information emanating in a steady flow from the high command of their enemies. . . .

I remember that in 1941 he supplied information regarding the manufacture of flying bombs and plans for the construction of ten-ton rockets. In effect, as far as the Kremlin was concerned, the possession of Lucy as a source meant that they had the equivalent of well-placed agents in the three service intelligence staffs plus the Imperial General Staff plus the War Cabinet Offices.

Lucy provided Moscow with an up-to-date and day-to-day order of battle of the German forces in the East. This information could come only from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht itself. In no other offices in the whole of Germany was there available the information that Lucy provided daily.

Not only did he provide information on the troop dispositions, information which could only have come from the O.K.W. [Supreme Command of the German Army] in the Bendlerstrasse, but he also produced equally good information emanating from the headquarters of the Luftwaffe and the Marine Amt, the German Admiralty.

One would normally think that a source producing information of this quality would take time to obtain it. No such delay occurred in the receipt of Lucy's information. On most occasions it was received within twenty-four hours of its being known at the appropriate headquarters in Berlin. In fact, barely enough time to encipher and decipher the messages concerned. There was no question of any courier or safe hand route.⁴

Moscow's esteem for Rössler found expression in praise which was extraordinary for the Director: ⁵

[January 16, 1943] Transmit without delay, ahead of any other messages, Lucy's and Werther's information on Caucasus front and on the important events at Eastern front, as well as dispatch of new divisions to Eastern front. Werther's last information was very important. Director.

[January 18, 1943] . . . Convey to Taylor or Lucy our thanks . . . Director.

[February 22, 1943] . . . Convey to Lucy our appreciation for good work. Last information of her group was important and valuable . . . Director.

[June 4, 1943] . . . Convey to Lucy and Long our thanks for their work . . . Director.

[November 24, 1943] Please tell Lucy on our behalf he should not worry. The transmission to us of his information will continue and his group will receive payment without fail. We are prepared to pay amply for his information in accordance with his request. Director.

[December 9, 1943] . . . Tell Lucy he should not worry about payments; we will certainly pay our debt not later than

January. We request him to continue giving us most important information. Director.

[January 8, 1944] . . . Please tell Lucy that he and his group will receive large payment as soon as possible. He should wait patiently and should not waste time and work at this important hour of the last battle against our common enemy. Director.

In these messages "Lucy" sometimes appears as a female, which was the intention when, for reasons of secrecy, he was given a female nickname; sometimes as a male because the Center, overburdened with war work, had to sacrifice some meticulousness and efficiency. The lack of efficiency is seen also in the inability to supply funds to the Swiss network as well as in the pleas addressed to Rössler to continue his work. As a matter of fact, the cessation of Rössler's operations for Soviet intelligence in 1944 was entirely the result of a surprising lack of efficiency and thoughtfulness on the Soviet side, as will be shown later.

4. ALEXANDER FOOTE AND HIS NETWORK

Alexander Foote, second in command of the Swiss network, was designated to take over if something should happen to Rado. In many respects Foote had autonomy and often worked on his own; he had direct communication with the Director. He was a coder, transmitting operator, and trainer of younger recruits in the rules and secrets of conspiracy. During his most active period, from June 1941 to October 1943, more than six thousand messages to and from Moscow went over his radio. Foote * had the personal traits which are prerequisites for a successful spy. His capacity for work was astounding. He performed duties that would ordinarily require a team, and often slept without undressing. He worked at night and spent his days with his non-Communist friends. Moderately tall, quiet in demeanor, somewhat heavy, he had unusual composure and could not easily be embarrassed by a question. To the police he appeared a well-to-do, politically innocent Englishman with funds enough to permit him to live in leisure in Lausanne far from the commotion of war.

* Also "Allan," "Jim," "John," "Lapidus," "Major Granatov," "Dymov."

Unlike the majority of Soviet agents of that era, who had embraced Communism in their youth, Foote had been in sympathy with the conservative party in his younger days. He had worked first as an auto mechanic and then for a time as a motorcycle salesman; he had never been successful, however, in a financial sense. Since the early 'thirties his friends had been British fellow travelers, leftist laborites, and Communists, and he accompanied them to meetings at which Harold Laski and other leaders of the left Labor wing discussed political affairs and attacked the British government for its anti-Soviet attitude. In 1933 this circle of friends was widened by the addition of a few newly arrived German émigré Communists.

Foote did not occupy himself with theoretical problems of Communism, but developed into a "practician"—a man with horse sense about political and underground jobs, a good understanding of the precepts of conspiratsia, and a strong personal taste for taking chances. His friend George Brown, a Communist organizer of Manchester, dissuaded him from openly joining the Communist party. A man of his character, he urged Foote, could be of more use outside the party. Foote joined the International Brigade in Spain and returned to Britain as a veteran in 1938; he was then thirty-three years old.

On the recommendation of the British Communist party Foote entered Soviet intelligence and was sent to Switzerland to be trained by Ursula-Maria Hamburger; there he at first performed unimportant tasks. Then he lived in Germany for a time without specific assignments; he returned to Switzerland after the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of 1939. Gradually he acquired knowledge of codes, radio transmission, false passports, and other illegal operations and was a fairly well-prepared intelligence agent when the Soviet-German war broke out and the Swiss network entered its era of greatness. At this time Foote was ordered to settle down in Lausanne, less than an hour from Geneva. In an apartment house in the Rue Langerai he opened his "office," installed his transmitter and receiver, and took care to remain inconspicuous as one among thousands of idle foreigners looking for rest and relaxation in Switzerland. His small circle of private friends in Lausanne never suspected him of underground activities. Years later, when his *Handbook for Spies* appeared, the *Gazette de Lausanne* ran a series of stories on Foote by his former friends:

"We kidded him [one of them recalled] about being a British spy. 'Listen, where are your secrets, your messages in invisible ink and your attributes of a perfect spy?' we used to ask him. He enjoyed these jokes immensely and took part in the game with dry humor. Someone asked him once: 'In fact, what are you doing for a living?' Unperturbed, he answered: 'Don't you know? I am a spy.' He gave the same answer to a young lady who told him: 'Allan, you really look like a spy.' 'Oh, my dear,' he answered, 'it is awful, nothing can be hidden from you.'

"In fun his friends had his handwriting analyzed. Unfortunately they did not keep the report, but they poked fun at him, calling him a rotten hypocrite. He was plainly overjoyed: 'Oh, this is wonderful! Great! What did the graphologist say? That the writer pretends to be someone else than he really is?' " ¹

Mme. Colette Muraille recalled:

"Stout and placid, with small porcelain-like eyes and thin blond hair, he once made an appearance in our group—and nobody gave him a second thought. He was the least mysterious fellow in the world! His face was so completely unexpressive that he never aroused curiosity on the part of his friends. Foote pretended to be in Switzerland for reasons of health. We made fun of his imaginary ills, which we suspected were a cover for his innate laziness. However, his paleness and slight cough, which he exhibited at the right moment, made these reasons plausible.

"He used to drink a lot, but never too much. He enjoyed eating immensely; he gave the impression that if the restaurant and the whole town collapsed over him, he would not let himself be disturbed. He was a perfect listener. Every little story made him laugh heartily, but noiselessly; even when his pale eyes brightened during conversations on military matters, nobody became suspicious. Everybody liked him very much. He was a friend of pretty women; they liked his manners of a big friendly bear and appreciated his always being at their disposal. The men enjoyed his quiet sense of humor without realizing the extent of it.

"One day we heard that the Swiss police were holding the Englishman; they had caught him at his radio transmitter,

which he had dissimulated so well from his friends. This insular fellow a Soviet agent? This dinner partner a big-scale adventurer? It was quite a surprise. And some of those who were devoted to him muttered reproaches: 'At least he should have let us in on his secrets!' " 2

Unlike other operators of Soviet intelligence, Foote worked alone. Liaison men or women brought him messages for Moscow from Rado or other agents. The messages, often written in clear, had to be coded, and this was Foote's most time-consuming task. Because a number of codes were used, and because complex precautions were applied, decoding of these messages was impossible for even the best experts of the Gestapo and the Abwehr unless the key were found by chance or supplied by a traitor.

Foote's transmitter was built into the cover of a typewriter which from the outside looked like a thousand others. It was Foote who installed radio transmitters for other members of the group. Edmond Hamel's was placed behind a wall board; Margaret Bolli's was hidden in an ordinary-size gramophone and when her transmitter was later exhibited in court the attendants had some trouble finding the *corpus delicti* in the gramophone.

Hamel and Bolli would receive the messages (which had been originally written in German) in code and ready for transmission; Foote, on the other hand, wrote in English and coded himself. The hours for transmission, always between midnight and dawn, were varied in accordance with atmospheric conditions in order to make the job of counterespionage more difficult. The wave length changed regularly, and the initialing of messages, indicating the name of the transmitting agent, changed too; one day it was "FRG," the next day "EMX," then "ZSK," etc. In his testimony at the trial, which took place in October 1947, Lt. Maurice A. Treyer, Swiss radiotelegraphy expert, made a favorable evaluation of the Soviet technique; he noted in particular that Foote's transmitter was so powerful its messages could reach the United States and even Latin American countries.

Moscow was highly satisfied with Foote's performance, often accepting his suggestions and commending him in its "orders of the day." He was decorated four times during the war and advanced to the rank of captain of the Red Army. An average of eight messages a day, some of them lengthy, passed through Foote's hands

in those years. One curious incident that occurred in the course of this rather monotonous work deserves mention.

Soon after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, in July or August 1941, a long message arrived from Moscow which started with the notation "vy RDO," meaning "very urgent." Composed in poor English, it differed from the usual type of Soviet message written in simple but correct language; moreover, its contents were anything but "very urgent"; it enumerated rules of intelligence work well known to every member of the apparat, for instance, never to communicate information "from our sources" to other persons, to observe strictly the rules of conspiracy, etc.

During the tiresome night transmission [Foote says] I twice asked Moscow to postpone the rest of the message to another night but the Centre refused and I had to receive it complete. A similar message reached Rado the same night but we never understood the real meaning until, four years later, it was revealed to me when I was in Moscow. It turned out that the message was written personally by Stalin after a meeting of the General Staff under his chairmanship; in this meeting our Lucy [Roessler] and his excellent reports were discussed. It was decided to accept Lucy as a genuine source and to make use of his information, yet to be cautious and to keep his reports to ourselves. Since Stalin himself had dictated the verbose message, nobody dared to translate it freely, hence the pidgin English; and because it came from Stalin it was marked "vy RDO" and the transmission had to be completed with no interruption.³

Foote, master of espionage, liked by his personal friends, was not popular, however, in the circle of Soviet agents; in particular he did not enjoy Rado's friendship. As a matter of fact, Rado had no confidence in Foote or his loyalty to the Soviet cause and suspected him of being an agent of the British intelligence service assigned to penetrate the Soviet espionage machine. Rado and a few other members of the group believed that throughout his career, in Spain, in Switzerland, and later in Moscow, Foote had been in His Majesty's service. "I have no documents to prove it," says a former member of the Rado network, "but I am certain that he was a British agent."⁴

Because of his suspicions, Rado tried to get rid of Foote, and suggested his removal; Moscow, however, disagreed, praised Foote, and promoted him. Almost all the high-ranking Swiss officials who, having investigated the Soviet espionage affair, are familiar with its details are certain that Foote was a genuine Soviet, and not a British, agent. The fact that now, eight years after he broke with the Soviet service, Foote has an unimportant and low-paid job in a nonpolitical office not connected with British intelligence would seem to indicate that the Swiss view is correct.

Two other interesting persons were a part of Foote's autonomous group during the war—Max Habijanec and Anna Müller, both veteran operators of the Comintern's underground. Living quietly in Basel, at the German frontier, they had been performing their particular assignments since the mid-'twenties, Max as a "cobbler" of passports and Anna as a liaison agent of Henry Robinson, Rado, and others.

In 1926 Franz Welti, a well-known Swiss Communist, had discovered Habijanec, a police official in Basel with access to passports and other documents. Habijanec agreed to supply "genuine" Swiss passports to the Comintern apparatus, and this he did for twenty-two years, until his arrest in 1948. In the 'forties his salary was 150 Swiss francs a month plus 100 francs per passport.⁵

The technique used in manufacturing these passports was the same as that applied in other Soviet passport shops set up in Canada, Berlin, and other places. The Center would supply Habijanec with a description of the person in need of the document—age, sex, color of hair and eyes, etc. The "cobbler" would find in the police files the name and address of a Swiss citizen of approximately the same description. A birth certificate would then be forged in Berlin or elsewhere (only as a last resort in Moscow) on the basis of which the passport would be prepared.

Habijanec, having weathered the war in neutral Basel, would hardly have been exposed had it not been for the fact that in the summer of 1948, in the clothing of a mysterious man who had died in Berlin of "unknown causes," the police had found a Swiss passport issued to one "Robinson." Investigation soon revealed how and by whom the passport had been issued in Basel; other similar passports were found in Paris and Berlin. Habijanec was arrested;

gravely ill at the time of his arrest, he was soon released and the proceedings against him were discontinued in accordance with the statute of limitations.

No one of the apparat was permitted to contact Habijanac directly; messages and documents had to pass through the hands of the liaison—Anna Müller—who served also as an address for money transfers to France and Germany and for arriving agents, in short, as one of the hundreds of Comintern “call addresses” and “letter boxes,” of which only a very small fraction ever have been or will be discovered. Having joined the Comintern network fifteen years before the war and served faithfully since, Anna was a quiet old lady past sixty whom nobody suspected of clandestine activity. Actually she had kept close contact with Henry Robinson in Paris and with other agents of the Comintern and was now in contact with Foote in Lausanne. With financial assistance from Moscow, she set up, as a cover, a private employment agency. Her salary as an intelligence agent was 450 Swiss francs (\$110) a month.

In Freiburg, on the other side of the frontier, lived Anna's brother Heinrich and his wife, both German Communists, both active in the Communist underground. In the winter of 1942–43, when her sister-in-law fell ill, Anna went to Freiburg to nurse her, and then returned, unmolested, to Basel. A short time after her return she received a “call from her brother”—his wife was ill again.

What had happened in the meantime Anna could not have known. In its list of reliable addresses for its agents in Germany, intelligence headquarters in Moscow had included the address of Heinrich as one of the “yavkas,” with the password, “I come from the old aunt in Basle.” The “old aunt's” name and address had likewise been given to Soviet parachutists to be used in the event something went wrong with Heinrich Müller; a postal card addressed to Anna and bearing an agreed-upon message would then establish the contact.

Two Soviet agents, Else Noffke and Willy Beuthke, supplied with Heinrich Müller's address in Freiburg, had been dispatched from Russia and parachuted over Germany in February. The Director radioed Foote instructing him to inform Heinrich, through his sister Anna, that “Inge” and another agent would arrive soon, bringing with them a short-wave transmitter.⁶ The

arrest of Noffke and Beuthke, and their disclosure of their instructions, led to Heinrich Müller and his wife, who were arrested and executed.

Anna was called "to Freiburg" in June 1943 by the wire purporting to come from her brother. She was taken to Berlin, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The Swiss government intervened, however, and the execution was not carried out. After two years in prison Anna Müller returned to Switzerland.

On rare occasions, namely, when the heads of the Communist International wanted to keep their messages secret from the leadership of the Communist parties concerned, the radio facilities of military intelligence were used for the needs of the Comintern. A few such messages, signed by Georgi Dimitrov, president of the Comintern, and received over the Lausanne radio network in June 1942, were destined for the well-known Swiss "deviationist" Jules Humbert-Droz.

An outstanding personality in the Swiss Communist movement, Humbert-Droz had been a priest in his younger years and had joined a leftist Socialist group after the end of the first World War. He attended the Third Congress of the Communist International in 1921 as a Swiss delegate, was elected a member of the powerful Secretariat (the other two secretaries were Mathias Rakoszi and Otto Kuusinen), and remained in Moscow for a decade as head of the Latin department, dealing with the French-, Italian-, and Spanish-speaking countries of Europe and America. About the end of the 'twenties, when the "rightist deviation" began to take shape, Humbert-Droz was on the side of Bukharin-Rykov against Stalin. After a violent conflict with the dictator, whom he accused of narrow-minded interference in the internal affairs of Communist parties abroad, Humbert-Droz's work in Moscow had to end. Realizing his unfavorable situation, he returned to Switzerland in 1931, saving his life by this decision. Since his rightist course in the leadership of the Swiss party provoked the displeasure of Moscow, he was replaced by Karl Hofmaier, the Swiss Communist, who had Moscow's blessing. In December 1941 Humbert-Droz was eliminated from the leading body of Swiss Communism, and in 1943 he was expelled from the party. Hofmaier, however, was in no way fitted for his post. During the war he became involved in financial complications with the wealthy Swiss industrialist Schauwecker,

supplier of pakin (a kind of gelatin) to Germany, whose donations to the Communist party influenced it in a pro-German direction. A few years later the affair developed into a scandal which shook the Communist party to its foundations.

Uneasy about the Swiss party, the leadership of the Comintern began to look for reliable information on Hofmaier and his group and conceived the idea of assigning Humbert-Droz (this was before his expulsion from the party) to watch and secretly report on Hofmaier. To get in touch with Humbert-Droz and by-pass Hofmaier, Dimitrov sent a radio message to Foote through the military intelligence apparat. Foote was instructed to contact Humbert-Droz personally and to ask the deposed leader to collect and transmit information on Hofmaier and a few others as well as on the party's political course.

Next day [Humbert-Droz wrote] I met Foote again and handed him a telegram for Dimitrov. In this message I said that having replaced me by Hofmaier as the head of the party, Dimitrov should also turn to Hofmaier for information on the party's political course and on the members of its leading body. I warned Foote that, being loyal to the party's leadership, I must inform it on this exchange of telegrams. Foote advised me not to do so, saying that Dimitrov's message was just personal.⁷

Assuming that Foote was a Russian, Humbert-Droz, still a member of the Communist party, made him, in turn, an interesting offer which might have been important for Soviet intelligence had it not been for the existing Communist factional strife. Humbert-Droz had connections and numerous political friends in Swiss cities at the German border—in Schaffhausen, Rorschach, Kreuzlingen, Konstanz, Singen; in some cases the frontier runs through the city so that part of it is Swiss and part German, and people living in the Swiss part cross the border daily on their way to work. In this area, Humbert-Droz told Foote, he could find Swiss workers and engineers able and willing to gather information on German war industry, troop movements, and German home affairs in general.

Foote relayed this suggestion to Moscow. Alert and quick to act when a "rightist" was to be eliminated, the Soviet authorities deliberated for four months before taking a decision on Humbert-

Droz's proposition. It was at first turned down because it emanated from Humbert-Droz. In the end it was submitted to Stalin, who accepted it.

The plan did not materialize, however. The day after his meeting with Foote, Humbert-Droz was arrested by the Swiss police, although for a different political reason. He remained in prison six months, being released in December 1942. Early in 1943 he was expelled from the Communist party. A few months later he joined the Socialists.

5. THE PAKBO GROUP

Otto Pünter, another important member of the Swiss network, went by the name of "Pakbo." His services were rated highly by headquarters in Moscow; more than once the Director mentioned "Pakbo" as one of the best agents in Switzerland and expressed his gratitude to him. Unlike Rado, Dubendorfer, or the Hamels, however, Pünter had never been a member of a Communist organization. He had belonged since his youth to the Swiss Social Democratic party and became a Socialist journalist at the time the feud between Socialists and Communists was raging as bitterly in Switzerland as it was elsewhere. The story of this man who became an active member of a Soviet espionage outfit is the usual one of the consistent "antifacist" of the 1920's and 'thirties, that peculiar genus that flourished in the fertile soil of Europe at that time, when the term "antifacist" was often hypocritically used as a screen for Communism.

There did exist, however, a sincere trend toward an alliance of all anti-Nazi and antifacist forces, embracing liberals, Socialists, and Communists. It is easy today to criticize this kind of thinking, this great illusion of a multitude of intellectuals, but it must be remembered that the illusion was deeply rooted in the historical reality of the era.

Pünter was of that generation. To him fascism, Nazism, Francoism represented evils far greater than Communism. A non-Communist, he was prepared to ally himself with Stalinism and render service to the Soviet government if in this way the power of rightist dictatorship could be shaken. Switzerland, neighbor of Italy and with a significant number of Italians among its population, watched the rise of Mussolini with apprehension. In the

mid-1920's, when the Italian dictator was celebrating his great triumphs, a growing number of Italian émigrés were escaping to Switzerland to fight him from abroad. Among them was Randalfo Pacciardi, the non-Communist antifacist (member of the de Gasperi cabinet after the war), who allied himself with Pünter in an extensive and, at least at the start, successful press campaign. With Pacciardi and the two brothers Roselli (killed by the Cagoulards in Bagnolles de l'Orne on June 9, 1937), Pünter organized the sensational flight, on July 10, 1930, of a plane piloted by Bassardi which dropped tens of thousands of anti-Mussolini leaflets over Milan.

At this stage of Pünter's activity a group emerged which eventually became the "Pakbo group" in the Soviet intelligence apparatus. It consisted of five or six of Pünter's friends and comrades who lived at strategic points near the borders and were ready and willing to gather information for him from their contacts abroad.

A few weeks before the Nazi Nuremberg Congress of 1938, Pünter has reported, a man came to Switzerland from Germany to contact antifacist circles there and present a plan for dropping a bomb on the assembled congress, in this way destroying the entire Nazi leadership. This man contacted the "Pakbo" group; the group exposed him as a Gestapo agent and turned him over to the Swiss police. After a ten-hour interrogation he confessed and gave all the details of his assignments.

The Spanish civil war was another experiment in antifacism. Like Pacciardi, Pünter went to Spain, joined the Republicans, and for a time worked with Alvarez del Vayo, another and even more consistent antifacist. To help Republican Spain, Pünter made a few risky trips to Genoa, Rome, and Naples to obtain information on shipments of Italian troops and ammunition to Spain. To the agents of Soviet intelligence working in del Vayo's entourage in Spain, Pünter, the quiet, *gut-bürgerlich*-looking man, seemed a highly desirable person to attempt to recruit. With his well-established position in Switzerland as a Social Democrat and good connections in diplomatic, military, and governmental circles, Pünter was worth a dozen devoted Communist party members isolated from the political world, suspected everywhere, and with no access to important sources of information.

At the end of the Spanish war, when intelligence headquarters in Moscow proceeded to regenerate and reactivate networks in Western Europe, Pünter was back in Berne. Early in 1940 an agent of Soviet intelligence named "Carlo" came over from Grenoble, France, to woo him. Pünter relates:

The man, who presented himself as Carlo but did not tell me his real name, knew all about my activities in Spain, since he himself had been working there for Soviet intelligence. He suggested I should join the Soviet service. I replied: "I am a Social Democrat; I condemn the Soviet attack on Finland; I also condemn the Soviet-German pact." My rejection was not definite, however, in view of the obviously growing power of Nazi Germany.

Twice during the same year Carlo came to see me, and twice I evaded giving a definite reply.

In January or February 1941 I learned from the de Gaullist "Neger" (a French resistance group) that German army divisions situated in Bordeaux were being shipped to the East. This was obviously a step toward an attack on Russia, I informed Carlo. At the same time I gave my consent to work for Soviet military intelligence, adding that I would continue my collaboration with the French resistance, as well as with Mr. Salter, of British intelligence.

"Carlo" introduced Pünter to Rado and, with Moscow's consent, Pünter joined Rado's network, remaining at the same time in the Swiss Social Democratic party. This Socialist-Communist collaboration was somewhat one-sided: the Soviet government was not at all inclined to cooperation with Socialist parties, nor to leniency toward Socialist leaders. For reasons of his own, the Director, who knew all about Pünter, past and present, wanted to recruit him, with his Socialist membership card and his standing as an independent journalist. The leaders of the Swiss Socialist party were not aware of Pünter's participation in the espionage group.*

Having joined the Rado network, Pünter activated his sources and connections. His own little intelligence group of a decade before was enlarged to include a few more men from Swiss

* Pünter says that he kept one of the Socialist party's then top leaders informed of his work for Russian intelligence. I have not been able to verify this.

cities situated at the German and Austrian borders; thus emerged the name "Pakbo," standing for the places of residence of its members (Pontresina, Arth Goldau, Kreuzlingen, Berne, Orselina). From then on he himself was called "Pakbo" in the apparatus and in the correspondence with Moscow. For the purposes of his new job, Pünter maintained extensive contacts with the Swiss General Staff, in particular with its ND (Information Service), from which he obtained valuable information on political and military affairs abroad. Aware of Pünter's activity for Soviet intelligence, the ND tried to help him; this was, as we have seen, in line with General Guisan's policy during the war.

In addition there were the "Catholic lines" from Germany. From one of them, which ended in a Catholic monastery near Freiburg, Pünter obtained, in September 1942, a long document containing data on the forthcoming German offensive at Stalin-grad. He coded the document and turned it over to Rado for transmission to Moscow. Another "Catholic line" from Germany, called "Lilly of the Vatican," led to Italy, and "Pakbo," the neutral Swiss citizen, made risky trips to Rome to arrange things.

At the time there were two French bodies working in Switzerland: one, the official, represented the pro-German Vichy government; the other, the de Gaullist mission, was tied up with the Western Allies. The de Gaullists in Zurich, however, had pipelines to the official French legation in Berne, and abundant information traveled from Germany to Vichy, thence to Berne, from Berne to the de Gaullists, and finally to London. A few devoted French Communists in the de Gaullist group would have preferred, of course, to work for Moscow rather than London. The most active among these was George Blun ("Long"), the veteran French Communist and now one of Pünter's sources. At the same time John Salter served Pünter as a contact with Allen Dulles, head of United States intelligence in Switzerland, as well as with the Swiss operators of the British intelligence service. The diplomatic world in Berne, where Pünter had his ties, served him as a further source of information. On one occasion he made use of the Chinese radio facilities for the needs of the Soviet apparatus; this occurred about the end of 1943, when Rado had to hide and members of his groups were arrested, and it was of the utmost importance to inform the Director of these

happenings. Pünter persuaded the press attaché of the Chinese (Chiang Kai-shek) legation in Berne to radio the message to Chungking. Coded once by Pünter in the Soviet code, the message was recoded in the Chinese code, and reached the Director's office safely.

About the end of April 1941 Pünter learned that according to information of the Swiss General Staff the German attack on Russia was scheduled for June 15. He reported this to Rado; Rado, incredulous, inquired as to the source of the sensational information, and was informed that the source was a German refugee, Rudolf Rössler. Somewhat later Rössler reported that because of a delay in preparations the attack would not be launched until June 22.

Three months before the battle of Stalingrad Pünter informed Moscow concerning the doubts and hesitations of the German generals:

To Director. Through Pakbo from Berlin. Serious divergencies within the OKW [Supreme Command of the German Army] regarding operations on the southern part of the eastern front. Prevailing opinion that offensive in direction Stalingrad useless and the success of the Caucasus operation doubtful. Hitler insists Stalingrad offensive and is supported by Göring. Dora [Rado]. August 12, 1942.

As usual, Moscow digested this information slowly; it was not until October 20 that Soviet headquarters came back with a request for additional information:

To Dora. Pakbo's report on divergencies within the General Staff regarding the operations on the German eastern front is interesting. He should give detailed information since when [relations] deteriorated and who belongs to the different groups. From what does he infer that an open conflict is possible . . . ? Director.

When Foote and his whole network appeared endangered,¹ the Director ordered measures taken to ensure the uninterrupted activity of the apparat; among the most important operators named in the Director's message was Pünter:

To Dora. Prepare reserve treffs [secret meeting places] for Rose [Bolli] and Pakbo and for Jim [Foote] and Sisi [Duben-

dorfer] so that in case they cannot continue their groups can maintain contact with us. Tell Jim what happened to you; and ask him to observe the greatest caution in appointments and be cautious in passing on your messages to Jim. Keep in mind, dear Dora, that the work of your organization is at present more important than ever; you must do everything to continue the work. (Oct. 31, 1942.) Director.

A few days later, on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet revolution, the Director sent his congratulations to all members of Rado's apparat, including Pünter; decorations were awarded to older operators:

To Dora. 1. Congratulate you, Alfred, Sisi, Pakbo and all other friends, on the forthcoming great holiday and wish all of you great success in the struggle against our common enemy.

2. Maude and Edward [Olga and Edmond Hamel] received government decorations for tireless work. We have applied for a decoration for Sisi.

3. To you and Alfred we as Director express gratitude for your excellent work. Your decoration is waiting for you and we are certain many will follow. Best regards to all. Director. November 4, 1942."

In June 1943 the Director started to groom Pünter for a high post; a female radio operator, "Roger," was to be trained to assist him:

To Dora . . . The radio operator is the most important person in the organization. In our view if Roger is a suitable candidate, he should be trained for the Pakbo group only. Think over how best to arrange and let us know your opinion and your suggestions. Director. June 20, 1943.

At one time the Pakbo group had found a way to learn of Hitler's nightly whereabouts, which more often than not meant the location of the headquarters. The Socialist son of an Austrian conservative living near the Swiss border on the Austrian side had been drafted into the German army; he was attached to Hitler's roving headquarters as a radio technician. Without realizing the implicit significance of his messages, he called his

family nearly every night on a certain wave length to tell them where he was. His father, who did grasp the broader import of these messages, could not take them over the border from Feldkirch without being observed; he or one of his friends buried them at an agreed-upon place in Dornbirn. One of the Pünter men dug them out, leaving in their place food and money for the Austrians. This for a time was the way Moscow kept informed of Hitler's movements.

At the end of 1943, as we shall see, the Swiss network was practically destroyed by arrests. Pünter tried hard to rebuild it. The obstacle to resumption of transmission of messages was lack of funds, and the Center proved incapable of solving this comparatively simple problem. Moscow asked its agents in Switzerland to help raise the necessary funds. It told Rado on January 8, 1944:

To Dora. We have delayed our answer because we tried to find a solution to the financial question. Now we have very tangible possibilities of transferring a large amount soon. In the meantime try to make a loan with help of our friends; we shall repay it with high interest. Director.

Pünter, aided by Alexander Abramson from the International Labor Office and a few of their friends, contacted a number of wealthy Swiss industrialists who were either sympathetic to Russia or attracted by the hope of obtaining large Russian orders after the war; Pünter encouraged them in this expectation. The money was needed, they were told in rather vague terms, "to help Moscow," and the loans would, of course, be repaid. These loan operations netted considerable funds. Rado received over 300,000 francs (for which he gave signed receipts, using an assumed name). A part of this sum was collected by Abramson in Geneva; 85,000 francs came through Pünter.

Not a franc of these sums was repaid after the war, and the magnanimous industrialists did not receive a single Russian order. (It is a principle of the Soviet government never to acknowledge the existence of its espionage agencies abroad; it prefers to default on its promises rather than confirm the fact of its clandestine activities in foreign countries.) The creditors wrote letters and made trips to Paris to see the Soviet ambassador, Alexander Bogomolov, and the Soviet military attaché. The am-

bassador received them cordially, promised to look into the matter and let them know. No answer ever came.

Some of the creditors simply wrote off their loans to the intelligence agency; others, however, were insistent, holding Pünter responsible for their losses. Pünter went to see the new Soviet envoy, Anatoli Kulachenkov, as soon as Soviet-Swiss diplomatic relations were established, in October 1946, and found him well informed on the affair. Kulachenkov did not deny that the funds collected by the Pakbo group were loans to the Soviet apparat. He said, however: "Officially I know nothing. If the affair should be mentioned by any other person than you, I would deny it most emphatically."

Pünter tried again and again. Pressed hard by one of the creditors, he made a deal with him: the loan, reduced in amount, was to be repaid by Pünter himself in small monthly installments.

A few years after the war, when Soviet intelligence was proceeding to resurrect its apparat in Switzerland, a member of the family of Karl Hofmaier, the Communist leader, proposed to Pünter that he rejoin the network. Pünter, by now thoroughly disgusted, refused to have any further contact with Soviet intelligence.

In 1948 Pünter appeared at a conference of Swiss Socialist editors to recount his experiences as a Soviet spy. It was symptomatic of the temper of the time in Switzerland that most of the assembled editors simply refused to believe the "fantastic story." "Nonsense and fable," they said. It was a long time before public opinion in Switzerland and elsewhere came to understand the true essence of Soviet espionage and began to appraise its scope, its significance, and its accomplishments.

6. THE END OF THE SWISS NETWORK

Two Swiss governmental agencies were engaged in counter-espionage and radio monitoring: the *Abwehr*, which was the Swiss military counterintelligence, and the general police, Bupo (Bundespolizei). As is the case in most countries, there was antagonism and rivalry between the two agencies, and they sometimes worked at cross-purposes. While the military authorities under General Guisan favored a certain amount of cooperation

with the nonrecognized agencies of the Soviet Union, the police tried to hunt down all illegal activity in Switzerland, in particular secret radio communication with a foreign power.

Soviet headquarters in Moscow was not inclined to limit the activity of its agents in Switzerland to non-Swiss affairs. Despite the fact that, as Moscow was aware, Soviet espionage was tolerated by the Swiss high command only as an instrument of war against the Axis, the Director tried to obtain through his agents details on Swiss military affairs. It was another example of political shortsightedness and bad judgment.

In September 1941 a message from Rado to the Director described Swiss anti-aircraft artillery. On September 13, 1942, Moscow requested Rado to supply a detailed report on the Swiss army—its size, organization, equipment, etc.; a short time later the report was sent. On May 10, 1943, the Director told Rado: "Your information about the new conic gun, system Kern, is valuable. Please find out in addition whether the gun has been introduced in the Swiss army. Which plants make it and in what quantities?"¹ There were a number of other inquiries and reports on Swiss military affairs.

Working with the aid of radiogoniometry, but proceeding separately, the German and Swiss counterespionage agencies tried to locate the secret transmitters in Switzerland. They intercepted some coded messages but were in most cases unable to decipher them and so could not know whether the long rows of figures emanated from Soviet, British, or other spies. Additional investigation was necessary, and both agencies proceeded to investigate.

The Germans worked also through Hermann Henseler, a former employee of the International Labor Office in Geneva, who was discharged, along with a number of others, when the ILO reduced its personnel in 1939. When the Swiss police ordered Henseler to leave the country (he had no job and no visible income, and appeared somehow suspect), the German consul hired him and he was permitted to remain. Meanwhile the German *Abwehr* had discovered clues leading to the secret radio of Margaret Bolli, and Henseler was given the task of investigating. In October 1942 he instructed a young German barber in Geneva, Hans Peters, to approach Bolli, and it was not long before Peters replaced the aging Rado in the young woman's affections. What Peters learned from Bolli was reported to Henseler. The book

that Rado used as the basis of his code, *Es geschah im September*, was found in the German consulate after the war, but Bolli maintained that she never knew the real intentions of Henseler and Peters.

Swiss counterespionage, having on its own intercepted the coded radio transmissions but believing them to be German, had discovered the Bolli and Hamel stations. Since the fight against Nazi espionage was their most important task during the war, the police proceeded to arrest members of Rado's group without consulting the head of the army.

The members of the Soviet apparat were not unaware of the approaching storm. The electric current in the houses of the operators was being cut off for short periods (this is part of the technique used in the search for transmitters); Margaret Bolli had observed several policemen climbing to the roof of her house to check the antenna; etc. Alarmed, Rado sent a message to the Director on October 10, 1943:

From observations by Rose, I gather that the house where her apartment is located is being watched by the political police. Though I do not think these measures are connected with Rose, as a measure of precaution I don't permit Rose to work and have temporarily removed her radio. If we do not notice anything else, she will resume her work the night of October 16.

Three days later, on October 13, Edmond Hamel was arrested in the act of transmitting a radio message; Margaret Bolli was seized at the same time in Hans Peters' apartment. In their effort to do a thorough job, the police also arrested the Swiss Colonel Meyer, of the ND, who had served as liaison to British and French intelligence. General Guisan, indignant about the "mess" made by "these fools," demanded the immediate release of the prisoners, and Colonel Meyer was, in fact, released within three days. But that was about all "the General" could achieve.

In these last weeks of the group's activities, great blunders typical of Soviet intelligence were committed not only by the local agents in Switzerland but by the Center as well; as a matter of fact, the Director's errors were more serious than those of his subordinates.

After the arrests of Hamel and Bolli the signs became unmis-

takable that before long the other members of the group would be seized. Rado inquired, through Salter, whether the British would give him extraterritorial asylum if the need should arise; a positive reply arrived promptly. Planning also to send his coded messages through the British to London and thence to Moscow, Rado on October 26, 1943, dispatched the following inquiry to Moscow through Foote:

Since general situation in regard to unhampered continuation of work is getting more and more unfavorable and there is the danger of destruction through police action, I suggest, after serious consideration, getting in touch with the British and continuing work from there in a new camouflaged way . . . [Our] endangered people can only be saved by contact with the British . . . Organization seriously endangered . . . Swiss police obviously intend to destroy whole organization. Since matter urgent request immediate detailed instructions . . .

The answer, typical of the attitude of Soviet intelligence, came on November 2:

1. Your suggestion to hide with the British and to work from there is absolutely unacceptable. In this case you and your organization would lose independence.*
2. We are aware of your grave situation and are trying to help you. That is, we are trying to retain a prominent United States lawyer with good connections in Switzerland. This man will certainly be able to help the casualties and yourself. Inform immediately whether you could somehow manage for two or three months, perhaps hide somewhere.

* This was not the first time that the Director had refused to consider a sensible contact with an Allied intelligence network. Foote has reported: "Once, in 1942, Rado had had in his hands certain documents and plans which would have been of great value to the British as well as to the Russians, but the material was so bulky that it was impossible for us to pass it over the air. He therefore had suggested that it be handed over to the Allies—through a suitable and secure cut-out [liaison] of course. The Centre's reaction was immediate. Rado received instructions to burn the information at once. From the director's point of view there was little difference between information falling into German or British hands. It was Russian information and if it could not be passed to the Centre, then the right place for it was the wastepaper basket—however valuable it might be to Russia's allies." Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, p. 162.

Upon receipt of your answer we shall arrange the lawyer's trip.

3. Answer following questions: Who, besides you, is endangered in the organization? What is the situation of Sisi and Pakbo? Did the radio operators [the Hamels] receive the text of the indictment . . . ?

At present we are more than ever in need of further co-operation with the Lucy group and hope this will be possible as soon as your personal situation as well as that of Jim is cleared.

4. We ask you, dear Dora, to be calm and to do everything necessary for your safety and to retain your ability to work.²

In the meantime the Director learned that, without his permission, Rado had approached the British and received a positive answer. The Director reacted with a violent reprimand—an illustration of how poor was Moscow's understanding of the situation in Switzerland:

November 5, 1943. Director to Dora:

1. Your contact with Cartwright [British military attaché], made without our authorization, is an unprecedented breach of discipline. Your step was unexpected. Our evaluation of the situation of your organization and the prospects of our continued work with Lucy lead us to the conclusion that an official appeal to the British is not necessary. We repeat, it is impossible for us.

2. . . . You must take immediate steps somehow to undo this unpleasant action and to hush it up. Simultaneously take care of Jim's security so that part of the most important information from Lucy can be dispatched through him . . . Send immediately an explanation of your incomprehensible actions and of your suggestions.

A few days later Rado renewed his plea:

November 10 and 11, 1943. Dora to Director. Don't see any other possibilities to continue work usefully. Jim is very much endangered, he can do little work and should not meet Sisi often. I myself am completely paralyzed. Only from a building that enjoys diplomatic immunity could I continue

work on the previous scale. I believed I was acting in your spirit when I turned to the British through Salter.

I would arrange work with British embassy in such a way that the independence of our organization would be preserved. Repeat: this is the only possibility to forward immediately very urgent and important information and to keep on sending it. We ought to make the best of Lucy now in order not to lose him in the future . . .

Since there is no way to receive money from you for the time being, the organization is unable to continue work because of lack of funds. Sisi states Lucy's group will not continue if payments stop. Lucy says it is senseless to go on working if the information won't reach you. Working from the British embassy would also solve the financial question, since you could send me money that way.

The answer to this plea was a jewel of a message from Moscow, one that belongs in the textbooks; in effect, it said: your reports about the dangerous situation in Switzerland are inspired by British intelligence and actually you yourself are nothing but their tool:

November 14, 1943. Director to Dora. After a thorough study of all your messages and a detailed investigation of your situation we are inclined to think that the whole story was built up—for reasons which we absolutely don't understand—by a few members of the British intelligence service in Switzerland; they obviously do not realize the significance of the present events for the common cause of the united nations. We think therefore that neither you yourself nor the others are seriously endangered at present. We know your extraordinary ability quickly and correctly to evaluate the political situation, we are certain you will find a way out of this serious and complicated situation and hold your own at the battle post in this historical moment of the last war days . . .

Work must be continued above all with the Lucy group. You must arrange for immediate dispatch of the most important information from Lucy through Jim. Besides, new radio stations must be set up without delay . . ."

Rado replied on November 17:

The only way you could help is by introducing me and Maria [Helene Rado] to an allied embassy before it is too late. So far no address for money available. We are without funds . . .

Your reproach of breach of discipline was a hard blow to me. Regardless of my grave situation I am concerned above all for the continuation of the work. The situation is such that I have to remain in hiding. Making following suggestion: further work at present possible only if you accept the risk of Jim's continuing his activity . . .

"Your suggestions are right," the Director answered on November 28. He did not know that, eight days before, "Jim," the last surviving operator, had been arrested, and the tie to Moscow practically broken off.

Rado lived in hiding with Communist friends. Moscow did nothing to put new operators to work; despite the fact that the Director knew it would cease working if money were not forthcoming, nothing was done to supply funds for this most valuable of all the apparatus.

On the night of November 20, 1943, the police arrested Foote as he was transmitting a message to Moscow. Having seized Foote's radio, and being in possession of Rado's code, Swiss counterespionage for a short time tried to carry on a "Funkspiel" with Moscow. Lt. Maurice A. Treyer, who had detected the Soviet radio stations, initiated the first transmissions in this game. Later, when Foote was in Moscow, Soviet intelligence claimed to have discovered the trick immediately, because the messages supposedly sent by Foote were in German and were coded in Rado's code, whereas Foote's previous messages, always in English, had usually been transmitted in his own code. (The Swiss officers could not know of the Soviet apparatus's provisions for the changing of codes, according to which the operator notifies the Center, in the old code, about the forthcoming transition to a new one.) But Moscow's claim was at the very least exaggerated; it was not at all sure about the situation. To put the operator to the test, it radioed a few test questions. On December 9, 1943:

Inform when you saw Paul last and how often you have seen him since beginning of October . . .

On January 8, 1944:

As far as we know Pakbo never heard of Paul; how could he have found out about Paul's arrest?

At the same time, and rather carelessly, the Director discussed "Lucy," the money problem, and other matters in the same messages. His messages to the fictional Foote were most interesting to the Swiss police, but after a short time the radio game ceased. A few years later, when Soviet-Swiss conversations about diplomatic recognition and exchange of envoys were started, the Soviet negotiators, displaying a lack of both taste and humor, bitterly reproached the Swiss government for its "Funkspiel" efforts of 1944.³

With the disappearance from the scene of both Rado and Foote, it was the turn of Paul Boettcher and Rahel Dubendorfer ("Sisi") to take over the Swiss network. But things took an unfavorable turn, and the "Sisi" era was anything but a success.

Paul Boettcher was a prominent German Communist in the early 'twenties, had gone through the old Social Democratic party, joined the Communist embryo Spartakus Bund, and became minister of finance in a leftist government in Saxony; from 1926 to 1928 he had worked as chief editor of the Communist *Arbeiterzeitung* in Leipzig. During that period a group was formed in Germany, the KPO (Communist Party Opposition), of which Boettcher was a leader. Violently opposed to the course of the official KPD, Boettcher's group refrained, however, from attacking Stalin and the Soviet Union.

Boettcher's common-law wife, the Polish-born Rahel Gaspar, also belonged to the "Opposition" and shared with him all the vicissitudes of activity in a deviationist Communist movement. Having fled with Boettcher from Nazi Germany to Switzerland, Rahel entered into a fictitious marriage with a Swiss citizen named Dubendorfer; soon she was able to provide Boettcher with the passport of her legal husband.

Boettcher and Rahel joined the Soviet apparat in 1937. For a period prior to that time they had lived in poverty. Their position as well-known "oppositionists" made possible for them contacts and sources of information closed to Communists; the police, too, considered them harmless.⁴ Other members of "Sisi's"

family were also performing services for the apparat, in particular her son-in-law, the French Captain Jean-Pierre Vigier ("Braut"), and her cousin, Walter Fluckiger ("Brand").

In the 'thirties "Sisi" was a member of the Communist cell in the International Labor Office of the League of Nations, an international agency which provided excellent facilities: in addition to ideal working conditions, it provided a kind of diplomatic protection, namely, a special travel document which obviated a check at frontiers; though no extraterritoriality was officially granted its officers, they were usually treated as diplomats enjoying special privileges. A number of Communists, loyal to their parties and to Moscow, were working in the ILO and making use of its extraordinary facilities. At least six agents of Soviet intelligence were employed there in the late 1930's. Rahel Dubendorfer was one.

Having served Rado for a time as a source, Paul and "Sisi" advanced in the apparat in the fall of 1942, when the German danger to Switzerland seemed to be assuming ominous proportions and a reserve set of agents was to be appointed. On October 8, 1942, a radio message for "Sisi," couched in high-flown, exaggerated language, arrived from the Director:

Dear Sisi. In this serious hour we remind you of your duty as an old fighter. At this time of our hard struggle against the worst enemy of mankind everyone must make an intensive effort to do his utmost for the common cause. In case of a German invasion you will be assigned to do a very important piece of work. You must learn a code and also get other instructions from Albert [Rado]. For a time there will be hard work to do, but we are sure that you will devote your energy to this task.

More than a year passed before Rahel was called on actually to step in. When the time arrived, however, she was acquainted with all the main sources of information. Rössler was her contact; "Pakbo" was ready to help; and her radio set, little used up to then and overlooked by the police, was intact. Moreover, the multitude of sources working under cover names—"Kurz," "Diane," "Dux," "Amor," and others—had not been uncovered. Most of these men and women, living in Switzerland or abroad, could help "Sisi" to rebuild a formidable system of intelligence.

There were no funds, however, and this was "Sisi's" main problem. The Swiss Communist party, which had advanced some 75,000 Swiss francs, could give no further help; the possibilities of obtaining funds from private sources had been exhausted; and the industrialists, who had given considerable aid in expectation of receiving Russian orders, could not be asked for loans repeatedly. At the peak of its activities the network's monthly expenses exceeded \$10,000, a sum too large for "Sisi's" small group to raise without assistance from abroad.

Indicative of the inefficiency of the Center was the lack of a safe way even of asking Moscow for funds. The conduct of the Center showed little of what the new Soviet terminology calls "operativeness," meaning efficient and prompt action. Although there was constant traffic between the Soviet embassy in London and the French underground, and the distance from French town of Annemasse to "Sisi's" residence was only a few miles, and although the "maquis" had a number of radio stations communicating with Moscow, when "Sisi," isolated and desperate, decided to contact Moscow to ask for funds, she had to resort to a complicated and unsafe procedure.

Rahel's six months of strenuous effort to reactivate the Swiss apparat ended in failure. The main cause of her failure was neither the police nor the Nazi spies, but Soviet red tape, internal antagonisms, and the personal animosity existing among the leaders of Soviet intelligence. This chapter of our story is so important for understanding the allegedly fabulously efficient Soviet intelligence machine that it must be told in some detail.

Among Rahel's colleagues in the ILO group were Alexander Abramson ("Isaac") and Hermine Rabinovich, cousins and political friends, both nationals of Lithuania, Russian Communists, both in their forties. On the periphery of Rado's network, they rendered occasional services to the apparat without becoming regular agents. Hermine Rabinovich migrated in 1940 to Montreal, where an office of the ILO had been set up early in the war. Lame and having to move about on crutches, she was not fit for "conspiratorial" work; nor was her cousin Abramson, who remained in Geneva.

Seeking a means of getting in touch with headquarters in Russia, Rahel could find none better than the roundabout Geneva-Montreal-Ottawa-Moscow channel, and she knew of no

better go-betweens than the amateurish Abramson-Rabinovich combination.

The Dubendorfer episode was characteristic of many other developments in the operation of Soviet intelligence apparatus: the Swiss apparat, a remarkable agency of extraordinary importance, had no names or addresses of French Communists able to reach the Soviet embassy in London, no name of a reliable person who could act as a courier to Stockholm, no reserve radio transmitter, nor any other provision for resuming communication with Moscow if one day the existing arrangements should be broken off. Nor did Moscow take the initiative in resuming communication.

Rahel requested Hermine in Montreal to go to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa and find a way to ask for money for the Swiss group. Rahel's letters, signed "Abramson" to avoid suspicion, were safe in the uncensored mail of the ILO, but the impatient "Sisi" also sent cables to Hermine, strange messages which the Swiss as well as the Canadian censors certainly read and probably copied. The first of Rahel's cables to Canada reached Hermine in December 1943, a few weeks after the first series of arrests in Switzerland.

Not a regular agent, Hermine could not be familiar with the rules for contacting military intelligence personnel in the embassy; nor did she know personally anyone in the Soviet agency, or the password. Instead, she simply asked to see "the counsellor." Received by counsellor Tounkin, she told him about "Sisi" and the request for funds. Her report sounded strange and was bound to arouse suspicion. What were the real intentions of this Russian-speaking woman who came unannounced on an espionage errand? "It was a very unpleasant interview," Hermine testified later, "and I was rather furious and went away . . ." ⁵

Nothing happened. Hermine's message was not even reported to the GRU in Moscow.

In the meantime Rahel sent a letter to Hermine through the ILO's facilities; in a childishly transparent code she repeated her request:

. . . Some two weeks ago Sisi sent you a telegram. Tell us how did your journey to Gisel's parents [GRU in Ottawa] turn out. My health is excellent [I can continue]. Albert

[Rado] is sick [in hiding] and will probably leave his profession [intelligence activity] for a long time, he is laid up in bed. Relations with Lucy [Rössler] are good, she is a very good woman. Gisel's family [GRU] is for some reason no longer interested in her [does not send funds], although up to this time there was support. Lucy's situation has improved [he has new information]. Sisi's position is sad. Please inform Gisel's parents [GRU in Moscow] that they must remit 6,700 dollars. . . .

Hermine received this letter in March 1944 and mailed it to Tounkin in the Ottawa embassy. Tounkin turned it over to the GB chief in Canada, "second secretary" of the Ottawa embassy, Vitali Pavlov. Now another obstacle appeared on the road between Geneva and Moscow—the rivalry between the GB and military intelligence. Pavlov and Zabotin, the respective chiefs of the two agencies, were, of course, mortal enemies; instead of inquiring of his neighbor agency, Pavlov inquired in Moscow what to do about Rahel-Hermine. Moscow replied that "this is their person," meaning this is a matter for military intelligence. Pavlov did not even bother to tell his colleague of the other agency about the exchange of messages with the Center.

Meantime Hermine had cabled Rahel about her failure at the Ottawa embassy; Rahel replied in a letter which took over a month to reach Canada:

I have received your telegram of January 23, 1944. Please inform Gisel's family [GRU in Ottawa] that she [Gisel] should advise Znamensky 19 [GRU's address] that Sisi is alive [free] and works as of old with Lucy. Lucy wanted to change the personnel [radio operators], but funds ran out. Albert [Rado] is sick and is not interested in business [cannot take part in the intelligence work]. For the work of Sisi, Gisel's family must transfer 10,000 dollars. The transfer must be made by Hermine personally through N. Y. in connection with the wishes of Mr. Helmars [William Helbein of the Helbros Watch Company in New York]. R.D.

Again Hermine mailed the letter to Tounkin, and again Tounkin turned it over to Pavlov of the GB. This was the middle of April.

Only after receiving this letter [reads the record of Soviet military intelligence in Ottawa] . . . did Pavlov . . . advise Lamont [Zabotin's assistant, Motinov] that there is a certain Rabinovich. After receiving these data on April 19 we decided to contact her by telephone, as the latter was on her letterhead and to warn her that she must not write, nor ring up, and that in two weeks Gisel's man will visit her. She was very satisfied.⁶

Even after the Director authorized the funds, the mighty apparat could find no better way to transfer the money to Switzerland than through the amateurish Hermine. It was July 1944 before Hermine finally received \$10,000, which she handed over to William Helbein. It was not until November 3 (approximately a year after the urgent request had first been made) that Helbein's branch in Geneva paid 28,000 Swiss francs to the Soviet network.

In the meantime the intelligence work had continued to decline. In the spring of 1944 Rahel Dubendorfer, Paul Boettcher, and Rudolf Rössler were arrested. Although Rahel was released soon and Rössler was freed after three months, the network was almost paralyzed.

A year later, in the course of an investigation in Moscow of the Swiss network, Dubendorfer was accused of sending transparent cables to Montreal which might have revealed details of the intelligence operations to the Allies. The "vigilant" bosses of the GB, Alexander Foote learned in Moscow, were certain that even before Gouzenko defected Dubendorfer's messages had opened the eyes of Allied intelligence. But neither Foote nor anyone else that I know of has ever heard that the GB was punished for its strange role in the Canadian affair.

The "British spy" obsession that affected the Soviet intelligence service during the war against Germany was part of the morbid mentality which, emanating as it did from the sanctum of the Kremlin, was a kind of order for all lesser agencies in the GB and the GRU. Not one of the agents working abroad was secure from being suspected of treason in favor of London, and this was particularly true of the leading people in the Swiss intelligence group.

Rahel Dubendorfer was no exception. Even if there had been no additional proofs, her cables-in-clear and letters to Canada would have sufficed for Moscow to suspect her of disloyalty. But another "document" reached the desk of the Director in 1945, when Rahel's case was being investigated by the Swiss authorities in Geneva. At that time her real role was not yet known to the Swiss, and her connection with Rudolf Rössler (and Schneider-"Taylor," the middleman) and her interest in political information on Germany could not serve as proof of pro-Soviet activity: she might well have been working for a Western intelligence agency, and the Swiss would hardly prosecute her in such a case. In fact, the defense that "Sisi" put forth in the investigation was that she was connected with the British.⁷

In giving this story to the investigating officers, Rahel could not foresee its fateful consequences. It happened that her defense attorney, a Soviet sympathizer, one day forgot his briefcase in a friend's office. During the night the documents in the briefcase were photographed by Pierre Nicole (son of the Communist leader Léon Nicole) and the photos were shipped to Moscow.⁸ Now the inquisitive minds in the Director's headquarters had "Sisi's" "confession" in their hands: yes, they told Alexander Foote, she had admitted that she was a British spy.

At the trial, which took place before a Swiss military tribunal on October 22-23, 1945, only two of the four defendants were present. Paul Boettcher had escaped to Eastern Germany and settled in Leipzig; Rahel Dubendorfer, though accused only of supplying Boettcher with the passport of her husband, had likewise preferred not to show up in person. Boettcher and Rahel were each sentenced, in absentia, to two years' imprisonment. Rudolf Rössler, the most interesting of the defendants, could not deny his activity, but he tried to give the impression of being a non-Communist and a professional or mercenary spy. He was found guilty, but in view of his services rendered to Switzerland he went unpunished.

Having left Switzerland before the trial, "Sisi" lived abroad for some time, delaying her trip to Moscow to "report." In the summer of 1947 she vanished; her friends and relatives were unable to trace her. There is no doubt that she was arrested, tried, and severely punished in Russia.

In August 1944, when the Germans withdrew from Paris, the Soviet envoy arrived and with him a military mission under Lieutenant Colonel Novikov. Radio communication with Moscow was established. Emerging from the Swiss underground, Alexander Rado and his wife came to Paris and submitted a gloomy and pessimistic report on the situation of their group in Switzerland. Every member of the network, Rado said, was now known to the police; counterespionage was alert; and any attempt to renew activity was doomed. The document was forwarded to the Director by Novikov.

Before Moscow could come to a decision on the Swiss issue, Alexander Foote, who had been released from prison in September 1944, had also come to Paris to contact the Soviet military mission. He had met Rössler and the other members of the Swiss group and was authorized by them to tell Moscow that work could be resumed. Foote had brought with him on his call on the Soviet attaché an extensive political report prepared by Rössler.

Unaware of Rado's presence in Paris, Foote contacted Novikov and gave him an optimistic message for the Director: almost all sources of information were intact, "Lucy" was enthusiastic; since the clandestine radio, however, could not be manipulated from Swiss soil, Foote was submitting a plan for setting up the radio station in French Annemasse, on the Swiss border. He himself, Foote said, was willing to operate radio, while Pierre Nicole or another courier would regularly carry the information from Switzerland over the "easy" French-Swiss border.⁹

The Director, inclined to favor the optimistic project, decided, however, to investigate: why such a divergence of view between the two agents? Were they motivated purely by devotion to the cause or by personal or even anti-Soviet motives? When suspicion arises, the energies of Moscow know no bounds. Novikov in Paris was ordered to ship the two agents to Moscow in separate planes in order to prevent a possible compromise between them. When this order reached Paris, however, Novikov had already left, and his successor, unaware of the controversy, put Rado and Foote on the same plane (which had just brought Maurice Thorez, the supreme leader of French Communism, back to France from Moscow), instructing them only not to discuss the issue.

This was January 1945; the war was still on and the route

from Paris to Moscow lay through Egypt and Iran. Arrived in Cairo, Rado and Foote went to a hotel. Here for the first time their eyes were opened to each other. Foote told his comrade about his reports to Moscow, about the attitude of the surviving group of agents in Switzerland, about the financial situation (according to Foote, his reports had revealed Rado's financial mismanagement). Rado suddenly saw clearly the position he was in. He realized that he would not be able to counter the grave accusations against him; his "financial policy," his relations with the British, and his archives in the hands of the police would surely earn him a harsh sentence. He knew now what was in store for him in Moscow. He rose, left the hotel room, and disappeared. Foote proceeded alone to Moscow.

To effect the return of Rado, the Soviet government informed the British in Egypt that a Russian deserter, a colonel of the Red Army, "Ignati Kulicher" (the passport provided Rado by the military attaché in France for the trip to Moscow bore that name), was in hiding in Egypt and must be returned in accordance with agreements in force. The British were willing to comply with the request, but the search took some time. When Rado was found and arrested, he refused to go to Russia. He was a Hungarian, he said. A Soviet officer was sent from Moscow to fight for the deserter's extradition. In the end Rado was shipped to Russia against his will. He arrived in Moscow in the summer of 1945.

Although interrogated about Rado, Foote did not see him in Moscow, nor was he ever told how Rado's secret trial ended. Neither Foote nor others among Rado's collaborators have any doubt that he was sentenced to death and executed. This was wartime, and the special commission assigned to try agents of the GB and military intelligence was extremely severe in its sentences. In 1947 Helene Rado, still viewed as a loyal Stalinist, wrote to Eugene Varga, the eminent Moscow economist, and like Rado a Hungarian, and also inquired of Hungarian representatives abroad, concerning Rado's fate. After some time she was officially informed that Rado was imprisoned in a "corrective labor camp" in Russia. From the fact, however, that no letters from her husband have ever reached her it must be assumed that the Soviet reply was an attempt to silence Rado's wife and prevent any revelations by this former important member of the Swiss

network. If these were the intentions, Moscow was successful. "In order not to aggravate Rado's situation," Helene, embittered, disillusioned, and dismissed from her job in the pro-Soviet World Federation of Trade Unions, has made no public statements and has shunned publicity.¹⁰

Foote stayed in Moscow for over two years. At first he was considered a suspect and was treated as such. Although he lived well in a fine apartment of his own, he actually was under guard and was interrogated daily by "Vera," his superior at headquarters, as well as by the Director himself. Their questions often revealed a low level of understanding of foreign affairs. The notions of these intelligent and intellectual heads of Soviet intelligence and their accusations against the Swiss agents were absurd in the extreme. The chiefs were convinced that at the root of all the ills in their Swiss group lay intrigues of the British intelligence service. They were certain that the British had attempted to hinder the advance of the Red Army by false information, and that to British intelligence every means of achieving this goal was a good means. They believed that Rado (whose whereabouts were not yet known in Moscow) must have been liquidated by the British. Had British agents been present, the Director wanted to know, when Foote, after his arrest in Lausanne, was interrogated by the Swiss authorities? "The English" were the *bête noire*; all evil came from "the English."

Foote's situation, favorable because of Rado's defection, improved as the investigation went on. In fact, there were no proofs of his connection with British intelligence, and as far as the financial accounting was concerned, his reports were accepted. When Rado finally arrived, the most dismal chapter in the story of these two agents, a life-and-death fight, began. While they were never confronted face to face, their statements and recriminations were compared; facts and accounts were checked; messages exchanged over a period of two years were analyzed; loyalty was tested. Each knew what was at stake and each was unsparing in his revelations.

I was never taken to any office [Foote relates] but many people were coming to see me about various questions and to discuss with me political issues; sometimes their obvious assignment was only to form an opinion of my personality.

Soon I conceived how to answer their queries: it was reasonable to interpret every move of the Allies as inimical to the Soviet Union. When a British car, for instance, was made a gift to Stalin, I commented: the intention is to make Stalin's car easily recognizable and then, if necessary, to blow him to pieces. Etc.

I had to write papers on all possible subjects, as a test of my loyalty. There was one paper on France, another on Switzerland, on their relation to the USSR, etc. At first, I permitted myself to utter some criticism, as far as non-political issues were concerned. For instance, in a paper on the Moscow underground I remarked that there are few stations, that trains run in long intervals, etc. My superior was very much displeased.

Gradually I acquired the techniques of pretending.

The more I felt disillusioned and estranged, the better I played the role of a devotee. Once I submitted the project of sending abroad a special commission to liquidate the traitors of the Soviet cause. With a sympathetic and understanding smile I was told, however: "Why rush, soon there will be no place on earth where the traitors could hide; they will simply and easily fall into our hands." ¹¹

In the end Foote was vindicated. He was not told what happened to Rado. Once cleared of suspicion of being a British spy, Foote suddenly ceased to be important. "It was obvious," he says, "that they had much more respect for me before, when they viewed me as London's secret agent."

Having seen things with his own eyes and having gone through the mill of a severe investigation, Foote was weary and had become cool toward the Soviet cause. He was aware, however, that there was no easy way to get out and that a request or an inquiry would suffice to close the frontiers to him forever. Only pro-Soviet zeal, he realized, and superdevotion might free him from his captivity. He came forward with a suggestion that he again be sent as a spy to the West. Although with his record such an assignment would have been natural, the main obstacle was the fact that Foote had been "burned" and his identity, fingerprints, and face were known to the counterintelligence agencies of various countries. According to the standard Soviet rule, such an agent

cannot be used abroad until an interval of five years has elapsed.

At precisely this time (the end of 1945 and beginning of 1946) the Canadian affair broke out. Its effect on Soviet intelligence was devastating. Arrests, convictions, recalls from abroad followed *en masse*. The Director and "Vera" were removed in May 1946. When the dust had settled, every available person had to be used to fill the huge gaps. Foote, retrained for foreign intelligence service, was told that he was to go to Mexico. He had every reason to believe that the United States would become the field of his espionage operations.

Sent to Berlin on his way to the Western hemisphere in March 1947, Foote established temporary residence in the Soviet sector of the city. In August 1947, after almost a decade in the service of Russian intelligence, he crossed from East to West Berlin and reported to the British.

British intelligence authorities were incredulous, at least in the beginning: Could he be trusted? Who knew what his real intentions were? Perhaps he was still devoted to Moscow and his assignment was to worm his way into the secrets of British intelligence? He might be continuing to report every word and every move to his real superiors in Znamenski Street. For over two months Foote was held incommunicado in England. In dealing with him, British intelligence officers were cautious and some of them talked like "fellow travelers" about "our allies" in Russia.

Here was a paradox. Suspected by his Russian colleagues and bosses of being a British agent, for a number of years Foote had had to refute, disprove, and undergo minute investigation to convince his Soviet superiors of his genuine devotion to the Soviet cause. Having accomplished this, he now was under suspicion of being a double agent in the service of Soviet anti-British intelligence. Even his book, *Handbook for Spies*, which revealed the story of the Soviet network in Switzerland, and was damaging to both Soviet intelligence and Soviet prestige, could not completely dispel the doubts of the British. Today, after eight years, Foote is still an unimportant clerk in a nonpolitical British agency.

"When I was active for the Soviet Razvedka," Foote says now, "work was strenuous and life was hard but it was interesting. Now nothing happens, life is monotonous and very, very dull . . ."

Of the other Swiss trials of Soviet spies of the war era the most important, in which the main actors of the Swiss apparat—the two Rados, Foote, the Hamels, and Bolli—were the defendants, was held in October 1947. Neither the Rados nor Foote appeared in court and only the secondary agents sat on the defendants' bench. Edmond Hamel, builder and operator of the secret transmitter, assumed a proud and defiant pose and told the judge that he did not even know what he was transmitting. For what purpose had he built the short-wave set? "I suffer from sinus trouble," he replied without a smile. "I built the radio apparatus to treat this illness." "Then why did you hide it under the linoleum in your room?" "I wanted to comply with the law prohibiting short-wave radio sets in Switzerland," was the answer.

The defendants present in court received short terms: Edmond Hamel one year, his wife Olga seven months, and Margaret Bolli ten months. Rado and Foote, the main actors, sentenced in absentia to five years each, were at that time in Russia preparing to fight for their lives before a quite different kind of "tribunal."

CHAPTER 6

The Rote Kapelle in Germany

1. THE SCHULZE-BOYSEN-HARNACK GROUP

ON June, 22, 1941, when official Soviet agencies in Germany closed and all Soviet officials prepared to depart, no adequate substitutes for these organs of Soviet intelligence in Germany existed. Unlike the Soviet underground in Belgium, Holland, France, and Switzerland, the secret network in Germany was poorly organized, and there was not a single experienced espionage leader who could be left behind when Kobulov, "Erdberg," and Shakhnov turned off their short-wave radios, burned their papers, and left the capital amid a general frenzy over the "epoch-making victories."

What Kobulov and "Erdberg" left behind were a few embryonic organs rather than a network. In their frantic search for successors they had resurrected a few old Communists now living in near-isolation, a few scattered and inactive Soviet agents in no danger from the police, and a few young enthusiasts burning with hatred, hope, and ambition and happy to descend into the exciting underground. During their last few months in Berlin the Soviet diplomats had just enough time to introduce their closest friends to one another and distribute a few radio sets. When they left, things were still in the stage of unfinished business. After their departure the group was swiftly formed to which the German Abwehr later gave the name Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra); in Communist literature they were called the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack group, after their two leaders.

Arvid Harnack, the elder of the two leaders (he was forty when the war with Russia started), was a member of a famous family of philosophers and writers. His uncle was the well-known historian of Christianity, Adolph Harnack; his father, Professor

Otto Harnack, was an authority on the history of literature; other members of the family occupied important governmental posts.

Soon after the end of the first World War, when nationalist passions were stirred up in Germany, young Harnack joined one of the extreme rightist groups. After a few years he turned his back on nationalist trends, and about the middle of the 1920's became a Marxist and Communist; he remained true to his new faith for the rest of his life. This inclination toward the most extreme programs and parties—nationalism in its most violent form and social progress in its perverted embodiment in Communism—was characteristic of Harnack's personality. Education did not alter this trait in this honest and simple man, who was logical to the point of absurdity.

In 1927 Harnack came to the United States on a Rockefeller fellowship for two years' study of economics and the history of the Socialist and Communist movements in America. While in America he wrote a book, *The Pre-Marxist Labor Movement in the United States*, which dealt with the history of trade unionism in this country from 1792 to the Civil War. The book was factual, serious, and honest, though not a masterpiece of scholarship. It concluded with a prophecy of the spread of Marxism in the American labor movement.

In 1931, with the support of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, a few young German Communist intellectuals, Harnack among them, founded a pro-Soviet propaganda society, Study of Planned Economy (abbreviated Arplan). The guiding spirit of the society was Sergei Bessonov, first a member of the board of the trade legation, then a counsellor of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, a former Socialist-Revolutionary, well educated, an interesting speaker, and a likable personality; A. Hirschfeld, secretary of the Soviet embassy, took care of technical matters.

The Soviet intention in founding and supporting the Arplan was the same as always in such cases—to attract a group of influential non-Communist scholars on whose support it could count at a serious political moment. Espionage was not the main aim, although gathering information for Moscow and recruiting agents is never neglected. Among the approximately thirty-five members of the society only five or six belonged to the Communist party; the rest were persons with some leftist sympathies,

advocates of German collaboration with Russia, and a few somewhat confused minds who followed Lenin as against "cosmopolitan" Marx, etc. Among the Communist members were several outstanding personalities: in addition to Harnack, there was the sociologist and sinologist Karl August Wittfogel, the philosopher Georg von Lukacz, the economist Richard Oehring, and a few others. At meetings of the Arplan, which were held about once a month, papers on Soviet problems—Soviet law, the agriculture of the USSR, etc.—were read. The scholarly level of the reports and the discussion was high.

Behind the scenes, of course, were the Soviet officials; the German Communists to all appearances played a secondary part. Professor Friedrich Lenz, a non-Communist, was president; Arvid Harnack was the secretary.

A "study trip" of twenty-four members of the Arplan to Russia in 1932, organized by Bessonov, was a turning point in Harnack's life. In his contacts with official agencies in Moscow his devotion and ability were noticed, and before his return to Berlin he was received by Comintern leaders Otto Kuusinen and Osip Piatnitsky. Harnack was asked bluntly whether he would work directly for the Soviet government. He consented.¹

From then on, for a full decade, Harnack served Soviet intelligence and was proud of his activity. Financial motives did not enter into his consideration.

"Working clandestinely for Communism gave meaning to the life of this fanatic," according to Reinhold Schönbrunn, one of Harnack's Communist friends. When Hitler came to power and the Arplan died, the opportunity for continuing to serve the Soviet was the only reason for Harnack's remaining in his fatherland.

Fanatic, rigid, industrious, conspicuously energetic and efficient, Harnack was not precisely a likable person, not a jolly good fellow; always serious, he had little sense of humor, and we, his colleagues, did not feel at ease in his presence. There was something of the puritan in this man, something narrow and doctrinaire, but he was extremely devoted. His wife Mildred shared these traits with Arvid.²

Harnack did not join the Communist party, but from time to time he appeared at small Communist gatherings, such as "professional" or "trade union" meetings. Plans were ripening for better utilization of this learned friend of the Soviet.

In 1933 Arvid went to work in the Economics Ministry. There was more than one reason for this. In his job as an expert on the Russian (and American) economy he had to maintain regular contact with the Soviet embassy; hence nobody could question his visits to the Soviet counsellors and attachés. Also, he dreamed of a great future in a new Germany in which he envisioned himself a member of the leading body of a Soviet-German regime, carrying out socialization after the Russian pattern. In the Economics Ministry Harnack's prestige was high and his loyalty was never doubted; he advanced to the high standing of *Oberregierungsrat*. After the Soviet-German pact of 1939 he was sent to Russia as a member of a German trade commission.

Harnack's caution and his careful observance of the rules of conspiratsia were among his outstanding traits. Unlike some of his future co-leaders, he never committed a thoughtless act, never took unnecessary risks, and never betrayed himself. To his governmental co-workers as well as to his acquaintances Harnack appeared the solid, conscientious, loyal German official. Later his judges, and even the Gestapo investigators, spoke highly of him.* His cousin, Axel, however, while praising him highly, painted a more realistic picture, in which Communist fervor and fighting spirit have their place: "Arvid had an ingenious, brooding, meditative mind, was skilled in debating and always inclined to engage in it. A certain hardness was characteristic of him; moreover, he was inclined to be sarcastic, especially when debating with an inferior adversary. He was very ambitious, though his self-confidence was based on recognized achievements . . ."³

In the Soviet embassy Arvid's friend and inspirer, Sergei Bessonov, also advanced to the post of counsellor; Bessonov remained in Berlin until February 1937. Fate was not benevolent, however, to this remarkable man. In the first stage of the great Soviet purge, Bessonov was recalled to Moscow, arrested, and was accused of establishing contact between Leon Trotsky and the Nazis. For about ten months he stubbornly refused to confess, which was ex-

* Kriminalrat Panzinger, of the Gestapo, enjoyed discussing political subjects with his prisoner.

traordinary; he was finally broken and brought to trial together with Bukharin and Rykov (March 2-13, 1938). In court he "confessed" and accused himself and his co-defendant, Nikolai Krestinsky, the former Soviet ambassador to Germany. Krestinsky was sentenced to death, Bessonov to fifteen years' imprisonment.⁴

Mildred Fish, the American lecturer on literature, whom Harnack had married in the United States, was Arvid's companion in all his ventures, including the Rote Kapelle. Essentially a nonpolitical person interested only in literature and languages, she translated American novels into German and lectured on American literature at the University of Berlin; later, in prison, she translated Goethe's poems into English. Literature was her real vocation; it was only through her husband that she came in contact with Communism and Soviet intelligence. She admired her husband, his mind, his professional and scientific achievements. Axel von Harnack wrote of her: "Mildred had clear, radiant eyes; rich, blond, smoothly parted hair framed her face, and her engaging personality won everybody's heart. It would be somewhat of an understatement to call her a noble character . . . Her straightforward personality was matched by the extreme simplicity of her clothes and her whole way of life."⁵

Harro Schulze-Boysen, the other leader of the group, was different from Harnack in many respects, but as far as family and ancestry were concerned he was as prominent as his learned colleague. He was born and educated in a highly conservative monarchist society, among people emotionally and politically opposed to any brand of Nazism. Admiral von Tirpitz was one of his ancestors. Harro's father, Erich Schulze, was an officer in the German navy in the first World War and served as chief of staff of the German commander in Holland in the second World War. At seventeen Harro was a member of the conservative and anti-Nazi Jungdeutscher Orden; then he gradually started to move to the left. During his university years in Berlin and the violent fight between the extreme factions on the eve of Hitler's accession to power, he refused to join either Nazis or Communists. Though his thinking was vague and immature, it tended to blend the ideas of various political groups of a "progressive" trend. This negation of political exclusiveness was an important part of the thinking of the young Schulze-Boysen; to a degree it remained permanently a part of his political character.

In March 1932, when he was twenty-two, he wrote, in *Der Gegner*: "A thousand people are talking a thousand different languages, hurling their 'isms' at one another, ready even to go to the barricades to settle their alleged differences . . . We are not serving any party . . . we have no program. We don't know any hard truths . . . The 'old powers,' the church and feudalism, the bourgeois state and the youth movement have failed . . ."*

Der Gegner, a small publication with which young Harro was connected, was suppressed early in 1933. Harro himself was arrested and suffered mistreatment at the hands of the Gestapo. Released after three months through the efforts of his mother and her connections, he emerged a bitter enemy of Nazism. He first entered an aviation school, then studied foreign languages, and finally became an intelligence officer in Göring's Reichs Luftfahrtministerium (the Air Force Ministry, RLM).

In 1936 Harro married Libertas Haas-Heye, granddaughter of Prince Philip von Eulenberg. Hermann Göring was one of the large circle of her family's friends.

Libertas played an important role in the wartime activities of the Rote Kapelle, and one with a sad ending. Lively, charming, adventurously inclined, she assisted Harro in his political and espionage activities without fully realizing the danger involved in her work. Subconsciously she was certain that "somehow" they would come out of the battle unscathed. "She was not only beautiful," her attorney, Rudolph Behse, recalls, "but she also had great feminine appeal. She was so attractive that when she was arrested an order was issued that two officers were always to be present at her interrogations."†

Schulze-Boysen was affiliated with the Communist movement from about 1936-37 on, although he did not ally himself with the remnants of the KPD (German Communist party). His intelligence work for the Soviet began in 1936, when he transmitted information on German intelligence activities in connection with the Spanish war.* It was no coincidence that Schulze-Boysen's first act of cooperation with the Soviet government concerned an

* "As an officer of the RLM [Air Force Ministry] he was in a position to obtain information about secret intelligence operations directed against the Red Spanish government. With the help of his wife he transmitted a letter of warning to the Soviet embassy in Berlin through Gisela von Pöllnitz (since deceased), who was well known to us because of her traitorous activities. As a result measures were taken in the neighborhood of Barcelona, Red Spanish territory, against actions planned by the Franco government." Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942.

international issue, in which Communism was ostensibly allying itself with the Western powers. It was significant that this Communist, born out of anti-Nazi emotions rather than Marxist-Leninist ideology, had never, up to 1939, read any of Lenin's writings and was familiar with only a few of Stalin's.

There were in the library of the RLM a few recent publications of Stalin [writes a friend of Harro, Dr. Hugo Buschmann] but Schulze-Boysen knew practically nothing of Lenin's work. I told him that I could help him. My library had survived some twelve searches since 1933, and a nearly complete collection of Lenin's and a complete collection of Trotsky's works had been preserved. Besides, there were Stalin's old writings, and some others . . . We went to a secret hideout in the cellar . . . From that day on Harro Schulze-Boysen used to spend time in our house nearly every day.⁸

In these prewar years "Schubo" (as Schulze-Boysen was called) was surrounded by a group of five or six friends, men who later, during the war, were active in the Rote Kapelle; Harro himself became a leader of this political group. "I predict that no later than 1940-41," he wrote to his parents on October 11, 1938, "perhaps even next spring, a world war will break out, succeeded by a class war in Europe. And I am certain that Austria and Czechoslovakia have been the first battles of the new war."⁹

The group around Schulze-Boysen was certainly not a cell of the Communist party, although it was the nucleus of a Communist organization. One member of the group, Harro's friend and admirer Günther Weisenborn, states that Schulze-Boysen "was a Communist like Harnack."¹⁰ Harro's mother denies that her son had ever been an orthodox Communist, and this was also true: "My son's goal was to overthrow the dictatorship. To him every means and every ally were acceptable, regardless of whether they stood to the right or to the left . . . he found his best companions-in-arms primarily on the Communist side—probably because the most active, uncompromising and courageous resistance fighters were in their ranks."¹¹

As a political leader Schulze-Boysen was a controversial personality. A man of great vigor, unscrupulous in his selection of means, fanatically anti-Hitler, prepared to ally himself with any

anti-Nazi person or group, he could hardly have been harnessed to the iron framework of a Communist party; he had a searching mind and was too emotional and unstable to become an obedient "apparatchik." He provoked immense admiration as well as antagonism. To Harnack, the sedate Marxist, for whom all ideological problems had been resolved once and for all, Schulze-Boysen was a *Wirrkopf* (confused mind). Günther Weisenborn on the other hand, called his late friend "a genius of political leadership . . . Handsome, of perfect build, boundlessly cheerful . . . his political vision swept all of us along."¹² Comparing Schulze-Boysen with other members of the Rote Kapelle, Alexander Kraell, president of the Tribunal of 1942, gained a negative impression: "Schulze-Boysen was an outright adventurer, intelligent and ingenious, but impulsive and without inhibitions, reckless, given to taking advantage of his friends, ambitious in the extreme, a fanatic and an innate revolutionist."¹³

If Schubo had survived he would certainly have been appointed to one of the highest posts in the Soviet zone of Germany. But he would not have fitted into the chorus of satellite ministers. He had too much independence and passion to fill the role of an obedient servant of a foreign power at a time when Communist leaders like Laszlo Rajk, Traicho Kostov, and Rudolph Slansky were treading the path toward death. Had Harro not been hanged in Plötzensee prison in 1942, another scaffold, somewhere near Pankow or Karlshorst, might have seen his life ended a few years later.

With the outbreak of the war in 1939 Schulze-Boysen, now a definitely formed political personality, entered the last and most active period of his life. He saw the war not as a great catastrophe but as the beginning of the end of Nazism. Despite the pact of friendship entered into between Berlin and Moscow, all his hopes centered on Russia.

On the fateful date September 1, 1939, a group of German intellectuals, Schulze-Boysen among them, met in a private home in Grunewald. Another guest, Hugo Buschmann, has described the gathering:

The slender air force officer [Schulze-Boysen], little over thirty, lined face and blue eyes full of life and energy, was

an interesting personality in this Grunewald circle of writers, actors, and painters. It was not an anniversary they were celebrating, but the beginning of the war. What illusions these people had! All of them were certain that the end of the Third Reich was approaching; nearly all of them believed it to be imminent—at any moment they expected the first British air attack on Berlin . . . Only the air force officer, whose jaw trembled with hatred when Nazis were mentioned, did not agree: he did not want to destroy their optimism; the petit bourgeois Hitler was certainly facing inevitable downfall, but this would not be so easy to achieve.

In general Schulze-Boysen did not have much confidence in England, and Chamberlain's policy made him an adversary of that country. He did not consider England capable of coping with Hitler, and he turned all his attention to the East . . . Don't wait for British bombers, he would say during the first stage of the war—they are too weak; liberation will be the work of the Russians, not of the British. I expressed displeasure with the Hitler-Stalin pact, but Schulze-Boysen did not agree with me. To him the pact was a clever maneuver; when the time comes, the Russians will strike and emerge as victors.¹⁴

In the first stage of the war (1939–41) Schulze-Boysen widened the circle of his friends. He got in touch with old Communists as well as intelligence officers of the Soviet embassy. It was at this time that the group which later became the Rote Kapelle, a sizable "resistance group," was formed. A number of men and women prepared to go much further than purely political opposition also gathered around Schulze-Boysen. He met the devoted and obedient metalworker Hans Coppi, a KPD man; Johann Graudenz, the old KPD militant; the former editor of the Rote Fahne, Johann Sieg; and a few others. One of the most important in this latter group was the prominent writer and theatrical producer, Adam Kuckhoff, a close friend of Arvid Harnack. A man of the older generation, Kuckhoff was then in his middle fifties. Like so many of the art world, he had been somewhat unstable in his political sympathies, and some of his earlier novels had tended to the German nationalist side. Now, however, the leaflets he wrote for the Rote Kapelle were pro-Communist. His wife, Margarete, who worked for the Nazi party's Rassenpoli-

tisches Amt and had translated chapters of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* into English, was a Communist and assisted Kuckhoff in his anti-Nazi activities.

A short time before the outbreak of the war against Soviet Russia, Schulze-Boysen was introduced to "Alexander Erdberg" of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, and it was not long before the fathers of the prospective intelligence cell saw the potentialities of the young enthusiast. Schulze-Boysen was one of the three men selected and approved to head the espionage apparat in Berlin in case of war; the other two were Arvid Harnack and Adam Kuckhoff. It was significant—and fatal—that none of the leaders of the apparat was a real apparatchik with experience in the underground, knowledge of secret radio techniques and codes, or adequate knowledge of party matters, deviations, confessions, and purges. In this respect the German intelligence group differed essentially from its sister groups abroad, which were led by expert intelligence agents like Leopold Trepper, Victor Sukulov, and Alexander Rado. Amateurishness, naiveté, and "salon Communism" characterized the group. On the other hand, the German group displayed a greater amount of youthful enthusiasm and fanaticism and greater devotion to the cause than many of their colleagues abroad.

Thus emerged the Rote Kapelle. It was a small Soviet intelligence ring which was at the same time a part of a much larger political "resistance"—actually a Communist organization whose members were not even aware of the espionage activities engaged in by some among them. The two aspects of the Rote Kapelle were closely interwoven, the one being impossible without the other.

In some quarters, and especially in East Germany, there has been a deliberate ignoring of the espionage aspect of the activity of the Schulze-Boysen group and an effort to present it as only "resistance" to Nazism.* This pretense is dishonest. It is true

* A booklet entitled *The Schulze-Boysen-Harnack Resistance Group* was published by the Communist Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (VVN, the Union of Persecutees of Nazism) in Berlin in 1948. No mention of espionage is made in this biography of Schulze-Boysen and his colleagues; all those connected with the group, even the mercenary spies, are presented as "resistance fighters."

Of the survivors of the Rote Kapelle, only one, Günther Weisenborn, has had the courage to admit his espionage activity in the Schulze-Boysen group. Eric H. Boehm, *I've Survived* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949), p. 195.

that the hundred or so persons gathered around the leading group knew nothing about the secret reports that were going to Moscow, or about Soviet couriers arriving by parachute, or about contacts with the espionage apparatus in neighboring countries. But the brains of the network served Soviet intelligence, and the Rote Kapelle thus belonged to the wartime Soviet espionage system.

On the other hand, efforts were made, during and after the Nazi era, to deny the "resistance" aspect of the German Rote Kapelle and to picture it simply as a group of spies. This, too, is false. A "pure" espionage ring could not have embraced such a large number of persons. Had there been no common ideas and no strong political emotions behind the ideas, these men and women would have been unable to form themselves into a political organization and would not have engaged in activities fraught with great danger for all of them. Despite the fact that some disoriented non-Communists blundered into these circles, and a few young enthusiasts joined them without realizing the real nature of the group, the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack group was essentially a Communist organization. It consisted of several distinct elements:

There were the remnants of the old KPD, hardened by years spent in prison and concentration camps and by long years of hiding in the underground; now belonging to the older generation, they had lost some of their vitality and belligerence. During the years of their inactivity they had met in tiny groups; infrequently a courier would arrive from abroad, a leaflet would be read, an old comrade would emerge from a "KZ" (concentration camp).

Next there was the young generation, who had little knowledge of Leninism-Stalinism and appallingly false notions about Russia and the West, but who were easily incited, dynamic, and full of violent hatred of the Führer, his party, and his war. Liberation from Hitlerism was point one in their philosophy and program. They believed the future Soviet Germany would be a free country, and that they were serving first Soviet Germany and only secondarily Soviet Russia. "Antifascism," a hypocritical slogan launched by Moscow, was a flesh-and-blood issue for these young men and women. The smallness of their circle, the meetings, and the speakers who addressed them made them feel this all a novelty,

an experience; distribution of anti-Nazi leaflets was an exciting activity; they were filled with awe and love for the seasoned "veterans" who were their teachers and leaders.

The "old KPD men" were numerically in the majority in the Schulze-Boysen group, but their influence in it was not decisive. Of the nearly seventy members of the German Rote Kapelle whose political biographies are known, thirty-seven were old Communists; more than thirty had not belonged to the party before 1933, most of them because they were too young. In a way the two leaders, Harnack and Schulze-Boysen, personified the two main elements. It was natural that Schulze-Boysen, younger and more vigorous, became the real force of the network in both its general "resistance" activity and the espionage efforts of its small core.*

"Alexander Erdberg," who gave the espionage assignments to the prospective leaders of the network, had agreed with Harnack on a code book and had taught him the art of ciphering; Schulze-Boysen and Coppi received a few lessons in radio transmission and reception. In May and June 1941 "Erdberg" turned over a number of radio sets to Coppi and Kuckhoff and, before departing, left 13,500 marks (at that time about \$5,000) with his Berlin operators.

The amateurs, however, proved inefficient and were unable to establish regular connection with the Soviet capital. A few messages, edited and coded by Harnack, were dispatched and reached Moscow; these were important messages, one giving data on the German air force, another indicating the forthcoming movements of German armies along the Dnieper, a third communicating (obviously in connection with a possible Soviet air attack) the address of a repair shop in Finland, etc.¹⁵ On the whole, however, the new apparat was unsatisfactory on the technical side. This was July 1941, when the German offensive was

* Alexander Kraell, the president of the Tribunal of 1942, seems to favor the old KPD men: "The composition of the Berlin group was extremely heterogenous. The majority were bourgeois intellectuals, the rest were organized Communist party members. On both sides there was suspicion, especially on the part of the old Communists . . . Those of the accused who belonged to the circles of the old Communist party, most of them plain people whose forthright attitude evoked respect, made a far better impression than the others." *The Case of Dr. Roeder*, p. 382.

proving ominously successful, and the frequent breakdowns in radio communication between Moscow and Berlin were catastrophic.

By the time these messages reached Moscow, Erdberg was back at the intelligence center in Moscow.¹⁸ Two important steps were decided upon: the first was to order the experienced and efficient Victor Sukulov, the "Petit Chef," who was working in Brussels, to go to Berlin to straighten things out; the second was speedily to prepare a number of agents who had been trained in intelligence work and radio transmission in Russia, for landing by parachute in Germany. Sukulov's orders were: 1) to visit the Kuckhoffs, using "Alexander Erdberg" as the password; 2) through Kuckhoff to get in touch with "Arvid," "Choro" (Schulze-Boysen), and Libertas; 3) to dispatch certain information on four other members of the Berlin group; * 4) to dispatch a courier to the Soviet embassy in Stockholm and to the Soviet trade legation in Turkey; 5) to make the necessary preparations to receive Soviet parachutists; 6) to take care of the defective radio sets of the "Choro" group and arrange for satisfactory exchange of messages.

Traveling as "Vincente Sierra," a Uruguayan, Sukulov crossed the frontier with a group of foreign workers going to Germany. On his arrival in Berlin he contacted the two leaders, Schulze-Boysen and Harnack. Their meeting in the Tiergarten, in the latter part of October 1941, "covered" by the two wives, Libertas and Mildred, was the beginning of a close collaboration. Sukulov obtained a batch of messages which could not be sent from Berlin. He repaired the defective radio sets and supplied an additional one. It had been agreed that if there should be another breakdown in transmission messages would go to Brussels, to be relayed from there to Moscow, and that Adam Kuckhoff, who had relatives in Aachen, at the Belgian frontier, would in that case act as courier. Before leaving Berlin, Sukulov had a meeting with the sculptor Kurt Schumacher (no relative of the late Socialist leader of the same name) and his wife Elisabeth, to arrange with them, over the heads of the Berlin group, means for direct communication with Moscow. (Though he had been inactive for several years, Schumacher, a devoted Communist, had offered his services

* "The Italian" (Lt. Wolfgang Havemann, Harnack's nephew); "Strahlmann" (Hans Coppi); "Leo" (Skrzypczynski); and "Karl" (Behrens).

to Soviet agents on the eve of the war.) Finally, Sukulov got in touch with Kurt Schulze, a graduate of the Moscow radio school and a veteran of the Communist underground, and turned over to him a special code for use in radio communication with Moscow; it was to be used in particular for messages from Rudolph von Scheliha of the German Foreign Office.

Things were better now. Communication improved and a number of messages went directly to Moscow from Berlin, but since the volume of information was growing, part of the messages still had to be sent through other networks. The radio operator Hans Coppi, too, improved in efficiency after Kurt Schulze, a radio expert, had given him a few lessons. The transmitter was first set up in Coppi's home; later the dancer Oda Schottmüller accommodated it in her home; then Countess (by marriage) Erika von Brockdorf, an employee of the Labor Ministry, placed her apartment at the disposal of the radio operators.

Compared with the technical facilities, the information-gathering apparatus of the group was efficient from the very beginning, and as time went on it expanded and improved, acquired new sources in government departments, and penetrated thick walls of secrecy.

In his position as an intelligence officer in the Air Ministry, Schulze-Boysen himself was at the source of important information. A friend of his, Col. Erwin Gehrts, was employed in a department of the same ministry which dealt, among other things, with "secret missions" (sabotage) to Russia. Oberregierungsrat Harnack enjoyed prestige and confidence in the Economics Ministry. Horst Heilmann, a young student, formerly a Nazi and now a great admirer of the Schulze-Boysens, worked in the decoding department of the army, where he obtained highly important political and military information. Herbert Gollnow, a lieutenant serving in the Abwehr of the air force, was regularly obtaining and forwarding information on counterespionage measures of the army's high command; he was also able to give timely warning of planned German parachute raids behind the Soviet lines. Johann Graudenz, approaching sixty, formerly a United Press correspondent in Berlin and Moscow, was now a salesman of auto brakes; through his connection with the engineers of the Air Ministry, which was a customer of his firm, he obtained data

on German output of aircraft which he turned over to his friend in the Air Ministry—Schulze-Boysen. The playwright Günther Weisenborn went to work for the Radio Broadcasting Agency with the intent of serving the intelligence network; he sat in on secret conferences and obtained “regular information on secret material from government sources,” which he passed on to Schulze-Boysen.¹⁷ Anna Krause, a fortune teller, exerted great influence on some of her clients—Erwin Gehrts, Johann Graudenz, and others; from her nonpolitical visitors—officers and businessmen—she elicited interesting facts.¹⁸ Others of the intelligence group’s informants reported from the Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda, the Foreign Office, the Labor Ministry, the Administration of the City of Berlin, Berlin University, the People’s University (Volkshochschule), and a number of other official and unofficial places.¹⁹

On the basis of information gathered from these sources, the Berlin apparat, which was becoming one of the most remarkable intelligence agencies of all time, dispatched hundreds of messages to Moscow, either directly or through Brussels. According to the German authorities,²⁰ the most significant messages contained reports on:

Strategic plans of the German high command in the fall of 1941 to postpone the Caucasus offensive to the spring, and the timing of this offensive.

The movements and transfers of troops and air force units, and the decision of the high command to encircle Leningrad rather than occupy it.

Scheduled German parachute raids, giving exact times and places.

Scheduled attacks on a convoy from Britain to Russia.

Production of synthetic fuel.

Developments in German foreign policy based on reports from the Auswärtiges Amt.

Political opposition to Nazism in Germany.

Tension in the German high command.

Size of the German air force at the start of the war with the Soviet Union.

Monthly aircraft production.

The raw material situation in Germany.

- Location of German headquarters.
- Serial production of aircraft in the occupied countries.
- Concentration of chemical weapons in Germany.
- Soviet radio code found at Petsamo.
- German paratroop losses on Crete.
- Disposition of German air force at the Eastern front.
- Air force losses (periodic reports).
- German troop movements along the Dnieper.
- Technical qualities of the new Messerschmidt.

Outside and independently of the Rote Kapelle, a few single individuals were working for Soviet intelligence, sending messages through their own facilities. Two of these single operators, Hans Kummerow and Rudolph von Scheliha, were of considerable importance.

Hans Heinrich Kummerow, a noted engineer and inventor, had taken part in BB (worker-correspondent) activities since the late 1920's, when industrial espionage was the main preoccupation of Soviet intelligence in Germany. During the time he worked for the German aviation and war industry he had frequently supplied Soviet agents with descriptions of his inventions and patents, especially in the fields of radar and chemical warfare. However, Kummerow did not have a radio of his own and did not transmit messages himself. Before the war the official Soviet agencies sent messages for him; after the war broke out Moscow decided to assign Kummerow a radio operator. The latter was parachuted from a Russian bomber over Germany; he was arrested on landing. He betrayed both Kummerow and his wife. The two Kummerows were executed in 1943.

Another important source was Rudolf von Scheliha of the Foreign Office.* Aloof from all Communist or semi-Communist groups, and with no contacts, even of a private kind, with the Schulze-Boysen and Harnack circles, Scheliha was considered to be safe, if safety for a spy is possible at all. Had it not been for the shortage of radio operators, Scheliha and his aide Ilse Stöbe might have continued to work for a long time, perhaps until the end of the war. In the summer of 1941, however, Sukulov was ordered by Moscow to make contact with Ilse ("Alta") in Berlin. He assigned to the group a special operator, Kurt Schulze, a

* See p. 124.

veteran KPD man and the best radio technician in the Communist underground of Berlin, and as has been mentioned, gave him a special code to be used for the Scheliha messages.

How much material Scheliha supplied after that time has never been learned; "the scope of Scheliha's betrayal," the Gestapo stated after his arrest, "cannot be ascertained." It seems that the aging Legationsrat, in fear, was becoming reluctant. There was no longer a Soviet embassy in Berlin, nor were there Soviet intelligence agents to prod him; Ilse Stöbe, herself in mortal danger, had no power to persuade him, if she tried to do so. Scheliha's reports after June 1941 must have been unsatisfactory; this was certainly the reason why it was decided to use a means of persuasion which in normal conditions would be called blackmail. A special courier was dispatched to Berlin to arrange the Scheliha affair. The courier was Heinrich Koenen, son of a prominent German Communist leader and member of the Reichstag, and a man in whom Moscow placed great confidence. Koenen arrived in Berlin via parachute. His main argument was in the form of a receipt signed by Scheliha for \$6,500 received through his bank in Switzerland in February 1938.

Neither intelligence headquarters in Moscow nor Koenen knew, however, that the Sukulov report of 1941, which dealt with Stöbe and Scheliha, had in the meantime been decoded by the Abwehr, thanks to the betrayal of the radio operator Hermann Wenzel; that the Gestapo had arrested Stöbe on September 17, six weeks before Koenen's arrival; and that a Gestapo woman was waiting in Stöbe's apartment to receive the visitor from Moscow, whose arrival, too, had been announced in an intercepted message. Koenen was arrested when he appeared at Stöbe's apartment. He proved more amenable to "persuasion" than had Ilse, and revealed all details of the operation. Scheliha and Stöbe were court-martialed and sentenced to death. They were executed on December 22, 1942.

Along with purely intelligence operations, the Rote Kapelle leadership was active in political work on a large scale. A few "training" and "study" groups, guided by Johann Sieg, Professor Werner Kraus, Dr. Johann Rittmeister, Wilhelm Gudorf, as well as the three leaders, Schulze-Boysen, Harnack, and Kuckhoff, discussed the war, the inevitability of the defeat of

Nazi Germany, and world affairs. Leaflets written by the leaders and duplicated by members of the group were left in trains and telephone booths or mailed to selected addresses. Kuckhoff addressed his leaflet "To the brain and craft workers," and exhorted them not to fight against Russia. Schulze-Boysen wrote a paper entitled "Napoleon's Story" in which he stressed Napoleon's final defeat after his invasion of Russia, and hinted at a similar end for Hitler. The paper was widely distributed.

Leaflets were sometimes pasted on house walls in Berlin. One of these, bearing the heading "The Nazi Paradise," was intended as a reply to "The Soviet Paradise" exhibition being held in Berlin at the time. Another public appeal of this kind was entitled "How Much Longer?" In all this propaganda activity the call was for the defense of Soviet Russia and Soviet institutions and not defense of the West. The notion of a correct foreign policy was expressed clearly in the slogan "Understanding with the United States, alliance with the Soviet Union!" *

From the Soviet point of view, the mingling of general Communist activity with espionage was a serious shortcoming of the Berlin group; in fact, it proved fatal for several score of people who might otherwise have been spared. This is true in particular of Schulze-Boysen, who was obviously unfit for any kind of clandestine work. It was almost a miracle that he was not seized earlier. Wearing his military uniform, and with a revolver in his hand, he "covered" groups of young men and girls at night-time *Klebe-aktionen* (pasting of leaflets on house walls); a few hours later he was writing a message to Moscow on the moves of the German army; later he went to meet a Soviet 'chutist, etc.

One night [Schulze-Boysen's friend and neighbor Dr. Buschmann reports] Harro rushed into our apartment greatly excited. He had just learned—and reported to Moscow—

* *Widerstand im Dritten Reich*, published by the pro-Soviet VVN in East Berlin; p. 23. Propaganda lies, if directed against Russia, sometimes provoked ingenious reactions. "Once the head of a section of the Broadcasting Company gave me a report that 32,000 doctors had been killed in the Soviet Union in one year," Weisenborn recounts in Boehm's *We Survived* (p. 195). "I added a zero and the news was broadcast that 320,000 Soviet doctors had been killed. I was violently taken to task, and deplored the mistake in dictation. The Moscow and London radio picked up the fantastic statement as further proof of what any listener must have noticed: that the Greater German Broadcasting Station was lying."

that a British military convoy sailing for Russia was to be attacked by German forces. Schulze-Boysen was in a position to warn Moscow, and he had done so; now he wondered whether his message had been received in time. From this story I realized for the first time that Schubo was sending messages to Moscow.

Sometimes I tried to make Harro see reason; he was terribly incautious. At parties held in Berlin he used to appear in his air force uniform, decorated with the War Cross, and tell sensational and crazy stories about the Ministry, military operations, the execution of prisoners, etc. These elegant ladies and talkative gentlemen chattered till dawn, not realizing how dangerous it was to maintain relations with him.²¹

But there was no time, in 1941-42, to be careful about observing strict discipline; as a matter of fact, the rules of conspiratsia were broken more than once by various local groups of the Rote Kapelle in Europe and the United States.

2. THE END OF THE SCHULZE-BOYSEN-HARNACK GROUP

The Soviet-German war was nearing its climax at Stalingrad when the large Rote Kapelle organization of Berlin, after fourteen months of strenuous activity, was discovered and suppressed. That it had been able to operate for such a long period, in wartime, under the eyes of a police organization of unprecedented power, and despite continued violations by its leaders of the rules of conspiracy was a near miracle. Its destruction, which was brought about by a number of causes, was inevitable. The Gestapo and the Abwehr converged on it from various sides.

A search for the mysterious short-wave radio agents had started almost a year before the arrests. Since July 1941 radio monitoring stations in Germany had been taking down radio messages transmitted in code which the deciphering departments had been unable to break. In December 1941, when the first arrests of members of a Soviet network were made in Brussels, 120 coded texts were found on the network's premises, but since the arrested, with the exception of Rita Arnould, refused to talk, and Rita did not know the codes, no progress could be made. In the spring of

1942 the Abwehr succeeded in deciphering a part of the radio messages recorded, and alarm increased. The decoded messages had informed Moscow about the forthcoming German offensive in the Caucasus, given data on army fuel consumption, the size of the air force, German losses, etc. The only indication as to the sources of the information was the signature "Choro." The Abwehr analysis continued until, on July 15, a message was deciphered in which three names and addresses were given.¹

In the meantime a second Belgian group had been seized. The radio operator of the group, "Professor" Hermann Wenzel, the veteran Comintern technician, finally broke down, revealed the code, and in addition furnished a large number of clues. Now, the authorities were able to read the message of August 28, 1941, addressed to Victor Sukulov in Brussels: "Proceed to three addresses in Berlin and find out why radio communication often fails . . ." There followed the address of Adam Kuckhoff and indications as to "Choro" (Schulze-Boysen) and Arvid Harnack.

At first even experienced German police officials were incredulous; the Gestapo's investigation took several weeks.² On August 30, 1942, Schulze-Boysen was quietly arrested at the gates of the Air Force Ministry building. *Libertas* was taken into custody a few days later, and the Harnacks, arrested at a summer resort on September 3, were brought to Berlin.

The police operation was clothed in deep mystery. Harro's colleagues in the Ministry were told that he had had to leave on a new assignment, and the Economics Ministry, where Harnack had worked, continued for several months to send him his salary; Economics Minister Funk did not learn of the affair until the eve of Harnack's execution.³ Not until the Nazi Reich had come to an end was any mention made of the case either in the press or on the radio. Further arrests followed in rapid sequence. The police had tapped Schulze-Boysen's telephone before his arrest and were in a position, by early September, to seize almost all of the leading group as well as a large number of persons of lesser status. Horst Heilmann of the deciphering department was arrested on September 5; Coppi, Graudenz, and the Kuckhoffs on the twelfth. Soon the number of those arrested exceeded a hundred.

The investigation of the case was conducted by Gestapo Kriminalräte Panzinger and Koppkow, specialists on Communism.

Gruppenführer Müller, head of the Gestapo, was responsible for making regular reports on the case to Himmler personally. The methods employed by the Gestapo to extract facts and confessions from the prisoners varied. In certain cases a threat of involving the wife and children of an arrested man sufficed; in others the prisoner was misled by false promises that his life would be spared if he would be frank; prolonged interrogation, the use of strong lights, and shackling helped to depress the accused and paralyze their will power. Beatings were inflicted in some cases. There was no "false humaneness" in the Gestapo's methods.* In other cases the very fact that the Gestapo interrogator was in a position to confront the accused with a multitude of facts and details about himself had a staggering effect. "We told him to his face, for instance, where he had lived when in Moscow, the number of the streetcar which he took to go to his intelligence school, what kind of doors the school had, the names of students and teachers of the school, the names of his friends, etc.; he felt betrayed and exposed."⁴

Among the few members of the Schulze-Harnack group who agreed to give names and facts to the Gestapo was Libertas Schulze-Boysen. This aristocratic young woman, childishly optimistic and credulous, believed her interrogators when they told her that her life would be spared if she would become a crown witness against the others. The promise was a pure deception; in German law and German courts there has never existed (as in Britain) the institution of crown witnesses. Libertas talked and betrayed herself as well as her friends. In her deposition of September 1948 Adelheid Eidenbenz, former secretary to prosecutor Roeder, states that "The defendants were essentially convicted on the basis of Libertas Schulze-Boysen's statements. Frau Schulze-Boysen obviously considered herself a 'crown witness' at the trial

* "I saw with my own eyes the welts on Kuckhoff's body from the Gestapo's maltreatment. Further, on our journey in a prison van from the Prinz Albrecht Strasse to Spandau, Graudenz whispered in my ear how badly he had been abused." Adolph Grimme's deposition in the Case of Dr. Roeder, p. 790.

According to a report in *Kristall* (1951, No. 3), Frieda Wessolek started to confess when, before her eyes, a revolver was placed against the neck of her son Johannes. "I have heard of instances of maltreatment in the Rote Kapelle case," says Dr. Rudolf Behse, counsel for the defendants. "It appears that the maltreated, the more important defendants, were executed soon afterward. The survivors of the Rote Kapelle, the lesser figures, reported no torture or beatings suffered by them."

and believed that she would save her own life by exposing the others. As far as I remember, the defendants confronted one another for the first time at the trial and there they found out that Frau Schulze-Boysen had denounced them." ⁵

Libertas was the victim of another deception. Playing the part of a prisoner and pretending to feel deep sympathy for Libertas, a Gestapo woman, Gertrud Breiter, got abundant information; she also dispatched Libertas' letters (which involved other persons, too) to her mother, and copies of these letters of course reached the Gestapo. "These facts did not become known to Libertas," wrote the prison chaplain, the Reverend Harald Poelchau, "until shortly before her death. She told him how unhappy she was about having trusted a spy; the only explanation, she said, was prison psychosis, for Breiter had been the first woman in the prison who had embraced her and talked to her in a friendly way." ⁶

Libertas realized the bitter irony of her own situation: she had betrayed her friends and was now herself betrayed. In a letter to her mother written a few hours before her execution she said:

I had to drink the bitter cup of having a person in whom
I had full confidence, Gertrud Breiter, betray me and you.

Nun iss die Früchte deiner Taten
denn wer verrät, wird selbst verraten.

(Now eat the fruits of your deeds,
For he who betrays will himself be betrayed.)

Out of egotism I have betrayed friends; I wanted to be free
and come to you—but believe me, I would have suffered im-
mensely from guilt.⁷

Libertas, however, was not the only member of the large network who confessed and revealed. Johann Graudenz and Heinrich Koenen talked freely, perhaps under duress. In its confidential reports, the Gestapo referred also to other testimony. After two months of interrogation of over a hundred arrested persons and large numbers of other witnesses, the Gestapo had a fairly detailed picture of the network's operations. Later, Sukulov-"Kent," who had been arrested in Marseille, also started to talk, and he was brought to Berlin to round out the picture.

Harro Schulze-Boysen, however, was of little help. Whatever

the Gestapo learned about his activity came from other members of the group. When the investigation took a bad turn and the situation appeared hopeless, Harro resorted to a trick to mislead the Gestapo and perhaps buy a year's deferment for himself and his friends. He made a statement to the effect that during his long period of service in the Air Force Ministry he had gathered a large number of secret documents of the "highest political and military importance" which he had shipped to friends in Sweden; that the documents were still in the hands of these friends and had not yet been published. "If I push a button," Schulze-Boysen threatened, the documents would be handed over to the enemy—Britain or Russia—for publication. He refused to say precisely where the documents were or to order their return to Germany, since they "constituted the only security for himself and his friends."⁸

The "Swedish documents" created a stir in government circles. Göring instructed the Gestapo that "all means" must be applied to force Schulze-Boysen to reveal the facts, and Himmler ordered that the prisoner be subjected to "*verschärfte Vernehmung*" (which meant, officially, a lashing). The order was complied with, and the lashing administered to the air force lieutenant was officially recorded. As for the Swedish documents, Harro offered a deal: he would reveal everything about the papers on condition that the death sentences expected by him and his co-defendants should not be carried out until the end of 1943 and that the Gestapo promise this in the presence of his father, Commander Erich Schulze. ("No doubt," his aunt Else Boysen wrote later in her memoirs, "Schulze-Boysen was certain that the war would end and the Hitler regime would be overthrown before that date.")⁹ Harro's proposition was accepted; in the presence of his father, the Gestapo confirmed that the deal would remain in force even if the documents were found elsewhere than in Sweden, since the object was only to prevent their publication. Having obtained this pledge from the Gestapo, Harro made the statement that no documents whatsoever had been taken from the secret files of the Air Ministry and that the whole story had been concocted only as a means of saving his and his friends' lives, at least temporarily. Inasmuch as the "unusual deal" had been concluded with the consent of the "higher-ups" (obviously

Göring or Himmler, perhaps even Hitler), the two gentlemen of the Gestapo, Panzinger and Koppkow, gallantly confirmed its validity and the postponement of the expected executions.*

By October 1942 the Gestapo investigation had been practically completed, and the thirty-volume report on the Rote Kapelle was turned over to the prosecution.

From the start of the investigation to the end of the trial, the Gestapo and the prosecution stressed the negative character traits and immoral tendencies of the defendants. Although treason, even if committed out of purely idealistic motives, was punishable by death, the prosecution tried to minimize the ideological aspects of the Rote Kapelle and emphasized, on the contrary, base, egotistic motives as the force behind its activity. Terms like "paid agents" and "paid espionage" were used repeatedly. (As a matter of fact, except in the case of Scheliha, no substantial remuneration was paid.) It was alleged that Schulze-Boysen, Kuckhoff, and several others had embezzled the organization's money. Much was made of the "intimate relations" between members of the Rote Kapelle, married and unmarried, and of the "Fourteen Points" parties at which the women wore only as much clothing as one could get with the prescribed fourteen ration points; it was hinted that "parties" of this kind ended in orgies. It was stated that some of the young women of the Rote Kapelle circle had intimate relations with several "sources" and carried on these affairs with the consent of their husbands. Even Mildred Harnack, who was about forty and seriously ill, was accused of such behavior; other women allegedly went much further.†

In general the attempt was made to characterize the Rote Kapelle circle as a group of men and women moved by greed and lust. The shame visited on the ten-year-old Third Reich by the discovery of a sizable underground working for Russia could be minimized, it was thought, by presenting the accused as the dregs of society.

* The Case of Dr. Roeder, pp. 783-4. It is superfluous to add that the Gestapo had not the least intention of keeping the promise; the condemned were put to death a few days after the trial.

† Surviving members of the group maintain that the defendants sometimes tried to camouflage their political ties as love affairs; it was better to appear in court as a morals offender than as a spy.

The uncovering of an espionage network of such unprecedented proportions [Alexander Kraell testified in August 1948], in which members of various ministries played leading roles, struck like a bombshell. Hitler insisted on swift and severe punishment. Because of his old distrust of military justice, he at first wanted to pass it by and assign the case instead to a Special Tribunal [Sondergericht]; later, in connection with the group of July 20, 1944, he did so . . . It was due to Göring that there was no deviation from legal procedure. Göring was assigned by Hitler to direct and supervise the espionage affair.¹⁰

The main argument in favor of a "normal" court-martial and against a speedy Sondergericht was the fear that a hasty execution of two or three score defendants might handicap current and future investigations of treason affairs. Göring was, after all, minister of the air force, which had been the main site of the Rote Kapelle's activities; many of the culprits were military men; a court-martial was the logical place for a trial of these offenses. Hitler finally accepted the Reichskriegsgericht (Reich Military Court) on condition that no sentence in the Rote Kapelle case could become valid without his confirmation and that he could nullify any sentence.* The defense lawyers, appointed by the court shortly before the trial, were in no position to devote the time and attention necessary to a proper study of the case.

For political and prestige reasons, and in order to avoid a large number of trials in various courts over a protracted period, it was decided to tie into one affair all the heterogeneous elements in the case—the German Communist underground, espionage in favor of the Soviet Union, the non-Communist helpers, etc. Then, again because of the multitude of defendants, it was necessary to divide them into groups of from five to fifteen. The prosecution lay in the hands of Dr. Manfred Roeder.†

* Legally, sentences of the Reichskriegsgericht required confirmation by the head of the tribunal; in this case Hitler reserved this privilege to himself.

† Dr. Roeder, considered an able and reliable prosecutor in political cases, had won Göring's confidence in an earlier trial. The second important case after the Rote Kapelle which he prosecuted was the Johannes von Dohnanyi (Schwarze Kapelle) affair of 1943. After the war while Roeder was interned as a prisoner an investigation was started by the United States occupation authorities to establish his actual role in the political trials of the Nazi era, in particular the Rote Kapelle

Thus, in its last stage the Rote Kapelle appeared as an amalgam of various groups and persons who had in common only that they had worked, jointly or separately, knowingly or unknowingly, for the benefit of the Soviet Union or the Communist movement in wartime. Along with leaders well aware of the meaning and the risks of their doings, there were quite a few whose role in the intelligence network was negligible; others did not even know that they had been aiding an espionage organization, and some had actually had nothing to do with the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack group.

The first trial started on December 15, with thirteen defendants in the dock.* The abundant material in the hands of the prosecution made it futile for the defendants to deny the charges outright. They were aware that their situation was hopeless. Harnack stressed his hostility toward the Third Reich, but as *Kristall* reported,

his bellicose words contrasted gloomily with his low, tired voice; he showed no enthusiasm when he stated: "I have been convinced that the ideals of the Soviet Union open the road to the salvation of the world. My goal was the destruction of the Hitler state by all possible means." Schulze-Boysen and a few other defendants, on the other hand, continued fighting; while admitting what they could not deny, they denied what Roeder did not prove.¹¹

The court pronounced death sentences upon eleven of the defendants. Two of the women, Mildred Harnack and Erika von Brockdorf, were sentenced to prison terms of six and ten years

trial. The issue was whether or not he was guilty of crimes against humanity. It was significant that the Soviet prosecutors at Nuremberg, who in general tried to enlarge the circle of "war criminals," had obviously been instructed to abstain in the case of Dr. Roeder in order to avoid further revelations about the espionage affair. By the end of 1948 the United States agencies, having found no basis for an indictment, turned Roeder over to the German authorities. Early in 1949 he was released from jail, and in 1952 the investigation, having yielded no material, was discontinued.

* Namely, the Schulze-Boysen, Harnack, and Schumacher couples, Hans Coppi, Horst Heilmann, Erwin Gehrts, Kurt Schulze, Johann Graudenz, Herbert Gollnow, and Erika von Brockdorf. The defendants Rudolf von Scheliha and Ilse Stöbe had had already been sentenced to death in an earlier trial.

respectively. Libertas Schulze-Boysen reacted to the death sentence in a violent way:

When the sentence was pronounced [her lawyer, Dr. Behse, recalls] Libertas screamed and fainted. Although I had urged her more than once to realize her situation and to be prepared for the worst, she had remained confident and optimistic all the time up to this moment in court. She explained now that the Gestapo had promised her either a mild penalty or even liberty as a reward for her confession. I filed a request to the court to revise the sentence; since the charges on which it was based proved accurate, however, the court denied my request.¹²

There was no doubt that the death sentences would be confirmed by Hitler, but the fate of the two women, Mildred Harnack and Erika von Brockdorf, was uncertain because "in cases of treason Hitler never recognized extenuating circumstances. A phrase frequently used by Hitler, according to Keitel, was 'He who comes even only in the shadow of treason has forfeited his life.'"¹³ Following the sentencing, an oral report on the court's findings was made to Göring, who "exploded at the words 'prison terms.' The Führer, he said, would never give his consent."¹⁴ In fact, when Admiral Puttkammer, Hitler's aide, transmitted the report to the Führer, the latter refused to confirm the sentences of the two women and ordered a new trial. The death sentences for the rest of the defendants were confirmed.

Now Himmler's hour arrived. The court-martial proceedings with all their legal aspects were too much for Himmler and the Gestapo; real antagonism had developed in these months between Himmler's RSHA (Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt) and the military tribunal. "After the sentence in the Harnack-Schulze-Boysen case was pronounced," Dr. Lehmann testified, "I had a very excited talk with Obergruppenführer Müller. He complained vehemently about the slow working of the Tribunal and the slow pace of the court proceedings under Dr. Kraell. The circumstances of this case, he said, are as clear as the sun."¹⁵

The first executions were carried out three days after sentence had been pronounced. Even before the trial started, preparations for an execution of a special kind had been made in the Plötzensee prison. Instead of the guillotine, which was considered the hu-

mane method of execution (death occurred in eleven seconds), a special iron girder with eight hooks was fastened to the ceiling of the death chamber. (The ax used in executions at the beginning of the Nazi era had been replaced by the guillotine in 1934 because the latter was faster and several executions could be performed in a short time.) Painful and humiliating death on the gallows was chosen for the males. On December 22, 1942, eleven members of the Rote Kapelle were put to death.*

The other groups of the Rote Kapelle were tried one after another in 1943. For those condemned to death the guillotine was reverted to. In the retrial of Mildred Harnack and Erika von Brockdorf the new judges did not display enough courage to sentence them again to prison terms, and they were executed, Mildred Harnack in February and Erika von Brockdorf in May 1943. On February 3-5, 1943, the Kuckhoffs were tried along with the former Social Democratic minister Adolf Grimme, his wife, and others. Kuckhoff was sentenced to death and executed on August 5; the death sentence of his wife, Margarete, was later rescinded. In the string of executions resulting from the Rote Kapelle trials, which went on until October 1943, two dates are outstanding: May 13, when thirteen executions took place, and August 5, when sixteen persons were put to death.¹⁶ In all, the number of persons executed in the Rote Kapelle case was about fifty-five.

While the last men of the Rote Kapelle were being decapitated in Plötzensee, foundations were already being laid for a extensive new resistance movement in wartime Germany which ended in the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944. Both the Rote Kapelle and the group involved in the incident of July 20 were revolutionary groups, both grew out of a belief in the inevitability of Germany's defeat, and both tried to prevent a worse catastrophe by fomenting an internal upheaval in Germany. Despite the anti-Nazi motivation of both, they were alien, even hostile, to one another; their basic differences and their innate antagonism were, indeed, a symptom of historical significance. The Rote Kapelle was a pro-Soviet resistance movement with all the traits characteristic of a pro-Soviet organization—devotion and

* The execution of Herbert Gollnow and Erwin Gehrts was postponed for reasons having to do with the retrial of Mildred Harnack. They were put to death a short time later.

self-sacrifice but also political blindness, consistent defeatism, and readiness to submit to Moscow as the best way of avoiding catastrophe. The July 20 group represented a middle-of-the-road trend which had the majority of the nation on its side, was afraid of Russia, and was essentially pro-Western and democratic. Thus the two wartime movements in Nazi Germany served as the nuclei of the two postwar Germanies—the East and the West—and the controversy between them on the eve of Germany's defeat grew into the great world-shaking antagonisms of the entire postwar era.

After the war the Rote Kapelle, much discussed in books, magazine articles, and public speeches, became the subject of heated political debate. While the East German press eulogized all members of the Rote Kapelle as "antifascist heroes," the rightest elements in Western Germany attacked the wartime "traitors," some of whom are still alive: by acts of treason, they said, such as revealing German strategic plans to Moscow, the spy ring had caused around 200,000 casualties among German soldiers. There was in the contention the germ of a new stab-in-the-back legend, a fable reminiscent of the 1920's, when defeat in war was ascribed to the treacherous actions of leftist elements. Time and again passions flared; however, the repeated discussion led nowhere and soon died out.

For there is not and cannot be any answer to the question whether or not Soviet espionage in a Nazi country was morally justified. If 100,000 or 200,000 soldiers went to their death because of Communist espionage, who knows whether, had they remained alive, they would not have been used by the Nazi command to prolong the war and would have died in the wake of an even greater catastrophe after April–May 1945? Whatever negative judgment may be made of the espionage carried on for Stalin's Russia, it should be pointed out that there is a world of difference between subversive activity directed against a democratic nation which is endeavoring to maintain its independence and liberty and that directed against an aggressive and brutal political system.

3. OPERATION PARACHUTE

As early as August 1941 Moscow had informed the Berlin network (via Brussels) that new agents would soon be dispatched to

Germany and that necessary preparations should be made to receive them.

Preparations for receiving agents arriving by parachute were, in fact, a major task on both sides of the front. On the Soviet side it meant selection of suitable personnel, training in codes, instruction in parachuting, furnishing of radios, and last but not least, fabricating satisfactory passports and other documents for the use of the agents. On the German side it was necessary to provide housing for the guests and radio transmitters; provision also had to be made for obtaining food for the new arrivals since this was a time when ration cards were indispensable. It took many months to complete the preparations. The first 'chutists landed in May 1942.

To meet immediate needs of the fighting armies, agents were often sent beyond the firing lines to make reconnaissances. These reconnaissances, organized by local commanders and aimed at immediate targets, were of great military but lesser political importance. Soviet long-range espionage was at first considered a task of German Communists residing in Moscow: who else could be trusted with highly secret names, addresses, and connections but men and women who had fled Nazism, who were themselves sought by the German police, and whose only shelter in their own country was the Communist underground? And was it not their duty as Communists to render military service to and carry out military assignments of a Communist regime which had given them refuge and the means of existence for so many years?

Theoretically and from the moral standpoint this reasoning seemed logical. The danger entailed was certainly no excuse at a time when millions of Soviet soldiers were sacrificing their lives in a war with Germany. The émigrés did not realize, however, with what cynicism the operation would be carried out, how much negligence would be displayed in regard to their needs and their safety, and how little their mission, which entailed almost certain death, would accomplish for the "antifascist" cause.

The 'chutists' assignments were, in the main, twofold: first, to report on German political and military affairs; second—in view of the expected emergence of the so-called "second front" of the Western Allies—to remain in Western-occupied Germany in order to report from behind the Anglo-American lines, and to serve as Soviet agents in an Allied zone. Each 'chutist was given a few

weeks' supply of dry army rations. Each had memorized a "life history" to correspond to his documents. Each, of course, had a short-wave radio in his knapsack.

As a measure of caution, Soviet intelligence did not send agents into Germany singly: who could tell whether on emerging out of the parachute an agent who was traveling alone would not rush to the nearest police station and report? As a matter of principle, therefore, agents were sent in pairs, and the formation of these pairs was the first task of Alexander Erdberg, working with the leaders of the German Communist émigrés.

The first 'chutists to go to Germany were Erna Eifler and Wilhelm-Heinrich Fellendorf. Erna Eifler ("Rosita," "Gerda Sommer") had served with the worker-correspondent apparat in Germany and later went to China and Holland as a Soviet agent. Fellendorf ("Helmuth," "Willy Machwuroff"), a truck driver, had served as an officer in the International Brigade in Spain. Although they were veteran Communists, the previous experience of this pair was insufficient for the new assignment, and they first spent four months at an intelligence school, receiving instruction in radio techniques, diversion, sabotage, and parachuting; they then received additional instruction from both Soviet intelligence headquarters and the German Communist leadership. In May 1942 Eifler and Fellendorf landed in East Prussia and traveled to Hamburg, a city in which they had lived for years before the Nazi era.

The second pair were two men, Albert Hössler and Robert Barth, likewise old Communists. Hössler ("Helmuth Viegner," "Franz," "Walter Stein") was a former member of the International Brigade in Spain, where he had been wounded. He had worked in a Soviet metal plant in Cheliabinsk since 1939. Barth ("Walter Kersten"), a former employee of the *Rote Fahne*, had spent some time in Russia as a prisoner of war rather than as an émigré. This pair also were taught the science of intelligence at the special school. They parachuted from a bomber to a place near Gomel, in German-occupied territory, on August 5, 1942. A few days later they reached Berlin.

The next to arrive in Germany was Heinrich Koenen, whose assignment was mentioned above. He descended in a parachute on October 23, 1942.

What Soviet intelligence did not understand in relation to this

operation was the state of mind of a Communist agent coming to Germany from Russia in time of war. Every 'chutist knew that he was doomed; he was aware that in Hitler Germany no clemency could be expected for a spy; he knew, too, that if discovered he would bring doom to all his contacts, hosts, and even casual acquaintances. Lonely even among comrades, he aroused suspicion everywhere: Is this stranger not an agent of the Gestapo assigned to probe and report? The path of the agent was a thorny one, and because it was, the agent was beset by temptations: If arrested could he save his life by a confession? If so, why wait for arrest; would it not be wiser to report everything on his own initiative? Heroism is rare, even in the underground, and the behavior of an average person in a state of mortal fear is ordinarily not heroic at all.

The first five parachutists, as we have seen, arrived between May and October 1942. Before the next team descended on German soil, all of the first five had been arrested. Erna Eifler and Wilhelm Fellendorf, in Hamburg, got in touch with the local Communist group. They intended to move on to Berlin, where Wilhelm Guddorf, of the Berlin group, was making the necessary preparations. But before these preparations had been completed, Guddorf himself and fifteen of the Hamburg group were seized. Eifler and Fellendorf went to prison in October of that year.

Five months of liberty in Germany was more than their successors enjoyed. The Hössler-Barth team made their debut in Berlin. Hössler met the leader, Schulze-Boysen, and started to operate his radio, which had been installed in the apartment of Erika von Brockdorf. Barth even managed to send three messages to Moscow describing the hardships and problems of agents in the German capital. Only two months after their landing Hössler and Barth were arrested, the former on October 9 and the latter at about the same time.

Heinrich Koenen remained at liberty exactly six days. He had landed on October 23, 1942 near Osterode, in East Prussia, and traveled to Berlin with his short-wave transmitter. On October 29 he appeared at Ilse Stöbe's house, where he was promptly arrested. By what means Koenen was induced to talk is not known, but he did confess and make revelations. Although at first reluctant, he went further and further, because usually "confessions" cannot be kept under control, and the Gestapo knew

methods for extracting the most from a prisoner. In the end Koenen became an outstanding collaborator; his knowledge of Soviet intelligence affairs was extensive and the names and addresses of Soviet contacts in Germany revealed by him were of use to the police. Koenen, however, did not convince the police of his lasting usefulness; when he had told all he knew he was executed.

In Moscow in the meantime Operation Parachute was being pushed forward. Numbers of other German émigrés were selected to be trained and sent to Germany; former Communists, discovered among German prisoners, were groomed for secret missions; when the German retreat began, non-Communist prisoners, too, were accepted if they were anti-Nazi. Soon the operation began to assume massive size. Britain, geographically nearer to Germany and better prepared, agreed to assist Soviet intelligence in the parachuting operation: Soviet agents shipped to Britain by sea were to be re-equipped there and parachuted to a Soviet-designated place. This chapter of Soviet-British cooperation started in 1943.

The next pair of parachuted agents were Elsa Noffke and Willy Beuthke, who were assigned to work in southern Germany near the Swiss frontier. (See p. 204.) Frau Noffke, the guiding spirit of the team, was the former wife of a *Rote Fahne* editor of the early 1930's; her partner in the mission was a Communist from Berlin. After the usual training course in Russia, they were shipped via the Arctic to Scotland, where they were taken over and cared for by British intelligence. The pair, who were also in contact with the Soviet embassy in Britain, lived for a time near London. From the British they received equipment including two excellent radios (the British short-wave radio was far superior to the standard Soviet "Sever" and others). They were parachuted from a British bomber over the Black Forest near the city of Freiburg on the night of February 22-23, 1943, with instructions to look for the veteran KPD man Heinrich Müller in Freiburg.

The German police had obtained possession of a set of instructions sent by Moscow via radio to other agents in Germany, and the Abwehr were waiting for the two 'chutists near Freiburg. Noffke and Beuthke escaped, but they were forced to leave be-

hind their parachutes, radios, and other equipment; they fled to Heinrich Müller.

We found the parachute and the agents' luggage [reported the Abwehr investigator Heinrich Kalthof], and began a systematic search. Their German meat ration cards were forged, of course, and we were anxious to find out which of the Freiburg butchers were accepting these (faked) ration cards and sending them to the authorities. Finally we succeeded in tracing them to a woman living in Heinrich Müller's apartment, opposite the university. Observing the apartment from the university through binoculars, we distinctly saw two parts of a British-built short-wave transmitter.

Arrested, Noffke and Beuthke talked freely. They told us all about their assignments, their work in Moscow, their trip to Britain, and all addresses in Germany known to them. There was no sense in denying or lying, since all their notes and documents were in our hands.¹

The agents as well as Heinrich Müller and his wife were executed.

There followed a long line of other Communist 'chutists: Joseph Baumgarten, native of Bavaria and for many years a Comintern agent in Japan; Theodor Winter, son-in-law of the present president of the German Democratic Republic, Wilhelm Pieck; and others. As time went on, the non-Communist agents recruited from among prisoners of war began to arrive in Germany in numbers.

Prisoner-of-war camps in Russia were under the GB, whose informers, recruited from among the German prisoners, reported from every unit and barracks on every political-minded officer or private, their political views and their conversations and discussions. Thus the authorities possessed a fairly detailed description of political trends among the prisoners. Those who were anti-Nazi, particularly Communists or Socialists, were sometimes approached with the suggestion that they "take an active part in the antifascist war." It was hardly possible to refuse such a proposal since the alternative was to be listed as a Nazi sympathizer.

In this way large groups of prospective parachutists were recruited. They were shipped to points nearer to the front, given

a minimum of instruction, some papers, and uniforms, and flown over in pairs from behind the front lines into Germany. The operation assumed large proportions in 1944, after the Allied invasion in Normandy.

The Soviet authorities acted on the premise that Germany, after her severe defeats, was in such a condition of disarray that an illegal agent with any kind of documents could work and survive in the country. This was an appallingly incorrect notion, but on the basis of it Soviet intelligence paid even less attention to the equipment of an individual agent—documents, uniform, etc.—than before. The operation was becoming a typical “mass action” in the Soviet style.

Once on German soil the 'chutists were apt to begin to wonder whether the Soviet cause was worth the tremendous risk they ran. In fact, the majority of German prisoners parachuted during 1944–45 reported at once to the German authorities, before any of their colleagues could denounce them. Soviet intelligence, while aware of this, held that the chance that perhaps one in a score or one in a hundred of the 'chutists would become an effective spy outweighed all dangers and negative factors.

The city of Peenemünde attracted much attention on the part of Soviet as well as Allied intelligence. A small spot on the Baltic Sea, Peenemünde was chosen by the German government as the site of experiments in rockets and other new weapons. Its significance at the time is comparable only to that of the atomic development sites of our day. About the middle of 1944 Soviet planes began to parachute large numbers of agents, recruited from among German prisoners of war, over and near Peenemünde. Armed with short-wave radios, German currency, and false documents, these agents were instructed to send weekly messages on their findings. They disobeyed and some of them, in collaboration with the Abwehr, even engaged in a “Funkspiel” with Moscow to mislead Soviet intelligence by false reports; their messages often ended with a request for money. The only agent of a sizable Soviet group in Peenemünde who sent intelligence reports to Moscow in 1944 was Lieutenant Brandt. He succeeded in sending six or seven radio messages from nearby Swinemünde, but the Funk-Abwehr located him and he was arrested and executed.²

One Soviet agent recruited from among prisoners of war was

Heinrich Melchior, member of the Socialist Youth. Here is a part of a statement he made:

In October 1944, six months after I was taken prisoner, the Russian chief of the camp came to ask me whether I was prepared to fight against the Nazis. I had to agree if only because the camp espionage system made refusal impossible; besides, there were chances of survival in such a venture, instead of certain rotting in a Soviet camp.

I was taken to a small Polish town near the front line, where I found twenty-six other German prisoners in the same situation. We were forbidden to discuss our assignments, but on Christmas day a small party was arranged for us at which I made a speech, and so, when the time came to form the two-men teams, many of my colleagues wanted to join me, or gave me their German addresses—somehow I had won their confidence.

My partner was a professional soldier, a German *Feldwebel*, now assigned to work as the radio operator of our little team. Actually we were not trained at all. One day I was asked to submit a comprehensive security plan for our operation, but when I did so, not a single one of my suggestions was accepted. Instead we were told: "The chaos in Germany today is comparable to what was going on in Russia in 1941, and you can easily move about the country and reach any place there unmolested."

Then I was given an old and filthy German uniform and identification papers, but with each of the documents made out in a different name. My equipment was a German uniform, Russian boots, a German holster and a Russian revolver, a Russian knapsack containing American canned food bearing Russian labels, a Russian map of the area where I was supposed to operate, and a Russian compass. There was no sense in arguing or making protests. Being familiar, however, with the area of my assignment, I could hope at least to hide somewhere.

On February 5, 1945, we were let down fifty kilometers [about thirty miles] from the place we were to operate. We parachuted from a height of three kilometers [two miles]. I

landed in a swamp and did not know how to free myself from the parachute. I gave the whistle signal, my partner appeared, and we marched off together . . .

Of twenty-seven men parachuted at the same time I know that at least twenty reported to the military authorities immediately. I neither reported nor worked for Moscow; my friends and relatives helped me and this is why I am alive now.³

A shocking but obviously honest report on a secret agent's mission to Germany was published by the loyal Communist worker Friedrich Schlotterbeck in Zurich in 1945.⁴ As a member of the KPD, the author had spent ten years in a Nazi concentration camp, was set free in 1943, and lived thereafter with his family in Stuttgart. In January 1944 his friend Eugen Nasper ("Noller"), likewise a member of the KPD, came to see him and told him his story. A radio operator in the German army, he had been taken prisoner by the Russians. He was treated well and was assigned to an intelligence mission in Germany. His main tasks were to send radio reports to Moscow on all outstanding developments, and to get in touch with illegal Communist organizations of German or foreign workers. The Schlotterbeck house had been chosen by Moscow as an address for its secret agents.*

* The conversation between the Schlotterbeck brothers and Nasper is eloquent concerning the extremely negative attitude toward the British ally:

"Who sent you to us?"

"The Party."

"What Party? Who's the Party?"

"I don't know any names."

"Well, how did you get here[?]"

"By parachute."

"From Russia! Don't talk nonsense. No Russian 'plane ever comes as far as this."

"I came in a British bomber . . ."

"So you're from the English, then, and not from Moscow?"

"No, I've nothing whatever to do with the English. All they did was to drop me at Moscow's request."

"You are not going to tell me the English do things like that for nothing. Not the English! . . ."

He told us about the vast preparations being made there [in England] for the invasion of the continent.

"When's it going to come off?"

After Nasper left, Schlotterbeck and his brother discussed their extraordinary visitor and their difficult situation: this, they realized, was gambling with their lives. They recalled what they had known of Nasper before; in addition, they checked with friends. All reports were favorable and there seemed no reason to suspect Nasper. Nasper, who thereafter visited Schlotterbeck about once a fortnight, reported that radio connection with Moscow was going on satisfactorily. Instead of staying four weeks in Stuttgart, as had been intended, he stayed five months. He was never short of money or ration cards.

One day Nasper suddenly broke down and confessed to Schlotterbeck: yes, he was "working for the Gestapo." He had been arrested on landing with his parachute, and since that time had been in the service of the German police. The Gestapo told him, "We are playing a big game with Moscow," and that his only chance to survive was to join in the Funkspiel. He agreed, with the intention, of course, of defecting at the first opportunity. He did not at first enjoy the full confidence of the Gestapo and was shadowed by police officers wherever he went; gradually he won their trust by rebuilding his damaged short-wave radio and operating it under the Gestapo's direction. All the facts that he had learned from Schlotterbeck he radioed to Moscow with the approval of the police. "When I received Moscow's messages, however, I made them unintelligible. Besides, when sending my reports I tried to make them sound unusual. Instead of thirty minutes, as ordered, I sent for an hour; I concluded my messages with 'Good night' or 'Sleep well.' In Moscow they certainly realized the situation, and cut off."

Knowing what was in store for him, Schlotterbeck fled immediately (June 5, 1944) to Switzerland. He warned Moscow from

"This year. My arrival here is co-ordinated with it."

"H'm . . . They talk a lot about invasion, but in the meantime they tar everybody and everything here with the same brush."

"My opinion about England is no different from yours . . . but they're fighting against Hitler, and that's the main thing."

"You've got nothing to do with the English, you say?"

"Nothing . . . Their only job was to drop us. They didn't even know our names." (Friedrich Schlotterbeck, *The Darker the Night, the Brighter the Stars*, Pp. 224, 229.)

there. He learned, however, that Nasper had betrayed a multitude of other men and women of anti-Nazi circles. All the members of Schlotterbeck's family were arrested and executed in Germany.*

* Schlotterbeck's book contains a photostatic copy of a letter from the Gestapo to the Standesamt of Stuttgart, ordering the necessary changes made in personal registers by reason of the fact that "the following persons were executed on November 30, 1944 for plotting high treason." There follow the names of nine members of Schlotterbeck's family.

CHAPTER 7

The Canadian Network

1. THE EMBRYOLOGY OF A SOVIET NETWORK

AMONG the wartime achievements of Soviet intelligence in the Western hemisphere were the revival and expansion of the network in Canada.

Until the end of the 'thirties Moscow had neither the personnel to spare for this militarily unimportant northern country nor the funds to maintain a sizable apparatus there. In addition, until 1942 there were no diplomatic relations and no significant trade relations between the two nations; there was no embassy, no military attaché, no legal short-wave station, no legitimate codes. The two leaders of the Canadian Communist party, Fred Rose and Sam Carr, were the representatives of Soviet intelligence in Canada; of the two Carr was the more important. Both had been born in prerevolutionary Russia, both were Communists of long standing and loyal to Stalin, both had been serving the GB since the 1920's, and they received payment for their services. Their intelligence reports dealt with Canadian Communist groups, factional fights, Trotskyites and Bukharinites, and the political attitudes of the numerous Russian immigrants in Canada. A few members of the Communist party supplied them, with information on Canadian affairs, when it was available.

As in the United States, the 1930's witnessed an upsurge in the generally feeble Communist movement in Canada and the gradual formation of Communist groups ("study groups," "circles") which among other things supplied information to the leaders. It was in these "study groups" that most of the future Soviet agents were to be found when, after the Stalin-Hitler pact, there was a lapse in Communist activity and the Communist party, degraded in public opinion and prohibited by law, ceased to exist

except in the underground and in a rudimentary form. When the German armies invaded Russia, the situation again began to change rapidly; the political atmosphere was becoming more and more favorable for the Soviet Union, police action against Communists ceased, and Communist leaders were free to re-enter the political scene as supporters of and spokesmen for the great Eastern ally.

It was at this moment that Moscow decided to rebuild its apparatus in the United States and Canada.* The idea that alliance with Canada in a war against Germany precluded Soviet espionage in the ally's country apparently did not enter Stalin's mind; on the contrary, such an alliance meant that new facilities became available which must be used. When the first Soviet trade mission came to Canada in 1942 (before official recognition was accorded), Major Sokolov, ostensibly a clerk in the trade mission and assigned to work in Canadian factories, was to start the organization of a nucleus of military intelligence. He was soon joined by Sergei Kudriavtsev, who bore the title of first secretary of the legation. Their procedure in creating the espionage agency had all the specific features of Soviet intelligence generally.

During this initial phase of the apparatus, meetings were held between Sokolov and Communist leader Fred Rose. Rose held the special post of chief of the so-called Central Control Commission of the Canadian party. The central control commissions, which exist in all Communist parties, have what amounts to police functions, particularly in the "struggle against spies and traitors" within the Communist ranks. Since Rose, however, had for a long time been connected with the GB rather than with military intelligence, inquiry concerning activities on his part for military intelligence had to be made in Moscow. Sokolov, who had neither radio nor code, turned to New York and his colleague "Pavel Mikhailov" (his real name was Shinikov),¹ officially Soviet vice-consul, actually an intelligence officer of the GRU, obliged to assist the new Canadian apparatus. Through "Mikhailov," Sokolov asked Moscow for permission to take over Fred Rose. Between inquiry and response some time was lost, but permission was even-

* The most important sources of information on the Canadian spy network are the extensive *Report of the Royal Commission* (1946), and Igor Gouzenko's book, *The Iron Curtain*, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1948.

tually granted and Rose became an important aide and tool of Soviet military intelligence.

Almost two years elapsed, however, before the new apparatus was working efficiently. To function successfully, a Soviet intelligence network built around an embassy and military attaché requires a number of facilities. There must be secret rooms with special installations, such as steel doors, automatic buzzers, incinerators, cameras and photographic equipment; Soviet employees with previous experience in other capitals and reliable coding clerks must be available; one or several groups ("nets") of subagents are needed, as well as a number of the special agents called "svyaznyie" (go-betweens) who serve as "cutouts," to make direct contact between the men from the embassy and their sources unnecessary. The Soviet rule requiring that every secret agent, however subordinate and humble his position, be approved by Moscow before he may be employed also delayed considerably the development of networks in the Western hemisphere. Often it is several months before the Center is in a position to respond to a request for approval of a prospective agent. A good deal of work must in fact be done in Moscow each time a new person is proposed. Things are easier if the nominee is known and there is a file on him in the offices of military intelligence; if he is not known, inquiry is made of other agencies, among which the Comintern is the most important. Even after the "disbandment" of the Comintern in 1943, its voluminous card indexes and personal files must certainly have continued to be the best source of information on potential intelligence agents from Communist and semi-Communist ranks. If the Center approves the employment of a proposed agent, it assigns him an alias which must invariably be used in subsequent correspondence.

The group of agents and subagents recruited by Sokolov, Kudriavtsev, and the party leaders in the course of the first year was small: there was only one group of three or four agents in Ottawa-Toronto and two or three groups in Montreal.

In the summer of 1943 military attaché Col. Nikolai Zabotin and his staff and cipher clerks arrived in Ottawa. Zabotin, who was assigned to head the expanding network, was a striking personality. Trained at the Krassin Artillery School, he became commander of a battery, went to Mongolia in the 'thirties, and

fought against the Japanese in the Khalkingol "border incident." His cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko, who arrived with him and whose defection was the doom of the military attaché, still has feelings of devotion toward him. Gouzenko says that Zabotin was a "magnetic personality," "tall, handsome, personable."

His curly grayish hair topped a fine military bearing. He must have been well educated because the polish of his Russian speech was a treat to hear. His bright, gay conversation sparkled with references to his place in the Ural Mountains, to his dogs and horses. We assumed that he belonged to a privileged family, a fact borne out by his sudden shifting of the conversation whenever we tried to learn more about his family in subsequent talks. . . .

He liked to talk of his service with the Red Army where he had won distinction as an artillery officer. During his reminiscences, he frequently mentioned names of commanders and often would pause to comment: "Later, during the purge, he was shot." Frequently, after such comments, he exclaimed: "When I come to think of it, why wasn't I shot, too?"²

Before Zabotin left Moscow to assume his Canadian post he was received by no less a personage than Georgi Malenkov. The fact that Malenkov, a top-ranking member of the Politburo and beset at the time by wartime problems, took the time for a meeting with the obscure party functionary on his way to Canada was significant. Malenkov, though not Zabotin's direct superior, gave him strict instructions on how he was to operate. The espionage work, he explained, would remain a secret from the ambassador; Zarubin (the ambassador) was to see none of the correspondence with Moscow on the subject nor was he to learn the names of any of the spies. In certain instances, when Zabotin's agents supplied information on Canadian affairs, Zabotin was to inform the ambassador, but without revealing the source of his reports.*

* "I have informed the boss of metro [head of the embassy] on political, economic and military questions in accordance with instructions given to me by the chief director [of GRU] and by comrade Malenkov. The sources were never reported by me." Zabotin message to the Director, Aug. 11, 1945, in *Report of the [Canadian] Royal Commission*, p. 87.

The network's first year of operation was occupied with recruiting agents, checking on them in Canada, and communicating with Moscow concerning prospective agents. By the end of 1944 a group of about twenty Canadian agents had been assembled. The network, including both military intelligence and GB agents, reached its peak in 1945; by the end of the war the former was composed of seventeen Soviet officials and about twenty Canadians. Two were camouflaged as officials of the trade mission, one as secretary of the embassy, one as a TASS correspondent, one as a translator, two as doormen, and two as chauffeurs. Zabotin felt, however, that an apparatus of this size was too small for the task, and a far-reaching plan for further expansion of the trade mission was prepared and, in veiled form, submitted to the Canadian authorities. Before the plan began to materialize, however, the great debacle had begun.

REGISTRATION CARD

No. _____

PHOTO
OF
CARR

1. SURNAME, NAME, PATRONYM SAM CARR

2. PSEUDONYM "FRANK"

3. SINCE WHEN IN THE NET _____

4. ADDRESS:

(a) OFFICE _____

(b) HOME 14 Montrose, Toronto. Tel. Ll-7847

(brook)

5. PLACE OF WORK AND POSITION LABOUR PROG. PARTY
polit. worker

6. FINANCIAL CONDITIONS Financially secure, but
takes money. It is necessary occasionally to help.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Detailed material on his biography is available in the CENTRE in the COMINTERN. Has an excellent knowledge of the Russian language, he graduated from the LENIN school in Moscow.

The Soviet intelligence ring in Canada, which flowered for less than a year, was much like the Washington groupings in respect to membership, assignments, and methods of operation: government officials, some of them in important positions, constituted the major part of the ring. A number of go-betweens were available to pick up documents, photograph them, and arrange for their dispatch. Moscow was pleased with the achievements of the young agency. A few weeks before the eruption, Zabotin was decorated.

The most important role in the network fell to Communist leader Sam Carr. The information on the "registration card" on Carr in Zabotin's office (which certainly corresponded to a similar record at the Center in Moscow) was terse and matter-of-fact, if not a little cynical.

In Zabotin's notebook, Sam Carr was described as follows ³:

Second Group

(Ottawa - Toronto)

SAM (FRANK) Jew. Organizer. Studied with us in 1924-26 in the Soviet Party School. Speaks Russian. LEON became acquainted with FRANK at a meeting in October 1942.

The following is a description of a "task" assigned to Carr in June 1945:

Is there any possibility for you of developing our work in the Ministry of National Defence, in the Ministry for Air, in the Ministry of the Navy or else in their military staffs.⁴

A later task given to Carr on August 16, 1945, by Major Rogov, Zabotin's assistant, contained the request to report on "Your possibilities regarding the selection of people in the General Staffs of the Armed Forces." It was Carr who procured the false passport for "Witczak" for \$3,000.

Fred Rose, the second of the two leaders of the Canadian Communist party, had been a Canadian citizen since 1926. He had more than once come in conflict with the law, but was nevertheless elected to the House of Commons in 1943. His services to

Soviet intelligence were significant. As an M.P. and head of the Ottawa-Toronto group of the Communist party, Rose was also in a position to obtain access to governmental documents and to report on secret sessions of the House of Commons.

2. THE MAIN AGENTS

Among the approximately twenty agents and subagents of Zabotin's network, Allan Nunn May was outstanding. An experimental physicist and a British civil servant, he had visited Russia in 1936 and among his friends was known as a man of leftist orientation; he did not, however, participate in political fights and his writings did not appear in the press. At a time when the main objective of British counterespionage was the uncovering of German spies, May's loyalty was not questioned by Scotland Yard. He was sent to Canada as a member of a research group in connection with atomic energy research.

On instructions from Moscow, Zabotin first contacted May in 1943, and from time to time thereafter obtained information from him, mainly on progress in atomic research. In 1945, at the instigation of Zabotin's apparat, May furnished several lengthy and comprehensive reports. In July 1945 he handed over laboratory samples of U-235 and U-225, which Colonel Motinov, Zabotin's assistant, immediately flew to Moscow. The day after the bombing of Hiroshima Zabotin was in a position to send a coded telegram to Moscow based on information from May containing facts on the atomic bomb which at that time were still highly secret:

To the Director: Facts given by Alek: (1) The test of the atomic bomb was conducted in New Mexico, (with "49," "94-239"). The bomb dropped on Japan was made of uranium 235. It is known that the output of uranium 235 amounts to 400 grams daily at the magnetic separation plant at Clinton. The output of "49" is likely two times greater (some graphite units are planned for 250 mega watts, i.e. 250 grams each day). The scientific research work in this field is scheduled to be published, but without the technical details. The Americans already have a published book on this subject.

(2) Alek handed over to us a platinum with 162 micrograms of uranium 233 in the form of oxide in a thin lamina.¹


Political information was supplied to Zabotin by two women agents, Kathleen Mary Willsher and Emma Woikin. A Communist for at least a decade, Kathleen Willsher, one of the first subagents of Soviet intelligence in Canada, had begun to furnish information to Fred Rose as early as 1935. Her duties as an employee of the office of the British high commissioner of the United Kingdom at Ottawa included filing letters and telegrams, including secret correspondence and documents. Letters exchanged between the Canadian ambassador in Moscow and the Canadian prime minister passed through her hands.

While Miss Willsher was able to supply information on the Moscow-London-Ottawa triangle, Emma Woikin could submit documents from the Canadian Department of External Affairs. Daughter of Russian immigrants, Emma Woikin was an unhappy young widow when Major Sokolov of the Soviet embassy and his wife started to cultivate her. She had lost not only her husband but her child, and had lived for a long time in poverty. To Emma Woikin the Soviet Union was a land where happiness reigned and the poor were cared for. Her "contacts," the Sokolovs, tried to encourage her enthusiasm for Russia. From the passport division of the Department of External Affairs, where she was employed, she was transferred to the highly secret cipher division in February 1944. In October 1944 she agreed to supply Sokolov with secret material from the Department of External Affairs, and as soon as Moscow gave the green light, she started to deliver it. What she most wanted was to emigrate to Russia, but Sokolov kept her from doing this; when she finally did appear at the embassy with her application for Soviet citizenship, it was already January 1946, and before action was taken on her application she was arrested.

A typical ring of informers was organized by Major Rogov, another of Zabotin's assistants. Four Canadian government officials—David Gordon Lunan, Durnford Smith, Ned Mazerall, and Isidor Halperin—were organized into one group, each member being assigned an alias (by Moscow), all beginning with the letter B. For reasons of "conspiracy," Rogov tried to restrict his

own contacts to the leader of this ring, who was Lunan ("Back"); Lunan in turn maintained contact with Smith, Mazerall, and Halperin ("Badeau," "Bagley," "Bacon"). The document reproduced here, typewritten in English, was handed over to Lunan by Major Rogov. The scheme meant that Jan (Major Rogov of the embassy) would be the supreme leader of the network; Lunan, the Canadian, would be the center of a four-man group of his fellow countrymen.

**The scheme of your group will be approximately such
as it is shown below.**



You only will know me (as Jan) but nobody else.²

Lunan's main task as a member of the ring was to collect facts and documents from the other three.

Durnford Smith, who was a research engineer in the National Research Council, supplied information related to the field of radio technique and optics and reports on the workings of the secret Council on Research Problems. Exact descriptions of Smith's "tasks" were kept in Zabotin's office; some were marked "fulfilled," others "partly fulfilled" or "promised to obtain." *

Ned Mazerall, Lunan's second subagent, was also employed in

* One remark in the margin of this record is indicative of the carefully elaborated system of discipline. It refers to a meeting of August 25, 1945, scheduled to take place at a street corner, and reads: "Was a torrential downpour but he [Smith] nevertheless came. I gave instructions not to come in the future in such weather; it is not natural." (An observer of the meeting between the two men would be likely to recall it, under the circumstances.) Then follows: "Handed out 100 dollars."

the National Research Council; he worked in the most secret department, that dealing with radar, technical aspects of radio, and air navigation. Mazerall was a fearful and reluctant spy, and his contribution was not substantial.

Isidor Halperin, a mathematics professor, was Lunan's third subagent. An expert on artillery, he had extensive knowledge of new weapons, explosives, and other inventions. "He is definitely keen," wrote Lunan, "and will be helpful." Halperin submitted a long report to Rogov, which was forwarded to Moscow, describing the work of the CARDE (Canadian Army Research and Development Establishment) and its various plants and laboratories, including the pilot explosives plant, the ballistics laboratory, the designs branch, etc.

On the basis of information received from his three subagents, Lunan, in turn, submitted over-all reports to his superior, Major Rogov, who forwarded them to Moscow. Lunan's reports started with the salutation "Dear mother and father"—a modest precaution against a casual glance from a colleague in the office; the texts of the reports, however, were outspoken:

With the exception of Bacon [Halperin], who is enthusiastic and politically experienced, it would be unwise to approach them point blank with all the tasks assigned. They already feel the need for maintaining a very high degree of security and taking abnormal precautions at their normal meetings (about once in two weeks) . . . Also, for the time being, [it is wise] not to characterize the work for what it is, but merely to let it be understood that it is work of a special conspiratorial nature, without mentioning my connection with you.³

Then Lunan proceeded to report on each of his subordinates individually, describing their assignments, personal problems, oral information furnished by them, biography, family situation, etc.

In the eyes of his Canadian-Soviet superiors, Raymond Boyer, nicknamed "Professor," was one of the outstanding agents. A noted chemist, wealthy, a Communist since the middle 1930's, he had started to work for Soviet intelligence before the new office in the embassy was established; at that time his superior had been Fred Rose. Boyer was the most learned expert on explosives in

Canada, and perhaps in the Western hemisphere. The Soviet military attaché characterized Boyer in his notebook as "the best of the specialists on VV [high explosives] on the American continent. Gives full information on explosives and chemical plants. Very rich. He is afraid to work." ⁴

On the basis of Boyer's reports, Zabotin sent information to Moscow on projects dealing with the atom bomb, most of them in the nature of rumors and not very accurate; these reports must have sounded naive in Moscow, where reliable information was being received from other secret sources. One of Zabotin's telegrams (it is not certain whether it was ever actually dispatched) read:

This plant will produce 'Uranium.' . . . As a result of experiments carried out with Uranium it has been found that Uranium may be used for filling bombs, which is already being done in a practical way. The Americans have undertaken wide research work, having invested 660 million dollars in this business.⁵

Despite his outdated and inexact information, Boyer was held in high esteem by Zabotin, whose assistants, Sokolov, and the latter's wife were permitted to have social relations with the "Professor"—a rare deviation from the strict code of behavior.

Two Soviet agents worked in the Canadian Department of Munitions. One, James Benning, was responsible for preparation of the quarterly secret "Forecast of War Production in Canada," a complete survey of the economic situation and the prospects of Canadian war industries. The other, Harold Samuel Gerson, was a brother-in-law of Benning. Son of Russian immigrants, and a geological engineer by profession, Gerson had served during the war with Allied War Supplies, Ltd., a Crown company engaged in production of chemicals and explosives, but after the war was transferred to the Ammunition Production Branch. Boyer had helped Gerson to obtain this position of trust. Introduced by Boyer also to the apparatus, Gerson was one of the first to join it, which he did early in the war. From September 1942 on he worked for Moscow under Fred Rose. "He works well," read a note in the military attaché's notebook, "gives material on shells and cannon (on films)."

Gerson was active in Soviet intelligence for three years. He supplied large quantities of secret documents, mostly on technical matters relating to artillery. One of his reports and related documents was 160 pages in length.

In August 1945, when the war was nearing its end, Gerson conceived a plan for continuing his work and increasing its importance for the apparat after he should be obliged to leave his government job. On his behalf the Soviet military attaché, on August 25, 1945, sent a message to headquarters in Moscow inquiring whether the Director would agree to the following plan: Gerson would establish in Ottawa a "Geological Engineering Consulting Office" (which would be in line with his prewar profession), the projected budget of \$7,000 a year to be appropriated by Moscow, the "office," of course, to serve as a cover for a Soviet espionage unit. The response from Moscow to this proposal did not come until after the catastrophe of September 6, when Igor Gouzenko turned over his documents to the Canadian authorities.

Another Canadian agent was Eric Adams, an employee of the Bank of Canada in a confidential position. Among his duties for the bank was investigation of industrial plans for credit purposes, so that he was well informed on the situation in the war industries; he turned over to the Soviet apparat secret "Reviews of Dispatch of Munitions to England," which came to him at the bank. Other confidential material, for example the report on the 1944 secret negotiations between Lord Keynes and the Canadian government, was forwarded to Moscow through Adams' efforts.

Another agent was David Shugar, a native of Russian Poland before the revolution, who worked in Research Enterprises, Ltd., a Crown company, in the vicinity of Toronto; he became an expert in radar, his special knowledge pertaining to the equipment for locating submarines. Shugar bore the proud nickname of "Prometheus." "He agreed to work for us," Major Rogov noted, "but with special precautions; he has been under observation." The "observation" was no obstacle, however, to Shugar's espionage work, nor did it help the Canadian authorities to learn anything about the apparat.

Engineer Matthias S. Nightingale was a squadron leader in the air force during the war, hence the nickname "Leader" by which he was known in the Soviet apparat. His knowledge em-

braced Canadian airfields and coasts. Nightingale was a new recruit, having been proposed to Moscow in 1945, and was still in the preparatory stages of his spying career when the whole Canadian structure crashed. A prerequisite for Canadians in Soviet service was, of course, breaking off relations with the Communist party; the rupture must be made some time before, not on the eve of, entering the secret service. In February 1945 Major Rogov made this characteristic note in one of his documents: Nightingale "has been detached from the corporants [Communist party], that is, he has been reserved for the future. He does not work for the corporation, his contact is only of a control nature twice a year."⁶

During even this preparatory stage Nightingale managed to make available to Major Rogov maps prepared by the Canadian air force, relating to the Gander projects in Newfoundland, Canadian airports, and others. Of particular interest for the GB in Moscow, no doubt, was Nightingale's report on a new system of "listening-in telephone devices" being used in America.

There were also a number of lesser agents for auxiliary work. Agatha Chapman, employed in the Bank of Canada, functioned as a go-between for more important agents. Freda Linton, employed at the International Labor Office during the war, served in a similar capacity. Squadron leader F. W. Poland, friend of Sam Carr, having proved of little use to military intelligence, was turned over by Zabolotin to the other Soviet apparat in Canada, the GB.

In addition to this brigade of "secret workers," to use the Russian term, special establishments were set up; all kinds of passports and visas were procured for illegal use; photographic laboratories in the secret offices of the Soviet embassy were supplemented by other photo ateliers, installed, for example, in reliable drugstores; meeting places were arranged; mail drops were set up; etc. Like the "yavka" of dentist Rosenbliett in New York in the 1930's, the office of optometrist Henry Harris in Toronto was used for secret contacts between Sam Carr and his agents.

3. THE PASS-APPARAT IN CANADA

Urged repeatedly by Moscow, Zabolotin and his assistants were making strenuous efforts to obtain false Canadian passports for

their agents in the United States. For example, an important Soviet agent in California traveled over the United States under the name "Ignacy Witczak." Moscow believed that the real Witczak, a Canadian citizen, had fallen in the civil war in Spain. A photo of the Soviet agent had been skillfully attached to Witczak's old passport, and a woman, traveling under the name of "Bunia Witczak," accompanied him when they arrived in New York in 1938. The real Witczak, however, returned to Canada from Spain in February 1939, was permitted to land without a passport, and proceeded to Leamington, where he had formerly lived as a farm laborer. The false "Witczak," a man with "a face smooth and expressionless as a wax mask, with narrow-set eyes and primly pursed lips, who looked more like a fussy schoolmaster than a Soviet agent,"¹ had enrolled in the University of Southern California as a social science student. When the war came, this man registered in the United States in accordance with the regulations, giving his nationality as Canadian. He later graduated from the university with high scholastic honors, including election to Phi Beta Kappa.

After seven years of espionage work the false "Witczak" found himself in need of a passport renewal, and military intelligence in Moscow was prepared to pay \$3,000 as a bribe to a disloyal Canadian official for procuring the renewal. On the urging of the military attaché, and against his own better judgment Sam Carr paid over the amount, and in August 1945 the passport for the false "Witczak" was renewed. Its bearer, however, did not enjoy his new legality for long. Six days after the passport was delivered, Igor Gouzenko began his revelations to the Canadian authorities, and the FBI began to watch the false "Witczak" in California. One day the spy disappeared with his wife and child; the security authorities of the United States have proof that he arrived safely in Poland.²

Six years later a former Communist from the West Coast, Dr. Arnold Krieger, appeared before a congressional committee to testify concerning the man who had called himself "Witczak." He said that Witczak had been his close friend, had repeatedly suggested that he go on a secret mission to China or Japan, and had later offered him work in Latin America. In each case Krieger was to set up an office to serve as a front for "Witczak" or his friends.

The Witczak passport affair and the negotiations concerning it between the Soviet agents in Canada and Sam Carr occurred during the visit to Canada of two very important persons from Moscow whose inspection trip caused much excitement and anxiety in the circles of Soviet intelligence. One of them was "Mikhail Milsky" (Milstein), deputy of Feodor Kuznetsov, supreme chief of Soviet military intelligence (the Director); the other was Grigori Kosarev, who occupied a position similar to Milsky's in the apparat of the GB. Traveling as humble diplomatic couriers, the two officials made a most interesting wartime trip through the United States, Mexico, and Canada. They went first to New York, proceeded from there to Mexico, from Mexico to California (where agencies of military intelligence and the GB had been doing their own particular "atomic research"), and from there to Canada. It so happened that they arrived in New York on the day that Victor Kravchenko "chose freedom" and published his challenging letter to the Soviet government. No wonder that, according to information in the hands of the American authorities, the two chiefs "were greatly dissatisfied with operations in the United States," and that a number of Soviet officials were ordered to return to Russia in reprisal for "lack of vigilance."

In Canada the inspectors were highly satisfied with the networks set up under Zabolotin, and Pavlov, the GB man, and by the great prospects looming for Soviet intelligence in that country. Without realizing that he was sealing his own doom, Milsky sent a cable to Moscow expressing high praise of Colonel Zabolotin and his staff. This was only a few months before Zabolotin was recalled and his outfit destroyed.

The honor of meeting the Soviet superchiefs was not accorded to the bulk of the Canadian agents. Only Sam Carr met Milsky to discuss the false passport affair. At the end of July the inspectors returned to Russia.

The following year another pair of inspectors came to Canada. One of them was again Grigori Kosarev; as the second member of the team, Sergei Fomichev replaced his unhappy colleague from military intelligence, Milsky. But now the situation had changed—in Canada all Soviet officials, agents, and subagents were anxious, expecting arrest any day.

4. THE END OF THE BOOM

The history of Soviet espionage over the years has been a sequence, on an international scale, of ups and downs, booms and depressions, in a pattern of periodic rise and fall resembling the business cycles in a national economy. The war, and in particular the years 1944-45, marked one of the most successful periods in the history of Soviet intelligence abroad. At its peak, in the summer of 1945, vast projects were ripening and hundreds of new agents were being recruited; it looked as if nothing could stop the rapid and successful extension of the apparatus. The blindness and almost childish optimism that affected the Soviet leaders during this boom period of espionage was analogous to the naive hope that pervades a stock exchange, at the end of a period of industrial prosperity, that somehow depression will be avoided and prosperity continue.

Toward the end of the war the army of Soviet secret agents and informers had reached a fabulous size. "There were thousands, yes thousands, of agents in the United States" says Igor Gouzenko; "thousands in Great Britain, and many other thousands spread elsewhere throughout the world."¹ On the basis of his own experience in the headquarters of Soviet military intelligence, Gouzenko states that "odds and ends of information kept pouring in . . . from thousands of agents."² But no Soviet agents were arrested in the United States, Canada, or Great Britain during the war, and Moscow ascribed this astonishing success not to deliberate policies of the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office but to its own cleverness and adroitness.

A further extension of the network was in the offing. A few days before V-J Day, for example, the Center was preparing to send a large new *équipe* to the Western hemisphere as part of a new "trade mission." On August 28, 1945, Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zarubin repeated his request to the Foreign Office for permission to open trade offices in Montreal which would have the privilege of diplomatic immunity. The staff of the commercial mission in Canada, which already had fifty employees, Zarubin wanted increased to ninety-seven; the new commercial offices requested for Montreal and Ottawa were intended to provide cover for the new intelligence cell of about twenty persons.

These and other plans would probably have materialized had it not been for the catastrophe brought about by the action of Igor Gouzenko, the significance of which went far beyond the Canadian borders; it was the initial signal of an international depression in Soviet intelligence activities.

The cipher clerk in Zabotin's office, the short, blond, twenty-six-year-old Igor Gouzenko, was a gifted young man whose real abilities lay in fields not at all related to international espionage. But a decade full of dramatic events intervened before he found his true vocation.

Born in 1919, at the height of the civil war in Russia, Gouzenko came of a poor family. Despite the fact that most of its members were emotionally attached to old Russia, he himself joined the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) and sincerely embraced the Leninist faith. He studied architecture for three years, but the war, which disrupted so many careers, put an end to his plans. In 1941 he was sent to the Military Intelligence School in Moscow to study ciphering and codes. Thoroughly screened and investigated, he was found reliable.

In 1942 Gouzenko was assigned to the military intelligence center in Moscow. In 1943 he was sent abroad as a cipher clerk of the newly established agency of military intelligence in Canada.

To Gouzenko and his wife Anna, Canada was more than a new country, it was a new world. After a year in Ottawa Communism appeared to them like a nightmare out of their past. When his two-year period of service in Canada was coming to an end, Gouzenko tried to postpone the inevitable parting. He knew that there was no simple way for him to arrange to remain in Canada. When his replacement, Kulakov, arrived from Moscow, Gouzenko knew that within a few days he must return to Russia.

The decision to defect, to break off the ties to one's country, friends, family, to live permanently among people of another tongue and another culture, is a difficult one. With Anna's approval and encouragement, however, Gouzenko decided to take the step, and he began to make meticulous preparations to carry it out. He took home from the office of the military attaché eloquent letters and documents relating to Fred Rose and his spy services, the exchange of secret messages between the Canadian Department of External Affairs and the Canadian ambassador in

Moscow (available through the services of Emma Woikin, spy in the department); and so on. Gouzenko was certain that at the critical moment these papers would prove he was a genuine defector, not an intriguer or provocateur. On September 5, 1945, he brought home some hundred documents which he had concealed in his pockets and inside his shirt. The papers were at least as revealing as those other famous espionage documents, the "pumpkin papers" of Whittaker Chambers. Gouzenko, like Chambers, was unsuccessful in the first stage of his venture, with the difference, however, that in the case of Chambers this first stage lasted about eleven years but in Gouzenko's case only thirty-six dreadful hours.

The dramatic personal aspects of the Gouzenko story have been related more than once in official reports and by individual authors; here we will dwell rather on its political aspects and the attitude of governmental agencies, in particular the Soviet agencies, involved in the affair.

Gouzenko at first met with firm resistance on the part of the Canadian government and press. Turned down by newspaper editors, he went to the Department of Justice, and then got in touch with the prime minister through the Department of External Affairs. For Mr. Mackenzie King there existed two different sets of considerations: on the one hand, there were misgivings as to the genuineness of the documents and the truthfulness of the unknown Gouzenko, doubts as to whether the whole affair was not an intrigue arising out of obscure aims of some anti-Soviet agency which might provoke a scandal and compromise the government if it became involved with the strange papers; on the other hand, the documents proved theft of atomic and other state secrets and secret correspondence from the Canadian Department of External Affairs, and the security of the nation demanded at least persual of them. It was symptomatic of the political climate of the time that Mr. King not only refused to deal with Gouzenko and his papers but recommended that the young cipher clerk return to his embassy. "I thought he should be told," Mr. King reported later to the House of Commons, "to go back to the embassy with the papers he had in his possession . . . What I felt most important was to see that nothing should be done which would cause the Russian Embassy to believe that Canada

had the least suspicion of anything which was taking place there . . ."

Gouzenko did not follow the advice of the prime minister. He spent a whole day trying to get access to some other agency, but failed. All doors seemed closed. The Gouzenkos went back to their flat in despair.

Meantime Zabotin's office had learned that not only was Gouzenko missing but so were several recently received messages; obviously this was not a case of illness or other legitimate absence. The measures taken by the Soviet agency from this moment on followed the same pattern as in other cases.

First of all, the Gouzenko case passed from military intelligence to the GB. Military intelligence was competent in matters concerned with Gouzenko's position, salary, advance, transfer, but from the moment his loyalty came in question GB had the say. Vitali Pavlov, second secretary of the embassy but actually chief of the GB in Canada, ordered two guards to watch the apartment house the Gouzenkos lived in and report his arrival there immediately. When the Gouzenkos returned from their futile round of the government agencies, a small brigade, headed by Pavlov, went to the apartment house. Their task was a delicate one: to enter a closed apartment, make a search of it without a warrant, compel Gouzenko to go with them or kidnap him, or, if necessary, take more drastic action. The Gouzenkos, however, had entered a neighbor's apartment instead of their own.

The standing Soviet strategy in cases like this is a full offensive and behavior arrogant in the extreme. The Pavlov group forced the lock and entered Gouzenko's apartment, prepared to wait for the culprit. Notified by Gouzenko, who had observed the arrival of the Pavlov group, the police appeared at the apartment. Pavlov not only did not try to justify the smashed lock but demanded that the police leave immediately, saying that Gouzenko had permitted him to enter in his absence, that he was looking for some papers belonging to the embassy, and that his diplomatic status must suffice to satisfy the curiosity of the police. The police were not satisfied, however, and refused to leave until Pavlov and his group departed. This was a sleepless night not only for the Gouzenkos but doubtless for Zabotin and Pavlov too.

It was Pavlov's nocturnal attack that saved Gouzenko. Now the

police had legitimate ground for protecting him and his family, and the incident caused the authorities to become more interested in Gouzenko's documents. The following morning the Gouzenkos were taken into custody by the police. They were now beyond the reach of Pavlov and the GB.

Pavlov and Zabolotin were faced with the familiar questions—exactly how much did the defector know about the espionage activities? How many documents, letters, notebooks, and memoranda had he taken? What part of the story, if any, would he reveal to the authorities? There was a good chance that, in fear for his life, he would keep silent about the most compromising aspects of apparat activities. In the earlier history of Soviet espionage there had been more than one case of a defecting member of intelligence who remained silent for the rest of his days. Perhaps Gouzenko, too, would vanish without leaving traces. Both Pavlov and Zabolotin had personal reasons for being interested in such a halfway solution, for if Gouzenko revealed too much, recall to Moscow and severe punishment for both was certain.

In this highly embarrassing situation the embassy set in motion its typical diplomatic barrage against the government. Even before the first instructions arrived from Moscow, Ambassador Zarubin sent a note of reproach to the Canadian Department of External Affairs. Igor Gouzenko, Zarubin said, was an embezzler whom the Canadian government must produce and turn over to the Soviet authorities; the Canadian policemen who had displayed such extreme "rudeness" during the encounter in Gouzenko's apartment must be punished.

A colleague of the Embassy [the note, dated September 7, 1945, stated], Igor Sergeievitch Gouzenko, living at 511 Somerset St., failed to report for work at the proper time on the 6th of September. . . .

It was later established that I. Gouzenko robbed some money belonging to the Embassy and had hidden himself together with his family. . . .

Constable Walsh of the Ottawa City Police appeared together with another policeman and tried in a rude manner to detain the diplomatic colleagues of the Embassy . . .

. . . Inspector of the City Police Macdonald, who appeared at the Gouzenko apartment in fifteen minutes, and also in a

rude manner demanded that Consul V. G. Pavlov and the other diplomatic colleagues of the Embassy go with him to the Police Station . . .

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. asks the Department of External Affairs to take urgent measures to seek and arrest I. Gouzenko and to hand him over for deportation as a capital criminal, who has stolen money belonging to the Embassy.

In addition the Embassy brings to the attention of the Department of External Affairs the rude treatment accorded to the diplomatic colleagues of the Embassy by Constable Walsh and Inspector of the City Police Macdonald, and expresses its confidence that the Department will investigate this incident and will make those guilty answerable for their actions.³

No reply, of course, was forthcoming. A week later, having in the meantime received instructions from Moscow, the ambassador presented a second note in which the same demand was reiterated, with the important addition that Gouzenko must be handed over *without trial*:

Confirming its communication in the Note No. 35 of Sept. 7th of the fact that Gouzenko had robbed public funds, the Embassy, upon instructions from the Government of the U.S.S.R. repeats its request to the Government of Canada to apprehend Gouzenko and his wife, and without trial, to hand them over to the Embassy for deportation to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet government expresses the hope that the Government of Canada will fulfill its request.⁴

Meantime, and in great secrecy, investigation was being made of Gouzenko's papers. Prime Minister King was uncertain as to the course he should take in an affair which had international significance. Without giving a hint of his action to the press, King decided to confer on the matter with President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. He arrived in Washington on November 10 and succeeded in misleading the press concerning the main topic of his discussion with the President. Then he sailed for London, and here again there appeared no hint in the press of the reason for his visit. King had the naive idea of proceeding

from London to Moscow to take the matter up with Stalin. (A few months later Mr. King told the Canadian House of Commons: "From what I have heard and know about Premier Stalin, I am confident that the Russian leader would not countenance or condone such action in one of his country's embassies.") Somehow King was dissuaded from making the trip to Moscow, and he returned to Ottawa to await further results of the extensive investigation.

More than a month had elapsed since Gouzenko's disappearance from the embassy, but no arrests had yet been made. The apparat in Canada and the Director in Moscow could assume that Gouzenko had not talked, that the worst was nearly over, and that "normal" conditions would resume. On October 15 Zarubin returned with nonchalance to the Department of External Affairs to repeat his demand for a new Soviet commercial agency in Montreal. But measures of precaution were nevertheless being taken by the Soviet agency. The mysterious "Ignacy Witczak," about whom Gouzenko was well informed, left the United States hurriedly. Fred Rose, Sam Carr, and the most important members of Zabolotin's ring became cautious. They were instructed to deny, if interrogated, any connections with the Soviet embassy.

A number of people in and around the ministries in Ottawa, Washington, and London got knowledge of the developments, and the FBI and Scotland Yard were becoming active. The rumors finally reached Moscow, too. Suddenly, on December 13, Zabolotin left Canada without notifying the Department of External Affairs, an omission contrary to custom; obviously fearful for his own security (there was some belief that, despite diplomatic immunity, in this case he could be subject to arrest), he escaped to New York and boarded the Soviet *S. S. Alexander Suvorov*, which sailed clandestinely at night, neglecting to comply with port regulations. Actually already a prisoner, he was jailed in Moscow and made a scapegoat for the Canadian affair. The GB accused him of having caused the cipher clerk's defection by his "bad attitude toward Gouzenko." He was sentenced to ten years of hard labor.⁵

A few weeks after Zabolotin's departure Ambassador Zarubin also left, though openly. The Canadian government had gone out of its way to stress that the ambassador himself was not involved in espionage activities; however, with the publication of docu-

ments and the outburst of public indignation which was expected at any time, Zarubin's position was becoming untenable. It was not stated that he was leaving his post in Ottawa for good, but he never returned. Nine months later Britain consented to receive Zarubin as ambassador when Moscow asked approval of his appointment. Zarubin's doubtful integrity was restored. In 1952 the United States followed the British example and agreed to receive him as Soviet ambassador.

It was not until two months after Zarubin's departure that the first official announcement about the spy ring was made in Ottawa. Why five months in all were allowed to elapse before the first arrests were made was explained by the prime minister in a statement which was illuminating in terms of the international situation. In September, when Gouzenko had first appeared with his papers, the prime minister explained, the conference of foreign ministers in London had ended in discord, and he wanted to avoid giving the impression that his disclosure was in the nature of a retaliation for Molotov's intransigence; soon afterward a new conference was held in Moscow, and Canada did not wish to disturb its proceedings by an anti-Soviet revelation; an important session of the United Nations was to take place in London, and this was "another factor which entered into the judgment of my colleague, the Minister of Justice, and myself as to the time at which it would be most appropriate to begin proceedings." ⁶ Never did a spy ring and a fifth column receive more consideration than did these in Canada.

When, finally, on February 15, 1946, the official statement of the Canadian government was published, it gave the bare facts about the discovery of an extensive network of espionage in favor of a foreign power, without mentioning the name of the country involved—Prime Minister King was inviting the Soviet chargé d'affaires to announce that it was the Soviet Union that was meant.

The final report of the Royal Commission likewise showed great consideration for the Soviet viewpoint. To prove Zarubin's integrity, a separate section of the report, entitled "The Soviet Ambassador Not Implicated," dealt with Zarubin's position vis-à-vis the espionage activities in his embassy. Documents were quoted to show that the ambassador was kept in the dark about the Zabotin and Pavlov groups. That ignorance was itself an

offense, and that Zarubin was responsible for what went on in his embassy, was not pointed out.

The Soviet newspapers carried almost the complete text of the Canadian statement—a procedure unique in the annals of the Soviet press. It was obvious that some guilt would be acknowledged, and some people punished, while the Soviet government itself would try to emerge from the affair intact and innocent. In fact, on February 20, 1946, an eloquent statement, important in each of its details, appeared in all the Soviet newspapers. The Soviet military attaché and “certain members of the staff” were made the scapegoats in the affair. Their acts were termed “inadmissible,” but at the same time the significance of their intelligence reports was minimized. (Moscow did not know at the time it released this statement that a large number of documents would soon be published which would reveal that the Director himself had urged his military attaché in Canada to obtain the secret data being sought by Russia, including even a sample of U-235.) Then, in line with the new postwar haughtiness of the Soviet Union, the statement spoke contemptuously of the information obtained secretly in Canada which, it said, the Soviet Union, with its “more advanced technical attainment,” had no need of. Finally the Soviet government went over to the offensive, throwing at Canada one accusation after another: the Ottawa government encourages the anti-Soviet campaign and seeks to cause the Soviet Union political harm.

It was almost as if the Canadian government were sitting in the defendants’ bench and Moscow was the indignant prosecutor. All efforts of Prime Minister King to appease his opponent were in vain. The Soviet statement read:

Soviet organizations have become aware that in the latter periods of the war certain members of the staff of the Soviet Military Attache in Canada received, from Canadian nationals with whom they were acquainted, certain information of a secret character which did not, however, present great interest for the Soviet organizations. It has transpired that this information referred to technical data of which Soviet organizations had no need in view of more advanced technical attainment in the U.S.S.R.; the information in question could be found in published works on radio location,

etc., and also in the well-known brochure of the American, J. D. Smyth, *Atomic Energy*.

It would, therefore, be ridiculous to affirm that delivery of insignificant secret data of this kind could create any threat to the security of Canada.

None the less, as soon as the Soviet Government became aware that [of] the above-mentioned acts of certain members of the staff of the Military Attache in Canada, the Soviet Military Attache, in view of the inadmissibility of acts of members of his staff in question, was recalled from Canada. On the other hand, it must also be borne in mind that the Soviet Ambassador and other members of the staff of Soviet Embassy in Canada had no connection with this.

At the same time, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to draw attention to the unbridled anti-Soviet campaign which began in the Canadian press and on the Canadian radio simultaneously with the publication of the Canadian Government's statement. In spite of the complete lack of significance and importance of the circumstances which gave rise to the Canadian Government's statement of February 15th, this anti-Soviet campaign is being supported by many Canadian organizations, and at the same time the position taken up by the Canadian Government is directly aimed at encouragement of this anti-Soviet press and radio campaign which is incompatible with normal relations between the two countries.

In this connection, surprise is occasioned by the unusual fact that the Canadian Government published its statement on February 15th instead of, as is customary between countries in normal relations, previously asking for an explanation from the Soviet Government. Inasmuch as the Canadian Government did not consider it necessary to approach the Soviet Government for a previous explanation, it must be admitted that the Canadian Government herein was pursuing some other ends having no relation to the security interests of Canada.

It must be admitted that the above-mentioned unbridled anti-Soviet campaign formed part of the Canadian Government's plan aimed at causing the Soviet Union political harm.

It cannot be considered a mere chance that Mr. King's statement was made to coincide with the ending of the session of the Assembly of the United Nations where the Soviet Delegate spoke in defence of the principle of democracy and independence of small countries. Evidently Mr. King's statement and the anti-Soviet campaign in Canada which has been developed in connection with it are something in the nature of an answer to the unpleasantness caused to Mr. King's friends by the Soviet Delegate at the session of the Assembly.⁷

In the multitude of published Soviet articles and reports concerning the Canadian affair, no mention was made of Soviet guilt, not even on the part of the military attaché; instead the attack on Canada was conducted with vigor and sarcasm.

King has inflated a trifling incident [the highly official *New Times* said in its editorial of March 1, 1946], of the type that are ordinarily settled by means of direct negotiations, into a pretext for the commencement of an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign. Although the facts in question occurred last autumn, King timed his statement to coincide with the closing of the session of the United Nations, issuing it in such a manner as to make it appear sensational. The reactionary press, which had been waiting for the signal, immediately assailed the Soviet Union with a series of insinuations reminiscent of the most despicable anti-Soviet provocations of the past. But this clumsy maneuver, intended to divert public attention from the moral victory won by the stand of the Soviet delegates in the United Nations Organization, met with a miserable failure.

The *Pravda* editorial was in the same vein; it asserted that only "trifling and insignificant secret information was imparted to the Military Attaché."

The Canadian Government tried to cause political harm to the Soviet Union marching at the head of an anti-Soviet campaign . . . King's behavior does not fit into the pattern of normal relations between two countries and in no way corresponds to Canada's own interests.

The Soviet press attack was seconded by certain voices in the United States; the privilege of spying was openly accorded the Soviet government by a number of public leaders. Joseph E. Davies, one-time United States ambassador to the USSR, stated that "Russia in self-defense had every moral right to seek atomic bomb secrets through military espionage, if excluded from such information by her former fighting allies." (*Time*, March 4, 1946, p. 26.)

The New York *Herald Tribune*, whose foreign editor was himself close to Soviet agencies, blamed the espionage affair on atomic secrecy in general. In its editorial of February 22, 1946, the *Herald Tribune* concluded that "it would be well to accept the necessity of spying and being spied upon and to conduct the dual process as efficiently and as painlessly as possible."

In Britain there was likewise little understanding of the affair. When the news of it appeared in the press the eminent British physicist J. D. Bernal stated that the espionage conspiracy was a direct result of reluctance to "share atomic secrets"—meaning, obviously, with Russia. Labor M.P. L. J. Solley said that the Canadian investigation of espionage was a threat to scientific progress.

One of the defendants, Allan Nunn May, was tried in England, the others in Canada. The trials in Canada began in May 1946 and, conducted separately for each defendant, lasted until 1948. Igor Gouzenko, guarded by police, appeared at the trials as the main witness. Press and audience were forbidden to take pictures or make sketches of him, or even to publish descriptions.

As in the espionage trials in France, Japan, Sweden, and Finland, members of the Canadian apparatus deviated from the strict rule of Soviet intelligence that agents, if arrested, must never admit their activities, never plead guilty, and never reveal their connections. During the investigation, and later at the trials, many of the accused, although Communists and admirers of the Soviet Union, chose to admit their guilt, confess, and implicate their comrades. David Lunan, one of the key figures of the apparatus, a great hope of the military attaché and highly praised in the coded messages to Moscow, was, according to the official report, "very frank" and "cooperative" when arrested and interrogated; he not only confessed but gave information on Major Rogov as well as other members of his own little ring. Raymond

Boyer, the rich "Professor" and expert on explosives, testified about his underground contacts, involving Sam Carr, Fred Rose, Soviet Major Sokolov, and ten other persons. Kathleen Willsher, of the office of the British high commissioner, pleaded guilty to the charge of espionage; Emma Woikin, of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, did likewise. Allan Nunn May confessed and made a written statement of his espionage activities, which had included handing over uranium to Soviet agents and receiving money from them.

May was sentenced to ten years' penal servitude. Public opinion in England, not yet ripe at that moment to realize the full significance of Soviet espionage, was vague in its judgments; members and leaders of the Labor party especially were uncertain. There were protests against the "harsh" sentence, and a deputation under Labor M.P. Harold Laski tried to intervene with the government in May's behalf. They failed, of course, and May served out his sentence, which had been reduced one-third for good behavior. He was set free on December 30, 1952.

The Canadian court was lenient in this first of the great post-war espionage affairs. Six of the twenty accused were acquitted, including some whose guilt appeared obvious. Thirteen were sentenced to various prison terms. The two party leaders—the organizers and soul of the apparatus—were each given six years. Fred Rose remained in prison until August 1951. Two years later he left Canada for good and returned to Soviet-controlled Poland. His co-leader, Sam Carr, had escaped to Cuba, returning later to New York to live in hiding. Two years later, in January 1949, the "statistical engineer," who was writing "a book on mathematics," was arrested by the FBI; turned over to the Canadian authorities, he was tried and sentenced in April 1949. The Communist party of Canada, of which he was the leader, while dismissing the affair as nothing but "blackmail against peace," at the same time announced that Carr "no longer had any association" with the party.

During the early stage of the investigations Gouzenko and his family lived in houses and military camps of the Mounted Police as charges of the Canadian government. Kept busy by interrogations and investigations and in testifying before the Royal Commission and the courts, Gouzenko had little time for ar-

ranging his personal affairs. As his service to Canada became known and appreciated, help began to come from the public, as if in recompense for the initial cold treatment. His first book, *This Was My Choice* (in the United States titled *The Iron Curtain*), was a success, and a film was based on it. The former Soviet cipher clerk was now in possession of a fortune of over \$150,000. Financial troubles were over, at least for some time.

Other troubles, however, which have haunted the family since Gouzenko made his revelations, are likely to last. They are compelled to hide their identity from the public, the press, and even from their children. No more than twelve persons know their whereabouts; the police have fabricated for them a successful "legend," to use the GB term—a fictitious biography, well thought through, plausible, and accepted by the Gouzenkos' neighbors, their children's schoolteachers, and local authorities. They have changed houses, cars, their names, so that all traces of their past shall be covered up. The permanent bodyguard maintained in the vicinity of the Gouzenkos' home is camouflaged in such a way that it cannot be recognized as a police unit. The success of these measures is surprising: of all the defecting Soviet agents who have come over to the other side, some have vanished from public view and have succeeded in living in hiding in comparative security; others have tried to act openly in the political arena, and some of these have paid dearly for their courage. Gouzenko is the only one among them who has been living and working on both levels at the same time.

Are we sure, however, that his whereabouts have remained a secret to those interested in learning it? Is his safety due to masterful camouflage or to the reluctance of his former masters to start a risky operation and aggravate relations with North America? Experts on the GB are almost certain that, if Soviet police wanted to badly enough, they would succeed in breaking the secret by one means or another.

At the end of his adventure in intelligence and counter-espionage, Gouzenko turned to writing. His first novel, *The Fall of a Titan*, published in 1954, was a considerable creative and financial success. It appears that Gouzenko may have found his true vocation in literature.

On the international scale the Gouzenko affair marked the end of the wartime prosperity of Soviet intelligence. The number

of those apprehended as a result of Gouzenko's revelations was small compared to the army of Soviet informers that existed at the peak of international Soviet espionage, but the blow that fell in Canada spelled doom for many others. No figures can be cited, but it seems certain that at least in the United States and Canada the majority of Soviet informers of 1944-45 withdrew and tried to forget and be forgotten. The legend of impunity had evaporated; a host of former admirers became dubious about the aims of Soviet espionage as part of the universal Soviet offensive; the increasing vigilance of the national security organs, along with the increase in severity of punishment, has marked the arrival of a new period of depression for Soviet intelligence.

But Moscow can never permit the permanent obstruction of its intelligence operations. It has done much to overcome the new barriers and it has not done it entirely unsuccessfully.

CHAPTER 8

Europe Since the War

1. THE NEW SETUP

EMERGENCIES of war had inevitably led to a weakening of the strict conspiracy rules. We have seen how in the years 1941-45 rules of conspiracy had been transgressed in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland; how espionage activities had become entangled with Communist party activities; how in their private lives ranking intelligence agents had behaved contrary to established custom. Now the emergency was over, and the time had come when the culprits must pay for their transgressions. In every case of a major failure of Soviet policy some individual or some group of individuals is accused of being responsible for it and pays the penalty, whether guilty or not, because an example must be made for the future, "laxity" must be corrected, "treason" punished.

Scapegoat number one in the Canadian affair was Col. Nikolai Zabotin, the Soviet military attaché in Canada. Zabotin was sentenced, as we have seen, to ten years at hard labor for a fictitious crime. This was not enough, however, for the stern judges in Moscow. They were convinced that even before Gouzenko defected Allied intelligence had intercepted and correctly interpreted the cable sent by the devoted Soviet spy Rahel Dubendorfer (see p. 223) in her desperate effort to resume contact with Moscow and supply headquarters with information coming from Roessler. Rahel's friend "Vera," now at the Swiss desk in Moscow, who of course had not acted without the approval of her superiors, also became suspect. As a result of the Canadian affair the whole American department, and as a result of the Dubendorfer affair the Swiss desk, had to be purged; the purge operation was widened in larger and larger circles, until finally it included even the head of military intelligence.¹

The investigation of the Zabotin-Dubendorfer affairs was interwoven with the investigation of a number of others including, as we have seen, Foote and Rado. Moscow started a scrutiny of Soviet networks abroad. Investigators were sent to the Western countries to interview all agents who had operated during the war years and their friends and acquaintances, without of course revealing the developments occurring at headquarters or the purge which was under way. Their investigation extended to all personalities and incidents, even the most insignificant. "We need your information," they explained, "to learn about the mistakes we committed in the war years, so that we will be able to improve our work in the future." And at the end of the interview: "Never mention this conversation to anyone."²

It was not only the investigations and the purges that necessitated a renovation of the Soviet intelligence machinery. Things were different now. The war was over, the German wave had receded; the remnants of the network now emerging out of the underground were old or weary and unable to resume the former nerve-wracking activities. A new generation of intelligence agents was needed, a new apparatus had to be built up almost everywhere in Europe.

The scale of values, too, had changed. During the preceding quarter of a century various countries had shared the honor of being target number one of Soviet intelligence—Poland, France, Japan, Germany. The United States, however, had never during this period been a primary target; the great successes of Soviet intelligence achieved in Washington and New York in the 1930's were, as we shall see, due to the zeal of American friends and sympathizers rather than to Soviet pressure. In fact, the best brains of the GB and the GRU had been put to work elsewhere. With 1946–47, however, the United States became number one target, leaving Britain and France, not to speak of the minor powers, far behind. No risk was too great, no expense too exorbitant, no agent too precious for intelligence operations in the United States.

Western Germany soon took over the number two position. Since 1948 the significance of Western Germany in the eyes of Soviet intelligence has grown rapidly, and, as we shall see, a dense network of espionage operated there in the years following the war.

On the other hand, it became possible after the war to abolish entire departments of Soviet military intelligence, namely, those which had operated in what were soon to become the satellite countries. There was no longer need for military intelligence operations there, since no political, economic, military, or other secrets were kept from the Soviet protectors; where a telephone call from the Soviet embassy produced wanted information, spies were superfluous. On the Communist ideological level espionage is an activity directed against capitalist governments; as the "socialist" world expands and the capitalist world shrinks, the scope of Soviet intelligence is correspondingly reduced until one day, with the fall of the last bastion of capitalism, secret intelligence will be altogether abolished. Actually, this course of development, which has nothing to do with capitalism or socialism, results from the expansion of the Soviet Empire, since there is no need for military intelligence in a conquered and annexed area. In this respect the Soviet government follows the pattern of all conquerors.

Discontinuance of military intelligence activities, however, does not mean the end of espionage in general; loyalty to Russia, heretofore a duty of the Communists, now becomes law for the entire population, and a host of informers assists the security agencies in their efforts to seek out and punish all forms of deviation. This, however, is a phase of activity of the political police, not of espionage "proper."

The Baltic states, Poland, and Rumania, of eminent importance for Soviet intelligence in the 1920's and 1930's, were now inside the borders of the Empire. Only Yugoslavia, from 1944 to 1947 a loyal subject of Moscow, was reinstated as an enemy and an objective of Soviet espionage when Tito broke with Moscow.

Not only have the satellites ceased to be targets of Soviet espionage but they have themselves joined the Soviet Union in espionage activities. It was no longer necessary to use Soviet officers to do the whole dirty and dangerous job; now other nationals, too, could be used for these tasks. On the ideological level the practice was justified on the ground that Soviet Communists, having carried the burden of espionage for over two decades and suffered great losses, could now rightfully expect some help from the new Soviet countries. The more realistic motives, however, were quite simple: Satellite legations and embassies abroad are

not as much under the eye of the public and the police as are the Soviet envoys and their staffs, and their ties with the local population are easier to conceal. In the United States in particular, where numerous groups of immigrants continue to speak their native languages, satellite military attachés and unofficial chiefs of intelligence can draw agents from among these groups of sympathizers.

The domination of Soviet intelligence over satellite espionage remains undisputed, however; cooperation is close and consistent, and work is divided according to a simple and sensible arrangement. Poland and Czechoslovakia are active in nearby Germany, while Rumania and Bulgaria operate in the Balkans. In addition, Poland has a network in France, where a part of the Polish population of 400,000 there constitutes a base for intelligence activities, and Czechoslovakia is active in Belgium. Working under strict Soviet control and guidance, all the Soviet satellite countries that have been admitted to membership in the United Nations are active within that body as well as in the United States, prime target of all Soviet-satellite apparatus.

Of the other countries, Japan, Sweden, Norway, and Greece have come to have a certain importance as objectives of Soviet espionage since the war. Having eliminated Germany as a Baltic power and rebuilt German installations on the coast, Moscow views Sweden as the only obstacle to its dominance over that sea. Espionage in Sweden has increased since the war.³ The setup in Greece, including secret radio, couriers, and penetration of military secrets, was revealed at the Athens trial in February 1952.

2. FRANCE

In the first years after the war the situation in France was more favorable for Soviet intelligence than ever before. Although France had always been a member of the Western bloc of nations, her coalition government, in which the Communist party was strong and which lasted for two and a half years, provided unprecedented facilities for Soviet intelligence.

As was the case throughout the West, diplomatic ties to and cooperation with the Soviet Union had outgrown the framework of a calculated temporary expedient, and what had started out as a cool relationship became an affair of the heart. All doors in

France were open to diplomatic, military, and intelligence representatives; underground facilities—secret agents, clandestine radio, false passports—were hardly needed at a time when Communist leaders like Charles Tillon and François Billoux stood at the head of the war ministries, and Paul Marcel and Auguste Lecoœur were in control of industrial production. Finally, Maurice Thorez himself became vice-premier in the fall of 1945. Not one of these men or their trusted assistants could refuse a request of a Soviet representative, and all were bound to supply Moscow with information, including confidential, secret, and top secret information concerning the United States, Great Britain, and France as well as concerning their non-Communist colleagues in the government. Never a Soviet satellite, France, from August 1944 to May 1947, was a Shangri-la for Soviet intelligence.

In addition to this circle of official Communism there emerged a huge twilight zone of sympathizers and fellow travelers which, for the needs of Soviet intelligence, proved more lasting and at least as important as the ephemeral ministers of the Fourth Republic. A host of men and women—former rightists, Socialists, Nazi collaborators—came to the wide-open doors of the governmental service to atone for their former sins by new zealotry in favor of Moscow. Some openly joined the Communist party, others joined secretly, and some remained outside to play their assigned roles of “objective observers,” invariably pleading the Soviet cause. Their ties with the Soviet embassy were organic and close and their services abundant and significant. Within this category were a number of well-known names.

Frédéric Joliot, grandson of a second cook of Napoleon III and son of a virtuoso on the hunting horn, was a teacher of physics before his marriage to Irène Curie, daughter of the renowned physicists Marie and Pierre Curie. He became a prominent atomic scientist, chief of a large atomic laboratory. A non-Communist before the war, he had even protested against Stalin's pact with Hitler in 1939. When the German armies occupied Paris, Joliot-Curie conducted conferences on physics in which Nazi officers participated, and in an interview with a reporter of the pro-Nazi *Nouveaux temps* he reiterated the view of French collaborationists: “We French scientists, passionately attached to our country, must have the moral courage to draw the lesson from our defeat.”¹

Joliot did, in fact, draw the "lesson": Nazi authorities accorded a rare privilege to Irène Joliot-Curie when, in October 1942, at a time when foreign travel was strictly prohibited, they permitted her to leave France to go to Switzerland for a year for reasons of health.²

After the liberation Joliot-Curie, now an ardent Communist, rose rapidly in political stature and became the head of a multitude of congresses and organizations founded with Soviet money, guided by Soviet agents, and supporting Soviet policy one hundred per cent. As head of the French atomic energy commission, he advocated, in accordance with Moscow's wishes, "revelation of atomic secrets." He did not wait, however, for a decision in this matter by the French government, but immediately, according to *Carrefour*,* "carried out espionage in favor of Moscow." In addition to Joliot-Curie, a number of lesser personalities were on the payroll of the French atomic agency. The chief of personnel of the agency was Jean-Pierre Vigier ("Braut"), member of the Swiss apparat, husband of Tamara Gaspari, and son-in-law of Rahel Dubendorfer.†

Joliot-Curie remained at his post for a long time after the Communist ministers had left the government; he was not removed until April 1950. If one day the extent of the contributions to atomic espionage for Moscow should be revealed, it may well be seen that the assistance of open "friends of the Soviet Union," like Frédéric Joliot-Curie, was at least as important as the clandestine messages from Klaus Fuchs, Allan Nunn May, Harry Gold, or Julius Rosenberg.

There were also a few "non-Communists" among the officials in high positions: for instance, the well-known Socialist and former secretary of Léon Blum, André Blumel, who assumed a highly important post in the security agency as "chief of the cabinet" of Minister of Interior Adrien Tixier. Not until 1948, when he appeared on the Communist side in the Kravchenko trial, did he publicly reveal his real stand. Thereafter he made a number of moves supporting the Soviet course in international affairs; in particular he signed the French Communist appeals in favor of Soviet spies tried and sentenced in Greece and the United States.

* April 18, 1950. Joliot-Curie made no move to prosecute the magazine for slander.

† See Chapter 5.

Another such official was Pierre Cot, former rightist and secretary to Raymond Poincaré. Cot suddenly turned into an ardent leftist before the war. During the Spanish civil war when he was minister of aviation, the press accused him of having revealed to Moscow a French secret of military technique; he did not sue for libel. After the war he again became minister of aviation, and in 1953 a Stalin prize was awarded him.

The first wartime Soviet diplomatic mission to France arrived in Paris in October 1944; simultaneously a Soviet military mission arrived, which set up offices in the former Lithuanian legation, and later in the Estonian legation, both of which were now in Soviet hands. The military mission was equipped with the usual technical facilities (radio, codes, etc.) and was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Novikov, whose assignments also covered the field of intelligence.³ The military mission tried to establish contacts with the surviving members of the old Soviet intelligence network in Europe and began to assemble the dispersed remnants of the old apparatus. Now Paris became a mecca for the stranded, broken-down "had-beens" of Soviet intelligence.

Among the first of the former underground leaders to arrive in Paris during this period was Alexander Rado, former chief of the Soviet network in Switzerland, now physically exhausted and tired of "illegality." After a short stay in Paris he was sent to Moscow along with Alexander Foote.

In Paris at the time of liberation was also the Soviet "general" Waldemar Ozols, who had served as an assistant of Sukulov in 1943-44 and was now under indictment for collaboration with the enemy. Trial by a French court might have resulted in developments unpleasant for Moscow. In line with its practice of avoiding public discussion of Soviet agents in foreign countries and of seeking to have Soviet citizens accused of crimes turned over to Soviet justice, the Soviet government sought to prevent a trial of Ozols. On Novikov's intervention, he was released and sent to Russia. Had he been tried by a French court, a death sentence would appear to have been certain.

Hermine Rabinovich, who had gained international notoriety in 1946 by her part in the Swiss and Canadian spy affairs and had had to leave Canada, also came to Paris, where she easily found a job in an emigration office. (Two years later, when the political

situation had changed and French authorities had decided to put an end to their magnanimity, she was forced to leave Paris and migrated to Israel.)

Hermine's cousin, Alexander Abramson, also involved in the Swiss spy affair and forced to leave Switzerland, likewise came to France. Although his role in the espionage affair was well known, he enjoyed the support of the veteran trade union leader and president of the Economic Council,⁴ Léon Jouhaux. Jouhaux refused to break off ties to the pro-Communist elements, and engaged Abramson to work in his "personal office." Jouhaux's office, which cooperated closely with French, American, and British non-Communist labor organizations, was an excellent observation point and a source of abundant information. In August 1950, when the situation began to change, the French government decided to expel Abramson. An order for his expulsion was signed, but Jouhaux intervened three times in his behalf and Abramson was permitted to stay. As Jouhaux's confidant, he became connected, after 1952, with a new organization, *Démocratie Combattante*.⁵

Another casualty was the veteran Moscow agent Louis Dolivet, who returned to France in 1950.

Ludwig Brecher, alias "Udeano," alias "Dolivet," had served for over twenty years as stager of "fronts," "peace campaigns," and all manner of "popular movements," invariably pro-Soviet. He had worked as wirepuller and behind-the-front liaison man between the silent sources of directives and funds on the one hand and the noisy and costly drives, campaigns, and congresses on the other. It is a characteristic of our times that the organizing of "spontaneous movements" has become a full-time profession. The father of this peculiar specialty was Willi Münzenberg, producer of congresses, newspapers, magazines, films, patron of naive and faithful pro-Soviet scientists, and loyal to Moscow until 1939. He was assassinated by Moscow agents in 1940 in France. "Dolivet" was his pupil and, after the master's death, his chief heir.

Brecher-"Dolivet" was born in Russian Bessarabia at the end of the century, and Russia, Russian schools, Russian culture, and Russian revolution were his first love. When Bessarabia was annexed to Rumania in 1918, Brecher became a citizen of his second fatherland. He studied in Switzerland, joined Léon Nicole's pro-

Communist groups, was finally expelled from this country—his expulsion number one—and moved to France.

When "Dolivet" arrived in France in 1933, Paris was becoming the main haven of Communists and leftists in flight from Nazi Germany. Willi Münzenberg, one of the most important refugees from Nazism, proceeded to organize from Paris the "peace movement," the "world congresses against war and fascism," and such. "Dolivet" went to work as Münzenberg's apprentice and soon became secretary of the World Peace Organization, presided over by Lord Robert Cecil but actually staged by Münzenberg—"Dolivet" and aided in France by Pierre Cot. This combination of non-Communists at the open window and Soviet agents in the concealed driver's seat was becoming typical for this new type of "movement" abroad.

During all these years rumors and hints of intrigue surrounded "Dolivet." Many Communists believed he was a double agent; others accused him of embezzlement, in particular of substantial "Chinese funds." ⁶ Pierre Cot helped "Dolivet" obtain French citizenship in 1937. Two years later the French government initiated action to deprive him of this citizenship, but before a final decision was reached France was occupied by German armies and "Dolivet" had fled to the United States.

In the United States "Dolivet" enjoyed protection from very high quarters, and unusual privileges. Drafted into the United States Army in October 1943, he was discharged three weeks later. This three weeks of service sufficed as a basis for his application, under a special law with respect to aliens serving in the United States military forces, for quick naturalization. The two character witnesses required by law were his wife and his assistant.

During the war "Dolivet" was "international editor" of *Free World*, later renamed the *United Nations World*, a title which hinted at ties with the United Nations. His official position at the United Nations was an unimportant one—"consultant on handbooks and publications." Somehow "Dolivet" managed to obtain diplomatic passports and visas and he made numerous trips abroad. He cultivated the friendship of Henry Wallace, vice-president in 1944-48 and 1948 candidate for the presidency of the pro-Communist "Progressive" party. "Dolivet" organized Wallace's trip to Europe and supported his electoral campaign.

On May 25, 1950, the puzzle of "Dolivet" and his obscure protectors was discussed in Congress. Representative Edward Jenison of Illinois told the House about "Dolivet," his activities, and his unusual privileges. In the course of the debate Representative Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin asked:

I wonder if the gentleman can tell us how this man ["Dolivet"] got into the Army and out of the Army in such a short time.

Mr. Jenison: I will be very happy to say to my colleague from Wisconsin that that is one of the first questions that occurs to one in investigating a case of this sort, and to date there has been a very large and ominous note of silence from the agencies involved as to that incident. . . .

Mr. Smith: I understand that he is still an alien, and yet has free access to move about the United States by virtue of his identification with the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Jenison: I might say to my colleague from Wisconsin, not only does he have that privilege but he has access to such information as ought to be in a classified status and is available to him apparently, when it is not available to the representatives of the people of the United States. . . .

Mr. Jenison: . . . There is a black cloud of silence hovering over every agency that might give us information about this particular case, and I think my colleagues should know why we have not had any answer. . . .

[Clare E.] Hoffman (of Michigan): Is he an agent or officer of the United Nations, or does he work under their direction?

Mr. Jenison: He has a diplomatic connection with the United Nations. I am unable to say whether he is an employee of the United Nations. . . .

Mr. Hoffman: Where does he get his money, if he gets any?

Mr. Jenison: That would be a very interesting question.

Mr. Hoffman: The gentleman means he has not been able to discover that?

Mr. Jenison: I have not been able to discover the source of his salary as such. I suspect very much it is the taxpayers of the United States. . . .

Mr. Kenneth B. Keating (of New York): From neither the Department of State nor the Bureau of Immigration has the

gentleman been able to get any information of a substantial character about what is going on with regard to this?

Mr. Jenison: We have been unable to obtain any information as to why there has been delay and delay and delay in acting on this case, in which there is so much evidence to indicate that matters adversely affecting the Nation may be at stake.

Mr. Smith: If the gentleman will permit an observation, when this matter was called to my attention I made inquiry of the State Department and after waiting at least three weeks was informed indirectly that this was a highly secretive matter, a matter that the FBI was working on. I was referred to the FBI. I then contacted the FBI, and they said, "Strange; we don't know about it," except that he had an application on file for citizenship.

There is something funny between State and the FBI on this.⁷

This debate in Congress came precisely when "Dolivet" had been invited to Chile to receive a decoration and spend a few days as a guest of President Videla. In a statement to the press he protested that he was not a Communist and that "Such a thing is completely absurd"⁸—and left for Santiago. On May 30, 1950, he received the Order of Merit, accompanied by the somewhat ironic citation: "In recognition of his efforts to promote better understanding among the nations of the Western hemisphere."

In the United States, however, the clouds continued to gather, and "Dolivet" was expelled from the country in the fall of 1950. Having accorded him extraordinary courtesy for a decade, the State Department changed its attitude and instructed its embassies to refuse him any kind of visa, should he apply for one.

Back in France and once more in his element, "Dolivet" received protection from Léon Jouhaux. In July 1952, with another protégé of Jouhaux's, Henri Laugier, former vice-president of *Rapprochement Franco-Soviétique*, "Dolivet" launched Fighting Democracy, a kind of new international for "peace." Stressing its independence from Moscow-staged "peace congresses," Fighting Democracy gave promise of moving along purely democratic lines. "Dolivet" and Laugier succeeded in winning the support of President Auriol, Edouard Herriot, Paul Ramadier, and a

number of other non-Communist political leaders outside of France, including Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. However, the new organization, which had considerable funds at its disposal, never criticized the Soviet Union; statements concerning its goals were vague—to “put an end to war hysteria,” “to circulate goods freely,” “make certain the co-existence . . .” “Dolivet” had found a new stage for his activity.

Another “burned” Soviet agent (to use the French expression) was Helene Rado, wife of Alexander. In Geneva she had been sentenced in absentia to a year in prison and expulsion from Switzerland, but she escaped and came to France late in 1944. Until the end of 1945 the Soviet government continued to pay her for past services. She obtained a position with the American Unitarian Service Committee in France and later with the World Federation of Trade Unions. All traces of her husband had been lost in Russia.

In February 1950 this tired, disillusioned, and gravely ill woman permitted a correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph* to see a secret report which had come to her desk concerning a meeting in Peking of the Far Eastern group of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The report revealed the role of this “trade union organization” as a cover for a projected political and military campaign. Three Russian “trade union delegates”—Soloviev, Yakovlev, and Rostovsky—played the leading roles in this plot; their orders covered dislocation of shipping, sabotage, arming of the native population, and fomenting of strikes throughout Southeast Asia and particularly in India and Indo-China. The plan apparently contemplated a grand-scale Far Eastern revolution to break out simultaneously with the Korean war.*

* In this very interesting report China was considered “the base for further Communist successes in Southeast Asia—India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China and Indonesia . . .” Aside from the three Russians referred to, only two other persons—the Chinese Li Li-san and the French Louis Saillant—played important roles at the conference; the others merely made reports and took orders. Fox of Australia promised to start action in Brisbane; Shelvankar of India foresaw an outbreak of strikes in Calcutta; Saigon was to be the third port where action would start; Chinese forces would concentrate on Hongkong and Singapore. Aware of the forthcoming attack in Korea, Rostovsky hinted that “by summer 1950 imperialist war plans will be far developed”; “war convoys” in the Pacific [meaning American supplies to Korea] must be “tied up.”

As a consequence of her revealing this document, Helene Rado was removed from her position at the World Federation of Trade Unions and of course lost the sympathy of her former protectors.

The fate of lesser intelligence agents, too, was symptomatic of the postwar climate in France. The Russian émigré Moiseew, whose role in the Soviet apparat since 1921 has been referred to before, still lived in Paris. At least some of his activities—for example, those connected with the Gordon Switz affair—were well known to the French authorities. In April 1939 the prefect of Paris had included his name in a list of suspect foreigners whose expulsion was deemed imperative. In August 1939 Moiseew was arrested, and he remained in internment for over a year; when the war ended the veteran Soviet agent applied for a residence permit. Now, from the documents accumulated in his file, the police prepared a new “profile” on Moiseew, which ended with the words: “During his long stay in France Moiseew did not seem to be active in any political group. Observing strict reserve toward his adoptive country, he devoted all his energy to his business, which was always flourishing.” On the basis of this report, *le directeur du cabinet* stated: “I see no objection to granting a regular residence permit to this foreigner.”

France, of all the Western nations, was considered the best location for Soviet-sponsored international bodies, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the World Federation of Democratic Women; and all of these organizations opened offices in Paris. They developed tremendous activity, convening congresses, issuing publications, and in general conducting propaganda campaigns from the heart of the Western world. More important than their overt activity was their secret work concerned with preparations for the two war ventures in the Far East. It was not until January 1951 that the French government expelled the three organizations, which then set up their offices in the East. France-USSR was another active and noisy organization subsidized from the outside and serving various purposes. The magazine *France d'abord* (France First), a kind of French *Amerasia*,

Soloviev was the real leader at this conference. His main interest was India, where a successful upheaval was obviously expected to take place in 1950-51. *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* (London), Feb. 24 and March 24, 1950.

gathered secret military information from officers and civilians as well as from other publications of the same political trend.

The old *rabcors* system was revived almost simultaneously in France and Germany. The guiding hand behind this coincidence was obvious. The worker-correspondents of two decades before * reappeared in *L'humanité* as well as in the provincial newspapers of the Communist party. As had been the case under Pierre Provost and Izaia Bir twenty years before, hundreds of loyal party leaders were again encouraged to write to their newspapers. Of the reports received through this means only an insignificant number were ever printed; others served the needs of Soviet intelligence. Octave Rabaté, who had been involved in the Cremet espionage affair of 1928,† returned to his old job on *L'humanité*. In November 1951 Etienne Fajon, actually editor-in-chief of *L'humanité*, stated that about 650 *rabcors* in the Paris region and some 200 more in other parts of the country were writing for his newspaper. "These figures," commented the *Bulletin de l'Association d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales* (December 31, 1951), "are obviously too modest. Every secretary of a cell is, in fact, even if he does not have the rank, a correspondent, has to serve as such, although not everyone realizes the significance of his activity."

In May 1947 the Communist ministers had to quit the government, and the era of coalition with the Communist party was over. It was some time, however, before other official party members left their governmental posts; and the most important group, the sympathizers, among whom a considerable number had made contact with Soviet intelligence and were now in a position to serve the new apparatus, could not easily be recognized and eliminated; they continued in their posts, protected by law and custom.

The problem in France was essentially the one that every allied country of the West had to face after the war: the wartime alliance with Moscow had led to inundation of governmental services by friends and agents of Soviet policy, and they now had the hard and thankless task of eliminating them. Each of the Western nations tried to solve the difficult problem in its own way, but none proved satisfactory. In the United States, congres-

* See pp. 52 ff. for France, pp. 52, 86, 123 for Germany.

† See pp. 31 ff.

sional investigating committees, with their controversial hearings, reflected public indignation at the inability of the government to cope with the problem. Great Britain tried in its own way, but failed in numerous instances. The Klaus Fuchs, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Bruno Pontecorvo cases proved how difficult it is for a democratic government to purge itself of its enemies.

In France the task proved harder than anywhere else. The French Communist party was numerically one of the strongest in the world; its press, propaganda, and pressure facilities were greatly superior to those of its sister parties in the United States and Great Britain. The most sensitive agencies of the French government had been systematically penetrated in the fat years 1944-47 by men from the apparat, and the political climate in France did not facilitate the purging operation. Antagonism to Germany, more alive in France than in Great Britain or the United States, was still the prevailing emotion; the Soviet Union, its aggressiveness, its infiltrating, and its espionage, appeared no more than a scarecrow in the eyes of multitudes of non-Communists, and the wave of anti-American feeling served the Soviet cause well. Some actual or potential agents of Soviet intelligence remained in the justice, police, and security agencies of France.

In the eyes of Soviet intelligence, France had never resumed the prominent position she had held in 1927-33, because after the war French influence in international, and even in European, affairs was limited. Technical progress in French war industries was not comparable to that which had taken place in the United States; in atomic research France was behind the two Anglo-Saxon powers. American and NATO military installations in France, however, were of interest to Moscow; in addition, the newly rebuilt French navy, and the submarine fleet in particular, aroused the curiosity of Soviet agencies.

One of the most important espionage cases involving the French military was that of Commander André Teulery of the Ministry of Aviation. Professor in a technical school near Paris and a former naval officer, Teulery had joined the anti-Nazi underground during the war and the Communist party in 1942. He was soon taken note of, was given the rank of commander, and appointed aide to Charles Tillon, member of the French Politburo. After the war Tillon, now minister of aviation, took Teulery with him into his

department. In 1946-47 Teulery served as chief of the Security Department of the Air Ministry; the official task of this department was to prevent leakage of secret information. Abundant secret information passed through Teulery's hands, and he communicated it to both the Soviet Union and the French Communist leadership.

In 1947 Teulery was instructed by his chief to turn over all information destined for Russia to the Yugoslav legation in Paris. He followed these instructions. Yugoslavia was still considered a loyal satellite; and this change in procedure was part of the general reconstruction of Soviet intelligence, under which Soviet agents retreated into the background and satellite agents moved into the exposed spots. In the Teulery case communication with Moscow via Belgrade was considered preferable to direct contact with Soviet agents in Paris. When Tito's rebellion became known, the French Communist party, at Moscow's request, ordered Teulery to break off intelligence cooperation with the Yugoslavs. But Teulery's rapprochement with the Titoists had gone far; he continued to meet and convey information to the Yugoslav military attaché.

In February 1949 André Teulery was seized at the moment of handing over some documents to the Yugoslav attaché. (It was hinted in France that he was denounced to the counterespionage agency by the French Communists.) Before a court-martial Teulery admitted having "entered into relations with military attachés of a people's democracy which had fought on the side of the Allies" and having supplied them with "certain documents." In March 1951 he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment; he was released in 1952.

In other cases, however, in which Moscow rather than a rebelling satellite was involved, matters often took a different turn. An unseen power protected the foreign agents; behind-the-scenes forces were brought to bear; punishment was avoided by finding loopholes in legal processes. Simultaneously with Teulery's arrest several other persons were held on charges of divulging military secrets through the channels of two publications, *France d'abord* and *Regards*. This affair was so important and so secret that a detailed report was made on it at a cabinet meeting on March 1, 1949, which revealed that Capt. René Azéma of the paratroop forces, a teacher in the school for airborne troops at

Pau, had been turning over secret documents to the editors of *France d'abord*; these documents contained, among other items, a description of the arms, numerical strength, etc. of one particular airborne division. Four militants, writers on the two publications, were arrested, among them Jacques Friedland, editor of *Regards*, Bernard Jouenne, a draftsman, and Yves Moreau, editor of *France d'abord*. Sensational revelations were expected when the press mentioned in this connection two retired Communist generals—General Petit and member of the National Assembly Malleret (General Joinville). But the arrested men were soon released and by the time the defendants were acquitted by a French military court two years later, on January 13, 1951, the affair had almost been forgotten.

In postwar France alternating energy and inertia in the attitude toward Soviet espionage was becoming a pattern.

In October 1951 French authorities arrested the well-known former editor of the pro-Nazi newspaper *Le Matin*, Henri de Korab (born Henryk Kucharsky in Poland), who had been violently anti-Communist before the war but was now president of the pro-satellite Oder-Neisse Association. The reason given for his arrest was his "intelligence activity for a foreign power and actions harmful to the military and diplomatic situation of France"; he had also "received funds from a foreign power." He was soon released, however, and the case was closed.⁹

The same thing happened to the group of intelligence agents working in the south, in and around the military port of Toulon. Here, too, as it did generally in postwar France, Soviet intelligence kept behind the scenes, acting through its French militants and "honest trade unionists." From 1946 to 1952 a number of secret documents passed through the hands of employees of the Toulon arsenal—Edmond Bertrand, Emile Degrist, Fernand Revest. All, and in particular Revest, supplied their party chiefs with reports on the Scientific Experiments Center in Brest. Other secret reports dealt with the Submarine Research Center and experiments with landing ramps for radio-guided missiles on the island of Levant. The home of another trade unionist, Leclerc, served as a storehouse for documents. When this network was discovered in the course of searches carried out in Toulon, "documents dealing with national defense were found in a chicken house belonging to Edmond Bertrand." Arrests in Toulouse,

Paris, Brest, Lorient, and Bordeaux followed. The action resulting in the arrests was carried out by the French Ministry of the Interior.¹⁰

Then, oddly, the French minister of defense announced that he questioned the major part of the statements of the minister of the interior concerning discovery of the network. The documents found in Toulon, the announcement said, dated from 1947, other papers were of no importance, and so on. Public opinion, in the face of this dispute between the two ministers, was confused. The parliamentary committee dealing with the Toulon affair was unable to come to a decision. In Moscow *Pravda* declared triumphantly: "The fable of Communist espionage in Toulon has collapsed."

The shipment of French troops to Indo-China was a matter of interest to both the Ho Chi Minh command and the Soviet General Staff. André Tourtain, trade union general secretary in the Département de Var, organized a regular flow of information on departures of French troops. One of his aides was the Communist Marcel Mayen, secretary of the railwaymen's union in St. Raphael. These two men observed and reported in detail on military units leaving for Indo-China and on the morale of troops going to the Far East from St. Raphael and Marseille.*

The former "White Russian baroness" de Behr joined the intelligence apparat in the south of France as soon as she was granted French citizenship in 1949; from then on she could pretend to be working for the French Communist party rather than for a foreign agency. Maria Erica de Behr, of Baltic origin, about fifty years old at the time, conspicuous everywhere because of her unusual height (six feet, four inches), had lived in France as an alien for two decades. After the war she became active in politics and traveled to Yugoslavia and Italy to take part in such activities as the World Congress of "Women for Peace." Granting of citizenship has never been a simple affair in France and applications are denied more often than not, but the "Baroness" overcame all obstacles.

From her villa at Lavandou on the shore of the Mediterranean facing the strategic island of Levant, Mme. de Behr, the "painter,"

* When he was arrested, in 1952, Mayen stated: "It is the Communist Party and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail] that made me commit this 'foolishness' which I bitterly regret now." *Figaro* (Paris), June 10, 1952.

made excursions to observe the experiments with radio-guided missiles being carried on by the Research Center on the island. Arrested in June 1952 and confronted with incriminating documents written in her own hand, she admitted her work for the Communist organization of the Var Department but would not admit to having worked for a foreign power, although there were indications of ties with Polish espionage. Mathieu Garnerone, Communist secretary of Hyères, put up the same kind of defense when he was arrested for reporting on the Levant experiments.

This pattern was well established by the end of the postwar decade: whenever cases of espionage were revealed, the traces led to the French Communist party and disappeared at that point; the Soviet "resident" was so well concealed that he could not be exposed. And the French Communist party, large, influential, with sympathizers and agents in other parties and infiltrating the non-Communist press, was in a position to defend its intelligence agents vigorously. Investigations of the majority of the spy affairs of this era were like ploughing sand—much dust but no tangible results.

One of the most exciting of these espionage affairs was the Dides-Baranès case. In the summer of 1954 French counterintelligence received proof that the highly secret records of the National Defense Committee meeting of June 28 had been read by Jacques Duclos to the Politburo of the French Communist party. The National Defense Committee, analogous to the National Security Council in the United States, consists of a small group of government officials which meets under the chairmanship of the President in his palace. At its session of June 28 the Defense Committee dealt with strategy and policy of the Indo-China war. Technical data relating to arms and military units were contained in the records read to the Politburo of a party which was acting, at least as far as Indo-China was concerned, as an agency of the enemy. Nobody doubted that the records and data had promptly been relayed to Moscow and Peking, main supports of the Communist offensive in Indo-China.

The investigation revealed that M. Duclos had more than one pipeline to the secret chambers of the Defense Committee. The Communist-subsidized Progressist party, a small and otherwise unimportant group, served as a nest of "non-Communist" intelli-

gence agents. In the offices of the Defense Committee two secretaries, Roger Labrusse and René Turpin, who had been thoroughly "screened" for their confidential jobs by French counterintelligence, were supplying the "progressist" journalist André Baranès with confidential records ("in order to put an end to the war in Indo-China"); Baranès was turning the data over to Duclos in the Politburo.

Baranès, however, was simultaneously serving in an anti-Communist police network, and he revealed his story to his contact, police inspector Jean Dides. An investigation was started. Jacques Duclos testified that the reports in question (in versions more detailed than those recovered by the police) were obtained by his Politburo from a "very high" source (other than Baranès); René Turpin confirmed that other sources were available to the Communists.

In addition to the multilateral leaks from one of the highest government offices, political bickering between the rightist and leftist parties complicated the situation. When the Laniel government, under which the investigation was begun, fell and was replaced by the Mendès-France cabinet (June 18), the outgoing ministers failed to inform their successors about the spy affair; some of the documents involved disappeared from the files. Subsequently it was learned that records of other Defense Committee meetings had also found their way to the Communists.

The investigation, which is still in progress at this writing, has been made difficult and the issue obscured by internal political fights. The outcome is not yet certain, but no legal action has been taken against the French Communist party, ostensibly only a receiver of espionage reports. The main issue was presented to the National Assembly by member Jean Legendre on December 3, 1954, in these words: "France lost the Indo-China war, in spite of superiority in man power and material, because France was betrayed in Paris."

In a factual and lucid supplement entitled *Soviet Espionage in France, 1945-55* (published in May 1955) the *BEIPI* makes the following observations:

Communist espionage in France goes practically unpunished and is free in its actions.

. . . The judges, who are sharply taken to task by the Communists the moment they have an espionage affair to investigate and try, realize that they are not upheld or defended by the government, much less by the Parliament, as the latter proved by refusing, on November 6, 1953, to waive the immunity which protected the Communist leaders. They realize that the ministers often prefer to "avoid trouble" rather than to impose punishment for espionage.

. . . Sometimes someone is arrested carrying national defense secrets. He is not always accused, he is not always tried. If he is tried he is not always convicted.

. . . In 1952 when Greece tried the case of the Communist spies found in that country, it was known that these spies were receiving instructions and subsidies from France. Why from France? Because it was the simplest way. When the Communist Papadopoulos was questioned about this he said: "In France people are civilized and do not have to practice control."

The task of Soviet intelligence in France was facilitated by its having at its disposal, in addition to its own officials there, the military attachés and spy rings of the satellites. Whatever their degree of autonomy in other fields, in tasks of a military and espionage nature the satellite agencies acted as branches of the official Soviet embassy and the illegal Soviet apparat. When an assignment appeared too delicate or dangerous for the Soviet agencies, one or another satellite envoy and his staff were used to do the job. In this field the official Polish representative in France was more useful than all the others. Over a period of decades Polish workers and peasants had migrated to France in large numbers; on the eve of the war about 400,000 Poles, still noncitizens of France, were living there, mainly in the northern departments but also in the Paris region. A small segment of this Polish population was in sympathy with the new political setup in their native land and served the embassy in France as a pool of supporters, writers, speakers—and secret agents. Following the Soviet pattern, a number of "nonpolitical" offices and organizations were set up in France to serve as a cover for intelligence operations: the Polorbis and Gedok travel agencies (corresponding to the Russian Intourist), the National Council of Poles in France, Polish Youth, Polish Scouts, Union of Polish Women,

the Polish Red Cross, the Polish Repatriation Commission, and others.

Myszkowski, secretary to the military attaché in Paris; Joseph Szczerbinski, vice-consul at Lille; and Alexander Skrzynia, vice-consul at Toulouse, were official Polish representatives who did important work in the intelligence network. Despite the fact that their activities had been known to the authorities for a long time, the French government, trying to avoid a conflict with Poland as well as Moscow, was reluctant to act against them. It did act later, however. On October 20, 1949, when an "espionage" affair involving Western representatives was being staged by Warsaw, the French consular officer at Stettin, André Robineau, was arrested by Polish police on charges of espionage as he was boarding a plane for Paris. Next day the French police arrested Myszkowski, and, three days later, the vice-consul in Lille, Joseph Szczerbinski.¹¹ Simultaneously they conducted searches in Polish pro-Soviet organizations and in the homes of their leaders. Twenty-five Polish "activists," most of them Communists who had arrived before the war, and including the editor of *Gazeta Polska* in Paris and the president and secretary-general of the National Council of Poles in France, were expelled from France. A number of Polish organizations were dissolved.

The operation was repeated on a larger scale in January 1950 and again in September of that year, when over two hundred aliens (half of them Spaniards but including also a number of Soviet and Polish citizens) were expelled from France. There was doubt, however, in Paris that the most important foreign "operators" had been caught. *Le monde* reported: "Unbelievable indiscretions have allowed the most important aliens to get away in good time." As for Russian intelligence, *Le monde* hinted that the operation did not diminish "the sum of its facilities on French soil."

The Polish government reacted with a multitude of arrests and expulsions of French citizens from Poland. The "espionage affair" involving a group of French and Poles who were tried in Poland in December ended with severe sentences, some up to twenty-two years. In retaliation for the imprisonment in Paris of Polish vice-consul Szczerbinski, the French vice-consul Antoine Boitté was jailed in Warsaw; the Polish government announced

that he would be brought before a Polish court if Szczerbinski were tried. The two vice-consuls remained in prison for eight months and were not released until July 1950.

A clandestine war between Polish intelligence in Toulouse and French counterintelligence, enlivened by love, jealousy, and diplomatic notes—transpired in October 1950. The principals were the Polish vice-consul Alexander Skrzynia, his faithless valet, Thadeusz Lukowicz, his young female secretary, and a French couple, the Débards. The vice-consul's intelligence activities had been known to the French police since 1949. It was Skrzynia, for instance, who had warned the leftist press in time of the imminent arrests of Spanish Communists.

Pierre Débard, French counterintelligence officer assigned to ferret out Skrzynia's secret doings, befriended the vice-consul's seventeen-year-old secretary and succeeded, through her, in obtaining possession of a number of Skrzynia's documents and reports. Some of these confidential papers Débard kept at his home. His jealous wife, Mathilde, took them straight to the Polish consulate. Sensing the approach of catastrophe, Skrzynia, accompanied by his valet and chauffeur, Lukowicz, hurried to Paris. At the Aubrais station they were arrested. Lukowicz, who had secretly been informing counterintelligence and was suspected of this by the Poles, was ordered to leave for Warsaw under escort of a Polish officer. He managed to escape from his guard, asked the French police for asylum, and was released.

Skrzynia, however, remained in prison. The Polish government reacted in the by now established and effective way—it arrested Georges Estrade, French vice-consul at Stettin (who had suffered a serious injury in an automobile accident a short time before). Both vice-consuls were released after a week.

Thus ended the conflict, at least as far as its diplomatic phase was concerned.

Czechoslovak intelligence in France was on a smaller scale than Polish intelligence. Among its outstanding exploits was the affair involving the Czech Communist Baiza, who in 1947 was dispatched to Belgium and France to conduct military espionage. In December 1949 a military tribunal sentenced Baiza to four years' imprisonment. Stephen Kubik (Friedman Bornat), veteran Communist and second secretary of the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris since 1948,

was busy recruiting spies from among Czech students and émigrés. When he proceeded to organize the assassination of a Czech refugee, he was denounced and expelled from the country.

These affairs did not put an end, of course, to the extensive satellite espionage in France.

3. THE END OF "LUCY" IN SWITZERLAND

One of the first significant and lasting Soviet espionage ventures after the war was a peculiar international combination. Two Russian agents dealing with Germany were living in Switzerland and sending their reports to Czechoslovakia. Rudolf Rössler, outstanding and productive intelligence agent of the war years, and his junior partner, Xaver Schnieper, resumed their work in 1947 when the tempest provoked by the Canadian spy affair had calmed down and the new Soviet-satellite organization was set up. Rössler and Schnieper were among the very few old hands reactivated for espionage work after the war.

Since 1944 Rössler had engaged in no intelligence work, Swiss or Russian, consistently refusing to work for any Western intelligence service. The greater part of his wartime earnings from his second job, spying, was invested in Vita Nova; and this publishing house—his hobby or, as he preferred to consider it, his lifework—was deteriorating. Switzerland was no longer the only German anti-Nazi nation; publishers in Germany were now free to publish whatever they wished, and Rössler's firm suffered reverses.¹ A regular subsidy was necessary if it was to survive.

Although Rössler had never carried a membership card of a Communist party, he had accepted all of the "anticapitalist" ideology, and he now began to be less secretive about his political views than he had been during the war, when he was serving with the Swiss General Staff and giving information to the British as well. To Rössler the West was decadent, while the "Russian system" was opening new vistas for the human race; "excesses" in Russia were only a temporary phenomenon.

Resuming his role as a spy against Germany, Rössler was again aided by his friend Xaver Schnieper. We have already described Schnieper's ties with Swiss military intelligence during the war, his leftist-Catholic entourage, and his leanings toward the Communist party. In 1945 Schnieper was on the editorial staff of the

Communist *Vorwärts* and had become president of the Lucerne branch of the Workers' party (Communist). At the end of 1946, when a financial scandal rocked the Swiss Communist party, Schnieper was expelled from its ranks. Coinciding with the resumption of the intelligence activities of the Russian-satellite team, this expulsion helped Schnieper to obtain access to non-Communist and anti-Communist organizations. As an employee of the Swiss *Caritas* and a librarian, he traveled more than once to satellite Prague, now an important center of Soviet espionage, allegedly to "buy up libraries" for Switzerland. In 1948 Schnieper joined the Swiss Social Democrats; his ambitions and standard of living ("expensive women," reported *Der Spiegel* of April 15, 1953), however, required a better job than that of spying on the small organization of Swiss Socialists. Schnieper was sent to Bonn as sole representative of the Swiss Socialist press, and as such he was accredited to Kurt Schumacher's large and influential Social Democratic party.

In the new German capital Schnieper established friendly relations with Socialist and non-Socialist leaders, members of the Bundestag, and numerous well-informed people. He was welcomed everywhere. In particular, the Socialists in Bonn liked his reports in the Swiss press, which were always loyal to Schumacher and were never written in the hated condescending style of some Western correspondents. They did not suspect that complete reports on everything that he learned in their offices were rushed to Moscow.

The mysterious "Uncle Tom" of Czech intelligence had meantime advanced to the post of Czechoslovak military attaché in Switzerland and now lived in Berne under his legal name of Sedlacek. In 1947, when the decision was taken in Moscow-Prague to revive the veteran intelligence group in Lucerne, Sedlacek got in touch with his old friend Schnieper and introduced him to the circle of Czech intelligence officers and spies in Switzerland; among them Colonel Volf proved to be the most active. The espionage team Volf-Rössler-Schnieper began extensive operations.

The team worked, with interruptions, from the summer of 1947 to the end of 1952 and supplied a total of from 110 to 160 reports; the laconically worded messages frequently ran to ten pages. (Among other things, Rössler and Schnieper requested the

sum of 6,000 francs to establish a subagency in the United States. A meeting to discuss the project was to take place at the end of March 1953 in Vienna. Three weeks before the date of the meeting, however, the two were arrested, as we shall see.)

The leading role as well as the highest pay went to Rössler, the brains of the group. He maintained some of his productive wartime sources of information in Germany; unobserved, recognized by no one, never betrayed by Rössler, his German agents now came to visit him in Switzerland. His reports to the Czech military attaché contained valuable secret information on military and political developments in five countries—West Germany, the United States, Britain, France, and Denmark. He concentrated mainly, however, on Germany—her political and economic rehabilitation, her preparations for setting up a new military force—and on Allied agencies and armies in Germany.

Schnieper, on the other hand, concentrated on the technical phases of the work: he established contacts, traveled to Prague, Vienna, Berlin, and Bonn, and typed the reports prepared in longhand by Rössler. At first the information was submitted in Berne in the form of typed notes; as Prague intelligence improved its techniques Schnieper learned to prepare microfilmed copies of documents. The microphotos were then enclosed in food packages which were sent to a cover address in Düsseldorf. This procedure appeared to be a safe one at a time when Switzerland was sending thousands of food parcels to Germany.

In Prague Schnieper met persons of high rank in military intelligence who concealed their identity under false names, such as "Turek," "Konrad I," "Konrad II." Once, in 1952, having come to Vienna to meet the Czech agent and having missed him, Schnieper tried to establish the contact through friends. In a cynically frank move he was brought directly to the Soviet Kommandantura. When the contact was finally established Schnieper was advised on how to conceal reports in jars of figs and honey and send them to a cover address in Germany, whence they would be forwarded to the proper place.

Between 33,000 and 48,000 Swiss francs were paid to Rössler and Schnieper during this comparatively short period—a high price by the standards of the niggardly cashiers of the apparatus, and proof of how valuable the work of the Swiss team was in the

eyes of the Director. Rössler received about 65 per cent of the total.

In December 1952 Rössler mailed the usual "food package" to Düsseldorf, giving as the sender the name of a nonexistent "Heinrich Schwarz," of "Zurich." For some reason the addressee did not call for the parcel, and it was returned to Switzerland in January 1953. Since the sender could not be located, the package was opened in the post office; the microfilm found in it was turned over to the authorities. The film was of reports and data on British airfields in West Germany, United States officer-instructors with Korean experience, the results of United States Army maneuvers, the organization of the United States Air Force in Britain, military buildings in the Rhine province, French occupation forces in Germany, and so on.

Rössler and Schnieper were arrested in March 1953. Although denying that their work constituted espionage, the two friends revealed to the authorities most of the details of their activities. They did not divulge, however, the most intriguing facts of Rössler's fabulous sources in Germany ("and our methods of interrogation," a high official in Berne told me, "do not go so far as to force them to talk"). The one circumstance that served as a mitigating factor in their favor was that they had not spied on Switzerland.

As a foreigner, Rössler would at least have been punished by being expelled from Switzerland, but he protested against deportation to Germany, where he would be prosecuted for espionage; nor did he like the idea of being deported to the East. Sentencing the defendants to terms of a year and nine months respectively, the court ruled, however, that Rössler should not be deported "because of his great wartime service to Switzerland and because, as a stateless person, he would be in a most awkward position." It would be hard to find among the massive records of spy trials a more lenient and magnanimous sentence.

The Rössler-Schnieper case was not an exception among spy affairs in Switzerland. For a number of reasons and despite her unaggressive policy, Switzerland maintained her place in the front row of Soviet and satellite espionage targets. Dr. Laszlo Tarr, a Hungarian journalist, was the leader of a Hungarian spy

ring in Switzerland between 1940 and 1948; he was sentenced in June 1948, in Zurich, to five months' imprisonment for political espionage, the appeals court later increasing the punishment to eighteen months. In Winterthur, in June 1949, the Rumanian citizen Solvan Vitianu was sentenced to eighteen months for espionage and extortion. In December 1954 the Swiss government expelled the Czech military attaché, Maj. Ludwik Sochor, and two of his assistants because they "carried on activities on Swiss territory which were incompatible with diplomatic usage"—actually espionage against Swiss military installations.² The chief of police of Basel, Fritz Brechnbühl, stated publicly that the countries of Eastern Europe were engaging in intensive secret activity in Switzerland: "Their political and economic espionage in our country," he said, "exceeds in extent the espionage practiced here by the Nazis during the last war."³

4. GERMANY IN THE FRONT LINE

Defeated, disarmed, and partitioned Germany soon began to assume the position of European target number one in the framework of Soviet intelligence, and since 1949 her significance has been comparable only to that of the United States. American and British armed forces, facing the Soviet Army along the demarcation lines, have been scrutinized, investigated, and studied. The German police and the embryonic new German military forces have been another objective, and the Bonn government, the political parties, industry, and foreign trade have been a third. Soviet intelligence in these fields in Germany has been a constantly growing operation of unprecedented scope and achievement.

In Germany, Soviet intelligence was not forced to go underground, as it was in other countries, and it had no reason to conceal its activities or camouflage its agencies. For four years after the war the Russian power acted openly as the state authority in the Eastern zone; later, when it had set up a German Communist government, its own military forces as well as others of its controlling agencies remained on German soil, and its GB network continued to enmesh the whole of East Germany.

In the first two postwar years, from 1945 to 1947, Soviet predominance was based, to a large extent, on the huge GB unit

which Moscow and Berlin had speedily organized. Col.-Gen. Ivan Serov, Lavrenti Beria's right hand, who had won prominence in 1940-41 as the engineer of mass deportations from the newly occupied Polish and Baltic territories and who eventually, after Beria's execution, became head of State Security in Moscow, came to Berlin to organize the "internal security" service in the Soviet zone. With him, as "political adviser," came Vladimir Semionov, actually an envoy of the Politburo with a direct line to Georgi Malenkov in the Kremlin, and Colonel Tiulpanov, as chief of the Information Department.

Major General Melnikov was appointed official head of the GB machinery in East Germany. The Soviet zone was divided into districts (*Bezirke*) with a GB agency in each; in the several precincts (*Kreise*) smaller "operation groups" of the GB were set up. The main function of this large apparat was, at first, denazification. Other functions were added, such as the general check on parties, leaders, trade unions; sovietization of the zone; organization of a comparable German agency; and, finally, gathering of information from the West—espionage in the strict sense. Espionage against the Western Allies in Germany, however, did not become extensive until 1947.

During this first phase of the postwar era (1945-47) more extensive activity of an intelligence nature was carried out by "technical commissions," which traveled about Germany openly and in military uniforms. Their task was to learn everything possible about the technical achievements of the Germans as well as about the West in general. It was also during this period that the TASS agency, the large Soviet press apparat, and its correspondents started their service in Germany as a cover for reconnaissance activity.

Finally, the operations relating to the repatriation of Soviet prisoners of war became a means of gathering abundant information. The chiefs of the repatriation network under GB general Dragun, connected by short-wave radio and courier service with their "missions" all over Central Europe, resided in Paris and Brussels. The intelligence achievements of this network, in particular the information gathered on American, British, and French forces in Europe, were not insignificant. Moscow had ordered them to stay where they were as long as possible and to continue their work in the Western zones up to the last possible

moment, but in 1948-49 the "repatriation" operation had to be wound up (except in a few cases, such as Belgium, for instance), and the commissions returned home.

The second postwar phase also lasted two years, from 1947 to 1949. It started on August 16, 1947, when the SMA (Soviet Military Administration) issued its "Order #201" creating a political police as a German agency; this was the "K-5" (Kommissariat 5), embryo of the future MSS (Ministry of State Security). Only reliable Communists, mainly those who had returned from Russia or had come out of Nazi prisons, were employed, and only after the Soviet GB, having checked them, gave them a clean bill of health. The Russian agency was reluctant and slow, however, to turn over its tasks to the Germans; the latter had first to stand the test as good Chekists. Russian GB officers reported later that in order to win the confidence of their Russian superiors the German pupils tried to surpass their teachers in cruelty.¹ Finally, in February 1950 the East German Ministry of State Security (MSS)—counterpart of the Russian—emerged.

This was the beginning of the third postwar phase of the history of Soviet intelligence operations in Germany. The Soviet controlling agency was ordered to withdraw into the background, turning over more and more of its functions and assignments to the MSS. Its own concentration camps were closed, and a part of its personnel were transferred to the German agency. It nevertheless remained the over-all controlling power in the zone, because the German MSS was actually, though not formally, subordinated to the Soviet GB at Karlshorst; the local agencies of the German department were likewise checked and controlled by the local Russian agencies. Actually, the large MSS has been nothing but a subsidiary agency of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior. The exploits and achievements of the new German police will be described in a subsequent section.

One of the tendencies of the postwar intelligence services (Soviet as well as satellite) in West Germany has been a frequent overlapping of military intelligence and GB assignments. The line dividing the two departments, at least in Germany, has not been as distinct as it was before the war.

As far as espionage against the wartime Allies is concerned, the GB has been expanding its operations since 1947-48. This was a task which the Soviet administration was at first reluctant

to entrust to the Germans; when it did so it continued itself to act as a center of espionage. In the end this type of espionage was performed by both the Soviet and German agencies. The GB still has its own V men (secret agents) in the zone as well as outside it and its own intelligence networks and apparatus in West Germany, its own couriers, and its own radio communications.

The type of Soviet intelligence agent has changed essentially since the war, at least in Central Europe, in Germany, and in the countries that were occupied by Germany during the war. Gone is the figure of a Communist spy who had studied Marx and Engels, heatedly debated the issues of Trotskyism and Bukharinism, dreamed of world revolution, and devoted his life to the Cause. Now the men and women driven into the network are moved by other impulses, and their loyalty has been secured by other means than faith and devotion.

Of the postwar agents some have been Communists of the new mass production type, with canned ideology in their heads and emptiness in their hearts. For the majority pecuniary remuneration, modest as it is, has been an essential consideration. There exists in almost every country a huge stock of human outcasts desperately seeking protection and a means of existence. Among the millions of German refugees from the East, unhappy, embittered, hungry, and disabled, have been thousands willing to do any job, regardless of the dangers. In addition, there are in every German province thousands of displaced persons of East European nationality, generally considered staunchly anti-Soviet and therefore highly prized by Soviet intelligence once they agree to cooperate. Finally, there are the Eastern zone citizens under Soviet control who can be induced by special methods to accept assignments in the West for intelligence agencies.

In the Soviet and satellite apparatus salaries usually start at \$10 or \$15 a month; the amounts are increased after a few months, and successful agents may earn from \$100 to \$120 a month. For certain services, for instance delivery of a person sought by the intelligence service, from \$200 to \$500 may be paid. The mass of agents remain, of course, in the lower brackets.

Another source of potential secret agents, as seen by Soviet-satellite intelligence, is the pool of numerous former "deviationists" among local Communists, as well as some former consistent

anti-Communist Socialists. If they live in the Eastern zone they can be confronted with the alternative of entering the secret service or going to prison. Some—a minority, of course—buy their liberty at the price of spy work. As the new intelligence agencies settle down, accumulate information, and set up files on all dubious or suspect persons, new opportunities emerge for the recruitment of agents. Every member of the KPD and SED (Socialist Unity party, the Communist party in the Soviet Zone) fills out questionnaires which help greatly in the task of building up the new spy corps. A German Communist must answer the following questions:

Do you know personally enemies of our party, their names, their addresses, their profession and their social standing? Their relations to the defense forces, police, constabulary, etc.?

Do you have in your family members of other [non-Communist] parties?

What are your relations to these elements?

Indicate your functions at present or in the past, in the army, police, etc.

Have you been abroad?

Where, when, for what purpose, which countries and places do you know?

Is your husband—are you—a member of a party?

Profession, social standing and financial situation of your parents-in-law; social standing and profession of your husband's near relatives: are they members of a party?

Occupation of your parents, their financial situation, way of life of the family in general.

Have you done military service?

When and in what capacity?

Do you have special military knowledge?

If you have never done military service, what was the reason?

Have you experience in illegal work?

What kind of experience?

When and how long have you worked illegally? ²

In general, people with some blemish in their biography constitute the human material for postwar Soviet and satellite in-

telligence. The ex-convict, one suspected of criminal offenses often is the prey. I was told in Germany—but of course was unable to verify the facts—that at least seventeen former prominent Gestapo men (in addition to a legion of small fry) are now serving the Soviet apparat, as well as a group of leading men of the Kommando Rote Kapelle. The knowledge and abilities of these persons are made to serve the Soviet cause at various points in the intelligence apparat. In general, the numerous “rank and file” of former Nazis are a favorite source of agents; relatives of former Nazis and relatives of war criminals in Soviet prisons are more easily “persuaded” than the average citizen. Entering the slippery path of espionage, these unhappy men and women often resolve to supply false information. It is not long, however, before their naive hopes are shattered and they are forced to deliver the promised goods.

Favorites among the recruits of the Soviet apparat are active agents of American and British intelligence and counterintelligence. To win them over is difficult, but in the few cases in which the effort was successful it has been well worth while. One mediocre American intelligence agent is worth a hundred rank-and-file spies. We shall see later how much energy and money are being devoted by the Soviet apparat to recruit their opposite numbers from among Western intelligence agents. New recruits from this source are advised, of course, to continue in their service (at the same time reporting to their new superiors). At the outset the two jobs serve to increase the income of the double-agent, but this favorable situation does not usually last for long.

In addition to these types of postwar agents in Germany, “cadres” of young Communists are being systematically educated for intelligence work. A network of SED schools as well as education “circles” in universities, working strictly along Soviet patterns, trains students for intelligence work in the West, in the first place in Western Germany. The graduates serve both the Soviet and the new German intelligence.*

* One of the reports concerned with the matter outlines the tasks of new recruits as follows: “a) watching of all important military transport and troop movements; b) ascertaining private addresses of Allied officers from colonels upward and of all former German officers from generals down; c) ascertaining the license plate numbers of cars of members of the West German government, as well as the names of their drivers and the daily routes taken from their homes to their offices, and noting points along these routes where an accident might easily occur; d) ascertaining the names

Despite the abundance of sources of human material for espionage, and despite all the efforts of intelligence agencies to comply with orders, the supply of new secret agents has not been up to the demand and the high goals set could not be attained.

5. THE FOUR INTELLIGENCE MACHINES IN GERMANY

Four Soviet-controlled intelligence machines have been active in West Germany since the end of the war:

First, the old Soviet intelligence service, with German headquarters in Potsdam and Karlshorst.

Second, the new Polish military intelligence, working through its official representatives in East Berlin.

Third, Czechoslovak intelligence, operated directly out of Prague.

Fourth, a new intelligence machine which was built up gradually in the framework of the government of the German Democratic Republic in Berlin.

The operations of these four intelligence services have been coordinated (at least they are never in open rivalry and never interfere in one another's cases). The presence of an over-all guiding hand in their activities is apparent. Starting about 1946-47, the apparatus and the scope of their work expanded rapidly; within a few years the agents numbered in the hundreds. The press began to take note of this growth. The first important espionage trial conducted by the United States occupation forces took place in February and March 1949. Subsequently a number of United States district courts and a Court of Appeals were set up. (The British and French also established courts in their zones, and since 1951 German courts, too, have been trying espionage cases in increasing numbers.) Less than two years after the first trials the United States Court of Appeals in Germany stated, referring to the case then on trial, "This is the fourteenth case . . ."; and two months later, "another of the seemingly endless Czech

and addresses of all employees of the 'Ämter für Verfassungsschutz' [the German FBI]; ascertaining all war industry plants of over one thousand workers. It is essential to have photos, plans, blueprints, etc." Young Communists belonging to one of the two following groups are considered better fit than any others for intelligence work of this kind: trade union officials and members of local shop committees. D papers, Dh 39-40.

spy cases." Only ten months later the court noted: "the twenty-ninth espionage case to be considered by us . . ."; and the next day: "The case at bar is one more in the ever-running stream of spy cases . . ." Only part of the spy cases tried by district courts, it should be noted, reach the Court of Appeals.

Between the middle of 1949 and 1955, 86 espionage cases,¹ involving 174 persons, were opened; most of these were completed:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Defendants</i>
1949	19
1950	9
1951	24
1952	25
1953	38 (plus 24 in "Vulkan" *
1954	59 case)

So far as is known, the defendants worked for the following services:

Soviet	49
Czechoslovak	86
Polish	13
East German	12 (plus 24 in "Vulkan"
Unknown	14 case)

Among spies sentenced in West Germany, 15 to 16 per cent have been women (the role of women in the networks is small). The motives for espionage among the convicted spies were mainly pecuniary, although thrill-seeking, particularly in the case of young people, was also sometimes a motive.

Almost all the spies brought to trial plead guilty. Sentences range from a few months to fifteen years, with the average five to six years; contrary to the general practice in other criminal cases, sentences in espionage cases are rarely reduced. Convicted spies are kept in the United States-controlled Landsberg prison in Bavaria, which also holds German war criminals. Their number is kept secret and the press is not permitted entry to the prison. Penalties in these cases are considerably less severe than those for similar offenses tried on the other side of the Iron Curtain; not a single death sentence has been imposed for espionage

* The "Vulkan" case, discussed below, was a separate large espionage affair tried by German courts.

by a United States court in Europe since the end of the war. In one of its rulings the Court of Appeals said, in January 1953: "In the Iron Curtain countries which the defendants were so anxious (for cash) to serve, they would have been hung out of hand. It is shocking to observe that the defendant Keib is himself a refugee from one of these countries—namely Soviet Russia." ²

Soviet intelligence has tried hard, especially during the last few years, to keep behind the scenes and attract as little public attention as possible. The pattern of organization is the same as it has been: a Soviet intelligence officer in East Berlin is at the head of a group of agents active in the West, and agents and liaison men are always recruited from among Germans. On the surface the organization appears as a German intelligence agency; actually all initiative is reserved to the Soviet chiefs in Berlin, whose identity is not revealed to their agents and whose orders must be followed strictly and promptly. Unlike Germans working for the new East German intelligence, Germans recruited to work directly for Soviet intelligence rarely belong to Communist circles; the majority are drawn from among former officer groups, prisoners of war, and similar sources.

A typical case was that of Rudolph Petershagen, fifty-year-old former German officer, district chairman of the Nationale Front at Greiswald in the Soviet zone.³ The Nationale Front, ostensibly an organization coordinating all political groups of the Eastern zone but actually subordinate to the SED, the Communist party of East Germany, serves as a pool for intelligence service talent-spotters. All petty local secretaries of Nationale Front groups are V men (informers) of the Ministry of State Security, whose duty it is to indicate persons in their circles suitable for work with that agency. After undergoing a few tests, the new agent receives his assignment; for assignments in the West, persons with rightist-nationalistic background are preferred.

Having had some disagreements with the boss of the local SED, Petershagen turned to Captain Malinovski, local chief of the Soviet GB, and received some help from him: the German mayor of Greifswald, a foe of Petershagen, was removed; the attacks on Petershagen stopped; and Malinovski secured for him a minor but financially adequate job. Obviously already in the meshes of Soviet espionage, Petershagen began an extensive correspond-

ence under Malinovski's guidance with war comrades in the West. On the surface his letters, which were of a purely private nature, were simple appeals for aid in the fight for "peace and democracy." The next step, also suggested by Malinovski (who had now become "Dr. Franz"), was for Petershagen to go to the West to visit friends who might be persuaded to accept espionage assignments. Persons connected with United States counterintelligence were, of course, at the top of the "wanted" list. Through mutual friends Petershagen got in touch with Ernst Baer in Munich.

Baer, a German "leftist" with a concentration camp record, had lived in the United States after 1936, joined the United States Army, and then served with the Counterintelligence Corps until 1949. In 1951 he was employed as a security worker at the International Refugee Organization office in Frankfurt. He was precisely the kind of man Malinovski and Petershagen wanted.

Petershagen told Baer that mutual friends had recommended him as a person who "could be depended upon." He asked Baer to give information on the CIC, its organization, personnel, names of undercover men, its agents in the Soviet zone and in the Soviet Union, its methods of operation, and such matters. In return, Baer was given to understand, a job would be secured for him in the Eastern zone with a motion picture distributing agency, since "the Americans would be leaving Germany in a year or so." As a beginning, he was to go to Berlin to meet Malinovski—"Franz" at a certain café on a certain day.

Petershagen was neither adroit nor shrewd, and he was beyond the age for setting out to become a spy or a recruiter of spies. (In the opinion of his army comrades, he was "idealistic but not too sound and practical in his judgments.") In assigning Petershagen to recruit agents for Soviet espionage in the West, a task for which he was obviously unsuited, the Soviet officials displayed a callous disregard for his welfare. He was arrested by the CIC on November 9, 1951. From jail he sent word to his wife, in the Soviet zone, to leave immediately, and she reached the United States zone unharmed. Petershagen was sentenced to six years' imprisonment by the United States court in Germany.

The same lack of regard of Soviet authorities for their agents as human beings is seen in another case, that of André Erwin Andrees of Stettin. As a high-school student with hopes of a career in journalism, Andrees was drafted into the German army

at the age of seventeen, in August 1944; soon after the armistice he was taken prisoner by Soviet troops and shipped to Russia, where he spent five years as a prisoner of war. He returned to Berlin in September 1950; he was apparently connected in some way with Soviet agencies. He entered a "linguistic school" in the Soviet sector but lived in the French part of the city.

A month after his return from Russia he was summoned to start intelligence work for a Soviet agency. (There was a regulation in effect that a prisoner of war must have been a member of the SED or otherwise given his services for one month after his return from Russia before he could be considered eligible for a confidential assignment.) Andrees' superior, Major Stolarov of the Soviet intelligence service in Potsdam, instructed him to seek employment with the United States employment office at Berlin-Dahlem, the United States air base at Tempelhof, or America House in Berlin. Andrees visited all these offices but did not succeed in getting a job. Then Stolarov conceived a plan to use him to recruit Alfred Krieg, an American intelligence agent, for the Soviet spy apparatus.

Andrees received a false passport and 1,000 marks "to be used at his discretion" in the recruitment of Krieg. He was also furnished some information concerning Krieg's background, including the statement that Krieg "had worked for the Americans only three years, had been in the United States, and was not entirely satisfied with the treatment accorded him by the Americans." In addition there was a letter, written in poor German, to be delivered to Krieg:

March 11, 1952. Mr. Krieg, don't be surprised that this letter is written by a Russian. We know that you are with the U.S. agency that is active against us not because of your inimical feelings toward the Russians, but because you have to support your family. We know that your financial situation is not good and we also know that you are dissatisfied with the Americans, who could never appreciate your capabilities; therefore we are making you the proposition, to keep us—for an adequate remuneration—informed of the activities of the agency in which you are employed. It is evident that you have to continue with your work for the Americans—we are interested in it. Don't worry, we will never do

anything that might endanger your situation (in connection with information you will supply us). Don't have any doubts about our gratitude. The Russians are in a position to pay you more than you receive from the Americans. We rely on your intelligence. Please let our representative know whether you accept our offer to get in touch with us; he will also tell you about the terms of your future work. After having read this letter we suggest you destroy it. Stolarov.⁴

On his first visit to Krieg, Andrees gave him the letter and 500 marks (\$120); Krieg promised to give a definite answer later. Three days later Andrees called on Krieg again and repeated the offer, unaware that his conversation was being recorded. He wanted to have "the names, ranks, primary assignments, and addresses of the American personnel" in Krieg's office; lists of Germans employed there, their addresses, and so on. Krieg wrote down the answer, dated it, and signed it "Hansfeld"—the alias assigned to him. Then he made a sketch of his office for Andrees and received 200 marks from him. On his way out of the house Andrees was arrested.

Andrees pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years by the United States district court; the Court of Appeals reduced the sentence to seven years.

Among the United States agencies which attract the special attention of Soviet espionage are the intelligence schools. An unexciting but typical case involving attempts at espionage in American intelligence schools was that of Georg Ernst Bozenhard, a teacher in the Berlitz language school in Leipzig (Soviet zone), who had lived for eight years in the United States, spoke good English, and was considered by the Soviet officials well fitted to penetrate American agencies. In 1951, in fact, he succeeded in obtaining a written report on the United States intelligence school at Oberammergau. Arrested and tried, he was sentenced to four years and nine months. His appeal was rejected, Chief Justice William Clark stating:

The reasons offered for reduction of sentence are that the defendant is weak, a homosexual, and might have been sent to Siberia if he had not obeyed orders. None of these reasons appear to us to have any validity. We must deter even such types from spying. As far as Siberia is concerned the defend-

ant is better off in a German prison. The school at Oberammergau is one of the nerve centers of our defense.

The judgment and sentence of the trial court is affirmed.⁵

A background of moral and political degradation as a road to espionage was revealed in the case of Dr. Arthur Pilz.⁶ In 1951 Pilz was forty-three years old. A German Social Democrat since the late 'twenties, he had spent six years in a Nazi concentration camp, and at the war's end he was a broken man. In Erfurt, in the Soviet zone, along with a number of other unstable Socialists he joined the SED. As a "victim of fascism" he received assistance in many ways. Three Soviet intelligence officers—Major Nikitin, Major Vasiliev, and Captain Volkov—became his friends and patrons. The German SED police inspector Jopp set up a spare parts business for him as a cover for his numerous trips to the Western zones. Since 1946 spare parts had usually been brought in without permits from West Germany as part of a black market and smuggling affair. Black marketeering, on the other hand, also served as a camouflage for spying and recruiting of spies for Soviet intelligence.

"Your assignment is based on the trust of the party [SED]," Pilz was told. The regular reports from the West which Pilz prepared after each trip referred to reconstruction of bridges, military vehicles, rebuilding of cities, and similar matters. He was twice arrested by the authorities of the Eastern zone for illegal currency transactions and selling pornographic literature, but was not tried. When he was released he was ordered to resume his dual spare parts and espionage business in the West.

Pilz was arrested by the United States authorities and tried in October 1951. The sentence, eighteen months, was a mild one, probably because of his having been a victim of Nazism. In rejecting Pilz's appeal, the chief justice made another of his pointed remarks for the record:

. . . we are amazed at the cloak and dagger approach of the Soviets and the Czechs as to what happens in the zone of their late allies. Since we, with characteristic trustfulness (or foolishness), permit free circulation in our zone, anybody may obtain the information these spies are paid to transmit. In the United States the death sentence of the two atomic spies, whose record for unreliability was childishly

obvious, has just been confirmed. It leads one to conclude that government in a democracy is a difficult business.⁷

The largest postwar espionage case in Germany was that of the IWF (Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung, the Institute for Scientific-Economic Research), nicknamed "Vulkan" by one of the West German intelligence agencies. Although it was allegedly devoted to study of economic relations between the zones, the IWF actually served as a cover for reconnaissance operations.

Interzonal trade has been an excellent camouflage for various illegal operations in postwar Germany. In addition to the usual advantages of "export-import" as a cover (ties with foreign countries and trips abroad being logically explainable), German "East-West" trade evoked patriotic sentiments and voiced protest against the partition of the Fatherland. It would be hard to convince anyone in Germany, even those who are aware of the regulations, that exchange of goods between Munich and Leipzig, or between Hamburg and Weimar, can be termed smuggling.

The Institute for Economic Research was founded in East Berlin in 1951 as a scientific organization. Among its members were well-known political and police figures of the Soviet zone: Richard Stahlmann, Anton Ackermann, and others. The institute proceeded to organize "research" in the West. In Frankfurt a branch, the Eastern Bureau for Internal German Trade, was set up under Ludwig Weiss, a high official of the Soviet zone Trade Ministry, whose immediate superior was the daughter of President Wilhelm Pieck, Lore Staimer. A "private" trading firm under the name Ost-West Handelsgesellschaft was established in Hamburg. In the Berlin headquarters of the institute two departments were concerned with gathering information, and a third was established to evaluate it.

Contrary to the standing rule that well-known Communists must be kept out of espionage affairs, the Soviet intelligence officers in Berlin placed members of the SED and KPD in high posts. For example, Wilhelm Dollmaier, a "victim of Nazism" who had served in the Stuttgart police and been fired after his attempt to make photographic copies of documents for the Communist party, was given a job in one of these "East-West" trade organizations. Hermann Wallbaum, whose membership in the

KPD was well known, was another member of the ring. The same was true in the cases of Franz Hendegen, Karl Becker of Koblenz, Johann Kamm, and a "bookkeeper" in the latter's wholesale egg business in Munich. A grave misconception concerning the situation in West Germany must be the explanation for this blunder. In setting up this large organization, its fathers in the East zone had in view the accumulation of information on various aspects of West German economy and policies. In addition to information on "rearmament," according to a written instruction of the IWF, "every development in the camp of the adversary, in particular what he tries to conceal, must be explored."⁸

The "Vulkan" affair, one of the first espionage cases discovered and prosecuted by the new German authorities without active cooperation of the occupation powers, revealed considerable skill and efficiency on the part of the Amt für Verfassungsschutz (the German FBI for political affairs) and the courts. At an early moment in the life of the "Vulkan" organization the Amt penetrated it and supplied false information; a secret agent of the Amt, Wilhelm Ruschmaier, pretending to have good connections in various governmental agencies, provided Ludwig Weiss with documents fabricated ad hoc by the Amt. For a time this game went on successfully; then Weiss started to collect other, genuine, information on the military and political activities of the Federal Republic, and now the authorities decided to put an end to things. Weiss was arrested in September 1952, but the network continued to operate for another six months, obviously unaware of the close surveillance of the Bonn authorities. On April 6, 1953, thirty-five more persons were arrested. In a statement on their arrest, the government said: "The destroyed Russian espionage ring was the largest among secret Soviet organizations in the West discovered and made harmless . . . Since the destruction of one Polish and one Czech espionage network, this is the third dangerous eastern secret organization to be broken up in one year."¹⁰

The trials of the "Vulkan" leaders, which started in January 1954, were interesting in two respects. The head of the ring, Ludwig Weiss, unable to deny the accusations, assumed an air of defiance: he did not, he said, recognize the Federal Republic

nor its laws and courts; only the laws and courts of the German Democratic Republic were competent: "I am not a subject of this state organization which, in my view, has been established by dictatorial order of alien powers. As the only legitimate representative of the German nation I recognize the German Democratic Republic; this is my government, that sent me to West Germany with the honorable assignment of promoting inter-zonal trade."¹¹

The Supreme Court, which tried the members of the "Vulkan" group, showed understanding and leniency toward the defendants. Communist defendants who had suffered imprisonment during the Nazi era, including Weiss and a few of his aides, had their prison terms reduced by the amount of time they had been imprisoned before trial. Weiss's sentence of four years at hard labor was reduced by eighteen months. In the case of Hans Bogenhagen, a worker who had never known a real home, who had been called to military service at the age of eighteen and during his four years in a Soviet prisoner-of-war camp had adopted the Stalinist faith, the court recognized the sincerity of the defendant, who had "really believed he was serving a good cause," and sentenced him to twenty-one months, less the nine months he had spent in jail prior to his trial.¹²

The attitude of the court toward another defendant, Josef Gebhardt, was similar. Here the sentence stressed that Gebhardt, too, had grown up under adverse family conditions, had started his underground activity at the age of seventeen, and "spent the decisive years of his spiritual development at hard labor in concentration camps." It was natural, the court said, that immediately after the end of the war "he started to look for his old comrades" and contacted, among others, Ludwig Weiss. Gebhardt's sentence was seventeen months, less the time of his pretrial confinement.¹³

A distinct type of postwar spy was Wilhelm Klein, member of the SED, who operated for the Soviet intelligence service in the British zone.¹⁴ In 1950, at the age of thirty-three, he already had

a criminal record of burglary, auto theft, and black marketeering. When arrested by the British in August 1950 Klein named Soviet Captain Grabowski ("Viktor Schmitz" to the Germans) as his chief and guiding spirit. Grabowski's Soviet espionage agency had scrutinized Klein's record from its own particular angle and found him fit. Klein had been requested to gather information on the British-held airfield at Gatow, near Berlin, and his reports were to be submitted to the Central Committee of the SED rather than to Grabowski. Grabowski retreated, as least ostensibly, into the shadows; the role of the SED, however, as an organ of espionage was obvious in this case. Complying with Russian instructions, Klein went to Cologne to gather particulars on British occupation forces, bridges over the Rhine, the former German West Wall, and other objectives. On his return he delivered photographs to Soviet intelligence. During another trip to the West he made photographs of British barracks and military installations.

Soviet espionage in the British zone, however, was not as intensive as in the United States zone, if only because of the relatively smaller size of the British forces and their relatively smaller influence on German affairs. Some espionage cases, discovered in the British zone, were instructive and important.

A purely Communist, and therefore more interesting, group was the Berg-Donczik ring consisting of six Germans, among them two women.¹⁶ The group was guided from behind the Iron Curtain by two Soviet intelligence officers, "Victor" and "Boris"; the German chief of the group was Robert Koch, a "traveling salesman" who frequently crossed the demarcation line into the Soviet zone. The activities of the group centered around the Lüneburger Heath and Braunschweig, the largest military training grounds in Germany. Here secret tests of tanks, artillery, and armor-piercing guns are made on large ranges; in addition, several aircraft bases are located in the area. An important source of information was Erika Krüger, an operator on the British army switchboard at the Münster camp. Fräulein Krüger was in a position to supply important reports and photos of barracks and military installations to Russian intelligence.

The group was arrested on June 9, 1953, when the local blacksmith, Heinrich Beck, reported to the British that Werner Berg, a member of the ring, had tried to persuade him to gather secret information for a fee of 400 to 700 marks a month. When, in

addition, one of the arrested members of the group, Edith Seefeld, fiancée of a British officer, confessed, the activities of the group were laid bare.¹⁶ The trial by a British court, held in August 1953, ended in prison sentences of approximately the severity of those imposed by the United States courts: Berg was sentenced to five years, Erika Krüger and the courier Eberhard Donczik to four years each. The charges against Edith Seefeld were dropped.

The story of Soviet spies Hans Peter Frahm and Harald Freidank, who were arrested in the British zone, had a tragic ending. Soviet intelligence was in this case represented by a man going by the name of "Morev." Hans Peter Frahm, a German Communist, journalist, sports writer, and agent of Soviet intelligence, co-operated with "Morev" in a search for information about British agencies in the Kiel area.

As the German chief of a British-sponsored public press room in Kiel since 1945, Harald Freidank met numerous public figures, among them Frahm.¹⁷ When Freidank was informed that his services in connection with the press room would not be needed after September 1952, Frahm promised to find him another job in the Western office of an "East German press agency." Frahm and Freidank went to Berlin to meet a Soviet intelligence agent, "Georg"; at their third meeting "Georg" proposed that Freidank gather information for the Soviet intelligence service, and Freidank agreed. He went to Hamburg with detailed assignments relating to a number of British officers.

Frahm and Freidank were arrested and a date was set for their trial before the German Supreme Court. Frahm committed suicide in jail before the trial began. Freidank, who had not yet performed any acts of espionage, was not severely punished despite the fact that the prosecution noted "the menacing growth of the espionage network in the Federal Republic." His sentence was one year.

Each of the Eastern intelligence services operating in West Germany assigns agents to shadow dissidents, refugees, "counter-revolutionists," "traitors," and others. This kind of espionage often serves as preparation for more important and dangerous assignments in which the targets are Russian deserters, Czech and Polish refugees, and Germans wanted by the police of the Eastern zone. Since the war, the demarcation line between military espio-

nage and secret police has not always been distinct and the same agents have sometimes been assigned to both kinds of espionage.

Soviet espionage of the secret-police type has been directed, in postwar Germany, against two sorts of targets—individuals and anti-Soviet organizations. In the first postwar years (1945 and 1946) groups of repatriation officials visited the huge camps for displaced persons in which Soviet citizens, both prisoners of war and *Ostarbeiter*, lived. Since the repatriation operation was the responsibility of the GB, the visiting commissions consisted of GB officials. The repatriation commissions did not have much success in their main assignment of shipping unwilling Soviet refugees home, but they planted a network of informants all over the hungry and desperate DP world. Occasionally one or another inmate of a camp disappeared without leaving a trace; in other cases persons testified to having seen an inmate kidnaped. It took the Western zone authorities a long time to oust these "repatriation commissions."

The network of agents remained, however, and kept the GB in East Berlin posted on persons and happenings in the émigré and refugee world. GB operations directed against refugees in Germany do not properly come within the framework of this book. In certain cases, however, these activities are interwoven with spy operations against the Western powers, in particular when the latter give assistance of one kind or another to émigrés and their parties.

The trial of Olga Larissa Robiné, a Russian DP and wife of a German Communist in the Eastern zone, developed into a sensational affair when, having confessed, the defendant was acquitted, released from jail, and permitted to return to the East.¹⁸ "Red Olga," a teacher in Brandenburg, an attractive, clever woman, had made three visits to a former Red Army officer, now cobbler, Nikolai Solonar-Fischer, who lived in the Western zone a few miles from the border of the Soviet zone. Her purpose was to recruit him as a secret agent for the GB. In her approach to Solonar Olga used a standard method: "letters from relatives," fabricated by the GB. Solonar reported these visits to the West German police. On the third visit Olga was arrested.

The trial was to take place on July 22, 1953, before a German court in Celle. On July 4 another Russian DP, Simon Kruchkov,

invited Solonar to take a ride in his motorcycle. Solonar, the main witness, was killed in an "accident" with a truck; Kruchkov was unharmed.

At the trial Olga Robiné made a good impression. She told a story (which could not be verified) of imprisonment by Soviet authorities; she gave the names of unknown GB officers who "compelled" her to spy; and she evoked sympathy by telling of her children back home. Her behavior in court was modest and cooperative. The court, which was dealing with a case of this kind for the first time, was not in a position to check on her veracity or determine whether Solonar's timely death had really been accidental. Nor did the court try to find out why Olga did not escape to the West in 1945, when so many other DP's, in fear for their lives, tried to flee before the advancing Red Army and Soviet police. Immediately after her acquittal Olga Robiné left for the Soviet zone. The August 2, 1953, issue of the German magazine *Der Stern* concluded its report on the affair with the sensible remark: "This decision will play a considerable role in the training of spies by Russian counterintelligence."

A similar case was that of Nina Siem, a Russian DP and an old hand at Soviet intelligence operations, who was, however, less fortunate than Olga Robiné.¹⁹ In 1951 Nina was assigned to recruit an active Russian émigré, "Stankevich" (a pseudonym) for the Soviet service, but her efforts were vain. The "letters from relatives" which she brought did not impress "Stankevich," who reported her to the American authorities. She was arrested and tried. The United States court sentenced her to five years' imprisonment.

There were other cases of female agents who consistently maintained, after they were arrested, that "coercion" and "threats" were the only reasons for their having entered into espionage activities. One of these was the typist, Ursula Herlitz,²⁰ who came to West Berlin in December 1952 as a "political refugee," but actually for espionage purposes. She was denounced, arrested, and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. Another was Elli Erhardt, who gathered names, addresses, and various other items of information on the German police as well as on Soviet refugees. In general women are preferred as agents by the Soviet authorities in cases where refugees are to be approached for recruitment.

The main attention of the Soviet police and Soviet intelligence

turned naturally to the "activists" among the émigré groups—those men and organizations that work with dynamite and poison, try to penetrate Soviet agencies, send emissaries to Russia, create an underground and supply it with arms, radios, and propaganda materials. Once agents of Soviet intelligence succeeded in getting into such groups, they became instigators, plotters, and the most insistent "fighters" among their new colleagues.

All émigré groups are screened by the GB, but two—the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-R) and the Russian Solidarists (NTS, The National Toilers' Union)—have been objects of intensive attention.

The Ukrainian OUNR group, better known by the name of its leader (Stepan) Bandera, had its origin in Galicia, in the western Ukraine, a territory that belonged to Austria until 1918 and then to Poland until 1939. A violently nationalistic, conspiratorial, and terroristic group, it had as its goal the unification of all Ukrainian areas and the establishment of a united Ukraine as an independent and sovereign power. In the war years from 1941 to 1944 the Bandera party extended its ties deep in the Soviet Ukraine and organized armed groups in that German-occupied territory. When the Soviet armies returned and the GB began an extensive purge, numerous Ukrainian guerrilla groups remained in hiding in the woods and villages of this large country, while the political leadership settled down abroad, mainly in Germany.

The Soviet police tried by their well-known methods and techniques to infiltrate the émigré Bandera groups. They dispatched their agents abroad under the guise of envoys of the underground; if they succeeded in arresting "divers" (Bandera couriers dispatched from Germany for quick sorties into Soviet territory), they tried to "turn them over" and send them back as their own spies. The Bandera group, on the other hand, meted out severe punishment to GB spies that they caught. An underground battle full of drama, treason, blood, and murder ensued.

Among Russian organizations, the NTS (Solidarists) has been the chief object of attention since the war. The political program of this group is of less interest to Soviet intelligence than its methods of operation, which include contacts with Soviet officers and soldiers stationed in East Germany, printing and distribution of millions of leaflets, a radio station for broadcasts to the Soviet

zone, and last but not least, the sending of agents illegally to Soviet Russia after training in special schools. The NTS made no secret of these activities and it benefited, at least for a time, from considerable help on the part of certain American agencies.

One of the most prominent cases of Soviet espionage in Germany was that involving Darko Chirkovich, a Serb refugee in West Germany. Son of a well-known member of the Yugoslav parliament from Macedonia, Darko himself had been secretary of the Yugoslav Senate before the war; he had also served as secretary to Prime Minister Draga Tsvetkovich. During the war he moved to the left, joined the resistance, and was imprisoned by the Germans. His wife Tatiana, daughter of a Russian émigré physician, Istomin, joined the NTS, whose leaders, before the war, had lived in Belgrade. Arrested by the Germans, Tatiana committed suicide while in prison in 1944.

After the war Chirkovich moved to Munich, where he lived as a "refugee from Communism" and maintained close relations with the leadership of the NTS. The enthusiastic "anti-Communist" Serb-Russian was let into many of the party's secrets. In particular, he had knowledge of the preparation of agents for work in the East, of intelligence schools in Germany, and some activities of United States intelligence. He made trips to East Germany, where he met with the chiefs of Soviet intelligence and betrayed to them all NTS secrets known to him.

In October 1952 Chirkovich was arrested by the United States authorities, and confessed. He made a full statement of his activities, including the supplying of information on American forces in Germany to Soviet intelligence. On December 15, 1952, Chirkovich was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.²¹

During this time a new agent of Soviet intelligence—the "most dangerous of Soviet spies in Germany"—was rapidly advancing to posts of confidence in West Germany. Combining two reconnoitering operations, one against American intelligence and one against Russian émigré groups, he might soon have been among the greatest of Soviet spies had it not been for one of those professional accidents which have put an end to more than one brilliant career in the field of espionage.

Capt. Nikita Khorunzhi, a Russian teacher before 1941 and again after 1946, and member of the Communist party, stationed with the Soviet Army in East Germany, crossed the line in 1948

to appear before the American authorities in Berlin as one of the multitude of Soviet defectors of those years. His motives were anything but political and his opposition to Soviet policy was not so much the cause of the defection as its by-product. He had been ordered by the Soviet Command to return home, where he had left a wife and two children, but he decided to remain with Elisabeth, a German woman, mother of two grown children, whom he wanted to marry. To do this he fled with her to the Western zone. The Americans interrogated Khorunzhi and found him to be a genuine refugee (he was not yet at that time connected with Soviet espionage) who was willing to serve the American authorities. He was given a passport, and became German citizen "Georg Müller."

Khorunzhi-"Müller" obtained a job with an American Army depot at Griesheim, where he worked for two years; from November 1950 on he was employed at an automobile plant. The Soviet authorities, however, had not forgotten the escaped captain and found a simple way to reach him: when the new Frau "Müller" moved to Frankfurt to join "Georg," she left a brother Werner behind in the Soviet zone whom the Soviet authorities used as a tool against the "Müllers." In the spring of 1951 Werner brought Khorunzhi a letter stating that unless he returned immediately his relatives in Russia as well as his wife's relatives in East Germany would be severely punished for his crime of defection. In his reply Khorunzhi offered his services as a secret agent if the two families were spared. The offer was accepted. He was to stay in the West and fulfill assignments which would be communicated to him.

Everything in this case was typical of the methods of postwar Soviet intelligence: the unstable defector himself, whose defection was motivated by a love affair; the German brother-in-law who betrayed his whereabouts and was forced to play the role of go-between; blackmail applied to enlist the refugee's services. The subsequent developments, similarly typical, were somewhat sensational. Soviet intelligence headquarters in Potsdam assigned one of its German agents, Helmut Glöckner, who was well covered by the legitimate job of a "buyer for the Soviet Army" and by a false passport in the name of "Hammer," to keep in regular touch with Khorunzhi and transmit oral and written instructions to him. Khorunzhi's assignment was threefold: first, to become friendly with United States intelligence officers of the American headquarters in Oberursel (Germany) and to report in general on this

agency; second, to recruit other Soviet defectors as secret agents; third, to penetrate Russian émigré groups, in particular the NTS.

It was at this time (August, 1951) that Khorunzhi's rise began. First he got in touch with an extreme rightist émigré group, RONDD, a not very active organization and no important target of Soviet espionage. From here he moved to the NTS, at the same time starting to work for United States intelligence as an "expert" on Soviet affairs. In the fall of 1951 the NTS was patronizing a new Russian émigré organization, the Central Union of Postwar Refugees, in which defectors from the Soviet Army were united. Under the aegis of the NTS, Khorunzhi appeared at the congress of the postwar refugees in Munich, where he made a violently anti-Soviet speech and was elected to the governing body of the new organization. This body compiled lists of Soviet defectors, the whereabouts of many of whom (a well-kept secret of United States intelligence) became known to Khorunzhi and, through his reports, to the Soviet G.B. Under Soviet law and practice the family of a "nonreturnee" is severely punished, and Khorunzhi's services thus made possible punitive action against hundreds of relatives of the refugees.

At one point in Khorunzhi's advance a typical procedure was applied by his superiors to ingratiate him with United States intelligence and build up that agency's confidence in him. There was another Soviet agent working in West Germany, a sergeant-defector from the Soviet Army whose abilities and prospects were inferior to those of Khorunzhi. The fact that this man, too, was serving as a Soviet spy was kept secret, of course, until one day Khorunzhi was instructed by Potsdam to betray him to United States counterintelligence; the one spy had to be sacrificed to pave the way for the rise of another. From then on Khorunzhi advanced rapidly. He quit his job as a factory worker and became an instructor at a "counterintelligence school" of the NTS at Bad Homburg, where young Russians were being trained to work behind the Iron Curtain. This important and little-known section of the underground war in Europe had, of course, been a target of Soviet intelligence for a long time. It was open now to Khorunzhi, who met American and Russian intelligence instructors, learned the names of prospective agents, their assignments, and their methods of infiltration.

On May 27, 1953, the Soviet press and radio announced that

four Russian refugees, "foreign agents," who had been parachuted into the Ukraine from an American four-motored plane had been caught by the GB. From the details of the announcement it was evident that they had been betrayed:

On the night of April 26, 1953 [the official report stated] the Ministry of Internal Affairs received information concerning a violation of the Soviet border and the appearance over Ukraine Republic territory of a foreign airplane of unknown origin. It was established that foreign intelligence agents were dropped by parachute from the above-mentioned plane . . .

Two parachutists, arrested April 27, admitted that they were saboteurs and had been sent into the USSR from abroad by American intelligence to carry out sabotage, terror, and espionage assignments . . .

They testified that two other saboteurs, American intelligence agents, had been dropped from the same plane with them. They too were discovered and arrested . . .

The parachutists were found to be in possession of firearms, poison (potassium cyanide), four short-wave radio sets of American make, radio beacons for directing airplanes to their targets, cryptography devices, means for preparing false Soviet documents, large sums of Soviet currency, foreign gold coins, and plates for printing anti-Soviet leaflets . . .

Traitors to the fatherland Lakhno, Makov, Gorbunov, and Remiga, having already had experience of base treason [in favor of Germany in the war] were enlisted in the American intelligence service and sent to a special espionage and sabotage school of the American intelligence service in the small town of Bad Wiessee, near Munich, in Bavaria.

Traitors Lakhno, Makov, Gorbunov, and Remiga, under direction of American intelligence officers who used the pseudonyms "Bill," "Bob," "Captain," and "Vladimir," went through a detailed training course in methods of organizing and carrying out acts of terror, sabotage and espionage on the territory of the Soviet Union, use of firearms and explosives. They were also trained in the use of American radio sets of special design intended for use in espionage. . . .

Saboteurs Lakhno, Makov, Gorbunov, and Remiga testified that when they had completed the training course at Bad

Wiessee the American intelligence service provided them with false Soviet passports, forged military [service] cards, firearms, poison, radio sets, ciphers, codes and other equipment, and on April 23, 1953, accompanied by the above-mentioned officer of the American intelligence service, Captain Holliday, they were all delivered by an American military plane from Munich to the Athens airport in Greece.

American intelligence Maj. Harold Irving Fidler, who came to the Soviet Union three times in 1951 in the guise of a diplomatic courier of the United States State Department, met the saboteurs at the Athens airport. On the evening of April 25 the saboteurs were provided with parachutes and were seated by Fidler in the above-mentioned unmarked four-motored American plane, which brought them to the place in Soviet territory where they were dropped. . . .

A few days ago the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, having considered the case of Alexander Vassilievich Lakhno, Alexander Nikolayevich Makov, Sergei Izosimovich Gorbunov, and Dmitri Nikolayevich Remiga, in view of the gravity of the crimes committed by them against the Soviet state, on the basis of the January 12, 1950, decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On the Application of the Death Penalty to Traitors to the Motherland, Spies, and Saboteurs," sentenced them to the highest measure of punishment—execution.

The sentence has been carried out.

If we eliminate the conventional "sabotage" and "terror" charges and some other details, this report was essentially correct, as the émigré press conceded; the four Soviet refugees, ardent anti-Communists, wanted to carry on their political fight against the Kremlin on home ground and risked their lives in a cause which to them was a great one. They lost their lives before they even started their activity.

It was not without trepidation that Khorunzhi obeyed the first Soviet order to come to Berlin to report. As a deserter who had made full depositions to United States intelligence, he had earned a death sentence. But in his position disobedience was out of the question. He traveled to Soviet headquarters, but returned unharmed. He made a second trip later. To the Soviet espionage

organization Khorunzhi as an active agent was worth more than Khorunzhi as a prisoner in a labor camp or lying in an unmarked grave in a prison cemetery.

"Concentrate on the NTS," he was told by his superior in Potsdam on April 20, 1952, "and try to gain the confidence of its leaders. Try gradually to rise to a high and responsible position in that organization in order to find out who among the Americans is backing the NTS and who is financing its underground work." Nothing could be more desirable for the GB than to have its agents planted in such posts.

Willing to take on the assignment, Khorunzhi made a few successful sorties. Among his exploits was the recruiting of seven subagents for Soviet espionage from among Russian refugees. In the spring of 1953 he became an official member of the NTS; a few months later he wrote in his report to Potsdam:

I want to attain a position where I will have all information: who is working against us on our territory, where and for how long; when I have information on the whole net of the organization's agents, it will be sensible to take chances. At present, however, I have to be very, very cautious. This is hard at times; pretending is not easy, and I never was an actor. But I am getting stronger, moving forward and, as you know, am achieving something. The most important thing is that my chances increase. You may rest assured that neither the risks nor other considerations can stop me.²²

Khorunzhi was ordered to send his written reports to Potsdam once a month. The technique used was a rather primitive one: he was to type his reports on silk kerchiefs and bury these in a hollow under an oak tree in a certain wooded place near Frankfurt. In some cases his wife carried his notes over the frontier concealed in chocolate bars. It is characteristic of the Soviet lack of efficiency that not even a short-wave radio was put at the disposal of the prospective *grand agent provocateur*.

It was also characteristic that Khorunzhi felt a lack of support on the part of his Soviet chiefs. He was lonely and forlorn. More than once in this book we have seen how the impersonal, cynical attitude of the intelligence bureaucrats, themselves protected and secure, embitters and undermines the large apparatus subordinated to them.

I expected to receive from you kind and friendly advice [Khorunzhi wrote once], not insults and reproaches. Your messages are the only thing I receive from my homeland—at least do put into them some of the warmth and love in which our homeland is so rich. It is really hard to live surrounded by enemies and to have to pretend they are my friends. This is much harder than the hardest manual labor. Therefore I would like to hear something warm, happy, pleasant from time to time. It would give me strength, it would bolster up my courage and would spur me to action. For the time being this is all. The next letter will go *September 15*, if nothing unexpected happens. With warm and sincere regards, I remain as ever, yours, Wolf.²³

The “unexpected” did happen, however. Denounced by one of his subagents, Khorunzhi was arrested by German counterintelligence and turned over to the Americans. At the trial before a United States military court in December 1953, one of the prosecution witnesses was Glöckner-“Hammer,” the Soviet agent who had established the first contacts between Potsdam and Khorunzhi two years before; in the interim he had changed sides and was now working for United States intelligence. Glöckner revealed much about the operations of the Soviet apparat and Khorunzhi's role in them. Khorunzhi was sentenced to fourteen years in prison and his wife to two. The prosecutor, Thomas Lancien, told the court:

Defendant Khorunzhi is the most dangerous of all spies tried by our courts hitherto. Only once before has our court meted out a sentence of fifteen years—against a Czech who delivered information on one of our local air bases to Czech Communist intelligence. This Czech was certainly a less dangerous spy than Khorunzhi.

. . . We gave the Soviet spy the opportunity to defend himself in open court. Had he been an American agent arrested behind the Iron Curtain, he would never have been given such a possibility and would have been shot long ago. Khorunzhi's crime is worse than murder, because an assassin kills only his victim, whereas a spy threatens the safety of the entire society. . . .²⁴

In February 1955 Khorunzhi's sentence was reduced to five years.

In two other prominent cases the NTS was again the target of

GB operations. Alexander Trushnovich, one of the party's leaders, disappeared in Berlin on April 13, 1954;²⁵ and Nikolai Khokhlov, an agent of the GB, was dispatched to organize the assassination of Georgi Okolovich, head of NTS clandestine operations. (Khokhlov, however, defected, revealed his assignments, and joined the NTS.²⁶) These actions of the GB, though not entirely clear at the time of this writing, provoked a passionate controversy among Russian émigré groups as to the ways and means of penetrating Russia and creating the underground from abroad. But the matter, part of the great issue of a pro-Western underground in the Soviet Union, does not come within the framework of this book.

6. POLAND'S INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

In objectives, methods of operation, and selection of personnel, Polish intelligence in Germany has been almost identical with the Russian. One or two "Polish officers" living in East Berlin under assumed names recruited agents and gave the orders. The agents, usually non-Communist Germans, were assigned to espionage against military objectives of the Allies; since 1950 they have been assigned also to the embryo German war department, the Amt Blank. Political developments in and around the Bonn government as well as in the German political parties have been of special interest. After the Soviet pattern, discipline is strict, every move being conditioned on the consent of the chief. Communication has been maintained by means of microphotos, radio, and couriers. Agents are promised no protection in case of arrest.

In 1947 two Polish officers, "Albert" and "Gregor," began to build up, from East Berlin, a Polish intelligence network for Western Germany. From behind the Iron Curtain they employed a number of Germans, men and women, as agents. The "art historian" Karl Kunze was put at the head of one of the apparatus; he was assisted by his mistress Luise Frankenberg, owner of an "art store" in West Berlin.

Kunze's personality was typical of the postwar Soviet-Polish espionage agent. The "art historian" was actually a former colonel in the Germany army, whose career had been shattered and whose future was uncertain; it was impossible for him to live up to the pretensions and demands of Miss Frankenberg. When Kunze accepted the offer of the Polish officers to organize an espionage

group in Western Germany, he put on the mask of a conservative, hyperpatriotic German officer. He approached Germans of strongly anti-Allied orientation, asking them for information which, he hinted, was needed for German nationalist purposes.

Among the customers of Miss Frankenberg's "Kunsthandlung" was a German woman, Maria Knuth. Ties of friendship soon developed between the Kunze-Frankenberg couple and Maria Knuth. Maria was eventually brought into the ring, at first rendering only occasional service.

Maria Knuth, a woman of intelligence and strong will, forty-two years old at the time she joined the apparat, had had a hard, unhappy life. She had been a typist in Berlin and had been married to the flyer Manfred Knuth, but the marriage was childless. The couple separated after a few years. Maria tried to become an actress, but a face injury suffered in an air raid in 1943 put an end to her plans. She had suffered from tuberculosis and in 1942 developed symptoms of cancer.

In 1948 Kunze and Miss Frankenberg were ordered by Polish intelligence to move to Frankfurt to set up the "Berg-Verlag" there. Maria Knuth remained in Berlin, where she served the couple as a "letter box" for their correspondence with the chiefs in the East. At that time Maria, whose pay amounted to 200 marks (\$46) a month, was not aware of the real nature of her job; she supposed that it had to do with illicit East-West trade. (Here again was an instance of smuggling used as a cover for espionage.)

Kunze recruited a few employees of the Frankfurt police for his "Berg-Verlag," among them Hermann Westbeld and Marianne Opelt, two others who were typical of the mass of ill, unhappy people in postwar Germany. Westbeld, who had been an illegitimate child and spent his early years in a poverty-stricken family, suffered from a spinal ailment. A psychiatrist described him as "a weakling." At the time he accepted Kunze's offer he had a wife and two children and a monthly salary of 248 marks (\$59). He was in a position to report on the police organization and, somewhat later, to procure passports. Marianne Opelt, daughter of a conservative family, was attracted by Kunze's patriotic phrases. She, too, was ill. After twenty years in the Frankfurt police department she was earning 300 marks (\$71) a month.

Kunze spent the funds at his disposal freely, mostly on his mistress, and was generous in paying his agents. One day it be-

came impossible to maintain the deception any longer: the one-time Prussian officer had been embezzling. He committed suicide on June 30, 1949.

"Albert" appointed Maria Knuth to succeed Kunze. Maria's rise in the ranks ushered in the prosperity era of the ring. She moved to Frankfurt to be closer to the other members of the group, and she increased their salaries. The following year she was ordered on an important assignment to Cologne, nearer to the seat of the German government. On this occasion "Agnes" (Maria) took the oath of loyalty to Polish intelligence and pledged absolute secrecy.

Techniques improved from month to month. Two new "letter boxes" were established in Berlin-Wilmersdorf and another in Cologne. At first, reports were typed, sometimes in code, but this obsolete method was discarded and invisible ink was introduced. Ink gave way to microphotography, and Herman Westbeld became a photo-artist. A Buddha about twenty inches high—a relic of the "art store" days—always accompanied Maria on her trips to Berlin; it contained a secret cache of documents and other objects. Secret papers were dispatched concealed in the bindings of books, in cakes, in jars of face cream. The same methods were used to send money from Berlin for the ring in the West. Among the tasks assigned Maria's ring was the preparation of a detailed report on the size of American and British forces in Germany; another report, prepared by "Holl" (Westbeld), dealt with technical and personnel changes in the police. Marianne Opelt was doing a job of the significance of which she was not fully aware: she simply made an extra copy for Maria of all papers she typed; among the hundreds of papers that Polish-Soviet intelligence obtained in this way no doubt a few were of considerable interest.

In the fall of 1950 came the decision by the West for the rearmament of Germany in the framework of the European Defense Community; early implementation of the plan appeared possible. Moscow suspected that German rearmament was already in progress. A new task was put before Soviet and satellite intelligence—

to penetrate the Amt Blank in Bonn. Maria Knuth herself applied for a position as typist in that agency but was turned down because of insufficient shorthand experience. In January 1952, however, new opportunities presented themselves. One of Maria's agents, Hauer by name, who was neither clever nor agile, met one "Petersen" who claimed to be employed at the Amt Blank. It was obvious from his conversation that "Petersen" was in sympathy with Soviet policies. Hauer introduced him to Maria Knuth. The recruiting of "Petersen," of the War Office, into the ring would be a brilliant coup. Maria inquired of her boss in Berlin. To the old birds of Soviet-Polish intelligence, "Petersen" appeared suspect; he was too good to be true. Maria was warned but not forbidden to continue the contact. Collaboration began; with it there developed a personal friendship between "Petersen" and Maria.

"Petersen" of course was not employed at the Amt Blank; the German police, however, encouraged him in his risky venture with the Polish ring, supplying him with all kinds of false but interesting documents dealing with the new army organization. There was a "letter to the Chancellor," a "Big Plan," a "Shore Plan," etc. All the documents were handed over to Polish headquarters. Gradually "Albert" and "Gregor" themselves became enthusiastic. In March 1952 they gave a high evaluation of "Petersen's" reports; a month later they increased the salary of "Ernst Boldt" ("Petersen") to 500 marks monthly and promised an increase soon to 1,000 marks—which was unprecedented remuneration for a new recruit.

At this stage the German authorities were in possession of all the information they wanted; nothing more could be gained by continuing "Operation Petersen." In the latter part of April 1952 an end was put to Maria Knuth's three years of espionage activities. All the members of her ring were arrested. The trial was held in January 1953. In the prison hospital Maria underwent two operations for cancer. On her appearance in court she was escorted by nurses. Aware that she was nearing the end, she related her story fully and in detail, without trying to exonerate herself. Her only attempt at self-defense was her statement that, concerned with the fate of the Polish nation, she wanted to prevent, if possible, the

resurrection of a German army. This, she told the court, was the chief motive for her activities; she had no sympathy whatever, she declared, for the Soviet Union. Not convinced by these avowals of political motivation, the court sentenced her to four years at hard labor. The penalty for Westbeld was two years, and for Marianne Opelt three months. Compared with the "espionage trials" in the satellite capitals, with their routine "confessions" and severe punishments, these first sentences by a German court in an espionage case since the war appeared lenient and humane.

In another phase of its intelligence operations, initiated in 1947-48, the Polish government tried to reactivate old Polish espionage agents who had survived the war and could now, in the changed international situation, be of use. In his search for experienced agents, Captain Kamien of the Secret Service in Warsaw turned to a veteran of Polish intelligence, Theodor Szendzielorz, a man with an almost unprecedentedly long espionage record.

Szendzielorz had worked for Poland as a secret agent in Germany before the war and had been sentenced to life imprisonment by a Nazi "people's court" in 1937. Invited now to resume his former activities, he consented. He went to Germany in 1948 to start an espionage network of his own, and recruited agents mainly from among Germans who had been expelled from Poland. On their chief's instructions they drew maps and wrote reports on the location of United States forces, their arms, fuel depots, tanks, railroads, and so forth. Szendzielorz himself traveled back and forth between Poland and West Germany to receive the reports, pay his agents (the highest pay they received was 60 marks (\$14) per report), and bring his loot back to Warsaw.

As is often the case with intelligence reports of Eastern agents, they had more quantity than quality; interested mainly in money, Szendzielorz' agents supplied him—and through him, Warsaw—with some ludicrous news items. In one report a strange motorless airplane was described. (The report was probably based on vague knowledge of jet planes.) One message mentioned six hundred bombs as the total atomic-bomb reserve of the United States; one of the bombs, it was stated, had been "lost somewhere." Another report said that United States troops sometimes wear green uniforms in order to pass as Russians. To be sure, there was also correct information in the abundant papers that flowed to Szendzielorz—

sketches, maps, and blueprints of military and industrial installations, railway repair shops, gas and water works, and such.

Returning to Poland from one of his trips, Szendzielorz was arrested in the vicinity of the Grafenwöhr troop training area. In the act of trying to escape, he dropped a shopping bag full of incriminating documents. His arrest and the evidence found on him led to the uncovering of his whole spy ring. With Szendzielorz four other members of the network—two Poles and two Germans—were arrested. At their trial before an American court the defendants admitted their roles and described their activities. Their defense was “coercion” (this defense was to become standard in spy trails): they feared, they said, for their relatives in Poland; a refusal to cooperate in the espionage network would mean arrest and deportation of their relatives to Siberia. While in some cases retaliation against relatives might have been a real threat, this excuse was often used also by willing members of the apparatus, and courts in Germany have not always been able to discriminate between the real and false “victims of coercion.” Szendzielorz was sentenced for the second time in his life to a long term—this time to thirty years at hard labor; his accomplices received sentences of from twelve to twenty years. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, American military governor in Germany, reduced the sentences by half.

The espionage techniques of the Eastern service made considerable progress after the war. Only a few years lay between Maria Knuth's primitive efforts and the remarkable successes of another Polish agent, the “master spy” Bruno Sniegowski. Before going abroad, Sniegowski had been trained for two years in the Warsaw intelligence school, whose existence in itself signified a great step forward from the previous three- to six-month “courses.” Sniegowski's teachers were Russian officers, and the “science” he was instructed in was a Polish edition of what was being taught in the Soviet Union. Having found a job as an expert in the Amt Blank, Sniegowski, within a period of three weeks, made the record number of seven hundred photographs of persons and documents dealing with important military matters as well as counterespionage. He deposited his carefully wrapped photos in a “dead” letter box in a Bonn suburb (the box had been out of use for a long time), and the Polish courier picked up the “mail” without ever meeting the sender. This procedure was not as brilliant an inspiration as its inventor believed. On his third attempt

to use the letter box, Sniegowski was arrested. He was tried and sentenced to five years at hard labor.¹

Polish intelligence activity in Germany on the whole, however, has not been as extensive as that of the other Eastern services. Warsaw had few convinced and devoted Communists to spare for service in Germany, and the mercenaries picked up at random or taken out of moth balls proved inefficient in the new world of affairs. The harvest was mediocre.

7. THE EAST GERMAN APPARAT

The MSS, the East German equivalent of the GB, emerged, as we have seen, in 1950, after two years of meticulous preparation.* Espionage was one of its main activities. The MSS patterned its structure, methods, and techniques more after the Soviet prototypes than after its Gestapo predecessor; it adopted the Soviet practice of show trials and framed accusations and the specific Soviet methods of interrogation; with respect to concentration camps and prisons, it combined the practices of the two agencies. In the field of espionage it used the Soviet methods, and even adopted some Soviet terminology. The Soviet system of espionage, based on a quarter of a century's experience, was the model, and the German agencies followed it strictly.

The two men who have headed the MSS during the five years since its birth—Wilhelm Zaisser until July 1953, and Ernst Wollweber since that time—had won prominence as espionage agents of Soviet military intelligence. Zaisser and Wollweber, who have been mentioned earlier in this book, belonged to the generation of German Communists who joined the movement in the 1920's, went to Russia, and supplied Moscow with the best human material. Now, in addition to their German citizenship, both had Soviet citizenship. They retained their dual citizenship when they took over the guidance of East German state affairs; double allegiance was no problem in this case.

Wilhelm Zaisser had reached the peak of his intelligence career in the Far East during the middle 1930's. A few years later

* Two terms are in use in East Germany to describe the secret police: MSS (Ministry of State Security) and SSD (State Security Service). In order to reduce the confusion resulting from the abundance of abbreviated terms, MSS is used throughout this book.

he was sent to Spain, where as "General Gomez" he attained prominence in the civil war. From there he returned to Moscow, to be caught up in the greatest of all Soviet purges. Zaisser was arrested and spent two years in jail. When the sanguinary era came to an end and Lavrenti Beria became the new People's commissar of the interior, Zaisser was freed. Beria sent him to study at the Military Academy and gave him the rank of Soviet colonel. From that time ties of political friendship connected Beria and Zaisser, ties which became fatal for the latter when Beria was purged in Moscow.

During the war years Zaisser was active in organizing German prisoners of war in such groups as the National Committee for a Free Germany, the Antifascist School, and others. (Prisoners of war are the responsibility of the GB.) In this activity Zaisser was joined by another important member of Soviet military intelligence, Rudolf Herrnstadt, whose name had been associated with the Rote Kapelle, Rudolph von Scheliha, and espionage in the German Foreign Office. Herrnstadt, a journalist, became editor of the German prisoner-of-war publication, while Zaisser, former lieutenant of the Kaiser, conversed with officers from generals down, and persuaded many of them to join the pro-Russian camp. Both Zaisser and Herrnstadt returned to Germany in 1945 to assume leading posts in the Eastern zone; together they went all the way to power and all the way back to obscurity.

Zaisser started his rapid rise in 1945, when Beria's star was at its brightest. In 1945 the Soviet occupation authorities appointed him police chief in Leipzig; before the end of that year he was chief of police of Saxony and Anhalt; in 1948 he assumed the post of minister of the interior in Saxony. In February 1950 he became the first minister of state security of the German Democratic Republic. At the same time Frau Zaisser, his wife, was appointed to the post of state secretary of education, and his daughter, Mrs. Boettcher, became professor of Russian at the University of Halle.

No satellite dares to economize on secret police and espionage, and under Zaisser the MSS grew rapidly. Zaisser's chief "adviser" was Major Trukhanov of the Soviet GB, and his principal aide was Erich Mielke, a German Communist who had fled to Russia after having assassinated two policemen in Germany in 1931. Working together, the trio expanded the new agency into a huge department;

in 1953 it had 5,000 employees and 50,000 V men (informers). MSS took over from the GB control of many of the prisons and concentration camps in East Germany. Spying in the Western zone went actively forward.

Despite the zeal and activity, however, it was difficult to recruit the planned huge army of secret police and spies, and the number of officers in the MSS has always lagged behind the expanding plans. At first the plan provided for one full-scale MSS officer (*Sachbearbeiter*) for every 8,000 to 10,000 people. In 1953 the proportion was increased to one officer for every 2,000, although the actual ratio in 1953 was one to every 3,000.¹

Zaisser's three years at the head of the MSS were marked by growing espionage activity in the Western zone. To forward this, a West Department was organized within the framework of Zaisser's ministry. This department operated in even greater secrecy than did the other divisions of the MSS. It trained secret agents in short-wave radio techniques, codes, and such devices. The names of these agents were never revealed even to their colleagues. The West Department urged Communists to "leave" the SED and turn "unpolitical" or join anti-Communist groups, and it dispatched them to the West to enter government service or to take posts in industry.

The large press agency ADN (*Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichten Agentur*), operating on an almost legal basis in West Germany, with a staff of seven hundred, became another organ of the intelligence service. It is organized on the pattern of Moscow's TASS, press agency of the Soviet government, which also serves intelligence purposes, as we have seen. The ADN is both a press agency and a secret intelligence network. Some of its chiefs serve the Russian and the German espionage apparatus simultaneously; they establish contacts between agents in the West on the one hand and the SED (Communist party of the Eastern Zone) on the other. The personnel of the ADN are either members of the KPD (Communist party in West Germany) or "secret members" of the so-called *Deutscher Volksrat* (German People's Council), another pro-Soviet institution.²

The *Berliner Pressedienst* (a press agency in Berlin), with its fifteen "correspondents," became a collecting center for reports of

a secret nature. With the support of the MSS, other "Western departments" emerged and existing ones widened the range of their activity.

Fathered by the SED, scores of front organizations emerged all over West Germany. Not even in the United States did the organization of fronts reach the proportions it did in Germany. A list prepared in February 1953 contains the names of 149 Communist front and aid organizations. Most of them call themselves "national," "German," "patriotic," "democratic," or "Christian"; in the list are Former Soldiers, Fighters for Peace, Committee for the Defense of German Patriots, Pacifist Movement, Essen Committee of the Bloody Sunday, etc. The main purpose of their naive or deluded founders is not espionage, of course, but broad anti-Western political propaganda. MSS agencies, however, found access to them and used them, when necessary, as a cover for special tasks.

The so-called Free Trade Unions (FDGB) (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschafts-Bund) of the Soviet zone runs its own Western apparatus, whose task it is to gather information on the economy of the West, maintain connections with Communist groups and employees in trade unions of the Western zone, and finance and guide certain camouflaged organizations. Training "courses" are regularly held for carefully selected officials of the Eastern trade unions, in which tactics of gathering information and of activity in the rear of the enemy are taught. Before his demotion Rudolf Herrnstadt often served as the head of these schools.

As a result of this training, "representatives" of the FDGB, whose assignments were somewhat mixed, were doing intelligence work in the Western trade unions; under the excellent cover of trade unionism they served as informers on industry and trade.

Under a trade union cover, the worker-correspondents of two decades before and the well-remembered industrial espionage have been revived; once again "reports for the press" are being prepared, of which the most important are directed into the channels of intelligence; spies in the industrial field are often camouflaged as harmless reporters. A booklet published by the Social Democratic party in Bonn contains a typical story concerning three metal workers: "Three highly qualified turners—there is a big demand

for turners at the present time in Germany—"by accident" simultaneously applied for a job at a newly established factory at the Krupp works. 'Accidentally' they met in the employment office. Although they could make 520 marks [\$124] a month with a firm in Valbert, they prefer to work for 320 marks [\$76] here." ³

"Questionnaires" to be filled out by Communist party members concerning the plants in which they work contain items which could seem irrelevant. The Communist party in Stuttgart, for example, requires its members to answer such questions as

Value of the industrial plant?

Branches?

Stocks?

Purchasers of the output?

The Württemberg-Baden "economic division" of the KPD requests answers to the following:

Production capacity of the plant? In the past—present—future, if possible?

Type and quantity of present production?

What are the difficulties that are hampering production?

What does the management think of the future of the factory?

Communist coal miners of the Ruhr are required to fill out a questionnaire of 186 items concerning the mine they are working in. The questions pertain to all technical features of the mine.*

The information given in individual answers to these questionnaires may be of little significance in itself; when accumulated, however, the answers furnish a grand-scale picture of German industry and its war capacity and could serve as a basis for acts of sabotage in case of German rearmament or war. Classified and summarized, the information is diverted to the "security departments" of the German Democratic Republic and, eventually, to military intelligence in Moscow.

* In the summer of 1953 a new type of machine was installed in one of the Ruhr coal mines. Within a fortnight intelligence in the Soviet zone was in possession of drawings and detailed descriptions.

It is quite impossible to describe in one article the immense increase of intelligence, counterintelligence, undermining, and panic-provoking agencies of the Soviet zone. . . . The apparat of the Communist Willi Scheebaum in Hannover, who has his own connections with the Leitstelle Stahlmann [Stahlmann's agency], with Willi Zaisser and the high officers of the Soviet Control Commission, has at its disposal in Lower Saxony numerous people's correspondents, and intelligence agents who are regularly delivering information about the Kontinental Gummiwerke, the Hanomag Werk, the Eisenbahnwerk Wülfel, the Siemenswerk, the Peiner Walzwerk, the Ilseder Hütte, the Volkswagenwerk, etc. Among his informants are such spies as, for instance, the observer of British maneuvers in the Lüneburger Heath and Senne regions; Hermann Röhr, the so-called evaluator of maneuver damage, who is assigned to report on the maneuvers, exercises, arms, provisions, and morale of the combined British-Norwegian units; Gert Springer, the city editor of the Communist paper *Freies Volk* [Free Nation], who also had his assignment from Scheebaum, or, perhaps, from Soviet intelligence, to stay at the maneuvers region; Werner Ilberg . . .⁴

Stalin's death in March 1953 ushered in a short-lived general relaxation after the severe tensions of the preceding years. It also brought a new advance for Beria, who now became a member of the triumvirate—or, more accurately, since Molotov did not really count, the duumvirate—which took over rule in Moscow. It was paradoxical that the Soviet minister of the interior should spearhead a trend against the omnipotence of the police, and that this trend should immediately have made itself felt in the satellite nations too. In Eastern Germany Wilhelm Zaisser, protégé of Beria, became a standard-bearer of the new trend.

Relaxation means less terror and more freedom. If permitted to develop, this attitude might grow into a popular movement, and the popular movement into a dangerous uprising. Such a se-

quence of events spells doom for a dictatorial regime. The choice is between the downfall of the regime and rigid police rule. In the first months after Stalin's death the world witnessed strikes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and in mid-June 1953 the workers' uprising in the Soviet zone of Germany. In line with the new political trend, the Russian military force in Berlin was not immediately ordered to quell the movement by force of arms, nor did the German police employ all the weapons at their command. For several days the situation hung in the balance, while the prestige of the "people's" government sank lower and lower.

A week after the Berlin uprising Beria was removed from all his posts and denounced as an enemy of the people. The fate of his numerous aides in Russia and abroad was sealed. A new great purge engulfed Beria-appointed ministers of internal affairs in the Union republics as well as in the satellites; other high officials were demoted. A sharp wind was blowing from the East, and in the new wave of terrorism now rising Wilhelm Zaisser was one of the victims. In its session of July 24-26, 1953, the Central Committee of the SED expelled Zaisser and Herrstadt and removed them from their posts in the government. In veiled formulations the Ulbricht majority condemned the lenient attitude of Communists toward "opportunistic" worker movements: "Zaisser and Herrstadt worshiped the independent movements of the masses. They did not understand the main teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and they appealed to the nonparty masses to move against the [Communist] party. . . ."

Ernst Wollweber, Moscow's man, became Zaisser's successor. Except that, like Zaisser, he had been a secret agent of Soviet intelligence, Wollweber, the "prolet," former stoker in the German navy, in no way resembled the aristocratic, dignified, well-mannered Lieutenant Zaisser. We have seen how, toward the end of the war, Wollweber, in Sweden, was saved by the Soviet embassy from extradition to Germany and brought to Moscow (p. 132). When the time came for German Communist "cadres" to be dispatched to their new positions in Germany, Wollweber asked for an appointment in the Western zone (he did not want to do "office work"); the request was rejected, however, because of the possibility of his being recognized and arrested. He was sent to East Berlin to become "director general of navigation." He did not, however, plunge into paper work. The actual tasks of this old mas-

ter of sabotage and smuggling lay in fields other than the restoration of German maritime trade.

Once again Wollweber built up an intelligence apparatus of his own which was only loosely connected with the GRU and GB in Moscow. This rare privilege had been accorded him in the late 1930's because the nature of his assignment—anti-German sabotage *en gros*—required extreme secrecy. A similar situation existed now, in 1947–48, when Moscow's relations with the Allies were rapidly deteriorating and a new war was at various times considered inevitable and imminent. To Stalin, the American Marshall Plan sounded like veiled preparation for an armed conflict and camouflaged shipping of war supplies to Europe. The plan must be fought not merely verbally, at conferences and in the press, but also in the harbors and on the high seas.

In the Maritime School (Seefahrt Schule) in Wustrow, where two hundred young men are regularly trained to become naval captains, engineers, and radio men, Wollweber has his own group of about twenty-five students who after graduation are sent to Mecklenburg for special training in underground operations and eventually receive "political" assignments.

In Hamburg, Wollweber's old headquarters, a new organization emerged, and strange things began to happen. Explosions occurred in the harbors of Brest and Cadiz; in Le Havre a cache of explosives was discovered. Other acts of sabotage never resulted in serious damage, but they could, no doubt, have assumed the proportions of a full-scale operation had the Marshall Plan actually developed into what the Kremlin believed it to be.*

The second task of Wollweber's organization was smuggling vital goods, including strategic materials, into the East. East Germany was at the top of the receiving list. The thousand-mile frontier between Germany's two halves had to be probed and its weak points found; customs officers and the frontier police of the West had to be bribed and won over. In some instances the ring was successful in its smuggling ventures (an entire plant, it has been

* Later a number of other mysterious occurrences were connected by the authorities with Wollweber's organization: the fire on the *Empress of Canada* in January 1953; the fires on the British *Queen Elizabeth* and *Queen Mary* at about the same time; an explosion on the *Indomitable*; an attempt at sabotage on British airplane carriers, etc.—a total of about thirty incidents which have still not been entirely clarified.

reported, was gradually brought over to the East from the West), but German authorities deny that it was very important. After the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 this group devoted its energies to smuggling arms supplies for the Far East.

The disappearance from Rennes, France, of two British diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in May 1951, has never been completely explained. Investigating officers of British intelligence have concluded that the two men boarded the Polish ship *Warmia* at Dunkirk to travel behind the Iron Curtain. In January 1953 Edmund Wegner, member of the *Warmia* crew, who was arrested by the British in Germany, stated that he had belonged to the Wollweber organization and was present when the two diplomats boarded the ship to go to the East.

For about seven years, from 1946 to 1953, Wollweber remained at the helm of this organization, having advanced officially only to become a "secretary of state" in 1950. When he finally succeeded Zaisser in the Ministry of State Security, his name was well known throughout the Western world; all foreign political departments attentively followed his movements; books and hundreds of magazine articles were written on the adventurous exploits of this bold man whose heavy-set, clumsy appearance would befit a person of any occupation or profession except that of a revolutionary. He was now an aging man with a stormy past, including hundreds of risks taken and a multitude of human lives staked and sacrificed, a man with that cynical disregard for the individual human life which is a prerequisite for a successful GB-MSS career. Wollweber's advance was a part of the new course of Moscow-Pankow against "laxity," and coincided with new waves of arrests and trials as punishment for the "criminal passivity" of the initial post-Stalin era.

Espionage activities in collaboration with the Soviet agencies in Germany continued in the old vein. One group of networks was still run by the Russians, another by the Germans. In some operations their efforts were combined.

The main targets were the same: first, the Amt Blank; second, the intelligence apparatus of Gen. Reinhart Gehlen, the Allied and German intelligence agency active in Eastern Europe; third, the office for the Defense of the Constitution (Amt für Verfassungsschutz). At one time or another during the last five years each of

these agencies was penetrated by the Soviet, East German, or one or the other of the two satellite espionage machines; some were penetrated more than once and suffered revelation of their innermost secrets and arrest and punishment of their agents working in the underground in the East.* All of the tested methods and tricks of espionage are abundantly used against West Germany: crossing of frontiers, which is easy, especially in Berlin; blackmail and coercion, for which many opportunities exist; and use of those loopholes in the security wall which are an inevitable and perhaps normal phenomenon in a democratic nation.

When, for example, a West German state agency of a military or intelligence nature, preparing to erect a new office building, calls for competitive bids by contractors, each contractor receives a copy of the plans and specifications. In this way agents in the East learn many of the technical details of future Western installations. Again, interzonal trains coming into West Germany from the East often carry intelligence liaison agents disguised as railway employees. Looking for his contact in the railway yard, the agent is admitted everywhere with no questions asked; when he leaves the train he substitutes his hat for his railwayman's cap and arouses no suspicion as he moves about in the Western city.⁵

One of the gravest cases of espionage guided by the East German MSS was that involving U.S. Pvt. Robert D. Blevens, an American Communist, member of the occupation forces in Berlin, who himself became an agent of the Eastern State Security Service while stationed there. Assisted by agents of the MSS, Blevens and a young German girl, Ingrid Jonek, tried to persuade American soldiers to defect to the East. Blevens was court-martialed, sentenced to thirteen years at hard labor, and dishonorably discharged from the army. No decision on his appeal has yet been made known.

Johannes Nücker, police officer in West Berlin, was the sort of

* The heaviest blow to West German counterespionage was the defection of Otto John, head of the Security office, in the summer of 1954. There are no facts to prove that before his departure John had been in the service of an Eastern agency; but once in the hands of the Soviet and East German police, the unstable man had to reveal and betray whatever and whomever he had known.

On the other hand, General Gehlen's organization suffered badly when its agent Hans-Joachim Geyer ("Henry Toll") turned over secret documents to the Eastern MSS; about the same time (November 1953) the chief of Gehlen's local Berlin office went over to the Communist side. *Politik und Wirtschaft* (Bonn), Nov. 11 and 13, 1953.

human material used by the new German-Communist intelligence. A trained auto engineer, Nücker had been a member of the rightist Werwolf during the Weimar period; in 1934, when the Werwolf was incorporated into the embryo Nazi army, he became a member of the Nazi SA; later he advanced to the Nazi rank of *Truppenführer*. After a few years in the army and then as a prisoner of the British, Nücker, concealing the SA phase of his biography, obtained a post with the automobile division of the Polizeipräsidium of the Berlin police, in 1951. At that time an effort was being made to improve and increase measures against kidnaping, espionage, and all kinds of encroachments from the Eastern sector, and the police force was being reorganized accordingly. Along with his chief, Rudolf Lehmann, Nücker prepared a secret plan for the motorization of the police; the report was kept in a safe to which only four persons had access.

In December 1951 Nücker went to Babelsberg, a short distance from Berlin, in the Soviet zone, where his mother lived. When he returned he was under the obligations of a secret agent of the MSS. His new duties were to inform the authorities of the Eastern zone on the structure and size of the Western police, its techniques, and its arms.

Nücker prepared a memorandum on the requested data and turned it over to an agent of the MSS; meetings with the agent were scheduled to take place regularly, once every few weeks, either in an automobile or at a specified place in East Berlin. At each *treff* new data were demanded from Nücker: names of all police of higher rank, location of police training grounds and of the various sections of the police department, room numbers of individual officers. Nücker supplied the reports. In the end even the most insignificant details of the structure of the Berlin police were known to the MSS. At each *treff* Nücker received his payment.

On November 3, 1952, Nücker was arrested, and incriminating papers were found in his possession. At his trial he told the court the standard story of threats and coercion by the MSS. In his ten months of service for the East he had received, he said, only four payments of from 10 to 20 marks each. He was sentenced to six years at hard labor.

Other spies, also typical of the postwar human material of Eastern intelligence, were Elli Erhardt of Lüneburg, who was paid in nylon stockings, and Alwin Rose, veteran of Nazi counterespionage

in France, former member of the French Foreign Legion. In Hamburg August Moritz, working on assignment from the Central Committee of the SED and the Soviet Control Commission, served as an informer on a high political level. He supplied reports on developments in the Bonn government and on international relations, especially secret negotiations. He submitted to Eastern intelligence the text of an alleged treaty between the Western powers concerning Germany, a report on General Gehlen's agency, and other documents. Many of the "documents" he supplied (in particular the treaty, of which Walter Ulbricht made such wide use in his anti-Western propaganda) were fake. Neither Moritz himself nor his main collaborators, however, were Communists. Moritz had been an *Obersturmführer* of the Sicherheitsdienst in France during the war; the French, he later alleged in court, consider him a war criminal. Moritz' assistant, Uwe Wehlen, a hater of everything non-German, served British as well as Soviet intelligence. Arnold de Lannoy, another aide of Moritz, was a Nazi and a hater of France, too.⁸

Genuine Communists were in a minority. One such was Bruno Wricke, whose activities stretched over a period of six years, from 1946 to 1952. Wricke did not conceal his party allegiance when he applied for and obtained the post of Kriminal-Obersekretär in the Berlin Polizeipräsidium. As the situation in Berlin started to change and the Iron Curtain divided the former capital, Wricke was instructed by the party to quit its ranks in order to keep his job. He continued to work for another four years in the West Berlin police. During his years of service as an MSS agent he managed to supply the apparat with important documents, including lists of arrested persons, records of interrogations, descriptions of arms used by the police force, etc. One of his main exploits was a report on the tear gas grenade used by the police squads.

Among the minor operators of the Eastern espionage agency was Willi Kutscher, official of the Bundestag in Bonn. From 1948 to 1953 Kutscher worked for Eastern zone intelligence, supplying it with memoranda, miniature photos of documents relating to the frontier police of the Federal Republic, the customs service, the gendarmerie, the Amt Blank, and other agencies; in 1950 he reported on the conference of German atomic scientists. For substantial remuneration he also prepared reports on secret developments in the political, economic, and military fields.

The "easy woman," or, as the press likes to call it, the "Mata

Hari," type was abundantly used by the intelligence services of all Soviet countries. One of these was Irmgard Margarete Schmidt, close friend of American officers in Berlin and a clever agent. Attractive and intelligent, she was successful in her spying activity. An accurate description of her was given by Gaston Coblenz in the New York *Herald Tribune* of December 28, 1954:

Miss Schmidt, a very attractive girl, established her first substantial connection with Air Force personnel in West Berlin through an intimate relationship with an important intelligence officer that began in the summer of 1953 and seems to have lasted the better part of a year. It is thought that she had a concurrent or subsequent relationship with another Air Force civilian or officer of somewhat lower rank.

The higher ranking intelligence officer got her a secretarial job with an American intelligence agency in West Berlin—possibly with his own outfit. She was later dismissed from this job. The reason for her dismissal was that she showed excessive curiosity about secret papers lying on other persons' desks.

Nevertheless she succeeded in landing another secretarial post with the Americans at West Berlin's Tempelhof Air Base. While she held this job she retained contact with persons she had become acquainted with during her employment in the intelligence field. Her arrest occurred after she attempted to high-pressure a German national working for her former American intelligence employers into providing her with counterintelligence secrets.

One of the striking sidelights of the case is that following her introduction by the high-ranking intelligence officer she appeared to have been duly cleared for employment by the intelligence agency with all the formalities that are usually undertaken in such a case.

Her sentence was five years' imprisonment.

8. THE CZECH APPARAT IN GERMANY

Of the four espionage machines in Germany, that operated by Czechoslovak intelligence has been by far the largest. Since 1948 hundreds of Czech agents have worked in Germany, while others

have gone farther to the north and west, their assignments usually combining active espionage against military objectives with counterespionage against Czech refugees in Germany.

The substantial activity of Czech agents in the United States zone developed into an underground war between the intelligence agencies which increased in fury with each passing month. Rarely reported in the press, the story of this relentless war remained unknown despite its magnitude and the drama and tension that surrounded it.

Under Soviet guidance the Czech government organized an intelligence school in Prague to teach coding and decoding, radio transmission, use of invisible ink, microphotography, and so forth. The frontier, only a hundred miles from Prague, was "organized": support points were set up on both sides of the lines in the densely populated area, and scores of quickly trained agents moved to the West.

The large mass of men and women expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945—the so-called Sudeten Germans, or *Heimatvertriebene*—has provided an abundant source of Czech agents and helpers in Germany. Ties of friendship had in the past connected many of these men and women, now dispersed all over Germany, with Czechs back home. Among the millions of the *Vertriebene* there were some ready to serve the new regime for appropriate remuneration. The advantage of the services of the *Vertriebene* lies in the fact that their passionate hatred of the new Polish and Czech regimes makes them the least suspect from the anti-Communist viewpoint, and the circumstances of their tragic past can serve them as an additional cover in their underground work. It would appear that from 60 to 70 per cent of the rank-and-file personnel of the network come from this group of expelled Germans.

Among the most interesting personalities of the Czech apparatus, and one of the few Communists, was Frantisek Klecka, a Czech about thirty years old, formerly a pianist and student of philology. Sought by the Vienna police before the war, Klecka escaped to Moscow, where he received training in an intelligence school for service with Soviet intelligence abroad.

By the end of the war Klecka was back in Czechoslovakia as an intelligence agent. When international railway transportation was resumed he was given the job of waiter on the Prague-Munich-Paris express, a job favored by the network for espionage couriers.

Klecka also obtained access to anti-Communist groups in Germany and delivered a number of Czech refugees to the Czech police; in addition he took photographs of United States Army tanks, tank installations, and railroad buildings.

The arrest of this Soviet-Czech agent in the fall of 1948 had an ironic aspect. Two ranking officers of Prague military intelligence, Capt. Ottokar Feifar and Capt. Vojtech Jarabek, had escaped to Germany, leaving behind the daughter of one of them. Soon after, the daughter boarded the Munich-Paris train in Prague. Sewn into her handbag was a list containing the names of more than twenty Czech spies working in the West—among them that of Frantisek Klecka. At the Czech frontier the young woman became nervous; she asked the waiter, Klecka, to hold her handbag for a while. He obliged, returning the bag to her when the train arrived on German soil. A few hours later Klecka was arrested by the railway police.

Feifar and Jarabek were in a position to tell the United States authorities all about Czech espionage in Germany. In Prague it had been Feifar's assignment to gather information on the United States zone. He recruited agents in Germany from lists supplied by higher Czech agencies—the political police and the general staff. Despite the fact that his agency was of a military character and subordinate to the general staff, the over-all direction of its espionage work was in the hands of the Czech Ministry of the Interior. This combination was typical, as we have seen, of the post-war workings of satellite intelligence.

The two officers identified a number of Czechs and Germans in the American zone as secret agents of Prague. Arrests followed. In the ensuing trials, held in Munich, the defendants were in no position to deny the facts revealed by the witnesses, the two Czech intelligence officers. Klecka was the first to be tried. After initial denials, he confessed, and on February 17, 1949, was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Four other trials involving nineteen defendants, most of them German nationals, followed in February and March. The majority of the defendants in these trials were Czech spies; a few were Polish agents.

Robert Kruse, "one of the best Czech agents," was sentenced to eighteen years. Kruse had observed ship movements at Bremen and reported on the arrival of United States Army tanks. An eighteen-year sentence was also meted out to Adolf Frank, forty-

year-old Czech national who was concerned with spying on constabulary units. Gertrude Doerre, twenty-six, a Sudeten German with a record of having worked for the Gestapo in Norway and for United States agents in Hof, on the border of the Soviet zone, in 1948, before she joined the Czech intelligence network, was sentenced to twelve years. Maria Hablich, a Sudeten German, wife of the expert on refugee questions in a Bavarian governmental agency, had taken various official reports and documents from the files in her husband's office and mailed them to Czechoslovakia in official envelopes of the Ministry of the Interior of Bavaria. She was sentenced to seven years. Edith Dietrich, formerly employed by the YWCA in Munich, who said she had turned spy because of her love for a Czech intelligence officer, received a nine-year sentence.

The Prague government reacted to the arrests and trials of its spies in Germany in the way of Soviet strategy in similar cases since the early 1920's. Two American soldiers stationed in Germany, Clarendon Hill and George Jones, arrested by the Czech police in December 1948 when they lost their way and found themselves on Czech soil, were now charged with espionage. On March 15, 1949, after the announcement of the sentences against the Czech agents in Munich, the Prague government informed the United States that Hill and Jones would be tried by a Czech court. The United States envoy was not permitted to see the prisoners, who had been severely beaten.

On March 23 Gen. Lucius D. Clay reduced the sentence of Frantisek Klecka from twenty to five years. This action came too late, however, to prevent the trial of the American soldiers in Prague, which was scheduled to be held on March 29. In the trial, which was secret, Hill was sentenced to ten years and Jones to twelve. On May 23, however, the two soldiers were pardoned by the Czech government and permitted to leave Czechoslovakia.

Czech intelligence activity in Germany did not diminish after these arrests and trials; the casualties had been mainly among the small fry.

The most outstanding, devoted, and efficient Czech agent in the United States zone during the postwar era, a man regarded highly by his colleagues and considered to possess "the intelligence of five ordinary persons," was the Polish-born Emil Sztwiertnia, who at

the peak of his espionage activities (1949–50) was about thirty-five years old. A Communist with a record of six years in Nazi prisons, liberated at the end of the war, Sztwiertnia was first sent to London to work there with the “Western Commission” for Polish intelligence. From England he went to Switzerland, but was soon expelled from that country as a foreign Communist agent. Assigned to work in southern Germany, Sztwiertnia moved to Stuttgart and spent three years in a relentless war against United States counter-intelligence. His tasks were to learn the names of Czechoslovak leaders who were working for United States intelligence and names and addresses of United States intelligence officers; to report on the activities of CIC (Counter-Intelligence Corps) in checking on various persons; to learn the names of persons for whom the CIC was searching, and of people proposed for assignments with United States intelligence; the names of Germans working for the CIC, leaders of political and other groups in various DP camps, and persons working for Radio Free Europe; and to report on the movements of soldiers. In addition, Sztwiertnia was successful in organizing the kidnaping and smuggling over the frontier of political enemies. He was in a position to learn the names of anti-Communist underground leaders inside Czechoslovakia and report these to the STB (Czech equivalent of GB).

Sztwiertnia was utterly devoted to his job; nothing else mattered for him. “Oh, boy, here I feel I am in my element,” he wrote to “Honza,” his friend and superior in Prague. “It all interests me intensely.” His wife, tired of her nomadic life, was about to divorce him, but he did not care. He had “other interests” than women. He lived in poverty in a 40-mark- (\$9) a-month unheated room, pretending to belong to the mass of democratic refugees. Occasionally on his frequent illegal crossings of the Czech frontier he was interrogated by the German police. In these situations he was bold and canny: he gave the impression that he was a secret agent of the CIC; besides, he carried credentials from a Dutch publication, *Die Linie*, assuming, correctly, that nobody would investigate to what party that little-known publication belonged. Interrogated as to his business at the border, Sztwiertnia convinced the police that he was expecting a political refugee to arrive from the other side. Once he called on a high police officer to lodge a protest against being interrogated: he was a journalist working for “an American unit” and waiting for his brother Paul to cross the border.

While Sztwiertnia was working in southern Germany a new technique of communication was introduced in Czech intelligence. For exchange of messages between Prague and its numerous agents, a network of "letter drops" was organized in and around Stuttgart, Munich, Frankfurt, and Ludwigsburg. These letter drops were jars hidden in certain places. Each agent, who knew the location only of his own letter drop, put letters and reports into the jar assigned to him and later picked up the replies and money there, while a courier from Prague about once a month visited a group of boxes spotted on a general plan; the complete plan was known only in Prague. One of the drops in Stuttgart was in an almost inaccessible spot in the outskirts near "a tree with a crotch in it"; the precious jar was in a hole in the ground. Another was buried in the grass, under a piece of tin, beside a concrete wall on a steep hill. A third was located near a large wooden structure which had formerly belonged to a religious sect but was no longer in use; at the bottom of a double tree a plate, hidden under grass and earth, covered the jar.

The advantage of this system of communication lay in the complete separation of the courier from the underground agents in Germany. Even if he were a traitor or a spy, the courier could betray no names or addresses, give no personal descriptions. This precaution proved justified when a new courier, Georg Peinz, began to make the rounds in southern Germany. A German who had been expelled from the Sudetenland and returned in 1945 from a Russian prisoner-of-war camp, Peinz was now living in Mossbach, on the German side of the frontier. The fact that one of his occupations was smuggling made him a desirable recruit for Czech intelligence, the more so since he pretended to be a "sympathizer." Peinz was a "pure courier"—that is, one whose only assignment was to collect letters from certain letter drops, take them over the frontier, and return with a new set of communications. For the experienced frontier-crosser this was an easy and lucrative job; he had no knowledge of the writers of the letters on the German side, and on the Czech side he was meeting only two men for a short conversation a few miles from the border.

Despite all the precautions taken to ensure the reliability of this courier, his activity had fatal results for the apparatus. In July 1950, when the letter drops were set up, Peinz, urged by his wife, disclosed his activities to the CIC. From then on CIC agents accom-

panied him on his rounds, photographing all incoming and outgoing letters and documents, which were then dispatched to their various destinations. Months passed and counterintelligence still had no indication as to who the spies were or where to look for them.

Gradually the circle around Sztwiertnia tightened, observation became closer. Sztwiertnia began to suspect that incoming letters were being tampered with, and he became more and more nervous. In his letters to Prague he begged to be recalled. "You should not play with my life," he pleaded in an anxious letter to "Honza."

Like so many others, Sztwiertnia was meeting that outstanding trait of Soviet and satellite intelligence, indifference to the fate of their agents. On the high ideological level—which is often a hypocritical level—the attitude that agents are expendable is justified as an element of revolutionary tactics: every soldier of the revolution faces death, and, if necessary, must remain at his post in the face of it. Actually this attitude is rooted in contempt for the individual rather than in revolutionary necessity. It is easier to sacrifice someone than to protect him—and sacrifices make heroes. When the Director expressed interest in the well-being of his subordinates, his words sounded unnatural and false.

Sztwiertnia was not called home and he did not have the courage to leave on his own initiative. The CIC meanwhile, in an attempt to gather the final items of proof before making their arrests, sent a telegram addressed directly to Sztwiertnia, inviting him to come to the letter drop. "Our friend will arrive today urgent instructions. Hans." The fake was so obvious that Sztwiertnia doubled his precautions. Unobserved, he put the telegram into the letter drop for Prague. On it he had written, "Who would send me such a stinking telegram as this? It looks as though they were trying to compromise me. What am I to do? Are they stealing our mail?"

This was his last message. Sztwiertnia was arrested on January 13, 1951, and tried in April and May by a United States court at Stuttgart. "This case," the prosecutor said, "is probably the most important case of espionage that has come to the attention of the United States authorities for the American zone of occupation"; the affair, the prosecutor noted, had cost the United States between \$50,000 and \$100,000.

Sztwiertnia was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment; his appeal was rejected.¹ The idea of letter drops was not discarded,

however, although the Sztwiertnia case had proved that the new technique entailed many dangers.

The most dangerous secret agents have always been those who succeeded in penetrating the enemy's counterintelligence services; placed in the right spot, they are in a position to paralyze all the enemy's efforts. "Within a couple of hours the Russians know everything the American counterintelligence service is doing," said Heinz Silomon, a secret agent of Czech intelligence working for Maj. Alois Barta in the Prague STB. (His assignments included spying and reporting on American strategic attack tactics and night operations, and procuring copies of training manuals, telephone books, designations of new units, abbreviations used in the army, field radio frequencies, etc.)²

The tracking down of American intelligence agents was the main assignment of a group headed by Peter Hornung and Horst Baumgarten. Baumgarten, a German official of United States counterintelligence at Freyung, near Passau, with a record of a prison sentence for stealing army property (in 1947), was a logical target for Czech intelligence recruiters. He was important because as an interpreter he had sat in at the interrogations of political refugees from Czechoslovakia, read and translated documents, and in general was in a position to learn much about the work of the CIC. Baumgarten's brother was at the time serving with the police of the Soviet zone. Not a very able man, and aware that his position would not last long, Baumgarten agreed in 1949 to engage in secret work for the STB. In October of that year he crossed the border to receive his precise assignment, which was to supply reports on agents and officers of the CIC and the United States Army, German border police, patrols, and weapons, and obtain maps of German cities; in addition he was to report on Czech refugees in the United States zone. This last task was promptly carried out, and the STB obtained from Baumgarten the names of those refugees who were cooperating with the CIC in Ludwigsburg.

In January 1950 Baumgarten was discharged from the CIC, but he continued his relations with the STB, making five trips to Czechoslovakia and reporting each time to the Czech intelligence service. In this activity Baumgarten had the help of his friends Peter Hornung and Luise Rauscher. With Hornung's aid he was able to buy, from a corrupt German official, thirty-seven *Kennkarten* (German substitutes at that period for passports), paying

40 marks for the lot. The Kennkarten were turned over to the Czechs. The team also supplied information on Czech refugees at the Valka DP camp. Hornung procured snapshots of the United States CIC and HICOG offices in Munich, information on the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, training of International Refugee Organization personnel for service in Korea, and other matters. On their second crossing of the border into Czechoslovakia, Baumgarten and his two friends were arrested. They claimed to be smugglers (a standard though paradoxical cover for secret agents caught at a border). Fräulein Rauscher was the first to confess; at the trial she appeared as a witness for the government. The sentences were severe—fifteen years each for Baumgarten and Hornung. The Court of Appeals later reduced the sentences to ten years.³

The techniques of the Czech agents and the rather poor quality of their information became apparent in another case, that of Erich Koffmane, employed at the American docks at Bremerhaven. As a man working “for the Americans,” he was courted and won over by the Czech intelligence agent Bonte for the rather considerable monthly salary of 800 to 1,000 marks (\$185 to \$230), “depending on performance.” Bonte assigned him

to determine the names of all ships that arrive in BREMERHAVEN, state the exact arrival and departure dates, give the tonnage, describe the cargo and its destination, as well as the date of unloading, *and further furnish any other information in regard to the harbor traffic . . .* I was to place this material in a carton which was to be wrapped well. This carton I was then to deposit at the handbaggage section of the BREMERHAVEN-Lehe railroad station.

The baggage check I was then to place in an envelope and send it to Helene SCHWARZ, CELLE, Main Post Office General Delivery.⁴

The large Czech network centered in Frankfurt am Main, in which two girl spies played an important part, was remarkable because it revealed the main characteristics of postwar espionage—few traces of Communism, but instead a lust for money and love paid for in state secrets, treason, bribery, and immoral acts. High up and behind the scenes were Soviet intelligence officers at Karlshorst and a prominent Czech chief of espionage, “Willi Berger.” These

men remained at their posts behind the Iron Curtain, giving orders and receiving reports. The highest officer of the Czech service to visit Frankfurt regularly was a man called variously "Captain Burda," "Otto Wenzel Löffler," and "Otto Wagner," an adroit Czech, former director of a factory, then captain in the army, now hopeful of becoming Czech trade attaché in Frankfurt. His personality—"very polite, intelligent, and attractive to women"—was essential for his role as a recruiter of male and female agents. "Captain Burda's" office was in Karlsbad, a few miles from the German border.

"Captain Burda" had made the acquaintance of Hans Kurt Pape (a remarkable member of the network) when they met in Weimar in 1950 under somewhat peculiar circumstances. Pape, son of well-to-do German parents, well educated, and not unintelligent, had sunk to depths of immorality and meanness in his relations with friends, associates, and the authorities. Before the war he had held many jobs. During the war he had managed to spend many months in hospitals. Taken prisoner by the Russians, he was released after a short time and went directly to West Germany to work, from 1947 on, at the American Rhine-Main air base. In July 1950 he went to Weimar, in the Soviet zone, to start a new line of activities under the cover of smuggling ball-bearings into East Germany. During this period a Soviet intelligence major assigned Pape to gather information on Germans working for the Americans in military police and counterintelligence as well as on their relatives; the reports were to be delivered to the GB. In Weimar Pape also met "Captain Burda" of Karlsbad, and collaboration between them started.

Now money became abundant for Pape. "Captain Burda" promised him 1,000 marks a month—reasonable compensation "for a man of your intelligence"—and took him to Prague to be introduced to the Boss. A new restaurant and night club was soon to be opened in West Germany, and Pape would play a role in it. What Pape was to supply were reports "on the Americans," in particular the new M 10 gas mask ("don't bring the old M 9"). In addition Pape took it upon himself to recruit certain persons whose names had been given him in Prague.

In Frankfurt Pape opened a peculiar "studio of photo appraisal": he advertised in the press for girls anxious for a movie career, offering a photographic "test" at a cost of five marks. He

also hired prostitutes to obtain information from American Negro soldiers. His greatest achievement, however, was the recruiting of a former girl friend, Elisabeth Dörhöfer, for Czech intelligence.

Elisabeth Dörhöfer was a striking personality in this ring. An employee of Pan-American Airways in Frankfurt, pretty, with a good figure, and friendly, she was suited for the job of secret agent. When "Captain Burda" came to Frankfurt Pape introduced him to Fräulein Dörhöfer, and it was not long before a close friendship developed between them. She went with him to Czechoslovakia and returned after two days a full-fledged spy.

Fräulein Dörhöfer proceeded to get in touch with American officers; in her bag she carried nude photos of herself which she used as a kind of visiting card. For information on the United States Army she promised her male contacts considerable payments—up to 10,000 marks.

When United States 2d Lt. Thomas Jones, in whose home she had been more than once, reported her to the CIC, his was not the first report on Elisabeth Dörhöfer to get into the files of that agency; in the process of recruiting her, Pape, too, had reported the ring to the CIC—if one is a spy, why not enjoy a double income? Pape knocked at the doors of the CIC with his story on "Captain Burda," but United States intelligence did not hasten to open its purse for him. He went to the French intelligence agency and to the British, with no greater success. Nevertheless, American counterintelligence had become alert. Elisabeth Dörhöfer was arrested when she arrived once again at the Czech frontier; in her possession were found an overlay map of the Hanau Signal Depot, Army Circular No. 202 (*Career Guidance Plan for Warrant Officers and Enlisted Personnel*), pictures of mortar shells, and the canister of a gas mask. Tried before a United States court, Fräulein Dörhöfer was sentenced to seven years; her partners, the driver Karl Heinz Lippert and Hilde Klimberg, were sentenced to three and two years respectively. Double-agent Pape went unpunished, as did, of course, the real leader of the network, "Willi Berger," "Captain Burda" of Karlsbad, and the Russian officers from Karls-horst.⁵

Similar methods were obvious in the case of Margarete Pfeiffer, who worked for Czechoslovak intelligence in Bavaria. A young and attractive model, she was offering money and love for military secrets—for instance, the infrared tank gunsight. Denounced and

seized by one of her American contacts, Private Eicher, she was tried in Nuremberg in December 1953 and sentenced to four years. The trial revealed the methods of neo-Communist espionage:

Only once in the short trial session did the Amazonian blonde defendant falter and lose her composure. That was when she said Czech Communist agents threatened to kidnap her eighteen-month-old son unless she spied on the Americans. Her home, she said, was in a West German town, near the Czech border.

She said that while she was "negotiating" with Pvt. Eicher on the tank gunsight, she told him: "You know that my child is at stake and that possibly the Czechs are now in my apartment."

It was then she accepted a parcel from Pvt. Eicher, believing it was the secret gunsight. She gave him 2,000 marks (\$476) for what turned out to be a "bundle of junk" and American agents seized her.

Prosecutor William Canfield, of Springfield, Mass., declared that "the child story is ridiculous" and said the woman was nothing more than an "intelligent prostitute."

Sgt. Kliebert [U.S. Army] testified that he met her in a German beer hall. She said she offered him "plenty of money" but warned, "if you open your mouth in this affair, you will not live long."

Before the sentence, Mr. Canfield scathingly cross-examined the defendant.

He presented a list of "five lovers," all young soldiers of the same tank company, and the dates and places she allegedly went and spent the night with them.

The defendant shrugged and said, "I did not sleep with them, however."

"I did not ask for that," Mr. Canfield said tartly. "But by the way, did you actually?" She refused to answer.⁸

The severe penalty of fifteen years was imposed on Günther Schünemann ("Karl Schumann"), a comparatively young but diligent and efficient German who as a Czech agent penetrated the United States service. Schünemann's chief target was the United States Air Force. He visited the Munich airport, observed the types of aircraft located there, made photographs of the field and its in-

stallations, and delivered his reports to the Czech STB. He also reported on the United States air base at Neubiberg; to get access to this he obtained employment with the American Air Force, first as a laborer, then as a kitchen helper. Then he moved on to observe the air base at Fürstenfeldbrück, again reporting on the types of planes, lighting, flight formations, and runways. Schünemann made his reports either orally, crossing the frontier with a false Austrian passport, or in letters written in invisible ink. His particular technique was to register his package at the border station at Passau, to be picked up by the Czech courier.

Walter Siffert, a former German pilot and airplane radio operator, along with the railwayman, Paul Walter, reported to Czech intelligence on United States airfields in Germany and on movements of United States troops. The most important among the documents supplied by them were the plans and railway timetables intended to be used in case evacuation of the United States zone should become urgently necessary. Oskar Thiel-Malek, manager of soapbox derbies put on by the United States Army for German children, supplied Prague with military information. A group of Germans, agents of Prague, were gathering information on ship movements and disembarkations on the German north coast, and on troop movements, military installations, and barracks for Allied troops and German frontier guards in the Bremen region. Siffert and Walter were arrested in Berlin in February 1953 and their network in West Germany was broken up.

A large number of other agents of both sexes and various nationalities, ages, and professions have been working in Germany for Czech intelligence since the war. Most of them are not worth mentioning. Espionage, as it becomes a mass operation, becomes routinized and standardized, and the exploits of its spies become trivial, matter-of-fact, almost dull.

CHAPTER 9

The United States

1. FIRST STEPS

THE Soviet intelligence apparatus came to the United States later than to other countries. As a consistent and sustained Moscow-staffed and Moscow-guided venture it did not begin to operate in this country until the late 1920's; up to that time there had been only isolated and sporadic attempts to obtain secret information about America through Comintern men visiting the United States, zealous members of the American Communist party, "delegates" to meetings in Europe, and so on. These efforts were in no way comparable in size and efficiency to the Soviet networks already at work in France, Germany, Poland, and other countries of Europe.

This situation was due to a number of political factors. Tired of wars and the endless struggles in Europe, the United States was withdrawing from the old-world international arena. The "Russian question," part of the European scene in the 'twenties, still had some military overtones; a number of anti-Soviet projects were still alive in the foreign offices and antechambers of foreign ministers. America's aloofness from these projects, a source of satisfaction to Moscow, made espionage ventures in the United States less urgent than elsewhere.

The Communist movement in the United States differed from Communist movements elsewhere and never attained the size and significance of its sister parties in Europe. In the first stages, in the 'twenties and early 'thirties, it derived its main support from immigrants from prerevolutionary Russia and members of their families—Balts, Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and, to a lesser degree, "Great Russians." In a way it was a "workers' movement" of a limited size and of specific origin.

Coming from a country with strong revolutionary traditions and imbued with the political sentiments of prerevolutionary Russia, they were idealistic, ready to sacrifice and be sacrificed; conspiracy was in their blood. From the Soviet viewpoint they were superior to the new "underground workers" in Germany, France, and other Western nations because they knew about clandestine meetings, secret arms stores, prison escapes, invisible ink, false passports, and suitcases with double bottoms, having heard and read of these long before their prospective comrades in the American Communist party had learned the ABC's of Leninism. Soviet intelligence was in a position to rely almost exclusively on American friends to staff its emerging agencies in this country.

In the depression era of the 'thirties new groups of Americans, predominantly intellectuals, turned toward the Communist movement and became a mainstay of the party. Attracted by its "anti-fascism" and the lofty anti-capitalist slogans, they made their imprint on American Communism; as a result the American party became even less of a "workers' movement" than were the other parties of the Comintern.

The official Communist party of the United States maintained standard relations with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. It was the duty of the American leadership to assist the Soviet apparatus in every possible way, help recruit new agents, check and recheck information, and provide technical facilities. The Swiss-born Max Bedacht, for example, member of the American Politburo, for a time served as contact man and recruiter; later Earl Browder, whose star began to rise around 1930, replaced his modest colleague.

In line with the international pattern, an underground apparatus—an illegal Communist network—was organized in the United States; its operations often ran parallel to the operations of the Soviet apparatus; for example, in regard to false passports, clandestine communications, "yavkas," and other procedures. Important figures of the American underground (J. Peters, Steve Nelson, Jacob Golos, and others whom we shall meet later) often served as liaison between the American apparatus and Soviet espionage in this country.

In one important aspect, however, the pattern of activity in the United States differed from the general pattern of relationship between Soviet intelligence and the Communist party. Beginning

in the late 1920's, a considerable section of the Communist party of the United States was viewed with suspicion by Moscow, which was trying to appoint loyal Stalinists to all important posts abroad, and was dissatisfied with certain American leaders considered by Stalin as "rightists." The gap widened, and in 1929 Jay Lovestone, the party's general secretary, was expelled by the Comintern. He became the leader of the Communist Opposition, which under various names remained in existence until 1940, gradually evolving into an anti-Communist group.

Although it was outside the official Communist party, the Lovestonite group for a long time remained true to the Communist program, viewed Russia as the cradle of socialism, and was ready to help the Soviet homeland in every possible way, including the performance of "special services." Even after the expulsion of its leaders from the Comintern, the Lovestonites believed that the abyss was not deep and the rupture not final; until 1938 Stalin was never made a target of public attacks. Soviet intelligence, on the other hand, which was itself permeated with all kinds of oppositionists, did not hesitate to recruit secret agents from among dissidents who, in addition, were less suspect in the eyes of American counterespionage agencies. One of these dissidents was Dr. Valentin G. Burtan, who was involved in the 1933 counterfeiting affair. In one case Soviet intelligence officers, aware of his membership in the opposition, approached a member of the Lovestone group employed at Roosevelt airfield in New York, with the proposition that he join the Soviet apparatus. John L. Sherman, who had been purged from the *Daily Worker* because he allegedly was a "Lovestonite," was taken on as an agent by Soviet military intelligence¹ and assigned to important and confidential work in the United States and the Far East. There were other similar cases. Even actual members of the official Communist party known to be sympathetic toward the "Lovestonites" were taken into the Soviet apparatus. The best known of the latter was Whittaker Chambers, who worked for Soviet military intelligence until 1938.

Several hundred men and women were involved in the three-decade history of the two Soviet intelligence agencies in the United States, a history which recorded successes and failures, a strenuous fight against American counterespionage, defections and betrayals, purges and executions carried out in Moscow, and deaths in America from natural and unnatural causes. A full description of this

phase of American history would fill a large volume. In this book, which deals with Soviet espionage in a number of countries, the story must necessarily be a condensed one. Only the most active participants and the major developments will be discussed.

The GB was the first of the two Soviet intelligence agencies to come to the United States, and its emergence on American soil was connected with the setting up of the first large Soviet commercial enterprise in the United States. In 1924 two Soviet trading corporations merged to form the Amtorg Trading Corporation, an active, legitimate enterprise which, while itself a target of screening and investigation by the GB, served as a cover for illegal reconnaissance. The personnel of Amtorg, the majority of whom were American citizens, had to be watched since they included a large number of non-Communist elements. Among the responsibilities of the GB also was observation of non-Communist Russian émigré groups and gathering of information on them. In time, the exposing of Trotskyites and other deviationists also became a constant assignment of the GB personnel.

Until 1927-28 the GB operated in the United States on a limited scale and mainly with local, American personnel. The first "resident" (official of the GB dispatched to a foreign country on a more or less permanent basis) was a man by the name of Chatski whose assignment was to report on the attitude of Washington toward the Soviet Union and to help in the effort to gain diplomatic recognition. Chatski worked here as an employee of Amtorg and achieved some results, although recognition did not come until several years later. He returned to Russia in 1928 and was praised for his "magnificent work." For a time after Chatski's departure from the United States no "resident" could be dispatched to North America.²

Espionage proper was the task of GRU, which was interested mainly in American aviation, naval matters, arms, and industrial patents. Alfred Tilton,* a Latvian-Russian Communist, and Lydia Stahl † were among the founders of Soviet espionage in the United States. Both had worked as GRU agents in France, where they had escaped arrest. Tilton set up a sort of office within the office of a shipping company in downtown New York and, with the help

* Alias "Joseph Pacquet," "Martin."

† See Chapter 2.

of Communist seamen and the seamen's trade unions, organized the courier service. He also set up, for Lydia Stahl, a large workshop where the experienced photographer was kept busy photographing documents. Among these documents were plans of the British warship *Royal Oak* which had been transmitted by British agencies from Canada via Washington; they were stolen for a night and returned after they had been photographed. The theft went unnoticed.

In 1930, after three years in the apparat in the United States, Tilton was recalled to Moscow; Lydia Stahl went to France in 1932 to work there as an agent of Soviet military intelligence.

Tilton's successor, Nicholas Dozenberg,* was also a Latvian immigrant from Russia and a former member of the Latvian Workers' Club of the Socialist party in New York; he was about forty years old when the Communist party was founded in the United States. He joined the new Communist organization, and during the 1920's worked in its Central Committee as a technician. Dozenberg was neither a writer, theoretician, nor political leader, but was considered a loyal and reliable partisan.

In 1927 Dozenberg was recruited for Soviet military intelligence and severed open ties with the Communist party. His first assignments under his new bosses were unimportant ones. In 1929 he was called to Moscow, where he was received by Jan Berzin, top chief of Soviet military intelligence. He was assigned to countries outside the Western hemisphere. In the early 1930's he worked chiefly in Rumania. Like Poland, Rumania was a principal target of Soviet intelligence, and the Rumanian police had had considerable experience with the Soviet underground. The new cover for Soviet intelligence in regard to Rumania was to be the "American-Rumanian Film Corporation," a company which Dozenberg was to set up in the United States and which, in order to give it added prestige, was to have a branch in Bucharest. The only obstacle was the difficulty of raising the \$100,000 needed to establish the film company. The years 1930-32 were a period when Moscow's reserves of foreign exchange had shrunk to a critically low point and when only ventures of the highest priority received all the necessary funds.

In its effort to solve the problem of setting up the film company, Soviet intelligence embarked on one of the riskiest and most un-

* Alias "Dallant," "Nicholas."

wise adventures in its history—counterfeiting of American currency. Among the multitude of stories of Soviet use of counterfeit money, many of which were invented or exaggerated, the Dozenberg affair is one that has been proven and documented. In the trial which brought the affair to an end a number of witnesses testified to details which, a decade later, Dozenberg himself confirmed.

That a revolutionary government must not be inhibited in its actions by considerations of morality, legality, or decency is a fundamental tenet of a regime whose leaders had themselves robbed banks or married fortunes for the sake of "the party." But the Soviet government had to learn the hard way that, aside from considerations of law and decency, it does not pay to counterfeit money. A counterfeit money operation by a government makes sense only if it is conducted on a large scale, with hundreds of millions of dollars, marks, or yen thrown into circulation. But an operation of such dimensions would inevitably be uncovered by the police and the ensuing international scandal would do tremendous political harm to the counterfeiters. A modest operation, on the other hand, would not serve the needs of the government of a large country.

The situation is different, of course, in time of war, when a government is not afraid to provoke resentment on the part of the enemy. The German government, for example, printed British and American money in considerable quantities during World War II, which it used for espionage purposes; the best known incident of this operation was the reward paid to "Cicero," the valet-spy of the British embassy in Ankara, for systematic theft of secret documents. The £300,000 paid by the German government to "Cicero" was proven to be counterfeit.³ A German author, Eberhard Frowein, says that the Gestapo printed £140,000,000 (at that time the equivalent of about half a billion dollars) at a special plant set up in a concentration camp near Berlin during the war, but ran into trouble when it tried to place it in circulation.⁴

Dozenberg, in need of American notes, was instructed to find out the secrets of American currency and communicate them to the apparat. Before long the manufacture of American bills was begun. The first \$100 bills were sent by the Dozenberg group to Cuba and Latin America, where they were exchanged; a few were exchanged in the United States.⁵

Eventually Dozenberg was informed that \$100,000 in counter-

feit money would be brought to New York and that he was to arrange to put it into circulation. At the same time he was instructed that the Communist party was to be left entirely out of the affair.⁶

Dozenberg turned to his friend, Valentin G. Burtan. The Russian-born Dr. Burtan, a cooperative and likable man with a taste for adventure and risky undertakings, was a prosperous physician in New York. Burtan belonged to the dissident Communist Opposition, without, however, enjoying its complete confidence; a close friend of the Communist leader Jack Stachel, he was suspected by some of his comrades of having been planted by the Stalinites in their midst. Dozenberg appointed him vice-president of his "American-Rumanian Film Corporation."

Among Dr. Burtan's non-Communist patients was a German adventurer who bore the famous German name of von Bülow. E. Dachow von Bülow, a former German officer with no regular job, was involved in illicit sales of arms to Latin America. Politically he tended toward the Nazis, a fact not as disturbing in 1932 as it would have been later. Dr. Burtan, who had often helped von Bülow out of financial difficulties, persuaded him to take part in the counterfeit money operation, out of which, should it succeed, von Bülow would receive a share. Von Bülow knew of an easy way to solve the problem: the finance minister of Guatemala was his friend and would be willing to help, though not without remuneration. In the Guatemalan bank reserves, von Bülow said, there was always a considerable amount in American dollars, and the minister would need only to exchange the recently printed counterfeit bills for genuine American notes. By the time, perhaps not until many years later, that the Guatemalan treasury put the counterfeit money into circulation, the counterfeit operation would have been forgotten.

A lively exchange of cables between New York and Guatemala followed. Then, suddenly, negotiations ceased; the Guatemalan outlet was closed. Burtan and von Bülow tried another method. A private detective in Chicago named Smiley, an acquaintance of von Bülow and a dubious character, agreed to participate in the venture and engaged a number of men from the Chicago underworld to help him. He gave each a quantity of counterfeit notes and promised generous rewards. It was not long before one of the "helpers" was caught by the Chicago police and revealed the names

of the others involved. During the investigation von Bülow aided the prosecution, and at the trial in Chicago, which took place in May 1934, was a government witness against his friend. Dr. Burtan, however, remained loyal to Dozenberg and the secret agency and refused to reveal the source of the notes, nor did he tell the court that the proceeds of the counterfeiting were intended for the purposes of an espionage agency; thus the political background of the affair remained hidden. Burtan was sentenced on May 25, 1934, to fifteen years in prison and a fine of \$10,000. He served ten years of this term. His physician's license was revoked.

Dozenberg, never indicted, had left for Germany and Rumania, where the battle of espionage and counterespionage was at its peak. This was in the early 1930's. Later he was transferred to Tientsien, China, on military intelligence missions. In 1939, having returned from Moscow to the United States a disappointed and disillusioned Communist, he was indicted for having made false statements in an application for a passport, and spent a year in prison. After his release he changed his name and, although he continued to live in the United States, retired into obscurity.⁷

2. "GENERAL KLEBER" AND THE AMTORG ERA

Soviet espionage in the United States has been gaining momentum since the early 'thirties. About that time the GB and military intelligence established networks; Comintern agents came and went; false passports and cover jobs were available in abundance; and a considerable number of American Communists were only too eager to enter the holy apparatus of Russian Communism. Only a few of the "residents" of military intelligence assigned to the United States were outstanding Soviet figures; the ablest agents, whose numbers have always been limited, were needed at more important spots. One of the residents in the United States in 1930-31 was the former Red Army tank officer, "Herbert," a narrow-minded bureaucrat. Another was Alexander Ulanov ("Walter"), a former Socialist Revolutionary, who was no more outstanding.

The leading resident of the early 1930's was Mark Zilbert,* one of the few outstanding chiefs of Soviet military intelligence in the United States, who achieved world-wide fame during the Spanish

* Alias "Moishe Stern," "Mr. Herb," "Kotasky," "Gen. Emilio Kleber."

civil war, when, assuming the name of one of Napoleon's generals, Jean-Baptiste Kleber, he commanded a Loyalist army at the Spanish front. In April 1937, when the great purge was under way, Zilbert was recalled to Moscow, arrested, and executed along with a number of other Red Army commanders.

Despite his ability and intelligence, Zilbert was not successful as a Soviet espionage chief in the United States. One of his numerous Russian-American assistants was a former draftsman of the Arma Engineering Corporation, the Communist Solomon Kantor. The Arma Corporation worked on confidential orders from the Navy and its employees were pledged to secrecy concerning its work. Having left the employ of Arma, Kantor turned for information to an old friend, William Disch, employed at Arma as a designer, and established contact between Disch and Zilbert. In his dealings with Disch, Zilbert used the name "Mr. Herb," which sounded as German as Disch, and hinted at his sympathies with rightist trends in German political affairs. (The technique of having agents pose as rightists was used also in Finland and France; it was a precaution taken so that if an intelligence affair became public, Berlin rather than Moscow would be blamed.)

The information he wanted, Zilbert—"Herb" told Disch, was for a private industrial group for reasons of competition; he promised good remuneration for designs and documents. "Mr. Herb" and William Disch met regularly for about six months, and the American engineer supplied the Soviet agent with secret documents.

Prior to his second meeting with "Mr. Herb," Disch had told his superiors at Arma of the contact with Zilbert, and the president of the concern informed naval intelligence. The latter encouraged Disch to continue to see Zilbert, and instructed him as to what material he should turn over to the Soviet spy; the material was obsolete or falsified. Agents of United States counterintelligence followed Disch when he went to the appointed meeting place (Broadway near 96th Street in New York) and sat close to the two men in a Schrafft's restaurant. Disch never handed over documents to Zilbert directly; he would put the envelope containing them on the table, and as the two were leaving, Zilbert would pick it up. Each time Disch would receive a sum of from \$100 to \$200.

After several weeks of observation, naval intelligence turned the "Herb" affair over to the FBI. Before leaving for his meetings with Zilbert, Disch was required to come to the FBI office on

Lexington Avenue, where he was searched; following the meeting he was again searched, because there had to be no doubt as to the amount and kind of bills given him by the Soviet agent. The money was left with the FBI. The FBI was now faced with the task of finding out for whom "Mr. Herb" was working. At a subsequent meeting Disch told "Herb" that the documents he was turning over on that occasion had to be returned the same evening; it was therefore necessary for Zilbert to photograph them promptly. The FBI men who followed him observed him enter the Amtorg building.

Months passed during which everything appeared to be going smoothly. The documents supplied by Disch were coming to General Berzin's offices in Moscow. Soviet naval experts must have had some doubts as to the value and reliability of the information, and Zilbert's suspicions were aroused. One day he did not show up for an appointment. He never reappeared. He was not, however, arrested.

In other ventures Zilbert was more successful than in the six-months' underground battle with American counterespionage about naval artillery.

Another member of Zilbert's espionage apparatus was Robert Gordon Switz,* some of whose exploits were described in the chapter on France. Trained at first as a photographer to replace Lydia Stahl, he later became a pilot and, under the cover name "Aviator," took over spying on United States installations and military forces in Panama. Procuring secret documents from the Canal Zone was the task of a Communist cell in Panama which consisted of United States military and civilian personnel stationed there; the "Aviator's" assignment was to arrange for safe shipment of the stolen documents to New York.

Switz's subagent, the Russian girl Frema Karry, introduced him to her close friend, Robert Osman.† Osman, "a tall, lanky youth with sallow skin and unusually melancholy eyes," was a member of the Communist Youth League, son of a poor unemployed cobbler

* Alias "Harry Duryea," "Aviator."

† The Switz-Osman affair is described by Louis Waldman in his book *Labor Lawyer* (New York, Dutton 1944), pp. 221-57; see also Waldman's statement in D papers, AM 37b-d, and *New York Times*, Aug. 29-31 and Oct. 26, 1933, and May 12 and 24, 1934.

who had immigrated from Russia. At the time he met Switz he was an artillery corporal in the United States Army, stationed in Panama. As a clerk in the Army offices, Osman's duties included retyping various documents, some of them of a secret nature. Discipline and security regulations were not strictly observed in the office in which Osman worked, and a number of secret papers, including plans of Fort Sherman and Canal fortifications, found their way to Zilbert's network in New York. On his brief visits to the Canal Zone, Switz attended to organizational details of the spy machinery.

A letter from Panama containing military papers and addressed to "Herman Meyers" in New York, which for some reason could not be delivered, was returned to Panama and opened at the post office. Since the letter contained secret documents, an investigation was made and it was found that the documents had been typed on Osman's typewriter. It was also revealed that Osman had received a total of \$400 from New York. Osman was indicted. The sentence of the court-martial, pronounced in August 1933, was twenty years at hard labor, a fine of \$10,000, and dishonorable discharge from the Army.

The sentence was not carried out, however. In March 1934, on motion of the non-Communist lawyer Louis Waldman, the President of the United States ordered a retrial. In the new trial, which took place in May 1934, it was proved that somebody other than Osman must have mailed the secret documents to New York. Robert Switz, the real head of the Panama network, was not mentioned, nor was it learned who Switz's mailing agent in Panama was. Osman, a typical "rank-and-file" victim of Soviet espionage, was acquitted.

The new sentence was a victory for the able Waldman, but it was also proof of how little prepared were American counter-espionage and the American public for the task of exposing spies which was to acquire primary importance a few years later. In his book, *Labor Lawyer*, Waldman calls attention to the characteristic behavior of the Communist circles involved in the Osman case. Not only did they refuse assistance to Osman, but even in private they denied knowledge of or connection with him. Neither Herman Meyers, whose address in New York had been used for Osman's correspondence, nor Dr. Stenbuck, whose address was used in a similar way, came to Osman's aid during the trial. When Frema

Karry, Osman's girl friend, deserted him and disappeared, M. J. Olgin, editor of the Communist *Freiheit* in New York, whose help Waldman sought, responded in a manner that was in accord with the rules of *conspiratsia*: "Neither my paper nor the Communist Party want to have anything to do with the Osman case. We're not going to mess around trying to help you find Miss Karry . . . whoever she is."¹

Released from jail, Osman returned to New York and retired from parties and politics. His friend Robert Switz had in the meantime been arrested in France in connection with the spy affair of 1933.* He was released in 1935. He and his wife, who as we have seen had cooperated with the prosecution and revealed what they knew, had every reason to fear for their lives. Ordered to leave France, they lived for a few years in Salzburg, Austria, returning to the United States in 1938, after the acute phase of the affair was over. In America the authorities were glad to overlook the spy activities of the two disillusioned former Soviet agents. He died in 1951.²

The Amtorg Trading Corporation in New York was comparable to Arcos in London and the Handelsvertretung in Berlin. Its initial capital of \$100,000 (later increased) was provided by the Bank for Foreign Trade in Moscow, owner of the Amtorg shares. Like its two sister companies, Amtorg was a genuine commercial enterprise, not solely a cover, and its trading operations were the source of its strength and influence; in some years it did business amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. A large number of American industrial, financial, and trading interests relied on the stability and prosperity of this Soviet agency. The fact that Amtorg was a real trading institution made it doubly valuable as a cover for the personnel and operations of Soviet intelligence, since espionage ties to Amtorg, if discovered, would be considered trifling matters in comparison with the large economic operations involved.

For Soviet espionage, Amtorg provided jobs as a legal cover. Personnel were assigned to visit this or that city or plant. Photographic facilities, codes, and so forth were available. Soviet industrial espionage, which had been in vogue since the end of the 'twenties, was also making abundant use of Amtorg's ramified connections; missions from Russia came and went, making a con-

* See Chapter 2.

tinuous scrutiny of American industry possible. "There were commissions that were studying glass," testified Robert Pitcoff, a former Amtorg official who left the party in 1934; "there were commissions that were studying aviation; there was another commission that was here to study the chemical industry, and other industries; the manufacture of paper and such things as that. Almost every industry was studied by these commissions."³

Sometimes it was difficult to penetrate industrial secrets, for example, in industries considered strategic. In such cases the Communist party was called upon to find entree, and it often succeeded. For a time, for instance, Amtorg was unable to get access to the chemical industry. The party made strenuous efforts over a period of two or three years and finally found the right people and established the contacts.

One of Amtorg's fifteen departments was concerned with aviation; the head of this, always a military man, performed some of the duties of a military attaché in this country and was always on the lookout for military secrets.

In the main, however, Amtorg was the domain of the GB rather than of military intelligence. The GB supervised the huge human machine of Amtorg, shadowed and fired employees, and, from within Amtorg, deployed extensive activity outside its walls.

Of Amtorg's 700 to 800 employees (in the early 'thirties), between 200 and 300 were members of the American Communist party. A vivid picture of this organization, including its services to Soviet intelligence, has been given by some of these members who resigned from the party in subsequent years. There was obvious spying on employees, including high officials. The "secret workers" were disguised as employees of the lowest rank. One of these was the GB boss himself, who traveled frequently between Moscow, New York, England, and Canada.*

* Among the duties of the "secret workers" of Amtorg was the recruiting of new agents. Robert Pitcoff has reported how he was approached and dismissed after he refused to serve as an agent. "A member of the party who had been sitting on the same committee with me asked me whether I would be interested to become a secret service agent for the Soviet Government in the navy of some foreign country. . . . I told him that I didn't think my qualifications warranted such a job because I was not so familiar with it, and he said that would be taken care of; that I would be sent to Russia for two years to be trained. . . . I asked for time to consider it for a while, and after considering it, I declined the offer. Then subsequently another member of the Communist Party told me that he was approached by the same man

From time to time Amtorg was shaken by espionage scandals which revealed the political and police functions of the GB in this country. Basil W. Delgass, an Amtorg vice-president, on the occasion of his resignation in July 1930 made a number of extremely embarrassing statements concerning its working methods. Charging that Amtorg was conducting military espionage in the United States, he said: "I have seen information regarding the army and naval defenses of the United States that has been gathered by Amtorg's agents and transmitted to Russia."⁴

When Amtorg official Vladimir Asaturov and two others were accused, in July 1930, of smuggling watch movements into the United States from Switzerland, a financial operation typical of GB methods in those years became public. Along with watch movements the accused was found to have baptismal and birth certificates required for American passports. The New York police were aware that Asaturov was head of the GB in New York.⁵ About this time, too, the police were searching in vain for Amtorg official (actually important GB leader) Semion Filin, and his aides.⁶ In January 1931 Feodor Ziavkin, an Amtorg director, was exposed as a former chief of the GB in a provincial city in Russia.⁷

These and a large number of other espionage incidents which pointed to Amtorg failed, however, to make a serious or lasting impression on public opinion in the United States. Incredulous and skeptical, the press and intellectual circles were inclined to overlook the organic ties between the various events.

3. THE GRU AND GB IN THE 'THIRTIES

With the inauguration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in January 1933, a turn in Soviet-American relations appeared imminent. The issue of recognition of the Soviet Union, the significance of which was vastly exaggerated in both the United States and Russia, was nearing a solution; it seemed that something essential would be achieved by official recognition of a government that had actually functioned for sixteen years. In Moscow recognition was more keenly desired than the Soviet press and official

for the same purpose. . . . On numerous occasions I was called down before the district committee and told to resign from the Amtorg." Robert Pitcoff, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Communist Propaganda Activities, hearings of Oct. 14, 1939, 9, 5812-13.

statements indicated, but it was the prestige factor that was paramount.

As if fate wanted to be unkind to the Kremlin, certain events occurred in the United States each of which was serious enough to grow into an anti-Soviet affair. The counterfeit money scandal came to light soon after the elections and ended with the arrest of Dr. Burtan in January 1933; and a short time later Robert Osman was arrested in Panama as a spy. The Amtorg scandals too were still fresh in public memory. In spite of these developments, however, President Roosevelt decided not to depart from the program which was to lead to recognition of Soviet Russia, and invited Maxim Litvinov to Washington.

For Moscow these few months of 1933 were a period of uncertainty. Was it necessary to operate an espionage network at precisely such a fateful moment? Should the incompetence of a few Soviet spies be allowed to jeopardize the achievement of the long-coveted goal of United States recognition? And now, after the spy affairs had ended, should the risk be taken of building up a new network in the United States as if nothing had happened? Valentin Markin,* representative of the rival GB, an able and devoted Communist, summoned the courage to go to Molotov personally to report on the mischief caused by the GRU in the United States. He won the battle of the GB against the Army as far as America was concerned.¹ The military agency was ordered to lie low and freeze its spy apparatus for the time being. To disband an intelligence network was more than the Soviet police leaders could bear—"Who knows, we may need them soon again." Maintaining contacts and ties with the secret agents but temporarily not using them appeared to be the best solution.

Thus the Soviet military intelligence agency in the United States became for a time a "dormant" apparatus, as the term goes. A number of its prominent agents were dispatched to other parts of the world: Arvid Jacobson was sent to Finland; John Sherman was dispatched to Japan; Whittaker Chambers was about to sail for England; Nicholas Dozenberg, instead of returning to the United States from Moscow, went to China; the Switzes had gone to France, where the Soviet ring was being rapidly expanded.

From 1933 to 1935 Moscow refrained from sending important underground men to head its military intelligence in the United

* Alias "Walter," "Herman," "Oscar."

States. "Bill," a Red Army officer, did come over from Russia, but his main task was to prepare in the United States a new intelligence apparatus for England. So strict was the hands-off policy that when Whittaker Chambers photographed and offered him papers procured by Harry Dexter White from the Treasury Department, "Bill" "was not interested in them, and did not wish me to continue with such work."² Somewhat later Henry Julian Wadleigh obtained documents from the State Department, and Abel Gross brought material from the Bureau of Standards, which Chambers photographed, but again "Bill" rejected the tempting offers. How painful this decision must have been for a secret intelligence officer!

The dormant condition related to military intelligence only, and not to the GB, which continued to develop and expand. Amtorg, the GB base, was now supplemented by the newly reopened embassy; in addition, a few GB chiefs worked as "residents" in the underground and supervised their American agents.

For several years after Markin's victory of 1933 the major intelligence operations in the United States were carried out by the GB, although Markin himself did not enjoy his triumph for long. In 1934 he was found with an ugly head wound in a 52d Street hallway in New York; he died the next day. Later the chief of the Foreign Department of the GB in Moscow, Slutski, stated that Markin had been "liquidated" by his apparatus.³

Thus, beginning about 1934-35, the role of the GB was more important than that of military intelligence. The GB successes of the era, however, were due to the "antifascist" climate rather than to the talents of the GB representatives, who were mediocre men of little intelligence. Walter Grinke (another "Bill") who succeeded Markin in 1934, was a man of about forty, whom Hede Massing describes as having "a low forehead topped with thick, straight, pale reddish-blond hair. His lips were puffed and choked with saliva when in motion. His eyes were slightly slanted upward and continuously inflamed; they were the small, unpretty eyes of an unimaginative, frightened little man. He was slender, narrow-shouldered and his pallor was that of one who had never had wholesome food, or enough food, in his life."⁴ Another resident was Boris Bazarov ("Fred"), an officer of the Red Army with previous GB experience in Berlin, not an outstanding "operator,"

though personally less repugnant than Grinke. Bazarov arrived in May 1935 and remained until late 1937, returning to Moscow just in time to be plunged into the bloody morass of the great purge. A number of couriers, liaison men and women, reporters, and photographers worked under Grinke and Bazarov; one of them was the above-mentioned Hede Massing, author of *This Deception*, a significant report on Soviet intelligence in the United States. Other agents of this period were "Anton" and "Bill Berman," both Russians ("what was going on in his brain, if he had one," Hede Massing says of Bill Berman, "I was curious to find out. I never did."); "Victor," a Czech; and a young German woman, Gerda Frankfurter.⁵

One high official of the GB, under the Armenian pseudonym of "Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian," had been operating in the United States since 1932. "Ovakimian's" stay in this country was an unusually long one, lasting almost a decade. A large number of agents and subagents worked under him; among them were Robert Haberman, who operated in Mexico and the United States; Eda Wallance and Fred Rose, who worked in Canada; the Aaron Markovich and Adolph Stark pair, who worked on passports; Simon Rosenberg, an industrial spy from 1932 to 1938; Jacob Golos; and an attorney in the Department of Justice who furnished information from reports of the FBI; he was active in 1937-38.⁶

On the whole, "Ovakimian" was more successful than his predecessors. He was arrested in the spring of 1941. His defense and the permission granted him to leave for Russia will be described later in this chapter.

Among high-ranking intelligence officials with secret functions in the United States was Vasili Zubilin,* who lived in this country on and off from the early 'thirties to the mid-'forties and was considered a GB authority on the United States. His wife Elizaveta ("Helen") was also a veteran GB official; her first services dated from 1929 when she tried, by using far-reaching feminine charms, to get a confession from Jacob Blumkin in one of the first "Trotskyite" affairs.⁷ Whereas the great majority of Soviet intelligence officers were recalled from abroad in 1936-38 and never returned to their posts, both Zubilins escaped the deluge. Active members of the GB, they conducted here the investigation of the Ignace Reiss "treason" case and uncovered Reiss's sympathizers among the

* Alias "Zarubin," "Luchenko," "Peter," "Cooper."

members of the Soviet underground in the United States. As a reward, in January 1942, Vasili Zubilin was sent to Washington for his first "diplomatic" assignment, as third secretary of the embassy; somewhat later he advanced to become second secretary. Protected by diplomatic immunity, he directed the secret intelligence operations during the early era of atomic espionage. He returned to Moscow in August 1944.

Two other high-ranking GB men were concealed under the cover of the Russian Red Cross in the United States. A humanitarian agency, the Red Cross was the last place the authorities would be inclined to look for espionage and conspiracy. Unfortunately for the GB, its operations under the symbol of the Red Cross were revealed in great detail.

The head of the Russian Red Cross since 1921 had been the Russian physician David H. Dubrovsky.* An immigrant from Russia, Dubrovsky had first belonged to the American Socialist party, but later joined the Communist party. Since 1925, however, he had not been active in party affairs. In 1933, Jacob Sterngluss, who up to that time had been a GB chief in Afghanistan, came to the United States as "assistant" to Dubrovsky. Using the Red Cross as a cover, Sterngluss, as a resident of the foreign department of the GB, devoted his entire time to GB activity. His specific job consisted of organizing the theft of mail from the mail boxes of certain individuals. For this purpose he assembled a group of special agents whose task it was to station themselves at addresses where there was mail to be intercepted, wait for the departure of the letter carrier, and then immediately extract the mail from the box. He arranged contacts with minor employees of Western Union, Commercial Cables, and the Radio Corporation of America, with a view to intercepting telegrams, cables, and radiograms in which he was interested.⁸

Having learned about the operations of his "assistant," and concerned as to the possible effect on the Red Cross, Dr. Dubrovsky went to Moscow in the summer of 1934 to discuss the matter. He later submitted to Dr. Boris Skvirsky of the Soviet embassy in Washington a number of documents concerning Sterngluss' "nefarious activities"; he suggested that the embassy look into Sterngluss' bank account and check his expenses, which were out of proportion to his salary of \$170 a month. "Needless to say," Du-

* Alias "Ivanov."

brovsky told the Un-American Activities Committee, "neither the Russian Embassy nor the consul general has done anything in the matter. These plenipotentiaries of the Soviet Government are powerless to interfere in these 'special' activities of an agent of the GRU." *

Dr. Dubrovsky broke with the Soviet government in 1935 and resigned from the Red Cross. In September 1939 he testified before a congressional committee. He died in June 1950.

More important that Sterngluss was Dr. Gregor Rabinovich,* a physician, ostensibly a Red Cross officer in New York, who had been sent to the United States at the height of the purge with the assignment of investigating Trotskyites and organizing the assassination of Leon Trotsky. Louis Budenz, of the *Daily Worker*, was assigned by the Communist party of the United States to assist Rabinovich. Budenz' later revelations have cast light on the activities of the Rabinovich group, the considerable number of Communist agents provocateurs in the ranks of the Trotskyites, the large funds spent on anti-Trotskyite activities, and the relentless efforts of Stalin to do away with his hated rival. Budenz' account in *This Is My Story* and his testimony of November 11, 1950, before the Committee on Un-American Activities reveal one of the most tragic chapters in GB history. The Trotsky story, however, is beyond the scope of this book.

On the level just below that of the Soviet officials in the United States there were, in the 1930's, several score Americans working for the GB and GRU. Under strict discipline, they obediently fulfilled assignments of a limited nature in a limited field. Most of them rarely knew what agency they were working for, and often all that they knew about the project on which they were engaged was the small part to which they had been assigned. Some helped to shadow Leon Trotsky without realizing that they were preparing the assassination of the Communist rebel. Others reported details obtained from various laboratories without knowing that they were part of an espionage ring.

Three agents of this subordinate group who were outstanding for their intelligence, energy, devotion, and ruthlessness rose to positions of importance during the prewar era: George Mink, Jacob Golos, and J. Peters.

* Alias "Roberts," "John Rich."

George Mink * was perhaps the most typical of the horde of successful GB operatives abroad. A man of little education, he was a colorful personality remarkable for his restless activity, but even more for his extreme arrogance, ruthlessness, and boastfulness.

Russian-born Mink, a taxicab driver in Philadelphia, had never had anything to do with maritime matters when, on advice from Moscow, the United States Communist party helped him to become chairman of the Marine Workers' Industrial Union. At that time (the mid-'twenties) seamen's unions in Europe, America, and the Far East were the object of the special attention of the Comintern. In peacetime, members of these unions could (and did) serve as couriers; in cases of kidnapping, in which a victim was to be shipped to Russia, or when a Soviet agent had to escape from a foreign country, the help of Communists among the seamen's groups was indispensable. And in wartime, a group of devoted Communists could sabotage transportation of men and material of the anti-Soviet belligerent.

Mink was selected for this post in the MWIU by his close relative, Solomon Lozovsky, then chief of the Profintern (Communist-led international trade union organization). His assignments, which came directly from Russia, were such as to make him independent of the American Communist bosses, and his close collaboration with the GB in a large number of underground operations satisfied his almost pathological longing to play prominent roles.

From 1928 to 1932 Mink combined his trade union activities with his services for the GB. Among his exploits was the assassination in Hamburg of Hans Wissinger, a Communist who refused to obey a GB order to go to Russia.

Later that day [reports Jan Valtin] I found George Mink at the International Seamen's Congress, which was then in session in Hamburg. He sat in the adjoining restaurant, drunk and singing, surrounded by a flock of female Party stenographers. I accosted Mink: "Did you know Wissinger?" "What about him?" he demanded. "Perhaps he was innocent," I said. "Perhaps you have made a mistake." Mink gave the standard G.P.U. answer: "We never make mistakes! We never strike at innocent men!" ¹⁰

* Alias "Sorrenti," "George Hirsh."

The GB soon learned to appreciate this unusual triggerman who would not be stopped by anything and was ready to commit any crime. Mink left the Marine Union and became a high official of the GB abroad, traveling about and visiting Moscow repeatedly.

When the GB, whose apparat in Germany had been destroyed by the Nazi government, transferred a part of the German apparat and the Western Bureau of the Comintern to Denmark in 1934, Mink was dispatched to Copenhagen. In 1935 he was arrested at his hotel there for attempted rape of a chambermaid. Codes, addresses, and false passports were found in his possession. After an investigation the police arrested, in addition to Mink, Leon Josephson, an American Communist and GB agent, and others, all accused of espionage, plotting the assassination of Hitler, and maintaining underground communication with German Communists. Mink served a term of eighteen months and on his release went to Moscow.

In Moscow he had to explain the adventure which had proved so detrimental to the Soviet secret service abroad. Again he managed to inspire confidence. He had made the mistake, he said, of getting mixed up with a woman Gestapo agent who had turned the whole ring over to the Danish and German authorities. Mink took the blame and was pardoned; a number of the others were immediately purged.

In 1936 the GB again dispatched Mink to the United States—with false papers, of course. This time he set in motion large-scale terrorist activities. The purge was under way in Russia, and a number of “deviationists” abroad were slated for punishment. Mink, in the United States, was kidnapping deviationists. In 1937 he was sent to Spain (the Spanish civil war was another field in which strict Soviet discipline had to be maintained) to keep watch on the Lincoln Brigade. “I met George Mink,” writes Liston Oak, former Communist editor, “who boasted about his part in organizing the Spanish GPU and offered me a job—to put the finger on ‘untrustworthy’ volunteers entering Spain to fight Fascism, such as the members of the British Independent Labor Party and the American Socialist Party.”¹¹ William McCuiston, a close friend of Mink until 1936, testified later that he had been present when two GB men, George Mink and Tony DelMaio, killed two members of the brigade; whether these persons intended to escape from

Spain or were guilty of some kind of "deviationism" the witness could not say.

Soon afterward Mink appeared in Mexico, and it was possibly due to his bragging that rumors spread about preparations to assassinate Leon Trotsky. Concerning Mink's activity in Mexico, another former Communist, Maurice L. Malkin, testified: "A Mexican Trotskyite recognized him and he vanished. I do not know what happened. I know that plenty of American loyalists who came back [from Spain] would like to get their hands on George Mink. He was responsible for shooting many Americans in the back over there."¹²

Since the end of the 1930's all traces of Mink have disappeared. Did he die a natural death? Did he fall in the war? It is probable that the GB itself got rid of this gangster working in the service of the "highest ideals of humanity."

While George Mink was active mainly in the punitive branch of the GB, another outstanding Soviet agent from the ranks of American Communism, Jacob Golos,* worked in the field of espionage. Golos was a short, unattractive man, with a freckled face and colorless eyes which never looked straight at one. Never a political leader, Golos had joined the Communist party soon after its founding. Within the party he belonged to that influential group of leading men who in all Communist parties are gathered in and around the Central Control Commission, a kind of police agency within the party which checks, shadows, observes, and punishes, and in the furtherance of these functions cooperates with the Soviet GB. The powers of the control commissions, large to begin with, have been continually expanded; a call to appear before the CCC sometimes causes party members, even those in leading positions, sleepless nights.

In addition to being a member of the Control Commission of the Communist party of the United States, Golos was a confidant of the GB in this country. A naturalized American but Russian by birth, education, and language, and with a prison record in Russia, he was "one of ours" to both the GB and the Communist party of the United States. In the 'thirties he headed World Tourists, ostensibly a travel and shipping agency, which was used by the GB as a cover for various purposes; later, also as a cover,

* Originally Jacob Rasin.

he founded the United States Service and Shipping Corporation which shipped food and other parcels from United States citizens to relatives in Russia; enormous Soviet customs charges, ranging up to 100 and 150 per cent, yielded large profits for Golos' agencies. Other operations of a less legitimate nature was also concealed under the official cover of the shipping company, the most important of which was espionage. Golos had worked since the late 'thirties under the Russian resident "Ovakimian," collecting reports from government agencies in Washington; he continued this work after "Ovakimian's" arrest in the spring of 1941. He also took part in the preparations for the liquidation of Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Among his contacts and pupils was Julius Rosenberg, later head of an atomic spy group, and Abe Brothman,* who, like Rosenberg, was later convicted of espionage.

The life and work of Jacob Golos, who died in 1943, have been described by Elizabeth Bentley, his close friend during the last years of his life, in her book *Out of Bondage*. Despite slight inaccuracies and a certain naiveté of the author, this significant book depicts well the gradual development of a Soviet secret agent—Elizabeth Bentley herself—from schooldays to underground, and the eventual disillusionment, defection, and sensational publicity. It shows how a sincere "antifascist" young woman was led into the Communist party, her first spying assignment against the pro-fascist Italian Library of Information, and her first contacts with Soviet military intelligence. In 1937 Juliet Stuart Poyntz, secret agent of the GRU in the United States, looked Miss Bentley over, and soon afterward Joseph Eckardt, also of the GRU, got in touch with her. At this time, however, she was given no assignment. Then "Marcel," an old hand of the Soviet underground, scrutinized her again, but still no definite step was taken. Finally Jacob Golos took her over and plunged her deep into the pit of espionage.

Miss Bentley became an important "courier." She traveled regularly to Washington to pick up reports and films of documents for Golos to be dispatched to Russia. After the death of Golos in 1943 Miss Bentley took over some of his functions in the Soviet network. When Anatoli Gromov ("Al"), the new first secretary of the Soviet embassy, took over the reins of espionage, Miss Bentley was awarded the Red Star medal for her services to the Soviet cause.

* Alias "Penguin."

Despite the abundant praise she received from her Soviet bosses and despite her favorable standing, Miss Bentley was becoming more and more disappointed in both the Soviet apparat and the American Communist leadership. After a prolonged inner struggle, she went to the FBI in New Haven, Connecticut, and told her story. This was August 1945, a few days before the armistice in the Pacific and a few days before the revelations of the espionage affair in Canada. For over a year she worked with the FBI in secret, revealing and helping to reveal the Soviet underground in the United States. It was not until July 1948, however, that her story became public.

The third Soviet-American GB liaison man was the indefatigable J. Peters,* an outstanding leader, man of many aliases and a multitude of clandestine assignments, who remained at his American post from 1933 to 1941. His era was marked by great exploits.

A Hungarian by birth, an editor and writer, a faithful believer in the Russian leadership, and a figure of great influence in American Communism, he was right-hand man to Comintern resident Gerhard Eisler, and the most active, energetic, and resourceful man in those obscure depths of the underground where Soviet espionage borders on American Communism. If men were needed, he provided recruits; procuring of false passports was almost a hobby with him; he knew ways of finding money almost anywhere. When atomic espionage became necessary, Peters performed risky operations to obtain information. Although he was head of the Communist underground and not a member of Soviet military intelligence, his services were sometimes more important to Soviet intelligence than those of a score of spies. Peters' brother, Emmerich, was employed by Soviet agencies in this country (Amtorg and the Purchasing Commission).

In his capacity of chief of the Communist underground, Peters was also in charge of the "study circles" existing among Washington's governmental employees. This was the beginning of the "red decade," when the belief began to take root among American intellectuals that the most effective antidote to fascism and Nazism was a type of Soviet Communism. Government employees often had to keep their convictions secret, and although this was America

* Also "Alexander Stevens," "Goldberger," "Silver," "Isidore Boorstein," "Steve Lapin," "Steve Miller."

under President Roosevelt and not Russia under a cruel tsar, clandestine "circles" and "rings" began to grow in the capital. They operated in the manner of other Communist "circles," with lectures on Marx, Russia, capitalism; payment of membership dues; and the usual knitting of personal ties. The "study groups" looked on Russia with an admiration and devotion that made their members from the very outset potential informers and voluntary spies. No "discipline," no command was needed; they were more than eager to perform tasks for Soviet Russia. For many, a word from J. Peters was sufficient to induce them to steal papers, permit photographing of secret documents, or set up photo workshops in their homes. Some wanted to be sure that they were working for Moscow and not for the little American imitation of the Soviet; others, who did not like the smell of treason, were satisfied if they knew that the American party needed and used their services. All these men proved able to provide Soviet intelligence with voluminous documented information from every international and internal sphere, including the agency whose task it was to track down spies and foreign agents.

Counting only those actually known to him, Whittaker Chambers estimates the number of government officials involved in Soviet espionage at seventy-five in 1936-38. The most important and best known were Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie, Frank Coe, Laurence Duggan, Harold Ware, and Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. Of particular interest to the Soviet apparat also was Abraham Glasser, special attorney of the Department of Justice in 1937-39.¹³

4. NEW SOVIET EFFORTS AND THE GREAT PURGE

It was paradoxical but true that following the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (August 1935), with its proposal of a "united front" with the democratic West, Soviet espionage in America, which had been reduced in 1933-34, was not only increased but pushed forward with unprecedented vigor. In Moscow, which celebrates so many marriages, honeymoons are usually of short duration. America, with her rapidly growing power and military-industrial and aeronautical achievements, was an alluring target for Soviet espionage.

The main tasks of the intelligence apparatus in the United States in the years following Soviet recognition were fourfold:

First, there was industrial espionage, a traditional occupation of secret agents of various nations in this country. The widespread belief that industrial espionage was the only activity of Soviet agents in the United States before the war, however, is entirely wrong. Activity in other fields of intelligence was as great, or greater.

Second, there was recruiting of American Communists as Soviet agents for work abroad.

Third, the American government itself was made the target of a sustained intelligence offensive.

Fourth, because of the special interest of the United States government in Pacific affairs, and especially in Japanese and Chinese affairs, America was considered a good point for observation of developments in the Far East. The importance of activity in this field increased as Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated and "border incidents" took on the proportions of an undeclared war. Among the most important sources of Soviet intelligence on the Far East was the Institute of Pacific Relations, ostensibly an objective, nonpartisan, independent organization devoted to the study of Pacific problems. Enjoying considerable financial support from great American foundations and from certain governments of the Pacific area, the institute embraced a number of politically active leaders and writers who were outspokenly anti-Japanese; and anti-Japanism served as a bridge to pro-Sovietism. "Nonpartisans" served as the IPR's front, among them Edward C. Carter, William L. Holland, and Owen Lattimore; only one high-ranking Communist was among the guiding spirits—Frederic Vanderbilt Field. The IPR had considerable political influence on American public opinion, which was poorly informed on Asian problems; more important, however, was the fact that close ties connected the institute with the Far Eastern division of the State Department, and that abundant information flowed through official channels to the leaders and writers of the IPR, and thence to the Soviet intelligence agencies. The Third Section of GRU was using the channels and information of the IPR.*

* Testimony of Ismail Ege, Oct. 28, 1953, Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments*, p. 1017.

The official head of Soviet military intelligence in the United States, the Soviet military attaché, and his assistants constituted the official machinery for gathering military information. Provided with the legal and technical facilities of the embassy, and supported by an extensive underground, Soviet military intelligence in the United States would have achieved much had it not been for the great purge which began about that time (1936) and soon engulfed the majority of Russian intelligence officers as well as their American aides. (According to State Department data the official staff [ranking officers] of the Soviet military attaché in Washington numbered four during 1934-36, decreased to three in 1937, to two in 1938, to one in the first half of 1939, and to none in the second half of 1939.)

From 1936 on new "illegal" leaders (usually Red Army officers trained for intelligence) arrived from Russia to extend the apparatus in the United States; they maintained regular contact with the military attaché in Washington. Col. Boris Bykov ("Peter"), who came in the fall of 1936 and stayed for about two years, was a mediocre and cowardly espionage chief. He was short, sturdy, with red hair, reddish-brown eyes, and ginger-colored eyelashes; his manners were primitive and his intelligence low. He spoke German but not English, knew little about this country, and saw American "secret police" everywhere around him and behind every one of his failures.¹ That this unimpressive man should have so greatly impressed American Communists and sympathizers could only have been because they saw in him the powerful arm of Stalin. "I was to learn," writes Hede Massing, "that it did not matter how stupid a Russian official is, what he stood for was the important thing. What he represented gave him access to this pool of voluntary co-operation that he could draw from at random. Stupid or shrewd, calculating or straightforward, the Russian official got results in spite of the waste that irritated me so."²

One of the most important acquisitions of Soviet military intelligence of those years was Juliet Stuart Poyntz. More outstanding in the Communist movement than other American agents, Juliet Poyntz was less successful in the secret service than in the open party; her direct services to Soviet intelligence lasted less than three years. Tall, heavily built, and somewhat masculine, yet handsome and likable, she was about forty-seven years old in 1934 and had been a member of the party since the mid-'twenties. With

her Barnard College education, good manners, and great abilities, she belonged to the higher strata of American Communism and had been the Communist party candidate for the office of assemblyman and alderman. In 1934 she was invited to join Soviet military intelligence. Following the prescribed pattern, she "resigned" from the party and soon left for Moscow to receive training. On her return to the United States she set up a comfortable home in New York, and her first assignment was to search for new agents. She met the high-ranking intelligence men from Moscow, suggested new recruits, and arranged appointments. "Treffe" of various sorts, luncheons, and dinners in fashionable restaurants—this outwardly exciting but essentially dull activity—constituted her occupation after she returned from Russia.

It was not long before Juliet Poyntz, rich in Communist experience at home and in Russia, began to waver in her faith. Her doubts were increased by the mass "deviations" in Russia and the Moscow trials of "traitors." By the end of 1936 she was completely disillusioned. She started to write a book of memoirs—a fact that did not remain a secret to her friends, comrades, and superiors.

One day in the spring of 1937 Juliet Poyntz, wearing neither coat nor hat, left her apartment and vanished forever. Neither her friends nor the investigating agencies in this country have been able to learn the facts about her disappearance. She was either kidnapped and shipped to Russia or killed and secretly buried. Some have suspected George Mink, others Shachno Epstein, Communist editor, GB man, and formerly Miss Poyntz's closest friend, of having had a hand in the affair. But all this was surmise. It is possible that a "mobile brigade" came from abroad to "execute" Miss Poyntz, and then left the country in accordance with the standing rule of the GB about "executions" performed outside the Soviet Union.*

Juliet Poyntz was one more casualty of the great purge; other important agents, like Bykov, Eckardt, and Marcel were recalled to Russia; some took the risky course of leaving the Soviet service.

* Alexander Orlov says: "The decision to perform an 'execution' abroad, a rather risky affair, was up to Stalin personally; if he ordered it, a so-called 'mobile brigade' was dispatched to carry it out. It was too dangerous to operate through local agents, who might 'deviate' later and start to talk." D papers, b 923-4.

The defection in 1938 of Whittaker Chambers, whose ideological deviation from Communism had begun long before his decision to desert, represented a great loss to the apparat. Chambers had performed many intelligence jobs; among them was the formation, in collaboration with John Sherman and Maxim Lieber, of the American Feature Writers' Syndicate, actually a branch of Soviet military intelligence. The syndicate was to serve as a cover for espionage by its "writers." Though formally established, the syndicate did not, however, materialize as a spy organization.

A more important one of Chambers' intelligence assignments, carried out under the supervision of Boris Bykov, was organizing a group of government officials in Washington and collecting information from them. When he quit, after six years of service, his knowledge of intelligence secrets was extensive, and the more extensive the knowledge of an intelligence agent the greater the danger if he defects.

In a case of defection from the Soviet intelligence service both the GB and the "traitor" engage in a guessing game: How will the other side react? The GB's guessing is along the line of: Will he talk or is he afraid? Will he try to buy leniency by remaining silent? If he talks, how much will he tell? Will he reveal all that he knows?

The defecting agent wonders what steps the GB will take in his particular case. He is well aware of the general principle that a defector cannot be sure of his life; he remembers only too well Ignace Reiss, Juliet Stuart Poyntz, and others executed by the GB when they tried to desert. But he knows of others, too, who survived after defecting. Each must resolve the problem in his own way. Silence, preferred by many, has rarely proved the best solution. When Ignace Reiss was killed by the GB in Switzerland in September 1937, Leon Trotsky drew some conclusions from the event which he presented in an article, "A Tragic Lesson":

The only effective safeguard against Stalin's hired assassins is full publicity. . . . The very day of the break a political declaration should have been made to the press. Such a declaration, signed in his [Reiss'] name, would immediately attract the attention of wide circles and thus hamper Stalin's executioners. In addition, and in the interest of his self-preservation, Reiss should have given himself up to the

French or Swiss police and told them the full story. . . . He need hardly have expected severe punishment, but in any event his life would have been saved. His courageous break with the GPU would have won popular support. The political aim would have been achieved, and his personal safety secured as far as this is possible under present conditions.³

Chambers tried to free himself from the apparat by the method of silence. Vacillating and uncertain, he came to Jay Lovestone, by now an anti-Communist, for advice. On the principle that a public statement would provide a better avenue to safety than disappearance and silence, Lovestone offered to arrange a press conference in his office at which the defecting Soviet agent would tell the story of Soviet espionage in the United States. In addition Lovestone suggested that Chambers go on a lecture tour through the country. The two were to meet secretly several nights later in the Pennsylvania Station in New York. Lovestone and a friend, the latter remaining at a distance, kept the appointment, but Chambers did not show up.

Indecision haunted Chambers for an entire decade. For a year, he later revealed, he lived in hiding, "sleeping by day and watching through the night with gun or revolver within easy reach. . . . I had sound reasons for supposing that the Communists might try to kill me." ⁴ He felt it his duty to come out into the open and tell his story, but he feared for his family and himself. He now chose the path of compromise: he decided to reveal a part of his story, but not publicly. The results proved that in cases like these compromise is not the best solution.

More than a year had passed since he had deserted the Soviet service before Chambers saw Adolf A. Berle, Jr., assistant secretary of state. He went to Washington with the idea of telling his story to President Roosevelt, but the President's secretary Marvin McIntyre referred the matter to Berle, who was in charge of security. Chambers did not reveal the full story to Berle. He stressed the Communist connections and sympathies of certain officials but he omitted the Soviet espionage part of the picture (aside from Soviet attempts to get battleship and military plans, several years previously). From the names he gave to Berle he omitted two of the most active and important—Harry Dexter White and Abraham George Silverman; and he asked that the matter should not be re-

ported to the FBI. In general Chambers was only giving "tips," while the men he alleged to be Communists and pro-Communists had excellent records in the government.

Berle did not report on Chambers to the President directly, but discussed the matter with McIntyre, who informed the President about it; neither Berle nor Roosevelt took the matter seriously, and no action was taken. Nor did Berle check with the FBI or other security officers of the State Department. There the matter rested for a long time.

Today an attitude on the part of loyal citizens of high standing such as that displayed by government officials in the Chambers case would appear incomprehensible. Yet it is futile, as events recede and harden into a pattern, to try to place the blame for the mistakes of the past. History must be understood, not judged. It was understandable that Chambers, threatened by the Soviet assassination machine, should be hesitant and cautious; it was understandable, too, that two days after the German attack on Poland White House aides should not be alert to Soviet threats and should minimize the significance of the Communist underground. These were serious blunders, of course. But half the world's history is marked by blunders committed by governments and peoples.

Two more years passed before Chambers told part of his story to the FBI. Again nothing happened. The Communists in the government agencies remained in their posts, some advancing in rank, and continued to give information to Soviet intelligence. Not until the war ended and the situation had completely changed did the security organs of the United States begin a thorough investigation.

Not long before Chambers' defection, John Sherman, the second in the Chambers-Sherman-Lieber underground trio, disgusted and frightened, with Chambers' assistance deserted the Soviet underground and re-emerged in California as an ordinary member of the open Communist party. The Soviet apparat acquiesced in Sherman's independent act. Thus ended the career of another intelligent and promising Soviet spy.

The third member of the trio, Maxim Lieber, remained loyal to his Soviet bosses after the purge era. He had been a literary agent for a number of well-known writers, among them Erskine

Caldwell; Leon Trotsky was one of his clients. It was paradoxical that at a time when Stalin was jailing and destroying Trotsky sympathizers one of Stalin's own agents was busy placing Trotsky's articles in the most popular American magazines and making contracts with the best American publishers for publication of Trotsky's books. Obviously, Lieber was doing this with the consent of his superiors; and obviously the professional connection with Trotsky served him as an excellent alibi. At the peak of the purge, however, when Lieber's chiefs were themselves trembling for their lives, he was ordered to drop his illustrious client.

It was not simple for Lieber to extricate himself from the affair; he had no plausible explanation to offer. In a most awkward way he began to sabotage Trotsky's writings. On February 3, 1937, Trotsky wrote to a friend in New York:

As to Lieber's attitude, he was actually my counter agent in this last period: such was his conduct in regard to Doran, to whom he refused to offer my book "The Betrayed Revolution." I have seen the letter of the [New York] Times to Lieber regarding my Lenin book. The Times wants to have the serial rights. Lieber answers: the matter is uncertain; a few years ago I was, in fact, Trotsky's agent, but . . . In answer to a telegram [to Lieber] suggesting that I send articles by cable, I have received a wire: "Lieber left for a week." He is a coward, plays hide and seek and practically sabotages my literary work in the United States. On the basis of his answer to the Times regarding my Lenin book, I am justified, it seems to me, in demanding that he quit as my literary agent altogether. I intended to write him today along these lines but decided to wait for your advice.

Trotsky dispensed with Lieber's services. In April of the same year the Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky in New York, which was preparing documents for the eventual counter-trial of the Communist rebel, asked Lieber, on Trotsky's behalf, to permit it access to the correspondence between the author and his agent. Lieber informed the committee that he had "destroyed" the correspondence. Today we know that he had turned it over to the Soviet intelligence agencies.*

* In this connection I recall my only meeting with Maxim Lieber. Soon after my arrival in the United States, in the fall of 1940, I began to write a book on Soviet

About the same time another unfortunate affair burst into the open—the arrest of Mikhail Gorin, Soviet citizen and agent of military intelligence, who had served with Amtorg in New York in 1936 and had been transferred to the West coast ostensibly as a manager of Intourist in Los Angeles. Gorin did not have the benefit of diplomatic immunity. His story is proof of how secure was the existence of Soviet “residents” in the United States at that time.

One of Gorin’s exploits in Los Angeles involved a United States naval intelligence officer, Hafis Salich, who, through his job, was in possession of secret information on Japan. Gorin, with a letter of introduction from the Soviet vice-consul, approached Salich with a request for a special kind of “collaboration”; Salich refused; but he had relatives in Russia, and when Gorin began to make references to them, the situation changed. Salich started to supply Gorin with secret documents, the bulk of which related to Japanese espionage and the Japanese navy. All told, he supplied sixty-two American intelligence documents, and received a total of \$1,700 in payment.

The collaboration might have continued indefinitely had Gorin not committed a blunder for which, in the code of behavior of secret agents, there was no excuse, and for which he must have been severely punished upon his return to Russia three years later. In December 1938 the man who picked up a suit that Gorin wanted cleaned found some papers in the pockets. The papers obviously belonged to United States intelligence. When Gorin and Salich were arrested, the Soviet embassy in Washington became alarmed: Had this been an intentional “error” on

foreign policy. In search of a publisher, I asked friends to recommend a non-Stalinist literary agent. One suggested Maxim Lieber as an able man and, as Trotsky’s literary agent, certainly above suspicion. One day in December 1940 or January 1941 I went to see Lieber in his office on Fifth Avenue. He inquired as to the theme of my book. When I stated my views, which, needless to say, were anti-Communist, he offered neither argument nor criticism, but told me, in a manner that seemed frank and honest: “Mr. Dallin, American readers will not be interested in a book of this kind, and my advice to you is not to write it at all.”

Although discouraged by Lieber’s advice, I continued to work on my manuscript. Eventually Professor Philip Mosely put me in touch with the Yale University Press; the book appeared in 1942 and was not entirely unsuccessful. My conversation with Lieber had no doubt been the subject of a report to the GB. If so, it was not the first such report on me in the files of the Soviet police.

Gorin's part? Was Gorin planning to make revelations to the Americans? The GB took over the Gorin case. It was advisable to get Gorin out of jail as quickly as possible, give him whatever assistance was necessary, and ship him back to Russia. The stern measures would come later.

Gorin, under arrest, demanded and obtained permission to call the embassy in Washington from Los Angeles. When he reached Constantin Oumansky, then acting ambassador, he asked for "instructions" (another breach of the rules—a spy caught in the act must never ask the embassy for instructions on how to behave). Oumansky dispatched the Soviet vice-consul (actually a GB man), Mikhail Ivanushkin, from New York to Los Angeles by plane. Oumansky himself went to the State Department to talk to Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles.⁵ Oumansky took the offensive—the characteristic attitude assumed whenever Soviet officials are caught in the act of espionage—and vigorously protested the arrest. He demanded to know why Gorin had been ordered to conduct the telephone conversation with the Soviet ambassador in English. In general, he protested, "the Department of Justice was acting in a high-handed and not entirely legal manner."

Oumansky next went to see Loy Henderson in the Division of European Affairs and requested permission for a representative of the embassy to see the arrested Gorin. This request was interesting because members of the American embassy in Moscow were not permitted to talk to American citizens arrested in Russia "within three days after their arrest," as provided in the notes exchanged between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov in November 1933. Permission was granted.

Ivanushkin arrived in Los Angeles and, obviously afraid that Gorin would "talk" to the American authorities, and discarding all caution, told Gorin, in the presence of an FBI agent, what attitude he must assume in the face of an accusation of espionage. "We admit nothing," Ivanushkin said. "We will make no statement in connection with the papers found in the suit."

During the investigation Oumansky became more and more nervous and made further protests to the State Department, but the State Department refused to interfere in a court proceeding against a person having no diplomatic immunity. On March 10, 1939, Oumansky again discussed the Gorin affair with Loy

Henderson. Unable to persuade Henderson that the American authorities were behaving improperly, Oumansky "arose and said in the most formal tone: 'Mr. Henderson, I feel that I should inform you that unless proper retraction is made by the federal district attorney in Los Angeles before the conclusion of the trial, it will be distinctly unfortunate.' " *

Now it looked as if the United States government was being asked to apologize to the Soviet embassy. A formal diplomatic note containing reproaches and accusations in connection with the Gorin affair was presented by Oumansky to the Department of State on March 10.

The State Department took no action, and the trial proceeded. Gorin was sentenced to six years and Salich to four years in prison. For almost two years the case moved through the higher courts, but all appeals were rejected. In January 1941 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the original verdict.

A few days later Oumansky came to the State Department with a request that Gorin be released and be permitted to leave for Russia. An agreement was finally reached, and in March 1941 the State Department and the attorney general "recommended" to the Los Angeles court that it suspend the sentence. This step was obviously taken for "state reasons," a procedure which was soon to become the rule in Soviet espionage cases in this country.

A few weeks after the settlement of the Gorin case a person more important than Gorin became the center of a similar affair. This was "Gaik Ovakimian," Amtorg employee and veteran GB agent in the United States. Arrested in May 1941, he was slated to go on trial if the law with respect to registration of foreign agents was found to apply to him. "Ovakimian," in jail, claimed "diplomatic immunity": he was, he protested, a "purchasing agent" for "defense goods" but had been unable, for political reasons, to negotiate any substantial transactions. The Soviet embassy furnished the bail of \$25,000, "Ovakimian" was released, and negotiations for his return to Russia proceeded quickly. Moscow agreed to release six United States citizens held in Russia in exchange for "Ovakimian"—three arrested in the Soviet Union and three prohibited from leaving the Soviet Union. The deal was concluded, and "Ovakimian" sailed for Russia in late July 1941.

As for the six Americans, three never reached the United States. The GB, which was handling the matter of their release, was slow in acting, and before they could depart the German-Soviet war had started and two of them fell into German hands; the third was kept in jail by the GB despite the agreement with the United States. The second group of three came to the United States; two promptly started a pro-Soviet propaganda campaign in this country; only one, Dr. Michael Devenis, "seemed to have truly been an American hostage of the Soviet Union." ⁷

The American attitude toward secret "residents" of the Soviet government in the United States was far more lenient and considerate than that of Soviet authorities toward United States citizens rightly or wrongly accused of espionage in Russia.

Espionage in general was increasing rapidly during the years immediately preceding the war; German and Japanese espionage agents in the United States were especially active. J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, stated on June 20, 1939, that his agency had investigated an average of 35 espionage cases annually in the five years 1933-37. In the year ending June 6, 1939, the number rose to 250; in the fiscal year 1939 there were 1,651 cases. Announcing an anti-espionage campaign in this country, Attorney General Murphy stated, on September 1, 1939: "There will be no repetition of the situation in 1917 when a democracy was unprepared to meet the espionage program. There will be no laxity in our efforts." ⁸

The government kept this promise as far as espionage by the Axis powers was concerned; in regard to Soviet espionage, however, the attitude of the government was different, especially after June 1941, when Soviet intelligence took on unprecedented dimensions.

In 1939-40 Soviet intelligence apparatus in this country, which had been almost shattered by the purge, began to undergo rehabilitation; by the time of the Soviet-American war alliance they had attained their former size. Ranking personnel of the military attaché's staff in Washington, which had been reduced, as we have seen, from four to none in the preceding years, was increased; in 1942 there were six such staff members, in 1943 seven, and in 1944 nine. In April 1941 Gen. Ilya M. Sarayev was sent to Washing-

ton as military attaché, a post that had been vacant for a long time; he was to play a prominent role in secret Soviet intelligence work in the United States.

5. THE BOOM ERA OF THE WAR YEARS

Alliance with the United States was never conceived by the Soviet side as an alliance in the sentimental sense, that is, as a matter of trust and sincerity; least of all was this true of the Soviet intelligence agencies. The improved relations, the abundance of American material supplied to Russia, and the extensive Russian trading operations in America created new facilities and opened up new vistas, while the reluctance of the United States government to make an issue of Soviet underground activity during a war in which the Soviet Union was its ally was a favorable circumstance that had to be made use of. Moreover, time was short. It was apparent that once the war was over relations might deteriorate; the few good years were a God-sent opportunity to get whatever information could be got on industrial, political, and military-technical matters.

But no one in Soviet intelligence could have expected to find the American gates as wide open and the American security agencies as agreeable as they were after the start of the German-Soviet war. For the Soviet apparats these were golden days. With each passing month the heads of these agencies in this country as well as in the Moscow "centers" increased the tasks and the personnel of their services.

During the war the United States rose to position number one in the list of Soviet sources of information and targets of espionage. Continental Europe was at war, and the information being gathered by Soviet apparats and individual agents working in that part of the world was often limited to local or military affairs and was often interrupted. In Japan the Sorge ring had collapsed in the fall of 1941. In 1942-43 all eyes were on Washington. Hundreds of Soviet officials were arriving to man the embassy, Purchasing Commission, consulates, and subagencies all over the United States and Canada; with every contingent of Soviet officers there also arrived a few special agents of the intelligence departments.

An attempt to coordinate work and exchange information was made about the end of 1943, when Gen. John R. Deane was sent to Russia as head of a United States military mission. Among the assignments of the mission was to arrange for exchange of secret information between Soviet military intelligence and its opposite number, the American Office of Strategic Services. According to General Deane,¹ his instructions were to avoid seeking information about Russia. General Marshall, his chief,

was convinced that a quest for such information was not only unnecessary but would irritate the Russians and make operational collaboration impossible. . . . Consequently we studiously refrained from seeking information about Soviet equipment, weapons, and tactical methods unless we could present a strong case to show that such information was of value in our fight against Germany. . . .

In contrast to Soviet secrecy was American openness. We had thousands of Soviet representatives in the United States who were allowed to visit our manufacturing plants, attend our schools, and witness tests of aircraft and other equipment. In Italy and later in France and Germany, Russian representatives were welcomed at our field headquarters and allowed to see anything they desired of our military operations. Our policy was to make any of our new inventions in electronics and other fields available to the Russians once we had used such equipment ourselves, had exploited the element of surprise, and were satisfied that the enemy had probably gained knowledge of the equipment as the result of its having fallen into his hands. Each month I would receive a revised list of secret American equipment about which the Russians could be informed in the hope that, if it could be made available, it might be used on the Russian front. We never lost an opportunity to give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which we thought might help our combined war effort. This generosity, or at least attitude, was never reciprocated by the Russians except after endless argument, negotiation, and delay.

In December 1943 Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, head of the OSS, arrived in Moscow to discuss a somewhat naive project of liaison and cooperation between the two intelligence organiza-

tions. In a conference with Gen. P. M. Fitin and Gen. A. P. Osipov of Soviet military intelligence, General Donovan explained the American way of introducing agents into enemy territory and the training and equipment given such agents; he described the new suitcase radios, plastic explosives, etc. It was agreed that when the project was definitely accepted, Col. A. G. Grauer would come to Washington with his staff to represent Soviet military intelligence. Doubts arose in Washington, however, as to the propriety of establishing what would amount to a legal Soviet espionage agency on American soil, and in March 1944 Roosevelt canceled the plan.

While these negotiations were going on, Moscow was obtaining authentic information on the same project in another way. (To get identical secret information from two sources is a great satisfaction to a government.) Duncan Lee, member of the Silvermaster group in Washington, reported to Moscow, through the apparat, that an exchange of missions between the NKVD and the OSS had been discussed at a top policy meeting of the United States government.* With the exception of Admiral Leahy, Lee reported, all present supported General Donovan's idea; even FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover presented no objections.† The opinion in Washington, according to Elizabeth Bentley, was that the NKVD had been wandering around the United States for years: "It probably would make it a lot simpler for us if they came already labeled."²

In respect to Soviet representation in Washington, the plan did not materialize: the Moscow plan was not approved by the White House. This was early in the election year of 1944, and to admit an "NKVD commission" into this country, it was felt, might embarrass the President and the government, since a press campaign against the new Soviet agency in the United States would be certain to develop. At the end of March the President informed the embassy in Moscow by cable of the disapproval of the plan, stating that "the domestic political consideration in the United States was the predominant factor" in the decision.³

* Testifying before the Committee on Un-American Activities on August 10, 1948, Duncan Lee denied ever having been a Communist, having paid dues, and having divulged state secrets, in particular OSS secrets, to Miss Bentley. In the same session Miss Bentley, likewise under oath, insisted on her statements about Lee's abundant and important disclosures of OSS secrets to the former Soviet agent.

† Lee's information about Hoover was incorrect. Hoover was not at the meeting; when he learned of the plan being considered by the OSS he protested to President Roosevelt.

Cooperation between the American mission and Soviet military intelligence in Moscow continued, however, although on a limited basis. General Fitin occasionally supplied the Americans with bits of information, for instance, on certain unreliable contacts in Switzerland and the Balkans, on the fate of American agents in Czechoslovakia, and on methods of subversion in Germany. American services to Russia were more substantial and important:

Donovan's organization maintained a constant flow of information to Fitin. This included studies made by the Research and Analysis Branch of the O.S.S. as well as intelligence gained by operatives in the field. Perhaps the most important information Donovan transmitted to the Russians was documentary proof that the Germans had succeeded in breaking certain Russian codes.⁴

"As usual we gave the Russians," General Deane concludes, "in the field of secret intelligence, much more information than we received." This, Deane believes, was because the OSS was a more effective organization than its Russian counterpart. This explanation is questionable, for it is doubtful that the young OSS was more effective than the huge, seasoned GB and GRU. The disproportion would seem rather to have been rooted in the different approach of the respective governments to the meaning, aims, and scope of Allied cooperation.

The turning point came in the Stalingrad winter of 1942-43; from then on intelligence activity was conducted systematically and on a large scale. Lend-lease operations had got under way and by the second half of the war had reached tremendous proportions. Soviet missions in the United States, growing in size and encouraged by the warm reception they received in this country, found it easy to contact industrial managers, scientists, and engineers; new inventions were discussed with Soviet representatives; complete industrial plants with the most modern equipment were shipped to Russia.

The newly established Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington served both lend-lease and intelligence purposes. With its staff of over a thousand employees, and business connections with practically every important industrial unit in this country,

it served as an excellent cover for industrial espionage. Soviet experts on aviation, artillery, and submarines, including scientists of high standing and military personnel with special experience in engineering, were arriving from Russia. Sometimes it was prudent to conceal the standing of these experts in order not to arouse the suspicions of American industry. Some were employed for short periods as ordinary workmen in industrial plants.*

At 3355 16th Street in Washington, on the seventh floor, behind an iron door, the "Politburo of the Purchasing Commission" had its offices. The group consisted of Gen. Leonid Rudenko (a political rather than a military general), chairman of the Purchasing Commission; Mikhail V. Serov, assistant chairman (actually a representative of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union); Gusev, head of Amtorg, a man with considerable experience in setting up covers for Soviet agents; and a few chairmen of special departments. Secret communications from Russia came first to the "Politburo"; on the other hand, the latter had agents and informers in every section of the commission. Mrs. Arutunian, daughter-in-law of a high official in Moscow, was chief of a "special department," and all secret papers passed through her hands. "All of us knew," Victor Kravchenko testified before a congressional committee, "about the functions of the special department, but we never knew who the representative of the Soviet Secret Police was in the Soviet Purchasing Commission." ⁵

One day in late 1943 or early 1944 all employees of the Purchasing Commission who were actual members of the Communist party were summoned to a meeting behind closed doors at which Mikhail Serov presented cabled orders from Anastas Mikoyan in Moscow (Mikoyan was a member of the Moscow Politburo and people's commissar for foreign trade, and the Purchasing Commission was part of his department) which directed every Soviet Communist working in the commission to gather information on industrial developments in the United States, especially in the

* For example, an official of the Purchasing Commission, Semion Vasilenko, formerly member of the Ukrainian Soviet government and personal friend of Victor Kravchenko. Among the arriving Soviet officials there was not a single professed Communist—all were "nonpartisans."

war industries. After the cable was read, each member of the "cell" signed his name to a statement that he had been informed of the order and would make every effort to carry it out.

An orgy of information-grabbing began; among the items obtained were designs of industrial plants, special machines, parts, and details; photographs and blue prints of technical processes in the aviation, arms, oil, submarine-building, and many other industries; long-range plans for the development of large industrial units; hundreds of maps of the United States, the individual states, industrial sites, bridges; descriptions of railroads; reports on the building of cities and highways; and so on. At this very time when every agency in Russia was trying to increase its knowledge through the channels of semilegal intelligence, information could be had for the asking.

"Super lend-lease" was the playful name given to this sort of information in the Soviet Purchasing Commission. The quantity of information grew from month to month, and soon, as Kravchenko said, "We transferred to the Soviet Union not just this one package; we transferred . . . dozens of tons, of material, not just by airplane. We also were using Soviet ships that came from lend-lease for the Soviet Union . . ."*

The methods employed in the search for industrial secrets have been described by Jack Roberts, an American employed as an interpreter for a group of engineers in the department of black metals of the Soviet Purchasing Commission.* One of the group was engineer "Naryshkin, a tall, smooth, blondish, sharp-eyed man," actually no engineer at all, who spoke English fluently and was obviously in the service of the GB. Wherever the group went, engineer Veselkov, head of the small brigade, made a routine speech to the manager of the American plant to the effect that "we are no competitors of yours, you can show us everything," and hinted at possible large orders.

Very gradually their questions became more searching. Unobtrusively the notebooks were brought out, including the little black book of Veselkov. New machinery and proc-

* *Saturday Evening Post*, Oct. 1 and 8, 1949. After several months of employment with the commission Roberts reported to the FBI; he continued his work while in contact with that agency.

esses, the laboratories and special devices for testing the quality of metals interested them especially; and here, with exclamations of amazement and admiration, they led the Americans on to talk at length. . . . They [the questions] were asked more casually, and if at first not answered, were brought up again and again in other forms. The Russians also began asking for samples of ore, copies of work and schedule sheets, data of chemical analyses. They inquired closely into the water- and electric-power supply, and the transportation network upon which the plant depended. . . . Those Russian engineers were busy beavers. They worked day and night to cram up on the factory to be visited. On arrival they adopted a friendly comrades-in-arms attitude, played dumb, and then proceeded, unobtrusively, skillfully and tirelessly to extract every possible scrap of information on new technical processes. On returning to Washington they spent more days and nights making their drawings and reports, which were photostated in quantity and shipped back to Russia.

Another member of the group, engineer Talalaev, was an outstanding Soviet scientist, an expert on coke-oven doors. Passionately devoted to his very special task, he wanted more than anything else to see a model of the Wilputte, in his opinion the best coke-oven door. At their visit to the coke-oven division of the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation in New York, the Soviet Commission, with promises of orders, finally succeeded in being shown the model, which had not before been shown to anyone.

He [Talalaev] took the model apart, put it together, took it apart again.

His lazy indifference was gone now. I knew him well, from our travels together, and could tell he was excited. His hands did not tremble, but his expression showed a concentration I had never seen before. Several times he closed his eyes for a moment, as if trying to imprint what he saw on his memory.

When Mr. Wilputte broke away from Naryshkin's conversation and came over to the table, Talalaev was his old, easy self again.

When Roberts learned about Talalaev's forthcoming return to Russia, he said it was a pity he was leaving—"We had good times together, didn't we?" "We certainly did," Talalaev said, and grinned. "My glance strayed to his desk. There, among the patents and photostats, I saw neat drawings of a familiar object, sketched from various angles and in cross sections. It was the self-sealing door."

Summing up his impressions of this Soviet engineer-reconnaissance team Jack Roberts says in conclusion: "Most of the engineers were earnest, extremely hard working men who belonged to the Communist Party because of their technical achievements rather than because of political activity. They were doing right by their own standards, though they knew perfectly well they were doing wrong by American standards, and despised us for letting them get away with it; at the same time, the careless open freedom of American life bewildered, attracted and frightened them. They loved their own land, but lived in terror of their own government. They were torn by American temptations, but armed against them by deeply indoctrinated suspicions."

In the same way as the Talalaev group, other Soviet teams were discovering and copying the most progressive technical achievements of American industry. It all was the prelude to the unprecedented upsurge of Soviet engineering after the war.

Shipment of the mountain of reports and documents presented a problem in itself. There were four main ways of shipping confidential or semiconfidential material, including samples and blueprints, to Russia.

First there was the sealed diplomatic pouch dispatched by diplomatic courier. But only a small part of the available material could be accommodated in the pouch.

A second method was via "diplomatic passport," an excellent way to avoid inspection. Contrary to the widespread notion that only diplomats travel on diplomatic passports, every government from time to time issues special passports to nondiplomatic travelers, an indirect way of asking foreign authorities for special courtesy. A "diplomatic passport" practically obviates inspection by customs and immigration authorities. The Soviet government made abundant use of this facility before and during the war. In the United States a large number of Soviet officials in no way

connected with the diplomatic service traveled on diplomatic passports and took objects and documents of prime importance out of the country, without submitting them to inspection. General Belayev of the Purchasing Commission took to Russia volumes of blueprints of aviation plants, machines, details, and so forth. Semion Vasilenko, on his flight home, took with him packets containing important information on American industry. A well-known case is that of Lieutenant Colonel Motinov, aide to the Soviet military attaché in Canada, who flew to Russia with a sample of uranium metal supplied by the spy Allan Nunn May.

Shipment by steamer was a third way of carrying secret information to Russia. Soviet sailors ashore in American ports had no difficulty taking packages aboard when they returned to their ships. What is more, export licenses for goods going to Russia were given to Soviet agencies in Washington or New York, which attached them to the cargo they wanted to pass through customs. It was a simple matter to dispatch goods under false labels, for instance, radar instruments under a license for auto motors, and so on. Yakov Lomakin, Soviet consul general in New York, was never questioned concerning the parcels that he placed aboard ship. One interesting technique was to conceal secret material among innocent books, magazines, or catalogues.*

The fourth method was shipment by plane. Early in 1942 the new Alaskan air route from Great Falls, Montana, to Fairbanks, Alaska, was established. Fairbanks was the point at which the American section of the route ended and Soviet crews took over the flight of passengers and freight to East Siberia and thence to

* This technique is reminiscent of what Whittaker Chambers has described as "filling the box."

"Every so often, Charlie would bring to the apartment a big empty box. In the apartment, Charlie, Maria and I would fill it with hundreds of thin leaflets in white paper covers. These were patents which anybody could then buy for a small fee from the United States Patent Office. They were collected in the bottom of the trunk until there were enough to make a shipment.

"Other perfectly legal documents also went into the box—the *Infantry Journal*, the *Cavalry Journal*, *Iron Age*. When packed, the box was heavy. Charlie and I would lug it downstairs and rope it to the bumper of Charlie's car. . . .

"One day, Charlie and Maria took special care to leave a space in the middle of the packed patents. Charlie then brought from the truck several wide-mouthed flasks, filled with what looked to me like bits of uncooked yellowish-gray or brownish-yellow macaroni. I was curious enough to ask what they were. After a moment's pause, Maria decided to tell me. 'Flashless powder,' she said." *Witness*, p. 305.

Moscow. The airfield at Great Falls became an important shipping port during the war.

The airfield had been speedily constructed and no United States censorship procedures were set up; the only inspector assigned was Randolph Hardy, a man over seventy, who worked for both the Treasury Department and the customs service, and whose office was four miles from the airfield. A special liaison officer, assigned by the United States Army to Great Falls, was instructed to be helpful to the Russian mission. Maj. George R. Jordan worked in this capacity from 1942 to 1944. He later testified before a congressional committee, and published a book, *From Major Jordan's Diaries*.*

Supervision of border operations on the Soviet side was entrusted to Alexei Anisimov, an important GB official stationed in Fairbanks, who had under his direction hundreds of Soviet pilots; his agent in Great Falls was Sgt. Andrei Vinogradsky. The first duty of the GB outfit was, of course, to insure safe and speedy dispatch of goods to Russia; their special assignment was to see to it that there should be no inspection of shipments by the American authorities.

Anisimov Jordan described as a slight, elegant man of about forty; his dark "ascetic face could have been that of a holy recluse. . . . the voice was soft and gentle. He spoke in cultivated English." Major Jordan was Anisimov's guest on one occasion while in Fairbanks.

As I entered the Officers' Mess, in response to Mr. Anisimov's invitation, I noticed that the Americans kept apart, on the other side of the dining-hall, where women were not allowed. The Russians, on the other hand, were sitting with their wives, and with girl translators. I looked for my host, but could not spot him. Suddenly the Russians stopped eat-

* A part of Major Jordan's reports appeared controversial to the Committee on Un-American Activities, which was not unanimous in the evaluation of his testimony. There was doubt particularly as to Jordan's description of the role of Harry Hopkins, aide of President Roosevelt and actual head of lend-lease; Hopkins appears in Jordan's report as a too willing tool of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In every other respect, however, Jordan's story appears reliable and is corroborated by other testimony and official reports, and to this extent it can and should be used as historical reference material.

ing, thrust their hands under the tables, and sat at attention. Mr. Anisimov entered.

He greeted me cordially. As we sat down at his table, the silence in the room persisted. It was not until he picked up his knife and fork that the Russians shifted from "attention" to "at ease." He acted as if this procedure were the most natural thing in the world, and undoubtedly it was, for him.⁸

Sergeant Vinogradsky, Anisimov's representative in Great Falls, was a man of less education; he knew little English and communicated by means of sign language and interpreters. One of his special assignments was to keep watch on Colonel Kotikov, his military boss. He made mysterious trips, traveling all over the country; in San Francisco he often visited Soviet Vice-Consul Grigori Kheifets, chief of Soviet espionage on the west coast.

In Great Falls planes arrived from Moscow regularly with Russians aboard that Major Jordan could not identify. "I would see them jump off planes, hop over fences, and run for taxicabs. They seemed to know in advance exactly where they were headed, and how to get there. It was an ideal set-up for planting spies in this country, with false identities, for use during and after the war."

Early in 1943 "black suitcases," made of the cheapest kind of material, bound with windowsash cord, and sealed with red wax, began to be shipped in large numbers from Great Falls to Russia; these shipments continued throughout the remainder of the war.

The first black suitcases, six in number, were in charge of a Russian officer and I passed them without question upon his declaration that they were "personal luggage." But the units mounted to ten, twenty and thirty and at last to standard batches of fifty, which weighed almost two tons and consumed the cargo allotment of an entire plane. The officers were replaced by armed couriers, traveling in pairs, and the excuse for avoiding inspection was changed from "personal luggage" to "diplomatic immunity."

Here were tons of materials proceeding to the Soviet Union, and I had no idea what they were. If interrogated, I should have to plead ignorance.

I began pursuing Colonel Kotikov with queries and pro-

tests. He answered with one eternal refrain. The suitcases were of "highest diplomatic character." I retorted that they were not being sent by the Soviet Embassy but the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington. He asserted that, whatever the origin, they were covered by diplomatic immunity. But I am sure he knew that one of these days I would try to search the containers.

They had grown to such importance in the eyes of the Russians that they asked for a locked room.⁹

Jordan has described a party arranged for him by Colonel Kotikov in March 1943, at which he was plied with vodka and other drinks to distract him from his duties at the airfield; he left, however, before the party was over and proceeded on his own initiative to inspect suitcases prepared for shipment.

There were groups of documents which, on the evidence of stationery, had been contributed by the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and State. All such papers had been trimmed close to the text, with white margins removed. I decided that this was done either to save weight, or to remove "Secret," "Confidential" or "Restricted" stamps that might have halted a shipment, or for both reasons. . . .

Bewildering, to say the least, was the discovery of voluminous copies of reports which American attachés in Moscow had forwarded trustfully, in diplomatic pouches, to their superiors in Washington. I asked myself what these officers would think if they knew their most secret dispatches were being returned to the Soviet capital . . .

For the first time in my life, I met the word "uranium." The exact phrase was "Uranium 92." From a book of reference I learned afterward that uranium is the 92nd element in atomic weight.¹⁰

According to a report of March 28, 1944, of an investigation made in Great Falls by a special agent of the United States Counter-Intelligence Corps, there was "an incredible amount of diplomatic mail sent to Russia through Great Falls."

On 29 January 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2440), 3,563 pounds of mail was shipped to Russia. On 17 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2579), 4,180 pounds of mail was sent. On 28

February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (92764), 3,757 pounds of mail was sent. All of this was protected from censorship by diplomatic immunity. . . . it is not at all uncommon for the Russian mail or freight shipment to be accompanied by two men, who openly state that they are to see that the mail or freight is not examined and the diplomatic immunity privilege violated. One man sleeps while the other watches the parcels and vice versa.

The report also states:

This material has been sent by members of the Consular service, Russian Army Officers, Russian Engineers, and families of Russians who pass through here and others. The freight is diversified in nature. It includes American publications—for the most part newspapers and magazines. He [Jordan] recalled one occasion when the Russians shipped detailed data regarding American shipping rates and procedure. Major Jordan questioned this and was told by the Russians that the Russian economic structure is patterned after the German economic system, but that the Soviet Government was interested in changing it with the intention of copying the American economic system. Considerable American clothing is included in the freight.*¹¹

The flow of "diplomatic" cargo reached such proportions that the United States government began, although reluctantly, to tackle the matter. A meeting was held in the State Department on July 6, 1944, at which the FBI, the Office of Censorship, Military Intelligence, and several other agencies were represented. The record of the proceedings of this conference indicates that some of the departments involved (State, Customs, Immigration) considered the Army responsible for control of the movement of goods and passengers. The Army, however, disclaimed responsibility and even considered it undesirable "at this time" to inter-

* "Robert K. Califf of Lake Worth, Fla., who was weights and balances officer at the Washington airport, with the rank of First Lieutenant, revealed that he was often prevented from inspecting Russian shipments. In his interview . . . he declared: 'I can say I was prevented many times from examining parcels and pouches which I should have inspected. I was prevented from examining these articles by higher authorities, on the ground that they carried "diplomatic immunity."' " *From Major Jordan's Diaries*, p. 247.

fere. "It also developed that the principal interested agencies such as Customs, Immigration, State, and Censorship had no idea of what was going on at the two places mentioned in so far as their responsibilities were concerned. They agreed to take steps to inform themselves and then, if necessary, consult other agencies involved."¹²

Finally, on July 28, 1944, the Soviet embassy received a memorandum from the State Department in which it was pointed out that only packages in charge of a diplomatic courier and addressed to the Narkomindel (Foreign Office) were exempt from inspection. The Soviet authorities, or, more accurately, the Soviet intelligence agencies, did not bother to change their methods. The security officer at Great Falls, for example, reported, on September 21, 1944:

Aircraft number 8643 type C-47 departed this station 20 September 1944 destined for Russia carrying one passenger of Russian nationality and 3,800 pounds of cargo consisting of communications that had not been censored and were not immune of censorship by being diplomatic in nature. . . .

The implication here is that anything going to Russia on aircraft sold to the Soviet Union is immune to censorship and of a diplomatic nature. This is completely incorrect. The removal of communications from the United States prior to Censorship is a violation of the Espionage Act and the rules of the Office of Censorship.¹³

Essentially the situation remained unchanged until some time after the end of the war. Not until lend-lease shipments stopped (August–September 1945) and the postwar espionage affairs started to unfold did the era of toleration of grand-scale espionage come to an end.

6. POLITICAL ESPIONAGE

While gathering of information on American industry in wartime was chiefly the responsibility of personnel of Amtorg and the Purchasing Commission, political and military espionage was carried out by other apparats, official and illegal. It involved a vast number of inquiries from Moscow and research by Soviet agents in this country. It is almost impossible to convey a no-

tion of the quantity of the reports, documents, and questions and answers exchanged between Moscow and its agents in the Western hemisphere in the years 1942-45.

The wartime setup of Soviet military intelligence in the United States was essentially as follows: at the top stood Gen. Ilya Sarayev, military attaché in Washington. The attaché's office, whose personnel had shrunk to a few clerks on the eve of the war, was now being rapidly enlarged; assistants and clerks were arriving, couriers were coming and going. The size of the task can be judged from the fact that in 1943-44 five specialists were occupied solely with coding and decoding messages.

The GB outfit in the United States was likewise well staffed during the war years. Vasili Zubilin, the GB resident, whom we have already met, now served as third secretary of the Soviet embassy. When Zubilin was recalled to Moscow, in the summer of 1944, he was replaced by Anatoli Gromov, the new first secretary of the embassy. In the fall of 1945 Gromov was exposed as a chief of Soviet espionage, and he left the country in December of that year. He was replaced by Feodor Garanin.

On the level just below the intelligence chiefs working out of the embassy were the ostensible consuls, vice-consuls, members, and employees of various Soviet commissions in this country. Some of these persons had diplomatic immunity; others, although not officially entitled to immunity, enjoyed protection by reason of their official standing—actually they were not subject to indictment, trial, or imprisonment in the United States. In New York "Pavel Mikhailov," officially vice-consul, was actually one of General Sarayev's most important assistants in Soviet military intelligence. (It was he, for instance, who got the new Canadian spy ring started.) In 1944 Anatoli Yakovlev arrived at the consulate in New York to assume important duties in connection with atomic espionage. Grigori Kheifets and Postoyev served as intelligence officers in the Soviet consulate in Los Angeles, while Peter Ivanov performed intelligence work as vice-consul in San Francisco. A number of other figures—secretaries and attachés in the embassy and consulates—served as intelligence agents.

The third level was made up of Americans serving as liaison between the Soviet apparat and the rank and file of espionage. The liaison men were outstanding figures of American Communism who devoted themselves to the cause of Soviet intelligence in this

country. Among this group were J. Peters, Jacob Golos, and Steve Nelson, the latter a Communist organizer in California and head of his own group of informers and agents.

On the next level down was a large group of nonprominent American Communists and "nonparty men" who worked as Soviet subagents.

During the war years Soviet agents and subagents in this country numbered several hundred. Col. Ismail Akhmedov-Ege, who had worked with military intelligence in Moscow and who defected in 1942, has estimated that there were at least twenty Soviet networks in operation in the United States in the first year of the war. Each of the eight departments of GRU in Moscow had at least one "legal" and one "illegal" network in the United States. Thus it is "permissible to assume that at least there were 8 legal and 8 illegal networks on the line of general staff, intelligence department. . . . as far as NKVD . . . it is possible to think that . . . the number of these legal and illegal networks . . . is at least about 8 or 9. . . . I would say at a minimum there are 25 networks, legal and illegal . . ." * ¹

Rank-and-file Communists and sympathizers in government service in Washington continued to supply information to Soviet intelligence. The sources that had served Chambers-Bykov until 1938 were taken over, after Chambers' defection, by a new Russian contact.³ Later Elizabeth Bentley was assigned to collect this material from some of the Washington rings. When she began to visit Washington regularly, she found a large part of the group

* Colonel Ege has explained the difference between "legal" and "illegal" networks as follows: "Usually the Soviet intelligence organization has two channels, one is so-called legal network, which in Soviet intelligence it is understood are networks consisting of Soviet citizens working in some Soviet foreign office or in some Soviet office working as Tass, Voks, foreign section of the state bank, Amtorg, foreign offices and so on. . . . Persons working here, of course, have Soviet passports. Sometimes they use false names, sometimes they have real names. It depends on the situation and the background of the person. They are conducting the espionage under cover of these organizations and that kind of network is full legal network. . . . By illegal network, it is understood network of agents called residents in Soviet terminology who consist of foreigners, of American citizens, of British citizens, of Turkish citizens. They don't need cover because they have their names and passports and they are traveling. They might have a high position in Government so they don't need cover." ²

of the Chambers days intact and even more anxious to continue their secret activities, since the Kremlin had in the meantime become an ally of the United States.

During the war years the Soviet apparat had its men in at least the following agencies:

Office of Strategic Services (Duncan Lee, Leonard Mins, Helen Tenney, J. Julius Joseph)

Counter-Intelligence of the War Department (Donald Niven Wheeler)

War Department (William Ludwig Ullmann)

Air Force (Abraham George Silverman)

State Department (with access to the secret cable room of OSS (Alger Hiss, Maurice Halperin, Robert T. Miller, Donald Hiss)

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Joseph Gregg, Bernard Redmont, William Z. Park)

Justice Department (Norman Burster)

Treasury Department (Harry Dexter White, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Harold Glasser, Solomon Adler, Sonia Gold)

Foreign Economic Administration (Frank Coe, Allan Rosenberg, Lauchlin Currie, Philip Keeney, Michael Greenberg, Bela Gold)

War Production Board (Irving Kaplan, Victor Perlo, John Abt, Edward Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff)

Department of Agriculture (Harold Ware, John Abt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Henry H. Collins, Bela Gold)

Office of Price Administration (Charles Kramer, Victor Perlo)

UNRRA (Solomon Leshinsky)

Department of Commerce (William Remington, Nathan Witt) *

* James Burnham lists the following agencies as having been penetrated, to some degree, by Soviet intelligence (*The Web of Subversion* [New York, John Day, 1954], pp. 70-1): "The administrative staff of the White House; the Departments of State, Treasury, Army, Navy, Defense (under the present organization), Justice, Agriculture, Labor, Commerce; six congressional committees; the office of the General Staff; the Bureau of Ordnance; the Signal Corps; the Manhattan District (atomic energy project); Office of Strategic Services; National Labor Relations Board; Works Progress Administration; National Research Project; Office of Defense Mobilization; War Production Board; Foreign Economic Administration; North African Control Board; Bureau of Standards; Bureau of the Census; Civil Service Commission; Coordinator of Information; Office of Education; Office of War Information; Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; Federal Emergency Relief Administration; Federal Public Housing Authority; Federal Security Administration; Government Printing Office;

This list is not complete, however. It was only by accident that three of the Washington "cells" became known after the war; the accident was the defection of persons who had served as liaison between the cells and Soviet intelligence. There is no doubt that, in addition to these, there were others, probably more numerous and no less important. James Burnham states that "the existence of seven cells is now a matter of public record."

The members of these groups were often transferred from one government department to another. Some of the American agents were highly active, others were slow and cautious; some were aware that they were working for a foreign espionage agency, others were not. The most interesting and important personalities in the Washington group were Harry Dexter White, father of the Morgenthau Plan; Maj. William Ullmann, who was in a position to supply the apparatus with United States war plans as well as FBI reports (obtained through Army Intelligence in the Pentagon); Nathan Silvermaster, with his secret photo workshop located in the basement of his home; Maurice Halperin of the State Department, who supplied official reports, among them copies of secret messages of the American ambassador in Moscow to his government criticizing the Soviet regime; Duncan Lee, who turned over information on the OSS; Victor Perlo, who supplied data on aircraft production.

To evaluate correctly the phenomenon of ramified spy networks working within the agencies of the government, it must be borne in mind that essentially the "cells" were Communist party organizations made up of party members, "candidates," and sympathizers whose interests lay in the field of *Hochpolitik* and social problems rather than espionage. Members of these cells who were in important government posts during the war strove to influence American policy, if only in individual instances, in a pro-Soviet

Library of Congress; Maritime Labor Board; National Archives; National Youth Administration; OMGUS (Military Government in postwar Germany); SCAP (Military Government in postwar Japan); Office of Price Administration; Railroad Retirement Board; Reconstruction Finance Corporation; Resettlement Administration; Securities and Exchange Commission; Social Security Board; War Manpower Commission; U. S. War Assets Administration; War Shipping Administration; Veterans Administration; Tariff Commission; U. S. Information Services. In addition, the web has been spun over the important international organizations to which the U. S. government belongs or has belonged: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA); the United Nations itself; the International Monetary Fund."

direction, and helped comrades to obtain jobs in specific agencies or transfers to more strategic posts. In their cell meetings they heard reports on Russia, read literature from or about Russia, paid party dues, and in general behaved like hundreds of other Communists in cells all over the country and abroad.

Supplying information to Soviet intelligence was, in the beginning, an incidental activity. As time went on, however, the activity grew in size and importance; and because Soviet intelligence was greatly interested and began to show appreciation of their services, members of the groups, some of them not without misgivings, started to operate like regular spies. The development of these groups has been described in some detail by Elizabeth Bentley in *Out of Bondage*, by Whittaker Chambers in *Witness*, and in the records of congressional hearings of 1948; a compilation of the activities was made by James Burnham in *The Web of Subversion*. It would be superfluous to repeat the now well-known story.

One aspect of the development of these networks, however, should be stressed. As time went on and the significance of the Washington groups in the eyes of Soviet intelligence grew, Moscow became aware of the paradoxical and, from the intelligence viewpoint, highly dangerous pattern of activity in Washington, namely, collective espionage. In the course of decades and at great cost, Soviet intelligence had learned and enforced the principle that its agents and subagents must not be let into the secrets of other Soviet agents, that the number of people in the know must be kept at a minimum, and that gossip and careless talk are a breach of discipline. Espionage carried out by a "cell" is contrary to rules of conspiracy.

Thus the Washington activity was based on a breach of rules, and the time arrived when Moscow decided to do away with the Washington system of spy cells and deal directly with the individual members. In 1943 the men of the Soviet apparat requested that the more important members of the Washington groups cease working through the American party and work directly for the apparat.

Elizabeth Bentley tells the story of this transformation in dramatic detail. She recalls the resistance offered by Jacob Golos, Earl Browder, and herself to the requests of Soviet intelligence, their attempts to retain the Washington groups inside the Com-

munist party of the United States, and the increasing pressure of the Soviet bosses. After Golos' death in 1943, she relates, "Bill," her Soviet intelligence superior, insisted that members of the Washington groups be turned over to him. Miss Bentley tried to hold off, appealed to Browder, and delayed taking any action.

"Bill" was succeeded as Miss Bentley's chief in the espionage outfit by Anatoli Gromov, first secretary of the Soviet embassy, who was even more insistent on surrender of the Washington contacts to the Soviet apparat: "You will turn them over to us," he said; "we will look into their backgrounds thoroughly and decide which ones we will keep." Miss Bentley, too, was to sever her connections with American Communism, devote herself to the GB network in the United States, and set up a new cover for her underground operations.

Further resistance was not possible. Browder gave in. To Miss Bentley he gave the cynical explanation: "Don't be naïve. You know that when the cards are down, I have to take my orders from them. I just hoped I could sidetrack them in this particular matter, but it didn't work out."⁴

Within a few months the best informed and most devoted members of the Washington cells had been transferred to Soviet intelligence.

By the early part of January all of my contacts had been turned over and I found myself completely tired, mentally and physically, from the strain of leaving them. It hadn't been easy; even though there had been no choice, I was still haunted by the thought that I might somehow have been able to save them. In spite of the fact that they were part of a job I had had to do, I had regarded them as my friends—an attitude that the Communist Party frowned upon. I hated to feel that I had let them down.⁵

From the viewpoint of Soviet intelligence the operation was logical, even urgent: espionage performed by party groups was unorthodox, and had this not been a time of war, Moscow would have clamped down sooner. That the Washington spy operations which came to light after the war caused such a great national scandal and aroused such strong anti-Soviet feelings was to a large extent due to the methods that had been employed in conducting them; only a fraction of what was revealed would have become

known had Soviet espionage rules been followed in the United States during the war.

For Miss Bentley, however, the failure to preserve the autonomy of the cells and her defeat in the fight with the Soviet apparat was the straw that broke the camel's back. Soon afterward she told her story to American security officials.

About the time the war in Europe was coming to an end a new *cause célèbre* erupted in the United States. This was the *Amerasia* affair. On June 6, 1945, the Department of Justice announced the arrest of six persons on charges of espionage "through theft of highly confidential documents"; among the arrested were a Naval Reserve lieutenant, two employees of the State Department, and the editor of the magazine *Amerasia*, Philip J. Jaffe. Although the accusation of espionage was not sustained later, the lurid headlines made it appear obvious that the spy ring was tied to a Soviet intelligence agency.

Philip J. Jaffe was a Russian-born American and a successful businessman. He had been active around the Communist movement since the early 'thirties, had made a trip to the Far East, visited Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an and wrote abundantly on Far Eastern affairs, mainly for the Communist and pro-Communist press. In *China Today*, where he signed himself J. W. Philips, Jaffe followed the Moscow-prescribed Stalinist line strictly and devotedly. *Amerasia* was launched in 1936-37, after the announcement of the "united front" course, with its implied Kuomintang-Communist coalition for China. Less aggressive and less outspoken than its predecessor, and with greater appeal to public opinion in the United States, it turned its guns against Japan as the main enemy of the free world in Asia; it commented favorably on a rapprochement of the Chiang Kai-shek regime with the Communist party of China. On the eve of the great war this political line found sympathizers and adherents among American foreign service officials, in particular those inclined to underrate Communist prospects in the Far East. The trend was of course in harmony with Stalin's anti-Japanese policy of that time, when Japan was the chief menace to the Russian East.

A number of American scholars and writers, experts on Asian problems, were invited to serve on the editorial board of *Amerasia* or to write for it. In the State Department *Amerasia* was read at-

tentively; some of the senior officials of the department praised and recommended it. Despite its small circulation (under 2,000) it exerted a measure of political influence.

The co-owner, with Jaffe, of *Amerasia*, and co-editor until 1943, was Frederic Vanderbilt Field, another Communist expert on the Far East, 100 per cent orthodox and always in line with the Soviet course. Among the regular contributors to the magazine were Andrew Roth, a devoted young Communist who had been appointed (over opposition) to Naval Intelligence and had access to secret documents of other departments; Emmanuel Larsen, a Danish-born American with an involved biography, who had at one time served on the police force in China and since March 1935 had been with Naval Intelligence in Washington; Mark Gayn, a Russian-born journalist; and others. All kinds of confidential files were available to these persons, and especially to Roth and Larsen. Larsen supplied Jaffe with documents from the State Department, Naval and Military Intelligence, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Office of War Information, most of them dealing with the Far East. John Stewart Service, Far Eastern expert of the State Department, who had returned from China in April 1945, also supplied Jaffe with information.

Hundreds of secret papers found their way into *Amerasia's* offices. Among them, for example, were a secret message from President Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek; a report revealing the location of twenty-five United States submarines in the Pacific; a report on disposition of Chinese Nationalist troops; secret reports on the private life of the Chiang Kai-sheks; plans for postwar control of Japan; the United States Navy's wartime organization plan of counterintelligence operations in the United States; a report on composition of Allied troops in Malaya; and so forth.

In the February 1945 issue of *Amerasia* there appeared, slightly altered, the text of a report on British policy in Thailand, which had been taken in the main from papers of the Office of Strategic Services. British intelligence complained, and the OSS started an investigation. For ten nights a group of OSS men kept watch outside the *Amerasia* offices and one night (March 11) entered them and found over 300 original and photostatic copies of documents. In four drawers they found 267 documents from the State Department, 19 from Naval Intelligence, 50 from the OSS, 34 from Military Intelligence, and 58 from the Office of War Information.⁹

The OSS turned the case over to the FBI. For three months the

FBI observed Jaffe and his group and followed Jaffe on his many trips to Washington.⁷ But this was May 1945, when ties with Moscow seemed close and Soviet assistance against Japan seemed imperative. The principle in force during the war called for lenience in regard to Communism both Russian and American; besides, great hopes were pinned on the first United Nations conference, which was at that very time being held in San Francisco. Having learned about secret naval documents in the hands of Soviet agents and recognizing that Andrew Roth was in Naval Intelligence, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal nevertheless tried to stop the FBI. On May 28, 1945, he made the following note in his diary:

Major Correa [Mathias F. Correa, at the time a special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy] reported to me that the Department of Justice has evidence to the effect that Lieutenant Andrew Roth has been furnishing confidential and secret documents to a man named Jaffe, head of a publication named *Amerasia* in New York. Jaffe has had intimate relationship with the Russian Consul in New York.

Other Departments of government involved are the Office of Strategic Services, the Department of State, and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Major Correa reported that it was proposed that Lieutenant Roth should be taken into surveillance Wednesday. He said that the FBI thought that unless speedy action were taken important evidence would be dissipated, lost and destroyed. I pointed out that the inevitable consequence of such action now would be to greatly embarrass the President in his current conversations with Stalin, because of the anti-Russian play-up the incident would receive out of proportion to its importance. . . .

I asked Captain Vardaman [Naval Aide to the President] to see to it that the President was informed in this matter and I then called Mr. Edgar Hoover and suggested that he advise Mr. Tom Clark [then an Assistant Attorney General] and have him also see that the President is in full information of all the facts in the matter as well as their implications.⁸

As a consequence of Forrestal's *démarche* the Department of Justice advised the FBI that prosecution in connection with the *Amerasia* matter was to be held in abeyance until the conclusion of the San Francisco conference.⁹ The new President, however, re-

versed this decision. On June 2 Mr. Truman ordered continuation of the investigation and, if necessary, arrests. Four days later Jaffe, Roth, Service, Gayn, and two others were arrested. The FBI found 1,700 documents on the *Amerasia* premises. However, there was no evidence that the documents in possession of *Amerasia* were intended to serve the needs of a foreign power. The only charge sustained against three of the accused was that of removing confidential material from government files. It was indicative of the political climate of the era that the accused could take the offensive. Writing in the *New York Post*, Andrew Roth attacked the "conservative clique in the State Department." Jaffe told reporters "the Red-baiting character of this case is scandalous and often libelous." The trial was held on September 29, 1945. Jaffe pleaded guilty and Larsen pleaded *nolo contendere*. They were fined \$2,500 and \$500, respectively; Jaffe paid the fines for both. John Stewart Service not only was exonerated and reinstated in his position with the State Department but received a sort of apology from the secretary of state. "I congratulate you," Mr. Byrnes wrote him, "on the happy termination of your ordeal . . . Your splendid record . . ." ¹⁰ (In 1952 John Service was dismissed from his post.)

During the decade that has passed since these developments a large number of Soviet espionage cases have come to light in this country, many names of foreign agents have been recorded, and many secret ties have been exposed. Although no traces have led to *Amerasia* or its chiefs, there is no doubt that the amazing collection of secret documents in the hands of the magazine and its ability to procure confidential material from government agencies must have been alluring for the zealous and ubiquitous Soviet intelligence operators.

After the war Philip Jaffe, center of the *Amerasia* affair, moved away from Communist fronts. The break became public when the Communist press as early as 1945 began to attack him for having committed the same sins for which Earl Browder had been expelled from the party, namely, alleged belief in "the dangerous nonsense of a progressive Wall Street." (By a "progressive Wall Street" was meant the concept that "capitalist parties" do not necessarily belong to the "camp of reaction.") * ¹¹

* Now independent in every respect, Jaffe denies ever having served a Soviet intelligence venture. In a statement made in June 1955 to this author Jaffe said:

More than ten years after the *Amerasia* case first made headlines, it is still regarded by many people as an "unsolved" cause célèbre. In part, this is my fault,

Aside from the regular well-organized networks there existed smaller separate and independent groups of Soviet agents, each organized around an important Soviet "resident" and subordinate to neither military attaché, embassy, nor consulate; often they were unknown to the local chiefs of Soviet espionage, since their lines of communication—codes, short-wave radio, and other means—went directly to Moscow. The intention behind this apparently chaotic system was twofold: first, Moscow, which liked to check and recheck all items of information, often doubled and tripled the number of its informers at critical points. Second, important agents might enjoy greater security in their fight against the FBI if they were not known in the embassy and if they had few or no contacts with the official chiefs of espionage.

because I have not written my side of the story, with the result that many distortions of fact, as well as out and out fabrications, have gone unchallenged. My chief reasons for not having written my story were: (1) the enormous publicity given to the charges against me, which made it seem very unlikely that I would be believed if I attempted to correct the errors and distortions in the Amerasia story; (2) the difficulty of proving that I did *not* do something of which I was accused. For example, it has often been charged that I was a "frequent visitor" to the Soviet Consulate and that therefore I was in "constant touch" with Soviet officials. The truth is that I was never at the Soviet Embassy in Washington and that only once did I visit the Soviet Consulate in New York. That one visit occurred in the spring of 1945 when I attended a large banquet in honor of a number of high-ranking American Army and Navy officers to celebrate the continued victories of the Allied forces. I sat next to an American Colonel's wife, with whom I exchanged the usual small talk. I met no Russians, and of course talked to none. But how can I prove that I had not been at the Consulate a dozen other times? Proof of the negation of a fact is always impossible. Similar difficulties arose in connection with a number of other accusations.

Another example will help to illustrate my point. I was accused of operating a photostat machine "day and night." I did have a duplicating machine that cost fifty-eight dollars. I attempted to use it just twice with very poor results. And because it was too inferior a product or I was too incompetent an operator, I ceased using it thereafter and ultimately discarded it. But there it stood in the center of my office for all to see and "discover." Is this the way an intelligence operative would function? Wouldn't such an operative rather possess a high-grade microfilm camera hidden in some obscure cellar? And yet how can I prove my duplicating machine was not working "day and night"?

Nevertheless I have come to feel that I was wrong in not publishing the facts of the Amerasia case as I know them.

At my trial in September 1945, Department of Justice officials told Federal Judge James Proctor that mine was simply a case of an over-zealous editor gathering material to make his magazine more factual and more meaningful. These same officials repeatedly testified to the same effect and under oath before various Con-

One such independent "resident" assigned to the United States was the man who went under the name of "Ignacy Samuel Wiczak," student and later lecturer at the University of Southern California, whose story was told in Chapter 7. "Wiczak's" initial assignments had to do with American-Japanese affairs. After Pearl Harbor his ties with Japan were broken off and his new assignments related to Latin America, United States military forces, and other fields.

Another more or less independent agent during the war was Arthur Adams, a Soviet citizen, old Bolshevik, and prominent agent of Soviet intelligence, who worked in this country from 1938 to 1945; since his activities were connected with atomic espionage, more details on him and his group will be given in the section devoted to that phase of Soviet espionage.

Among individual Soviet agents in wartime America, the case of one, engineer Andrei Shevchenko, was instructive and typical. Shevchenko was perhaps the most inept and grotesque spy in the history of espionage. A well-trained engineer, not without ability and intelligence, an expert in aviation, he was unable to grasp the meaning or the rules of "conspiracy." He was a heavy drinker and after a few drinks became sentimental and talkative; on top

gressional Committees. After my arrest in June 1945, a large number of important newspapers supported me and the five others whose names were linked with mine. It was not a crime in 1945 to receive or divulge confidential information unless that information would harm the armed forces of the United States. The only crime was to possess such information on government paper. Any experienced journalist, apparently, was well aware of this, and consequently they never kept the paper on which such information was communicated to them.

I, on the other hand, am an inveterate collector of books, pamphlets, reports, and all kinds of material pertaining to social and economic trends in various parts of the world, and simply cannot bear to tear anything up. Incidentally, this collecting instinct of mine has enabled me to build up one of the finest private reference libraries in the United States, which is used by many scholars in the course of their work. During the past ten years, not a single fact of even minor importance has been added to the Amerasia story as it was told in 1945. No new charges were ever added officially to the old ones. On the contrary, when I was forced to stand trial on charges of contempt of Congress early in 1951, the Chief Counsel for the Tydings Committee attempted to convince Federal Judge James Morris that I had no grounds to claim my constitutional privilege of remaining silent on matters affecting me, by stating under oath that he had been in charge of more than 100 F.B.I. agents who had trailed me for three and a half months and found absolutely no evidence of my having any contacts with a foreign country. Two and a half years later, a somewhat similar statement was included in a highly publicized report issued by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, entitled "A Report on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments."

of all this, he was timid to the point of cowardice, and his very behavior gave him away. He never discussed intelligence business with his subagents indoors, whether in a home, restaurant, or his own apartment. He would point silently at the walls to indicate "walls have ears"; even after years in this country he remained convinced that the "American secret police" had installed microphones in every wall. If his American "friends" had not reported him, he would still no doubt have fallen into the hands of the FBI.

Shevchenko arrived in June 1942 to serve in the aviation department of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; his special assignment was contact with the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo, New York; for a time he lived in Buffalo. At first this was his only assignment, and gathering of information was a minor function. But new assignments were added, and the aeronautics expert, whether he wished to or not, had to develop into an espionage expert.

In a manner which no doubt seemed to him shrewd, he approached three Americans. The first was Mrs. Leona Franey, librarian of the Bell Aircraft Corporation, who supervised the small stock of books on engineering as well as the secret technical reports arriving from Washington, access to which was permitted to only a small group of "cleared" persons. The Soviet engineer sent theater tickets, candy, and perfume to the women on the library staff, and invited Mrs. Franey and her husband to dinner. Then he began to request classified material from the library. It was remarkable that he did not refer to the catalogue of the items in the library; he did not need to because his superior had acquainted him with the code numbers of the current secret reports and the subjects dealt with in them.

The second American whom Shevchenko tried to win over was Mrs. Franey's husband, Joseph John Franey, who was crippled. Franey worked at the Hooker Electro-Chemical Company, which, because of its connection with the atomic project of the "Manhattan District" was under the eye of the FBI. Shevchenko gave Franey glowing descriptions of the special treatment accorded handicapped workers in Russia and of the care provided by the state for victims of industrial accidents. Why not go to Russia, Shevchenko proposed, and told the Franeys that he was in a position to help them in such a venture.

The FBI instructed the Franeys on how to deal with Shevchenko.

From then on the business between the Soviet agent and the Franey was conducted in a systematic manner. Shevchenko asked for reports dealing with certain technical questions; in accordance with FBI instructions, Mrs. Franey would declassify some particularly interesting and secret reports which the FBI would then photograph; one of the Franey's would turn the "espionage material" over to Shevchenko. Shevchenko paid \$200 to \$250 for each set of reports; the money went to the FBI, which noted the numbers of the bills. Although Shevchenko was transferred to New York in 1944, Joseph Franey continued to furnish him "secret" material.

The third American whom Shevchenko tried to convert into a subagent was engineer Loren G. Haas, who was also employed at Bell Aircraft. Haas was training a group of Russian pilots and technical personnel. Shevchenko served him as interpreter. A real friendship developed between the two engineers, while Haas's position with Bell Aircraft deteriorated. He tried to sell some inventions to the Russians instead of to his American employers. Eventually he had to leave Bell Aircraft and he went to Philadelphia to work for Westinghouse Electric Corporation. When Shevchenko felt that the friendship had developed sufficiently, he began to suggest that Haas obtain secret drawings, reports, and other information for him. The FBI, now contacted by Haas, instructed him too how to proceed. Working with the security agents, Haas prepared microfilms of documents containing misleading or false data. "This might seem rather difficult," Haas testified before a congressional committee,

to put across with a man like Schevchenko, but . . . while he was a very intelligent and learned man, the job he was tackling was a job for not one man, but perhaps an entire company, and he tried to do it all. . . .

On our many meetings [Haas testified]—I suppose I should not bring this out—the Russian was an excessive drinker, and perhaps there had to be some doubts in his mind as to my sincerity, and on these occasions we would drink together, and regardless of how much a man can drink, his senses do become numbed. It was during these, let us say, numbed periods that Mr. Schevchenko did reveal information to me such as that which I have just related about the prize, or, as he called it, the bonus, which he would obtain.

He put it this way: "You should make no bones about helping me." And he used this approach: "I am a Russian, that is true, and you are an American; but we can't let nationalities interfere with progress. Scientists must be international." And that viewpoint does exist with many scientists, I do believe.¹²

Haas continued for about nine months to supply false information to Shevchenko. Having reached the conclusion that an end must be put to Shevchenko's activities, the FBI became more daring. It rented an apartment which afforded a good view of Shevchenko's residence and took films of the happenings that occurred across the street. Soon Shevchenko realized that he was being watched, became more and more nervous, and asked Haas directly whether he had been in touch with the FBI.

These final stages of Shevchenko's activities coincided with the revelation of the Canadian spy affair. A dispute arose between the FBI, which wanted to arrest Shevchenko immediately, and the State Department, which wanted to avoid the arrest. In the midst of the dispute Shevchenko was ordered to return to Russia and he left the United States in January 1946.

7. ATOMIC ESPIONAGE

In the last years before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, Soviet interest in progress in atomic research abroad was intense. This was not because of Russian ignorance in this field. On the contrary, Russian scientists in the 1930's were making considerable progress in almost every branch of physics, including nuclear research; practically all experiments and discoveries made abroad were well known to Russian physicists, and the Soviet Union, although it never reached the top position in physical science, was certainly one among the nations which at the outbreak of the war had attained a very high level of scientific progress.

While the USSR was intent on military prowess, and shared the sound notion that the general progress of science would lead to military strength, more than military considerations lay at the root of the Soviet fostering of scientific development. Progress in science was also a matter of prestige for the Kremlin—a part of the great propaganda drive necessary to refute the widespread notion that under the Soviet system Russia's general backwardness was increasing. Soviet scientists at international scientific congresses

and Soviet publications reaching the West stressed, even exaggerated, the attention given by the Soviet regime to the arts and sciences. Russian backwardness, according to Moscow, was a thing of the past. It was a maxim that Soviet Russia must not trail behind the other nations.

In the 1930's Soviet appropriations for scientific institutions and installations were huge. New laboratories were built, expensive instruments were procured from abroad. Russian atomic physicists gained prominence during that period (1934-39): D. D. Ivanenko and G. N. Tamm for their research on the atom nucleus; D. V. Skobel'syn, L. V. Mystovsky, N. K. Semionov, A. F. Joffe, and others. Outstanding, however, was the Russian-born Peter Kapitsa of England.

Kapitsa had worked since 1921 under the British physicist Lord Rutherford at Cambridge; in 1933 he moved to the new Mond laboratory at Cambridge, which had been built for him, to study the effects of high magnetic influence on the properties of water. Not a political émigré, Kapitsa traveled freely between Russia and England. In April 1935, however, when Kapitsa was in Moscow to attend a scientific conference, the Soviet government refused him an exit permit. To the great indignation of Western scientists, the Soviet embassy in London announced, in explanation: "As a result of the extraordinary development of national economy of the U.S.S.R. the number of scientific workers does not suffice."¹ Kapitsa had to accept a post at the new Institute of Physical Problems in Moscow. The Kapitsa incident was one of the first in a series of kidnappings of scientific workers which soon became one of Stalin's standard methods of fostering Soviet research.

Kapitsa, who worked in Moscow from 1935 on, became one of the most prominent of Soviet scientists. It was not he, however, but his successor at Cambridge, J. D. Cockcroft, who was the first to smash the atom by electrical machinery, and it was the German physicist Otto Hahn who, in 1939, made the decisive discovery about chain reaction which opened the way to production of atomic weapons. The year 1939 was the turning point in atomic research, and from that time on Soviet scientists, prompted and assisted by the government, devoted increasing attention and energy to atomic science. The dean of Soviet physicists, A. F. Joffe, predicted, on New Year's Eve 1941: "We will finally have a cyclotron for smashing the atom nucleus. . . . The problem of uranium will be tackled."²

In examining the history of atomic espionage it is important to bear in mind how slowly science and research digested the idea that work with the nucleus of the atom had passed from the theoretical and laboratory stage to the practical and military stage, and how difficult it was to introduce the restrictions necessary to the new situation. Time and considerable effort were needed to make the non-Soviet scientific world realize the importance of the new regulations. The slogan of "freedom of science," like many other lofty slogans, was abused, and, as we shall see in this chapter, made things easier for Soviet intelligence in its search for atomic secrets.

At the end of the 1930's neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had reached the top position among nations working in the atomic field. In the scientific and military world the view prevailed, at least for a time, that the country which had the most certain chance of becoming the first to produce an atomic weapon was Germany. Like Russia, the mighty German state was prepared to sacrifice enormous financial and human resources for the sake of its prestige and go to great lengths to acquire a deadly weapon unknown to the other nations. But Hitler's bitter fight against opponents of Nazism, and his racial policy, paralyzed efforts to promote scientific progress. The Nazi government destroyed with one hand what it created with the other. German scientists of a liberal and leftist trend were viewed with suspicion; Jewish scientists had to leave the country. (How different was this policy from Stalin's kidnappings of Russian émigré physicists and forcing them to continue their work in Russia!) The blind hate that clouded the otherwise realistic minds of the men in German governmental circles who were busy with systematic preparation for the great war forced out of Germany a large number of outstanding men and women whose services might have meant the difference between victory and defeat. "By God's mercy," Winston Churchill said on August 7, 1945, "British and American science outpaced all German efforts. These were on a considerable scale but far behind. The possession of these powers by the Germans at any time might have altered the result of the war."

In this initial phase of atomic research the embryo of The Bomb was concealed, as it were, in the brains of a small number of individuals. As German, Italian, and other physicists from the Axis-occupied countries migrated to France, England, and the United States, they joined the scientists working in the same field in those

countries. Some of the new comers soon proved themselves the equals of the British and American colleagues.

Enrico Fermi, the Italian-born Nobel prize winner, was one of the first foreign scientists to arrive in the United States. Leo Szilard and Eugene Paul Wigner, Hungarians, and a number of less well-known and unknown scientists from Europe, including Bruno Pontecorvo, pupil of Joliot-Curie, soon followed. To England came Lisa Meitner, O. R. Frish, Rudolf Peierls, and Herbert Skinner, who were later joined by scientists of the younger generation; among the latter was Klaus Fuchs.

Among these emigrating scientists, European ideological trends were still prevalent; "anti-fascism" in its outwardly most militant forms was very much alive, and among the new immigrants were a number of victims of Nazism and fascism. The Communist element among this group of scientists proved to be considerably more numerous than in other fields.

Both Great Britain and the United States readily admitted European scientists to their secret installations and made them a factor in the West's growing military strength. This was necessary if production of the bomb were not to be delayed beyond a few years. It was inevitable that in this group of men, many of whom had been persecuted for their leftism, a few should prove to be connected with Moscow and its apparatus.* No other branch of industry or sphere of science was as accessible to Soviet espionage efforts as the newly erected huge projects in Harwell, Chalk River, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and elsewhere.

The war, which for the Soviet Union and the United States started in 1941, affected the atomic efforts of these two countries differently: it immensely accelerated progress in the United States, and slowed it down in Russia. The gap, which before the war had been perhaps two or three years, grew wider.

In the United States the Office of Scientific Research was set up in December 1941. In 1941 sixteen atomic projects were in

* In his well-known report Henry De Wolf Smyth said: "At that time American-born nuclear physicists were so unaccustomed to the idea of using their science for military purposes that they hardly realized what needed to be done. Consequently the early efforts both at restricting publication and at getting government support were stimulated largely by a small group of foreign-born physicists centering on L. Szilard and including E. Wigner, E. Teller, V. F. Weisskopf, and E. Fermi." *Reviews of Modern Physics*, 17, No. 4 (Oct. 1945), 373.

progress at various universities and laboratories. In June 1942 the Manhattan Engineering District, under the War Department, was created. At Columbia University there were important atomic laboratories and at the University of Chicago the Metallurgical Laboratory soon became prominent. Extensive research was being conducted at the University of California at Berkeley. Finally, in March 1943, an atom bomb plant was set up at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The period of great decision in atomic bomb production in the United States was 1942 and 1943, and the most crucial production and research centers were New York, Chicago, Berkeley, and Los Alamos.

By 1944-45 the atomic industry was in full operation; by that time 200,000 engineers, scientists, and other workers were engaged in the production of the first atomic bomb, and before the end of the war two billion dollars had been expended in this field.

Despite the acceleration and the high degree of cooperation between science, industry, and government, the bomb came too late to influence the course of the war. By July 1945, when the first test bomb was exploded, the German armies had surrendered and Japan was on the verge of capitulation. Contrary to the initial plans and intentions of using the bomb as a weapon during the war, the A-bomb was actually to serve only as a deterrent in the ensuing cold war and to possible future conflict with Russia.

In Russia atomic science suffered great setbacks during the war. The main laboratories in Leningrad had to be partially evacuated; the Moscow laboratory was paralyzed for a long time; some of the Russian scientists fled or were evacuated. Kharkov, the site of an important physical laboratory, was occupied by the German army, and part of the laboratory's equipment had been evacuated beyond the Urals. Although work continued on a small scale, the disruption had been great. Soviet industry, which was looked to to furnish raw materials and produce instruments of radically new design, was paralyzed. With half of Russia occupied, the industrial plants had to serve direct war needs. This state of affairs and the spectacular advance of the United States was acknowledged in the 1950 *Soviet Encyclopedia*, which, not without a gibe at the "imperialists," stated: "The United States has been able to solve this problem [of the atomic bomb] before other countries because the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the war against Fascist Germany."³

The gap in atomic progress as between America and Russia grew daily. How serious the situation had become for Soviet atomic research is seen from the fact that Moscow made more than one attempt to acquire uranium ores in the United States. Under normal conditions such attempts would have appeared absurd, but they actually developed to the point of espionage.

Russia possesses deposits of uranium ores sufficient to satisfy her needs, at least in the experimental stage. Uranium has been mined at more than one place in Central Asia: the great desert area of South Kirgizia and Tajikistan, near the Afghan frontier; the Altai range, which is rich in minerals, including uranium; and smaller deposits in Osetia and Svanetia in the Caucasus. All these places, however, are situated at the fringes of the Soviet Union and are thinly populated, and mining and transport were difficult operations during the war; in addition, during the first stage of the war the road to the Caucasus was blocked by the Germans. In Central Asia manpower had been drained by the Army, and the railways, which had lost thousands of cars and locomotives, were seriously overloaded.* Not until the end of the war did the government reassume full power over the nation's resources. Today the Soviet atomic industry uses mainly raw materials obtained in its own and satellite countries.

In 1942-43, however, Moscow was receiving information from its spies about the rapid pace of atomic research in the United States and England and the prospect of early production of an atomic bomb. Russia needed uranium for the research being carried on, and it was decided that in addition to blueprints, formulas, and other secret information being obtained in the United States, an attempt would be made to get the raw material, too, from that source. Chances had to be taken if atomic work in Russia was not to come to a standstill.

Uranium, a bulky ore, could not be shipped to Russia secretly. In January 1943 Moscow instructed its agencies in the United States to find a way to procure and legally export raw material for the A-bomb. The best method would be to conduct the operation under the guise of a normal wartime trade transaction—a part of

* Although no documented evidence is available, it appears that the sudden annexation of Tanu-Tuva (situated on the slopes of the Altai mountains) in 1943-44 was due to the intense search for uranium and other ores.

the war effort. The Soviet Purchasing Commission was assigned to start the difficult diversionist strategy.

In their approach to various United States agencies the Soviet trade representatives played innocent. The ore was required, they said, principally for "Russian military purposes," but also for "military medical purposes." The Soviet side expected that the lend-lease administration in Washington, which had been instructed to be helpful to the Russians, would overlook one item of not outstanding value among the hundreds of items it was supplying to Russia. In the lists of numerous chemical items uranium would sometimes be placed near the end, in the hope that the entire list might be approved without a careful check of individual items.⁴

In February 1943, General Belayev sent to the War Department a "requisition" for sixteen tons of uranium (eight tons of uranium nitrate and eight tons of uranium oxide). On March 9 the request was denied; not even "small quantities" could be allotted since production was inadequate for even the needs of the United States. On April 3 General Belayev again requested "prompt delivery" of sixteen tons of uranium; three days later the request was turned down. A year later General Rudenko, chairman of the Purchasing Commission, wrote to Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war, asking for sixteen tons of uranium ore and twenty-five pounds of uranium metal. Stimson's reply of April 17, 1944, was in a tone of polite finality:

Dear General Rudenko:

I regret that we find ourselves unable to comply with the request contained in your letter of March 31 for certain uranium compounds.

We have made a careful review of the situation and this review indicates that our supply of this material is not sufficient for us to comply with your request.

I assure you that I will remember your need and will inform you of any change in the situation.⁵

The Soviet agencies, however, had more than one iron in the fire. In their appeal to other sources than the War Department they were more successful, although the quantities requested were considerably reduced. In contacts with private firms the Purchas-

ing Commission sounded out the uranium market in the United States and Canada and found certain quantities of uranium ore available.

As a matter of fact, the United States government did not place a general prohibition on export of uranium; it believed, erroneously, that such a drastic move would arouse undue curiosity on the part of the Soviet Union, and hoped, naively, to keep the Soviet partner happy though ignorant by giving him export licenses for small quantities. Actually, the Soviet partner was aware not only of the significance of uranium but of the various experiments then being carried on in American universities and laboratories. Even the anti-Soviet Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Grove, head of the "Manhattan District" agreed to grant an export license to the Soviet Union "rather than be pointing a finger at the material if the license was refused." *

In this game of mutual cheating, the Soviet side proved, of course, superior. Its first request for 420 pounds of uranium ore in February 1943 was granted, and the goods were promptly shipped to Russia. To prevent a repetition and at the same time avoid publicity, it was decided in Washington to request all industrial and trading firms dealing in uranium not to sell any before offering it to the government. When a second request came from the Soviet Purchasing Commission, the export license was again granted, but measures were taken to cut suppliers off from the Soviet Purchasing Commission by stressing the priority of the American demand. This shrewd maneuver, however, proved futile. The Purchasing Commission bought thousands of pounds in Canada, which it shipped to Great Falls, Montana, and, since there was no export prohibition, to Russia via Alaska. Later in 1943 shipments of heavy water, likewise needed for atomic research, went to the Soviet Union.

Much later, in 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that, in all, four licenses covering 700 pounds of uranium oxide, 720 pounds of uranium nitrate, 25 pounds of uranium metal, and 1,000 grams of heavy water had been granted in 1943 for export to Russia.

Along with this dangerous maneuvering and deception in connection with material for A-bombs, Moscow developed a high-grade espionage activity in the United States in scientific and industrial aspects of the prospective bomb.

Soviet atomic espionage was organized on the same pattern as espionage in general, and the rules of conduct applying to it were also the same. At the head were Soviet officials, sometimes with diplomatic privileges, and Soviet "residents"; under them worked couriers, contact men recruited from among the most reliable veterans of the underground; on the bottom level were American and British scientists who supplied information through the couriers. In some cases there was direct contact between the first and third groups—to the detriment of the spy apparatus, as we shall see later.

During the war years atomic espionage had not yet been synchronized and was not carried out uniformly all over the United States. In the four atomic capitals in the United States—New York, Chicago, Berkeley, and Los Alamos—and in London and Ottawa abroad, the various atomic espionage chiefs used different methods.

During the war about ten physicists at various scientific institutions in the United States, Britain, and Canada were regularly or sporadically sending information to Moscow. One of the most important of these scientist-spies was Klaus Fuchs, German refugee in London who in 1940 had been sent by the British, as a German national, to a camp in Canada. He was later permitted to return to Great Britain, where he worked first in Glasgow and then joined a group of atomic scientists in Birmingham headed by another German refugee and old acquaintance, Rudolf Peierls. Through German Communists Fuchs immediately sought and found contact with the Soviet apparat and met "Alexander" (Semion Kremer), secretary to the Soviet military attaché in London and one of the chiefs of Soviet espionage in Great Britain. "When I learned about the purpose of the work," Fuchs later stated in his confession, "I decided to inform Russia, and I established contact through another member of the Communist party. Since that time I have had continuous contact with persons who were completely unknown to me, except that I knew they would hand over whatever information I gave them to the Russian authorities." ⁷

The first meeting between Fuchs and Kremer occurred as early as May or June 1942; contacts continued for the next eighteen months, until Fuchs' departure for the United States. At these meetings, which were held every two or three months, Fuchs turned over to Kremer or his aide copies of his monthly reports.

In December 1943 Fuchs, along with other British physicists, was sent to the United States, where he worked first in New York at Columbia University, and then, from August 1944 to June 1946, in Los Alamos. Shortly after Fuchs's arrival in this country Moscow dispatched Anatoli Yakovlev, an important intelligence agent, to New York to work under the guise of a vice-consul; from March 1944 until his departure in December 1946 Yakovlev was the main organizer of atomic espionage in the eastern United States.

Unlike his Soviet colleagues in other parts of the country, Yakovlev followed the laws of conspiratsia strictly. He never met Fuchs personally. He assigned a reliable American espionage agent, Harry Gold of Philadelphia, to work exclusively in the atomic field. Gold had been active since the spring of 1935 in industrial espionage under Semion Semionov, Soviet spy chief (ostensibly an employee of Amtorg), who returned to Russia in 1944 and was succeeded by Yakovlev. Gold, whose most important assignments were the meetings with Fuchs, later described Yakovlev's careful methods of conspiracy in his testimony at the Rosenberg trial:

I worked in the following manner with Yakovlev: My duties were to obtain information from a number of sources in America and to transfer this information to Yakovlev. The meetings with the sources of information in America were effected in two ways: First, it could be personal introduction; secondly, there was an introduction which was effected only between the American contact and myself and was effected by means of a set of recognition signals. Now, these signals included at least two features: One of them was that there was always an object or a piece of paper involved, on one part or the other, or possibly on both parts; that is the other person in America and myself. In addition there was a code phrase used and this phrase was usually used in the form of a greeting. In all cases when I introduced myself I used a false name, and in all cases I never indicated my true place of residence.

Now, once the introduction had been effected, I proceeded to work; I conducted myself in the following manner: I give the source of information in America—whoever that person was who was going to furnish me the information—I give him a list of the data or material which was desired; secondly, in case there had been a Soviet agent who had preceded me, I

would take steps so that the source of information, that the person with whom I was working would first clean up all of the back work. Then thirdly, we would arrange for a series of meetings. These were very precise arrangements.

All of these people from whom I obtained information were not residents of Philadelphia. I had to go some distance usually to meet them. I would arrange for a meeting in the town where they lived or in some other town, and the meeting would be for an exact time at an exact place and there would be an exact schedule for what was to be done during the meeting. . . . In addition to this, I made payments of sums of money to some of the people whom I regularly contacted, and always I wrote reports detailing everything that happened at every meeting with these people, and these reports I turned over to Yakovlev. . . .

In addition to the details of my operations, of my conduct with the source of information in America, I had a very set pattern which I used in connection with my dealings with Yakovlev. This is how it worked: We had an arrangement not only for regular meetings, but we had an arrangement for alternate meetings, should one of the regular ones not take place, and then, in addition to that, we had an arrangement for an emergency meeting. This emergency meeting was a one-way affair. A system was set up whereby Yakovlev could get in touch with me if he wanted me quickly, but I couldn't get in touch with him because I didn't know where. Yakovlev told me that in this way the chain was cut in two places. The person from whom I got the information in America did not know me by my true name, nor did he know where I lived, nor could he get in touch with me, and I couldn't get in touch with Yakovlev. Yakovlev said this was a good thing.

In addition, Yakovlev and I had a very exact method when we were going to transfer information. It might be that something would have to be copied and then returned. In that case, we had to have a set procedure. On certain occasions we had a definite means by which we transferred information. Such means would include a set-up whereby I would take the information and put it between the folds of a newspaper and Yakovlev and I would exchange the newspapers. The one

that I got was just a newspaper. The one that he got had the information between the folds, the information usually being in some sort of an enclosure. In addition to this, of course, we had regular conferences all along at which we discussed my conduct with the people in America who were furnishing me with information, and the final point was that we had a system set up whereby we could act or react very promptly in case there was any sign of surveillance, and this system provided for not only surveillance should I notice any before I came to see Yakovlev but surveillance if we should suspect any while we were actually having a meeting, and also if there should be any suspicious actions around either of us after we had parted.⁸

In mid-1946 Fuchs returned to England but continued passing information on to Soviet agents. In November of 1947 he came to the United States to attend a scientific conference. His doubts about Soviet policy and his service to Moscow dated from that time; he began to fail to keep appointments with Soviet agents. When British authorities received "tips" from the United States, in the fall of 1949, they started to watch him.

Fuchs eventually confessed. He was tried on March 1, 1950, and was sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment—the most severe penalty possible under the existing law.

Despite Yakovlev's extreme caution and Gold's strict adherence to the rules of conspiracy, the affair would have been revealed much earlier and the damage caused by the spy group would have been considerably less had British and American security agencies not committed a number of grave blunders. The fact that Fuchs had been an ardent Communist and had belonged to the Communist underground in Germany had been reported to the British police, but because the source of this information was a Nazi consul the British had disregarded it. In 1945, when Kiel was occupied by the British and documents and witnesses became available to them, Fuchs expected trouble, but nothing happened. A few months later, when the Canadian espionage case broke, a notebook in which Fuchs's name and address were listed was taken from Israel Halperin, a member of the spy group, but there was no follow-up of this discovery.

Harry Gold, the courier, would also have been discovered, at least

in 1947, when FBI agents interrogated him at his home in Philadelphia; but they left when he assured them that they were mistaken in their suspicions. "If the agents had gone down into the cellar, they would have found a closet jammed from floor to ceiling with incriminating data." *

It was bitter irony that Yakovlev and Gold, loyal and disciplined intelligence agents, should have brought about a debacle for Soviet espionage by a single transgression of conspiracy rules. In the summer of 1945, shortly before the first atom bomb test explosion, a highly important report had been prepared by David Greenglass, the scientist-spy; and a courier, Ann Sidorovich, was to go to Los Alamos to receive it. For some reason Miss Sidorovich could not make the trip, and Yakovlev, eager to supply the significant information to Moscow, ordered Harry Gold, the courier for Fuchs, to take over this assignment—contrary to the rule of limiting contacts to a minimum. Gold went to Los Alamos, where for the first time he met Greenglass, and received his report. Years later, when Fuchs and Gold were arrested and started to confess, Gold was in a position to name Greenglass only because Yakovlev had brought him in touch with the scientist; it was Greenglass who in turn pointed to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Had it not been for this breach of observance of a standing Soviet espionage rule, the Rosenberg-Greenglass network might never have been discovered and the spies might have continued their activity to this day.

Inexcusable blunders also marked the case of another prominent atomic spy, Bruno Pontecorvo. Pontecorvo, an Italian, was one of the last in the long list of atomic scientists to come to the United States from Europe. He had been a pupil of Enrico Fermi in Italy; in 1927 he went to France to work as a physicist under Longevin, a Communist professor now deceased, and Joliot-Curie, and joined there the numerous group of Italian refugees of the extreme left. In 1940, when the German invasion was imminent, Pontecorvo decided to emigrate to the United States. To assist him in this, his Italian Communist friends procured for him an affidavit by Vito Marcantonio, the pro-Communist United States congressman, and the young physicist sailed with his family for America. Early in 1943 Pontecorvo went to Canada to work on atomic projects, in connection with which he made frequent visits to atomic installations in the United States. In 1949 he was assigned to work in Great Britain.

In 1949 a Communist friend of Pontecorvo who had broken with the party reported Pontecorvo to United States authorities, giving a complete picture of his activities and connections. No action was taken. The information, however, was turned over to British authorities (Pontecorvo was working at Harwell at the time), but again nothing happened. In October 1951 Pontecorvo went to Finland, allegedly for a vacation; there he and his family "disappeared." It was later learned that they had gone to Russia. On March 1, 1955, Pontecorvo published an article in *Pravda*, and a few days later he answered questions at a press conference. He had asked the Soviet government for asylum, he said, and it was granted; now he is a Soviet citizen. He works on atomic projects of a non-military nature and "does not know anything about application of atomic energy for military purposes in the Soviet Union." He praised the regime for its "peace policy," while he charged other governments, the American administration in particular, with blackmail against the Soviet Union. And, of course, "Soviet physicists are the first [the most advanced] in the world."

It is likely that the Soviet decision to transfer Pontecorvo to Russia was taken because the Soviet atomic community was in need of a well-trained scientist. Moscow has had the constant problem of deciding at any given time whether an informer from abroad is more important to its atomic progress than a Western scientist in a Soviet laboratory; a balance between the two groups must be maintained. Pontecorvo, a case in point, was no doubt called to Russia at a time when internal atomic needs prevailed, and the external intelligence service could spare one of its members.

On the same level as Harry Gold, that is, as an American confidant of the Soviet spy chiefs and a channel to atomic researchers, was another devoted Communist, Julius Rosenberg of New York. Rosenberg had been a member of a cell of Communist engineers, all serving or ready to serve the underground from strategic posts; the group was controlled by Jacob Golos. Rosenberg's first activities had been in industrial espionage, but he had been elevated to political and atomic intelligence. With his wife, Ethel, he helped to recruit his brother-in-law, David Greenglass, who was working at Los Alamos on highly confidential matters; Greenglass' reports, mentioned earlier, proved of great importance to Soviet atomic intelligence.

Rosenberg and his wife were arrested in the summer of 1950, after the confession of Fuchs and Gold had helped to disentangle the atomic espionage knot. Subsequently other Soviet agents—Abraham Brothman, Miriam Moskowitz, and Morton Sobell—uncovered about the same time were arrested and tried. The Rosenberg couple were sentenced to death; Gold and Sobell were sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment, David Greenglass to fifteen, Abraham Brothman to seven, and Miriam Moskowitz to two.

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed in June 1953 in Sing Sing prison—the only cases of Soviet spies to suffer the death penalty for espionage against the United States.

Along with Harry Gold, two other persons were indicted—"John Doe," alias "John," actually Anatoli Yakovlev, and "Richard Roe," alias "Sam," actually Semion Semionov. The indictment of the two Soviet chiefs was purely a formality, since they had long since left American soil.

On the West coast the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California at Berkeley was a focus of Soviet atomic espionage, which was conducted along the same lines as elsewhere in the country during the first years of the war: Communist party groups, the American underground, and Soviet intelligence were all involved. Chief organizer was Vasili Zubilin of the Soviet embassy, who from time to time came to the West coast to receive reports and confer with his Soviet aides and American assistants. Two officials of the Soviet consulate in California, Peter Ivanov and Grigori Kheifets, directed the work locally. They were in direct touch with the American Communists and Communist sympathizers, including atomic physicists, whom they met socially.

Vice-Consul Kheifets ("Mr. Brown") developed wide connections. An old Bolshevik, former secretary to Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, he was highly respected by American Communists and leftist professors, among whom were physicists of the Radiation Laboratory.

Soon after the establishment of the Radiation Laboratory, Paul Crouch, secretary of the Alameda County, California, branch of the Communist party, was removed; he was replaced by the more efficient and reliable Steve Nelson. Nelson (Steve Mesarosh), an immigrant from Yugoslavia and member of the Communist party since 1925, had studied at the Lenin Institute in Moscow, worked

for the Comintern in China in 1933, and been a member of the International Brigade in Spain. Since 1940 Nelson, by then a member of the party's National Committee, had served as Communist organizer in San Francisco; in January 1942 he took over atomic espionage in Berkeley.

Like Browder and Golos, however, Nelson held to the old concept of espionage by party cells and was opposed to the Soviet plans for reorganization of the spy apparatus. He believed that great successes in atomic espionage could be achieved by the collective efforts of the cell's members, and that "*collectively* the Communist scientists working on the project could assemble all the information regarding the manufacture of the atomic bomb."¹⁰

Nelson instructed Joseph Weinberg, research physicist and member of the Berkeley cell, to furnish him information "from trustworthy Communists working on the project"; the information, he told Weinberg, was intended for the "proper officials of the Soviet government." Precautions had to be taken, of course, Nelson meant, but they were trivial—"to destroy Communist party membership cards" and "refrain from using liquor."

Nelson tried to enlist Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, a leading atomic scientist at Berkeley and the future scientific director of the atomic plant at Los Alamos. The intention was to persuade Dr. Oppenheimer to furnish information regularly to his Communist colleagues.

In December 1942, on instructions from Nelson, the Communist professor Haakon Chevalier approached Oppenheimer; he used the standard argument of Russia's moral right to share American atomic secrets. "Since Russia and the United States are allies, Soviet Russia should be entitled to any technical data which might be of assistance to that nation." Oppenheimer not only refused but called the effort outright treason; later he informed General Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineering District, of the incident. It was not long before United States security agencies were informed on the activities of Steve Nelson and his Communist cell in Berkeley.

Undisturbed by his failure to enlist Dr. Oppenheimer, not suspecting surveillance, and unaware that one of his important reports to New York had fallen into the hands of the FBI, Nelson continued his efforts. Between January and March 1943 he established closer relations with Weinberg, from whom he obtained

highly confidential information on the atomic project, which he turned over to Ivanov in San Francisco. His meetings with Weinberg as well as his visits to the consulate were, of course, being observed. A government agent sat nearby when Grigori Kheifets, on the eve of his departure for Russia, met Martin Kamen, staff chemist at the Radiation Laboratory, in a restaurant in San Francisco; a recording of the conversation showed that Kamen gave the Soviet official information about the uranium stockpile at Chicago and atomic research in other parts of the United States.

In April 1943 Zubilin came to San Francisco from Washington to receive a report from Nelson on his work. At the meeting with Zubilin Nelson proposed a compromise: that "the Soviets choose in each important city or state where espionage activities might be necessary, a trustworthy contact and allow that person to handle direct contact with the Communist members to be given special assignments."¹¹ This was a concession to the Russian pressure against espionage by cells. Nelson's scheme, however, never materialized.*

In Chicago, the third major site of wartime atomic research, the situation was somewhat different from that in New York and California. There was neither a Soviet embassy nor a Soviet consulate in Chicago, and the spy apparatus had to be built around a "resident." The resident in this case was Arthur Adams, a Bolshevik since pre-revolutionary times, and an old hand at Soviet intelligence.¹²

Adams had come to the United States more than once, each time on a secret mission and always under cover of a legitimate commercial assignment. In 1927, for example, he ostensibly represented AMO, the first automobile plant to be built in Russia; in 1932 he came to "purchase airplanes" from Curtiss-Wright; in 1938 he set up the "Technological Laboratory" as a business; in 1942 he was "commercial agent" of a Canadian businessman (his friend Samuel Wegman).

Now, in 1942-44, in his fifties, he was a little too old for espionage work. He suffered from rheumatism and had to spend days in bed in his hotel room. Occasionally he was stricken by an attack on the street. His physical ailment made him conspicuous and unsuited to the highly secretive work he was doing; in addition, some of his informers were well known as active members of the Com-

* In July 1952 he was sentenced in Pittsburgh to a twenty-year prison term.

munist party of the United States. Obviously because of lack of personnel, Adams was assigned, however, to atomic espionage. He worked in this field for about four years, during which time he obtained and transmitted to Russia secret data on the atomic plant at Oak Ridge and atomic research in other countries.

Adams' American informant and close friend was Clarence Hiskey, member of the National Committee of the Communist party and chemist by profession. In 1942 Hiskey was placed in charge of a group of scientists working on atomic problems at Columbia University in New York; in 1943 he was moved to the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, which was working on preparations for large-scale production of plutonium for use in bombs. The information he obtained was passed on quickly, through Adams, to one of the Soviet consulates.

On the basis of reports on his political activities contained in Hiskey's personal file, the Army rejected him for active service. It was indicative of conditions prevalent at the time that he thereupon obtained a much more sensitive position, namely, one connected with the future A-bomb. In April 1944, when security officers of the atomic project learned of Hiskey's espionage activities, he was called to active duty and assigned to a military unit stationed in Alaska. On his journey to Mineral Wells, near the Arctic Circle, he was under the surveillance of a security agent; his luggage was searched and a notebook was found containing secret atomic information as well as a notation of an appointment in Alaska with an agent of Soviet intelligence. Hiskey discovered the loss of his notebook, and the meeting never took place. He was never arrested.

Before leaving for Alaska Hiskey had provided Adams with some worthy substitutes. One of them was John Hitchcock Chapin, a chemist employed at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. Despite the fact that the security agencies were aware of Chapin's contacts with Adams, he remained in his highly sensitive position until May 1945; later he found employment at the M. W. Kellogg Company, a firm which was working on a secret project for the Air Corps.

As the result of investigation of Hiskey and Chapin, Adams was placed under surveillance by the FBI. In 1944 his effects were searched, and highly compromising material relating to the A-bomb was found. In 1945 "a sealed indictment of Arthur Adams" was issued,¹³ but because of the standing rule of the State Depart-

ment against prosecuting Soviet intelligence agents, Adams was not arrested. He flew to Portland, Oregon, where he was to board a Soviet ship, but the FBI stopped him and he returned to New York. Unmolested, he left the United States in the summer of 1945.

Adams' services to Soviet intelligence were considerable. He was one of the most devoted, selfless servants. It is hardly likely, however, that he will ever again be assigned to the United States.

By the time the preliminary work of atomic research in this country had ended and the first A-bomb had been detonated, Soviet atomic espionage had performed its first and most essential task: from the United States, England, and Canada, Soviet physicists had obtained formulas, designs, and descriptions of instruments and processes; samples of U-233 and U-235 had been obtained in Montreal. Thus Russian scientists, although unable to conduct full-scale work in the atomic field, were well informed on developments abroad. For the time being experiments made abroad could not be tested in Russian laboratories, but there were Russian scientists able at least to understand every new formula and invention. This knowledge was imperative if, after the war, Russia was to challenge American leadership in the atomic field.

As soon as the war was over the Soviet government began to rehabilitate its scientific institutions. It was not until 1947-48, however, that Soviet industry was in a position to cope with even the most essential requirements of the country's military-scientific projects. By that time, following Germany's defeat in the war, approximately two hundred German scientists and technicians had been shipped to Russian laboratories and plants; among them were the Nobel prize winner Dr. Gustav Hertz, Baron Manfred von Ardenne, and other outstanding scientists. Thus, contrary to the Soviet claim, production of the A-bomb in Russia was accomplished with an essential contribution of espionage in the West and kidnapping of scientists from Central Europe.

The Soviet government has never acknowledged the legal and illegal, willing and forced, contribution of other countries to its atomic achievements. It has tried to represent the Soviet A-bomb as a product of purely Russian efforts, and has emphatically and quite unconvincingly denied having engaged in any kind of atomic espionage. When the Gouzenko documents were revealed, for example, Moscow announced, as we have seen, that it had no need of

these "technical data" in view of the "more advanced technical attainment in the U.S.S.R." After the trial of Klaus Fuchs, TASS denied the statement of the prosecution that Fuchs had supplied atomic data to agents of the Soviet government. This accusation, TASS stated, was "an outright invention because Fuchs is unknown to the Soviet government, and no agents of the Soviet government were in any way connected with Fuchs."¹⁴

Moscow claimed to have possessed the A-bomb long before President Truman announced, in September 1949, that Soviet Russia had exploded an atomic bomb. In November 1947 Foreign Minister Molotov told the Moscow Soviet that "the atom bomb has for a long time been no secret," meaning that the Soviet government was in possession of the bomb. In its comment on President Truman's statement of September 1949, TASS said:

Tass considers it necessary to recall that as long ago as November 6, 1947, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. V. M. Molotov made a statement concerning the secret of the atom bomb, when he declared that the secret had long ago ceased to be a secret.

This statement signified that the Soviet Union had already discovered the secret of the atomic weapon and that it had this weapon at its disposal.

Scientific circles of the United States of America considered the statement by V. M. Molotov to be a bluff, believing that the Russians could not possess an atomic weapon earlier than the year 1952.

They were mistaken, however, since the Soviet Union possessed the secret of the atomic weapon in 1947.

Actually, in 1947-48, when Russian production of an atomic bomb appeared imminent, a thorough reorganization of Soviet atomic projects took place. Professor Peter Kapitsa, head of Soviet atomic research, who had spent fourteen years in England, was removed from his leading post, although he was permitted to continue his scientific work. Members of the Communist party, "more reliable than Kapitsa, though of lesser scientific stature, were elevated to leading administrative posts."¹⁵ A special commission including Nikolai Bulganin, Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, and several others was appointed by the government to control A- and H-bomb research.¹⁶

Summarizing the attainments of Soviet atomic espionage, it must be stated that in this field of intelligence the contribution of international Communism has been great. If Russia had had to grope through the initial atomic darkness and repeat for herself the experiments of other nations, she would have needed a decade or more to achieve the level the United States attained in 1947-48. In addition to the scientific output of her own laboratories, Russian research had the help of another kind of laboratory, that situated at 19 Znamenski Street in Moscow—the GRU. An unprecedented enforced collaboration of science and espionage that continued throughout the war marked Soviet progress in the atomic field. The Soviet A-bomb has been the product of the combined efforts of Russian scientists and British, Canadian, German, Hungarian, Italian, and American Communists. To the detriment of their own countries, the communist parties of the West have in this way more than repaid the Soviet Union for the political and financial assistance they had received from her for over two decades.

8. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND SOVIET ESPIONAGE

More than once in these pages we have had to take note of the fact that for two decades preceding 1946-47 the United States government was inclined to minimize the significance of Soviet espionage and show leniency toward its perpetrators. There was more than one reason for this attitude.

First was the fact that the Soviet Union was viewed as a secondary power. Soviet Russia had emerged from her wars of 1917-20 with a poorly equipped army, no navy, and no air force; she had had to acquiesce in giving up large territories in the East and West; her population had suffered a loss of some twenty-five million; later the rapid collectivization of farms and purging of her officer corps had weakened her newly organized armed force. What danger could a power of the stature of Russia represent, people asked themselves, even if a few spies supplied the Kremlin with a few secret documents from abroad?

Second, with Soviet Russia a potential ally against Japan and Germany, since the early 1930's it had seemed unwise to offend Moscow by unnecessary publicity concerning Soviet spy affairs. In American political science scant attention was devoted to the Soviet

police, the Soviet underground abroad, and Soviet espionage. This attitude strengthened with every passing year as the aggressiveness of Japan and Germany mounted.

Cases of Soviet espionage revealed from time to time were seen as scattered and isolated efforts. No general pattern was distinguished in the background; the guiding hand remained obscure. Thus, as we have seen, a long succession of known Soviet intelligence agents were never punished for their spying activities.

Against this background of American public opinion and governmental attitude we can understand the reluctance of the security agencies to prosecute Mark Zilbert, whose spy activity was known to them; the failure to reveal the Soviet spy ring in Panama in the wake of the Switz-Osman affair; the reluctance to investigate thoroughly the spy nests in the Amtorg Corporation; the permission given to the exposed Soviet spy Mikhail Gorin to leave the United States without serving the term to which he was sentenced; Adolf Berle's disbelief of Whittaker Chambers' story; the inability of the security agencies over a period of three years to put an end to the activity of the clandestine groups in government circles in Washington; the negligence in the case of Klaus Fuchs; the overlooking of industrial espionage; and the State Department's generally negative attitude toward prosecution of Soviet secret agents during the war. Even United States citizens caught in the web of Soviet espionage usually emerged dry from deep water. It was a long way from this leniency to the death sentences carried out against two Soviet spies in 1953.

After the end of the war things began to change, although slowly. On November 2, 1945, soon after Elizabeth Bentley revealed to the FBI information much of which had been known to it for several years, Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a "top secret" report to the White House in which twelve United States government officials were named as agents of the Soviet apparatus:

As a result of the Bureau's investigative operations, information has been recently developed from a highly confidential source indicating that a number of persons employed by the Government of the United States have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Soviet Government.

At the present time it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the information they were transmitting. The investigation, however, at this point has indicated that the persons named hereinafter were actually the source from which information passing through the Soviet espionage system was being obtained, and I am continuing vigorous investigation for the purpose of establishing the degree and nature of the complicity of these people in this espionage ring.

The Bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested:

Dr. Gregory Silvermaster, a long-time employee of the Department of Agriculture.

Harry Dexter White, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

George Silverman, formerly employed by the Railroad Retirement Board, and now reportedly in the War Department.

Lauchlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to the late President Roosevelt.

Victor Perlo, formerly with the War Production Board and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Donald Wheeler, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services.

Maj. Duncan Lee, Office of Strategic Services.

Julius Joseph, Office of Strategic Services.

Helen Tenney, Office of Strategic Services.

Maurice Halperin, Office of Strategic Services.

Charles Kramer, formerly associated with Senator Kilgore.

Capt. William Ludwig Ullmann, United States Army Air Corps.

Lieut. Col. John H. Reynolds, of the United States Army.¹

Only the general political climate of those war years can serve as explanation of a fact that would appear incomprehensible today—that none of the named persons was arrested and that one, Harry Dexter White, was later promoted to a highly influential post (in the International Monetary Fund). On February 1, 1946, Mr. Hoover sent a second "personal and confidential report" to Gen. Harry H. Vaughan in the White House (whom the FBI addressed

when it had information it felt the President should know about). In this report the activities of Harry Dexter White were described; the report gave a number of new important clues to Soviet espionage in this country:

As you are aware, the name of Harry Dexter White has been sent to Congress by the President for confirmation of his appointment as one of the two United States delegates on the International Monetary Fund under the Bretton Woods Agreement.

In view of this fact, the interest expressed by the President and you in matters of this nature, and the seriousness of the charges against White in the attachment, I have made every effort in preparing this memorandum to cover all possible ramifications.

As will be observed, information has come to the attention of this bureau charging White as being a valuable adjunct to an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, D.C.

Material which came into his possession as a result of his official capacity allegedly was made available through intermediaries to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, his wife, Helen Witte Silvermaster, and William Ludwig Ullmann. Both Silvermaster and Ullmann are employees of the United States Treasury Department, reportedly directly under the supervision of White.

The information and documents originating in the Treasury Department were either passed on in substance or photographed by Ullmann in a well-equipped laboratory in the basement of the Silvermaster home. Following this step, the material was taken to New York City by courier and made available to Jacob M. Golos, until the time of his death on Nov. 27, 1943. . . .

This whole network has been under intensive investigation since November, 1945, and it is the results of these efforts that I am now able to make available to you.

I also feel that it is incumbent upon me at this time to bring to your attention an additional factor which has originated with sources available to this bureau in Canada. It is reported that the British and Canadian delegates to the International Monetary Fund may possibly nominate and support White for

the post of President of the International Monetary Fund. . . .

. . . facts might come to light in the future throwing some sinister accusations at White and thereby jeopardize the successful operation of these important international financial institutions.²

The warnings of the FBI went unheeded, and Harry Dexter White not only assumed his new post but brought with him to the Monetary Fund a number of other members of the Washington spy apparatus, including Frank Coe and Harold Glasser, who were named as Soviet agents in the FBI report.

In a democracy the course and spirit of public opinion are slow to change. It took about three years for the issue of Soviet espionage to be recognized in its entire significance and for the government to begin to change its course of action. The turning point in this general reorientation was the Hiss-Chambers case, which developed in the second half of 1948; the dramatic hearings in congressional committees, the "pumpkin papers," the personalities of the two men (one then president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the other an editor of *Time*); their contradictory statements; and the final outcome made the Hiss-Chambers case an historical *cause célèbre*. Early in August the Justice Department was making plans to indict Chambers for perjury on the basis of his statements about Hiss. In December Hiss was indicted by a New York grand jury. In the months between, a large part of the American reading public turned from indifference to indignation regarding Soviet espionage in the United States. Since the Hiss-Chambers case has been abundantly written about, a detailed report here appears unnecessary.

The indignation grew with each month. Congressional committees, loyalty boards, and the FBI began to track down present and past members of Soviet apparatus, most of them American citizens. As the anti-spy operation deepened and widened, administration leaders were becoming realistic. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, said, in September 1953: "I believe the Communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated practically every security agency of the Government." ³

A few months later William H. Foley, chief of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, reported that 766 espionage cases and 261 sabotage cases were being investigated at that time.⁴ And J. Edgar Hoover stated: "Enemy espionage rings are

more intensively operating now than at any other time in the history of the country.”⁵

It would be next to impossible to give an account here of even the most important postwar espionage affairs. Two channels of espionage which did not exist before the war, however, were highly significant and productive: the United Nations and the satellite countries. In August 1951, 87 cases involving alien diplomats or quasi-diplomats on whom “adverse information” had been obtained were being investigated. Forty-eight of the persons involved were attached to embassies and consulates, while 37 were affiliated with an “international organization.”⁶ Of the foreign embassies and consulates the Polish and the Czechoslovak were prominent as headquarters of pro-Soviet espionage.

Action was taken by the United States government against a number of American employees of the United Nations. The services of two Soviet employees of the organization—Assistant Secretary General Konstantin Zinchenko and the political affairs officer of the Department of Security Council Affairs, Nikolai Skvortsov—“were terminated” at the end of 1952; the positions of these two men had given them ample opportunity for spying and reporting.⁷ The grand jury for the Southern District of New York in December 1952 issued a detailed “presentation” against the State Department, accusing it of laxity in regard to Soviet espionage in the United Nations. The investigation carried out by the grand jury had disclosed, the statement said, that “Over a score of these United States citizens employed at the United Nations who were called to testify before us refused to answer questions concerning past and present Communist party membership and activity, including in some instances past and present espionage activity against the United States.”⁸

Of the multitude of Soviet espionage cases of the postwar era, one, the Coplon-Gubichev affair, was more illuminating than any other as to the postwar setup and techniques of Soviet intelligence. The case, which came to a dead end, has never been given the thorough analysis it deserved.

The espionage operations of the “Michael” network in the United States began after the end of the war, when “alertness” and strict compliance with conspiracy rules were again made imperative for all intelligence agents and agencies. The two members of the

group whose names became known, Valentin Gubichev and Judith Coplon, met the requirements, and the Director in Moscow had every reason to expect long and fruitful collaboration between "Michael" and the pair.

Judith Coplon came from a family rooted in American traditions. Her grandfather, a Union sympathizer during the Civil War, had been arrested and interned in Georgia for the duration of the war; her father was a member of a liberal Masonic lodge. Judith herself tended toward adoration of what, to certain liberals, has appeared as the spiritual continuation of democratic revolutions—the Soviet revolution in Russia. In college Judith had been interested mainly in her studies. In the Barnard College yearbook she was described in the following words: "An astute analytical mind lurks behind a baby face and emotional brown eyes." Russian was one of the foreign languages she studied.

When Judith entered the Soviet intelligence service she had to cut herself off from people and groups close to her in a political way. She had never joined the Communist party, but now even purely social ties with Communists were forbidden, lest the watchful FBI become suspicious. Two years after graduation from Barnard she took a job with the Department of Justice, where she at first dealt with political reports from various European countries. From her position as an assistant political analyst she was transferred, in the spring of 1946, to the Foreign Agents Registration Division. The Department of Justice of a democratic country and its judicial system in general are of no particular interest to Soviet intelligence. One component, however, of the Department of Justice is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where thousands of secret political, international, and military reports are gathered.

Since 1946 Judith Coplon had been working just outside the FBI. Technically the division in which she worked handled only registration of foreign agents. According to existing law all persons or agencies representing a "foreign principal," and in particular "any person who within the United States collects information for or reports information to a foreign principal," are required to register with the Department of Justice; diplomatic officers, who are registered by the Department of State, are exempt from this law so long as they are "engaged exclusively in activities which are recognized by the Department as being within the scope of the functions of such officer." Penalty for failure to register or false registration

is imprisonment up to five years or a fine up to \$10,000, or both.

In the supervision of registration of foreign agents, the division acts in cooperation with the FBI. The two divisions regularly exchange information and secret reports dealing with diplomatic representatives of foreign countries (including the Soviet Union and the satellites), military attachés and their efforts to obtain information on the United States, persons suspected of spying, secret government documents illegally shipped abroad, and so forth. In short, any foreign espionage service would be happy to have an agent working in that particular division of the Department of Justice.

Beginning about February 1946, Judith Coplon, in the course of her duties, read and copied a multitude of FBI and other reports dealing with secret affairs of state. When she was arrested, hundreds of FBI reports were found in her desk.

The material that she was able to supply to Soviet intelligence was so interesting that a special contact man, Valentin Gubichev, was dispatched from Moscow by the GB to work with her; he arrived in the United States a few months after Miss Coplon started at her new job.

Gubichev had graduated as a construction engineer from the Moscow Institute of Architecture, and his professional title could serve him well as a cover in New York. He had worked for a few years with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. As a married man whose wife had accompanied him to the United States, he had the further advantage of the cover of a family setup.

This stocky, stern-eyed man did not give an impression of great intelligence or talent, but his assignment did not require unusual mental ability. He was to serve as a liaison between Judith Coplon and his superior, a GB man residing in this country, and his task was to receive papers from time to time from the one and pass them on to the other. There was danger involved, of course, but Gubichev could rely, if worse came to worst, on the official protection of a powerful government.

Gubichev could well have used diplomatic immunity for his risky assignment, but the number of posts providing such immunity is limited. Besides, holders of diplomatic privileges, all known to the FBI, might be shadowed and their telephones might be tapped. Seeking a solution, the Soviet superiors thought of the possibility of a connection with the new institution, the United Nations. How

could diplomatic immunity be obtained for foreign agents working at UN headquarters in New York? How many Soviet officials would be in a position to enjoy UN immunity? Some members of the Soviet delegation were certainly entitled to it, but they had already been appointed and each had his own assignment. The GB found a clever way out: Gubichev, official of the Foreign Ministry, was appointed secretary to the Soviet delegation to the United Nations; he traveled on a diplomatic passport, and the United States embassy in Moscow granted him a diplomatic visa. Once in the United States, however, he was shifted to another post in no way connected with diplomatic affairs—that of an employee of the United Nations rather than of the Soviet delegation. In September 1946, soon after his arrival, Gubichev took the following oath: "I solemnly swear to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as a member of the International Service of the United Nations, to discharge those functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the organization." ⁹

His assignment at the United Nations related to construction of the new UN buildings on the East River which had just begun; his salary was not high (\$6,050 a year), and to all appearances he was an unimportant person on a low level in the organization; he rented an apartment in a modest Spanish-Negro neighborhood in New York.

Soon "Michael" brought Gubichev in touch with an employee of an important governmental agency in Washington—Judith Coplon. While Gubichev was busy with matters relating to the UN buildings, Judith Coplon was making regular trips from Washington to New York to spend weekends with her parents in Brooklyn. Meetings between the two soon became regular.

Judith would ask her colleagues in the Department of Justice for various secret reports, even such as did not relate to her field. She was interested particularly in papers marked "internal security R," the R standing for Russia. She insisted on inspecting documents concerning embassies, consulates, and their personnel; in these papers names of FBI agents might have been mentioned. In 1949 she made three requests for a top security report on Soviet espionage.

The Department of Justice and the FBI systematically gather

material on Soviet and satellite diplomats and in this connection make use, in certain cases, of undercover informants from among Soviet and satellite personnel. In 1948 the FBI learned that the contents of some of its papers were finding their way to Moscow and that Moscow in turn was informing its security agents in the United States concerning the FBI's most secret investigations and findings. It was not long before the FBI learned that the channel to Moscow started in the division where Judith Coplon was working.¹⁰

Having put its finger on Miss Coplon, the Department of Justice started an investigation. False documents, contrived by the FBI to mislead Soviet intelligence, were routed to her. In January 1949 she was transferred to another division. "She was very much disturbed," her chief testified later; unaware of the real reason for the change, she gave herself away, according to her superiors, by "loud protests."

In the meantime the two spies were following strictly, perhaps too strictly, instructions as to the behavior called for in their particular situation; meeting on the street and going to a restaurant was in accordance with instructions, but the two were not aware that since December 1948 a group of FBI agents had been following Miss Coplon when she left Union Station in Washington for New York, while others were waiting when her train arrived at Pennsylvania Station in New York. Often she went directly to her parents' home. If, however, an appointment with Gubichev had been arranged, she would wander around New York for hours, walking the streets and riding the subway, always trailed by FBI agents. Finally, meeting and riding together, Gubichev and Miss Coplon pretended not to know each other.

For her appointment with Gubichev on Saturday, March 4, 1949, Judith Coplon had prepared a number of important and interesting papers. In her covering memorandum, obviously addressed to her GB chiefs, she mentioned a "top secret" and detailed paper of over one hundred pages in length prepared by the FBI and dealing with Soviet espionage in the United States:

I have not been able (and don't think I will) to get the top secret FBI report which I described to Michael on Soviet and Communist intelligence activities in the United States. When the moment was favorable I asked Foley [her superior] where the report was (he'd previously remarked that he had such a

report). He said that some departmental official had it and he didn't expect to get it back. Foley remarked there was nothing "new" in it.

When I saw the report, for a minute, I breezed through it rapidly, remembered very little. It was about 115 pages in length and summarized, first, Soviet "intelligence" activities, including Martens, Lore, Poynts [sic], Altschuler, Silvermaster et al. It had heading on Soviet U.N. delegation, but that was all I remember. The rest of the report, I think, was on Polish, Yugo, etc., activities and possibly some info on the C.P., U.S.A.¹¹

Other FBI reports were also quoted by Miss Coplon; some were copies of original reports, some were raw material supplied by informants which had not yet been checked and verified, for example, material relating to Communist actors of Hollywood and the New York stage, in which many names appeared. Another interesting report was one prepared by the FBI agent Robert J. Lamphere on shipment of atomic implements to Russia:

. . . no export license had been issued for the shipment of atomic equipment that reached Soviet Russia aboard the steamship Mikhail Kutuzov in August, 1947.

. . . a shipment of similar secret instruments was found aboard the steamship Murmansk in New York harbor Sept. 2, 1948, but American authorities removed the shipment because it had not been authorized.

Then a third shipment was found on a dock in Claremont, N.J., Jan. 14, 1949 . . .

Amtorg bought the equipment that reached Russia from the "Cyclotron Specialties Company." . . . Amtorg had been in touch with the Geophysical Research Corporation about buying "geophones"—instruments used in measuring blasts.¹²

"Stuart Legge," another FBI report stated, "is a possible Russian espionage agent." A barber, Eugenio Chavez, of White Sands, New Mexico, according to another item in Miss Coplon's possession, was reported to the FBI to have received instructions to observe and make photos of experiments with guided missiles and turn the photographs over to the Russian embassy in Mexico City. Another FBI report mentioned Ruth Gruber, formerly a secretary

to Harold L. Ickes when he was in the government during the war, and who was reported to have been a contact of Feodor Garanin of the Soviet embassy.*

From one of the documents it was obvious that the FBI had agents in the Soviet embassy in Washington. This document was an application of one Leona Saron for a job with the *Information Bulletin* published by the Soviet embassy. The application, addressed to the embassy, had obviously been processed, and a number of details from the embassy's files had been added. Copies of these papers had been supplied to the FBI by an undercover agent, and now an undercover agent of Soviet intelligence, Judith Coplon, was to supply copies of the copies to her Soviet superiors. When this particular document was later mentioned during Miss Coplon's trial, Archibald Palmer, her attorney, asked the FBI agent who was testifying, "Has the United States counter-espionage agents working in embassies, consulates and UN delegations of other nations including Russia?" "Yes," the agent answered.

The State Department promptly issued a statement in the press that no such agents worked for the State Department, but that it could not speak for other United States agencies.¹³

Others of Miss Coplon's papers contained her answers to inquiries made previously by the GB concerning three persons in the United States: Alfred B. Stevenson and Alvin and Lorraine Sinderbrand. Miss Coplon furnished personal details on each of these persons: their educational backgrounds, political orientation, and relation, or rather—and this was emphasized—lack of relation to the Communist party of the United States.

A number of other "slips" (notes made by Miss Coplon on various FBI reports) included names of persons suspected but not yet screened by American counterespionage, and unverified reports. Among the names was that of Morton E. Kent, who died three months later under strange circumstances.†

Judith Coplon also had a detailed biography on herself—it was

* When the report was made public, after Judith Coplon's arrest, Mr. Ickes denied the truth of the report on Miss Gruber and told the press: "If she is a red, I am a Hottentot"; later, however, he was less sure.

† Kent was declared a suicide. According to reports, his wife drove him to a boathouse, where he rented a canoe; he was cheerful and wanted to picnic in the sun. A few hours later he was found dead, his throat slashed. *New York Times*, June 12, 1949.

likely that she was slated to advance on the intelligence ladder.

The FBI was not sure that Miss Coplon would bring with her to the March 4 appointment with Gubichev incriminating and compromising documents; it prepared a special report, part true and part false, dealing with atomic research, mentioning two FBI agents supposedly planted in Amtorg, and other items. This paper was given to Miss Coplon before she left for New York. William E. Foley, Miss Coplon's superior in the Justice Department, had told her that he intended to prosecute Amtorg for failing to register as a foreign agent. Miss Coplon fell into the trap. That day she left the Department sufficiently early to have time to retype the decoy paper; she added it to the other reports in her bag, altogether about forty sheets.

On the night of March 4, 1949, the two Soviet spies did the usual long and senseless wandering about the city. Followed by a detail of FBI men, Miss Coplon arrived twenty minutes late for the appointment. In accordance with the standing rule that if one of the parties does not arrive precisely on time both parties must leave and return an hour later, she walked about for forty minutes before returning to the appointed place. Suspecting that she had been shadowed, she hesitated to turn the papers over to Gubichev. Finally, however, she opened her bag and Gubichev reached out his hand, at which point the two were seized.

The announcement of the arrests created great public excitement and had a profound effect on public opinion regarding Soviet espionage in the United States.

The Soviet embassy had good reason and the right to come to the aid of Soviet citizen Gubichev; it was in no position, however, to act openly in favor of Judith Coplon. It is a procedure of all intelligence agencies to drop agents caught in the act, and the Soviet government adheres to this more strictly than any other government. Judith Coplon was certainly aware that if she were arrested she would receive neither help nor moral encouragement from the Soviet side, that she would stand alone, and that the sympathies of American Communists for a Soviet spy would not be expressed publicly. One indirect and not very helpful favor, however, was shown her by the Soviet organization—consent that she base her defense on the fable of a love affair with Gubichev.

With the agreement of the State Department, the Soviet dele-

gation to the UN (in New York) was informed of Gubichev's arrest a few hours after it had occurred. Some time after midnight two men from the Soviet delegation came to see Gubichev in jail and obtained permission for his wife to visit him the next day. The two gentlemen did not know, of course, that Madame Gubichev had been cast for the role of a deceived wife. The order from the embassy arrived in time to prevent her from visiting her husband.

Judith Coplon was tried in both Washington and New York: in Washington she was tried for stealing documents of the Department of Justice, and in New York she and Gubichev were tried for conspiring to commit espionage. The trial in Washington lasted from April to July 1949; the trial in New York was delayed until January 26, 1950.

The outlook for the two was poor. The evidence against them of documents and witnesses was so abundant and convincing that no real defense was possible. Gubichev took the line of refusing to talk—a line certainly approved in Moscow but actually engineered by the GB man Nikolai V. Novikov, charge d'affaires, and Lev S. Tolokonnikov, first secretary of the Soviet embassy.¹⁴ Obviously assigned by the chief of Soviet intelligence to organize the Gubichev defense, they made excellent use of democratic procedures for the benefit of their protégé.

Gubichev refused to answer questions, claimed immunity, and instead of disproving accusations, attacked the United States for its "illegal actions" and disregard of diplomatic privileges of Soviet diplomatic personnel. "Provocation," he shouted, "flagrant provocation." His arrest was for "certain dirty speculative political purposes"; while he himself was striving for peace, his jailers were acting with intent to "excite the feelings of this country against my country." He was not familiar with American laws, he told Judge Simon H. Rifkind, but "I know we do not deal with foreigners the way I have been dealt with here. . . . I know we are a backward country, but the practices being used here are the practices of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages."¹⁵

The claim of diplomatic immunity for Gubichev was based on a trick perpetrated in Moscow, of considering Gubichev's initial diplomatic visa as proof of his present diplomatic status. Twice the Soviet embassy officially presented these arguments to the State Department, but, anxious as the department was to demonstrate

objectivity and even courtesy in this case, the arguments were twice rejected. Gubichev's name had never been included in the list of diplomats carefully compiled by the State Department. Nevertheless, Gubichev repeated the claim; when overruled by Judge Alfred C. Coxe, he continued to protest against the "inquisition" and the failure to recognize his privileges until the judge ordered him to "stop the filibuster." He also refused to engage a lawyer: since he had immunity, there was nothing and nobody to defend.

After Gubichev had been in jail for seven weeks the Soviet embassy accepted the refusal of the United States to recognize his diplomatic status and posted a bond of \$100,000 required to release him. On April 27, 1949, Gubichev was told, in the presence of Lev Tolokonnikov, that while he was free on bail he was not permitted to board a ship or plane or enter on a pier or airfield; Tolokonnikov sarcastically added: "Also restricted from submarines, helicopters and balloons."

In the meantime, Judith Coplon was free on bail of \$20,000 furnished by her relatives in New York; a second bond in the amount of \$10,000 was posted in Washington.

The Coplon defense was far more difficult than the Gubichev, since Miss Coplon, an American citizen, could not claim immunity of any kind. "Between December 10, 1948 and March 4 of this year," 1949, read the Washington indictment, "Miss Coplon took secret espionage data on national defense from the files of the department. She did this . . . for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense and with intent and reason to believe that the information was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation."

Miss Coplon's lawyer, Archibald Palmer, was not very successful. A friend of the Coplon family, he was a specialist in criminal law. The family obviously tried to maintain the appearance of a non-Communist atmosphere by avoiding the group of well-known pro-Communist attorneys. In his handling of the case Palmer used methods that might have been suitable in defending a client accused of theft, and he failed to win the case for his client. He based his defense on the love affair legend; he obviously viewed this as the best approach to the sentiments of the jurors and the American public. When a jury was being selected for the trial in Washington, Palmer asked prospective jurors whether they had a prejudice

against persons seeking divorce or against Americans marrying foreigners. Miss Coplon, dressed in black, modestly lowered her head.

Mr. Palmer told the court that Judith Coplon had "developed an affection for him [Gubichev] and he for her. On January 14 he told her for the first time he was a married man but not on good terms with his wife and that he wanted to stay in the United States, which he admired." Up to the day of her arrest, he said, she was still undecided; she still "tried to find out whether she had to follow her head or her heart." Interrogating the FBI agents who had trailed her to an address on Third Avenue in New York, Palmer asked: "Was it not a quiet place that might be selected by lovers who wanted to whisper sweet nothings?"¹⁶ Judith and Valentin were afraid, Palmer explained, of "private detectives" that the jealous Mrs. Gubichev might have had watching them, and also of the Soviet secret police, the NKVD. "Did you know that the NKVD is supposed to murder silently?" Palmer asked. "Did you read that in FBI reports?"

Miss Coplon played well the role selected for her by Palmer, but she was obviously disturbed by the evident disbelief of jurors, attorneys, and the public.

The love story invented by Palmer heightened the sensationalism of the trial and the crowds trying to get into the courtroom grew larger from day to day. It was like a third-rate movie thriller: love, spies, the FBI, and an innocent girl. Tension reached a peak when the day arrived for Miss Coplon to take the stand. Despite the hot weather in Washington that day, the room was packed; scores of people stood during the entire time; some brought their lunches so that they would not lose their seats. As Judith told her story there was a solemn silence in the courtroom.

She fell in love with a Russian, Miss Coplon said, and suffered bitter disillusionment when she found out he was already married. She spoke in a low voice tinged with sadness. He told her, she said, that he loved her too.

She first met Gubichev "during the 1948 Labor Day weekend while browsing through the New York Museum of Modern Art." They met about six times during the next four months, but it was not until the night of January 14, 1949, that he took her to a restaurant. "Did he ever kiss you?" "Never, except on January 14 he tried to, when I got upset." "Had he ever told you that he loved

you?" Mr. Palmer asked. "He had. I thought I was in love with him." Gubichev complained about "how miserable he was." When she found out that Gubichev was married, "I let loose and started to cry," she said. "I had a newspaper in my hand and I suppose I was brandishing it. He said I was provincial like all American women—that I was not listening—he said he was so miserable."

The love affair burst like a bubble when prosecutor John M. Kelley, Jr., began to examine the witness. With exaggerated politeness he asked about her "kissless romance" with the Soviet engineer, and when she had confirmed this, he asked whether she had not spent two nights with another man during the very time when her love for Gubichev had reached a peak.

"It is a damned lie!" cried Judith.

The prosecutor then provided the details: on January 7, "Mr. and Mrs. H. P. Shapiro" of East Hartford, Connecticut, had registered at a hotel in Baltimore and occupied room number so-and-so. Mr. Shapiro was identified as an official of the criminal division of the FBI; "Mrs. Shapiro" was identified as Judith Coplon. On January 8 the same couple spent the night at a hotel in Philadelphia. Subsequently Judith had spent nights in Mr. Shapiro's home in Washington.

Still on the offensive, and with the injured air of an innocent victim, Judith cried: "Why are you doing it in front of my mother?" Then, realizing her true situation, she lowered her eyes and said: "Yes, but nothing illicit had occurred. I did not sleep or make any attempt to sleep." "Both nights?" "Both nights. He did not make any improper advances. I was fully dressed. He was only discussing with me my love for Gubichev."

Then Judith told an obviously hastily invented and unconvincing story of how she had driven with Shapiro to Baltimore because she wanted to buy a suit, and when she could not find the suit she wanted they had driven to Philadelphia.

The story of the Coplon-Shapiro affair created a great sensation; those in the courtroom audience who had believed the romantic version and were prepared to give Judith the benefit of the doubt were nonplussed. Judith herself, losing her cool poise, cried in a shrill voice: "You have branded me a spy, now you are trying to brand me a harlot."

Then, angry at everyone, she also gave expression to her doubt: "And Shapiro was part of this whole frame-up?" Judith did not

regain her composure in the days following; her outbursts of temper kept the court and jurors in a constant state of tension. "I am innocent," she shouted.

The love story destroyed, an abundance of documented evidence and witnesses proved Judith's guilt. Palmer's second legend burst like the first one. Judith Coplon, he maintained, intended to write a book, and the "data slips" in her bag, on which so many names of known Communist agents and anti-Communists appeared, were to aid her imagination—"just as types." And who, Palmer was asked in court, was "the mysterious Michael mentioned by her in her notes?" "Michael was the Biblical character," he replied, "who with his angels, fought a 'great red dragon' as described in Revelations, Chapter 12, verses 3 to 7."

The jurors deliberated for twenty-seven hours and reached a unanimous verdict of guilty. Judith Coplon was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from forty months to ten years.

The final act of the drama did not take place until seven months later, when a trial was held in New York. The sentence, pronounced on March 9, 1950, was fifteen years for each of the defendants.

During the New York trial the Secretary of State sent a recommendation to the court that the Gubichev sentence be suspended on condition that Gubichev leave the United States within two weeks and never return. The government's attitude was motivated by its concern for a number of American citizens in Eastern Europe, rightly or falsely accused of espionage or other crimes, who might be subjected to severe reprisals if Gubichev were imprisoned in this country. It so happened that at the time of the trial Robert A. Vogeler, American citizen and official of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation in Budapest, had been sentenced by a Hungarian court to fifteen years' imprisonment for spying. A number of Americans were also being held in Russia. Although no negotiations with the Soviet Union or the satellite governments were instituted, and no attempt was made to arrange an actual deal, the State Department obviously expected to ameliorate the fate of these American citizens by a simple show of leniency in the Gubichev case. "Defendant Gubichev," the State Department said, "should leave the United States rather than be required to serve his sentence here."

Following the government's recommendation, Judge Sylvester Ryan suspended sentence on condition that Gubichev be deported from the United States. The judge did not conceal his uncertainty as to the wisdom of the government's recommendation, and told Gubichev at the end of the trial:

You came here as an emissary of peace; you were accepted among us in the role of a friend; you violated your oath of office to the Secretariat of the United Nations of the world.

By your actions you have been not only false to that oath, but you have betrayed the cause of peace. . . .

And you do that with arrogance and with a smile on your lips and on your face as you stand here before me for sentence, and in defiance of all humanity. . . .

The Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of State have recommended that this sentence be suspended and that you be sent out of the country. These officials state that they feel that the best interests of the United States of America and of its citizens will be served by following this course. The direction of international affairs is entrusted, by our laws and our Constitution, to these officials. It is beyond my province to question the reasons for or the wisdom of their recommendation. I shall accept it, and if arrangements are made for your immediate deportation, I shall bring you back at their request for re-sentence and at their request I shall suspend sentence on the day you are about to leave this country, provided that a marshal shall accompany you to the ship upon which you are to depart and keep you in custody until that ship shall leave our shores, you never to return.¹⁷

On March 20, 1950, Gubichev, in handcuffs, was brought to the Polish ship *Batory* in a marshal's van from the courthouse. He and his wife were assigned a first-class cabin, for which the United States was paying the fare; he carried ten pieces of luggage, including a large television set. A group of Soviet officials and American correspondents saw him off at the pier. When he was asked whether there were television programs in Russia, Gubichev defiantly answered: "Why, television was invented by us!" The convicted spy received his salary for the period of the investigation and trial (about \$6,000) when he left the shores of the United States for good.

The fate of Judith Coplon was different, although in no way worse. Free on bail during almost the entire period since her arrest, and free now also of her espionage duties, she found her way to marriage and a family. Two months after the sentence of the New York court was pronounced she married one of her attorneys, Albert H. Socolov. A few months later, on December 5, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the federal court on the ground that her arrest had been made without a warrant and because wire-tapping had been resorted to by the government to obtain information. The indictment was not dismissed, however, and the offense of Judith Coplon was not denied; she went unpunished because of the strict adherence of a democracy to legal procedure and to observance of technicalities, which sometimes verges on the absurd.

While Judith Coplon, now a wife and mother, moved out of the public view, and Valentin Gubichev returned to the good graces of his powerful agency, the reciprocity expected by the State Department was not forthcoming. Neither Robert Vogeler nor any of the Americans in Soviet or satellite hands were soon released from prison or "labor camp." Vogeler remained in prison for another year, and it was even later before a few Americans were released by the Soviet government. The American attempt to teach Moscow ethics by giving an example of decency proved futile.

Today and Tomorrow

THE SOVIET espionage network abroad today is the largest on earth, probably larger than the intelligence systems of all other nations combined. Based on the one hand on forty-six embassies, legations, and missions abroad, and on the other on fifty-three Communist parties of the nonsatellite world as well as a number of networks independent of Soviet embassies and Communist parties, the Soviet intelligence system is one of the most remarkable phenomena of our times.

In each of the great Soviet ventures of the postwar decade espionage has had an outstanding part. It silently preceded Communist armies on their various drives, moved along at their side, and settled down as a legal or semilegal agency after a victory in a newly "liberated" country. In places like Greece and South Korea, Berlin and South Vietnam, where victory was not attainable, it expanded into an underground network. It concentrated large forces in Japan and West Germany. It tried to infiltrate and penetrate areas in which new arms production was being developed or new armies were stationed. Its main concentration, however, was on the great powers of the West, with the United States well in the forefront.

Because of its unprecedented size and ubiquity, and because of the mystery which surrounds Soviet espionage, a correct notion of its significance has not been easy to arrive at, and opinions as to both its size and significance have varied widely. In this country those who in the past exaggerated the virtues of our "great ally" often tend to minimize Soviet spy activity despite all facts to the contrary. Others are inclined to exaggerate its size and excellence and even accord it general superiority and invincibility. Actually the balance sheet of Soviet intelligence operations since the war has not been entirely favorable. Along with successes and even brilliant victories there have occurred failures, defeats, some painful loss of prestige, and exposure by the "enemy." The losses have

in fact been considerable and, moreover, have been mounting.

In more than one respect Soviet intelligence has embodied the main traits of the Soviet Army: quantitative superiority over all other similar forces, and inferiority in quality. This relationship between size and efficiency, a legacy of centuries of Russian history, has been maintained to this day and will undoubtedly prevail in the foreseeable future. A product of national Russian and Communist-added traits, the pattern was actually recognized by the great powers in the two world wars, the recognition being expressed in the ratio of three to four Russian to one German soldier as a basis of calculating fighting strength. Extreme centralization, neglect of the human factors, Communist prejudice in interpretation of events, and poor evaluation—constant elements of the Soviet intelligence system—have lowered its quality and kept it from attaining first place in the world-wide arena of reconnaissance.

Extreme centralization, the main element of a totalitarian national structure, is logical and sensible—on paper; carried beyond a certain point, however, it becomes a source of weakness. It is logical that every step taken by its intelligence agents abroad should be known to and sanctioned in advance by Moscow, because even the best “resident’s” knowledge and experience are inferior to the collective experience of the most extensive intelligence organization in the world. But pushed to its logical limits the procedure results in absurdities and causes delays in intelligence operations. A few examples will illustrate the point.

A rule against recruitment of agents or subagents abroad by any Soviet apparat without the approval of Moscow would seem reasonable and necessary, because Moscow has checking and screening facilities beyond the imagination of any military attaché or other head of an intelligence group. There are the archives of the GB, including those of its foreign division, the INU; there are available the German archives discovered in 1945; another large collection of data has been in the possession of the Comintern-Cominform, in which every Communist party has had its place, and whose Central Committee sent to Moscow copies of all important reports obtained locally. Finally, the headquarters of Soviet military intelligence has over a period of three decades accumulated a wealth of information and personal records.

This unprecedented abundance of documentation serves well to protect the intelligence service against security risks, double-agents, and planted agents, but it also causes serious delays in the progress of intelligence operations. If the system of completely centralized command is pushed to its limits, the live and elastic organism of intelligence becomes an automaton, one of hundreds of bureaucratic institutions, in which the human being begins to shun responsibility and acts on orders rather than developing his own initiative.

In the boom era of the Soviet spy organization in Canada (1944-45), a lavatory in a dentist's office in Ottawa was used as a "dubok" (hiding place for exchange of messages). "Nora" (Emma Woikin; see p. 280) would come to the dentist's waiting room and leave her material under the cover of a tank in the lavatory; an hour later, Gorshkov, ostensibly a driver employed at the Soviet Embassy, would appear at the dentist's office, proceed to the lavatory, and pick up the papers. This arrangement was desirable because no contact between the two agents could be observed. When the procedure was later investigated by the Canadian authorities, it was established that Moscow's consent had to be asked for and obtained before the lavatory plan was put into operation. All duboks, of which hundreds exist abroad, must be approved in advance by the Director.¹

A page of the Alger Hiss story concerns the fight between Hiss and another Soviet ring under Hede Massing for the new recruit, Noel Field, the issue being to which of the groups Field should belong. It was decided that Hiss, Massing, and Field should meet to discuss the problem, but, as Mrs. Massing testified before a Senate committee: "My Russian superior at that time, Boris, was quite distressed about this meeting because it was unorthodox and it had not gotten the O.K. from Moscow. . . . Such things are not done without the O.K. from Moscow."²

Even the comparatively simple operation of arranging a rendezvous between two Soviet agents is often taken out of the hands of experienced military attachés or group leaders and reserved to the headquarters in Moscow. The Moscow experts on treffs perform their duty with ponderous, often ridiculous, awkwardness. Before the atomic spy Allan Nunn May left Canada to go to London, a treff in London had to be arranged for him and another agent. To

accomplish this, the Soviet military attaché in Ottawa sent a message to Moscow to be forwarded to the agent in England:

Meeting: October 7, 17, 27 on the street in front of the British Museum.

The time: 11 o'clock in the evening.

Identification: Best regards to Mikel (Maikl).

How careful the attaché was is obvious from his mention of the Russian spelling of Michael as well as from the fact that three dates in October are given (just in case). But Moscow found the arrangements unsatisfactory; to correct them, the Director's office prepared a lengthy document providing a multitude of other passwords and complicated identification signs.

An involved set of instructions was given to Alexander Foote when he was to meet his contact, "Sonia," in Geneva:

I was to be wearing a white scarf and to be holding in my right hand a leather belt. As the clock struck noon I would be approached by a woman carrying a string shopping bag containing a green parcel, and holding an orange in her hand. One would have thought that this would have been sufficient to enable anyone to contact anyone, even an unknown, in the middle of a Swiss street. The woman would ask me, in English, where I had bought the belt; and I was to reply that I had bought it in an ironmonger's shop in Paris. Then I was to ask her where I could buy an orange like hers, and she was to say that I could have hers for an English penny. Hardly sparkling dialogue, but sufficient to ensure that the meeting was foolproof and an example of the usual thoroughness of my employers.³

Behind-the-scenes fights between governmental agencies and their chiefs, charges and countercharges, and intrigue between neighbors in the state apparatus are also an outcome of the rigid centralization. The peculiar atmosphere is described in almost every report on Soviet intelligence. Igor Gouzenko has called it a "bickering paradise," and has described the fight between the military attaché, Colonel Zabotin, and Pavlov, actual head of the GB ring in Canada. Pavlov was reporting to Moscow on Zabotin's men, Zabotin was denouncing the GB boys. Unimportant incidents were

exaggerated out of all proportion; coded telegrams were rushed to the Soviet capital (this was wartime): "Neighbor [Pavlov] must not work with such hooligan methods," etc.

Espionage workers abroad have the task of gathering information, but at least as important as that is its interpretation. This part of the intelligence operation is done at home. In troubled times hundreds of secret reports come to the intelligence departments of every country, and superior political intelligence, objectivity, intuition, and judgment are required to evaluate them, eliminate the false, place the facts in their proper place, and draw the correct conclusions. When even nonsecret developments are often misjudged, how much more often may grave mistakes occur in interpretation of secret reports coming from obscure sources?

The greatest danger threatening every intelligence system, secret or open, is a closed-mind approach to the news and a ready-made viewpoint. The conceptions and misconceptions, theories and patterns of Leninism-Stalinism have often proved fatal when applied to Soviet intelligence as a whole. In the summer of 1939, for instance, reports from agents informed Moscow that "capitalist" France and England would not fight "capitalist" Germany even if Hitler attacked Poland. On the basis of the conclusions drawn from these reports, Stalin committed the great blunder of entering into a "friendship pact" with Berlin. His attack on Finland, futile as a means of defense against Germany, was due to a grave misconception of the international situation. During the war years Soviet intelligence agents continued to feed Moscow reports on the perfidious plans of the "capitalist nations" against the Soviet Union, and even at the height of the "Great Alliance" Soviet intelligence officers abroad were warned against and strictly forbidden to cooperate with their Western colleagues.

Brigadier C. H. Dewhurst was British military attaché in Belgrade in 1948, when Stalin broke with Tito and appealed to all loyal Communists in Yugoslavia to rise against and overthrow the rebellious leader. This move proved to be a grave mistake and led to one of Stalin's first defeats of the postwar era. Dewhurst rightly ascribes the blunder to the poor quality of Soviet intelligence:

The country [Yugoslavia] remained perfectly calm after the bomb-shell [Moscow's appeal] except for a wave of anti-Russian and anti-Cominform resentment, which did much to

strengthen the régime's hand. It was Russia's greatest postwar blunder. . . .

Who, then, had tendered the advice for so lamentable a step? . . . I would blame it on their Intelligence Service, which I believe to be far less expert than is commonly held. Their Security Service is second to none, because suspicion is part of the Russian character and they are more "apt" for the work than ourselves. They have, moreover, not demobilized their specialist personnel, as we did after the war, for they believe the war to be still in progress—as it is. But they are not good at the acquisition of intelligence, which requires a great insight into foreign character and psychology, and which we, as "old imperialists," have certainly acquired, though we only use it when a war is "hot." ⁴

We have seen how Moscow reacted to Alexander Rado's attempt in 1943 to save his remarkable apparat in Switzerland with the help of the British; at the root of Moscow's fatal instructions lay the preconceived theory that the capitalist world was inclined to help "the fascists" rather than the Communists. The controversy, which started in 1942, centered at the outset around the United States. On December 4, 1942, when Rado asked for American visas for his group to be used in case of a German invasion of Switzerland, Soviet intelligence headquarters replied: "We cannot provide you with American visas without revealing you to the Americans, which would be wrong and is not necessary." They had better stay in Switzerland, the Director advised. In November 1943 the Director sharply reprimanded Rado for having in an emergency got in touch with Major Cartwright, British military attaché in Switzerland, "without our permission."

The individual agents at their outposts, trying to go along with the trend and please their chiefs, likewise looked for anti-Russian intrigue on the part of the "imperialist" allies; besides, being Communists themselves, they suffered from the same disease as their leaders. The result was a rash of reports on fantastic "anti-Soviet" maneuvers among the Western Allies during the common war with Germany.

On August 24, 1943, Rado sent a message to Moscow to the effect that in Norway the German General Falkenhorst was going to "open Norway to the Allies" in order to prevent a Russian invasion

in East and Central Europe. When Mussolini, interned in Italy after his downfall in July 1943, was liberated by a group of Nazi officers, Rado informed Moscow (on September 25, 1943) that according to a German source "Mussolini's liberation was carried out by Badooglio in agreement with the Allies," and that "they hope in this way the dynasty will acquire new prestige and the revolutionary republican propaganda will be paralyzed"—which was pure nonsense, though strictly orthodox-Communist.

In other cases agents vastly exaggerated the anti-war sentiments in Germany and fed Moscow ridiculous news of falling morale. Only six months after the German invasion of Russia, Rado sent a message to the effect that according to a "prominent German source, the German people are tired and desperate." Messages containing crude propaganda were dispatched, each of course in complicated code: ". . . now Himmler and the [Nazi] party bear the responsibility before the people for the growing weakness of the authorities in fighting the consequences of the massive RAF attacks."⁵ Five weeks later another message informed Moscow that "the German soldiers do not understand why they have to stay deep in Russia any longer," and so on.

The very size of the Soviet spy network and its steady growth implies a lowering of both the intellectual level and efficiency. There are a small number of excellent top agents, a larger group of men of mediocre abilities, and a very sizable group of active or potential "secret workers" of inferior quality. As the apparatus widens, the second and third groups must be drawn upon, and the law of diminishing returns begins to tell. "Soviet intelligence is based on quantity, but a quantitative basis means much chaff, much nonsense and pompousness, and very much money," states a former "illegal" German Communist.⁶

The German chief of front intelligence during the last war, Heinz Schmalschläger, comes to a similar conclusion: "Russian intelligence operations are conducted on a mass scale. Their performance is based on the notion that hundreds must be destroyed in order to enable a single agent to do a useful job."⁷

The Center in Moscow, says Alexander Foote, was

frequently foolish, frequently unco-operative, and frequently inefficient. They were often dilatory when speed was essential and rash when caution was the better course. In fact

the rigidity of the control and the lack of imagination of the Centre might lead one to assume that the dangers cannot be great if the system is so bad. Such an assumption would be dangerous . . .

. . . The inefficiency of the Russian Intelligence Service in matters of detail and administration was a perpetual source of amazement to me.⁸

A former official of the GB who defected during the war has stated that "the weak point of Soviet intelligence is the low level of intelligence and insufficient ability of its personnel. Even at the top the personnel is not well enough educated. This is due mainly to the limited reservoir from which the personnel is drawn."⁹

The satellite apparats, guided by Soviet higher-ups and working along the same lines as Soviet intelligence, have the same positive and negative traits: huge size and limited efficiency. "If the Czech government is to be judged by the efficiency of its spy system," said the United States Court of Appeals in Germany in one of its decisions, "that satellite country presents very little of a menace. . . . These defendants are not Klaus Fuchs, but they might have been."¹⁰ German spies in Soviet harness are no better than the Czechs. Summarizing his experience with German spies in the British zone, an "important person" told a *New York Times* correspondent: "They are so stupid that I sometimes wonder whether we should not encourage them. . . ." ¹¹

The attitude toward the human side of the espionage machinery is likewise true to the general Soviet pattern: emphasis on "mass" and neglect of the individual human being. Since the Soviet task is "liberation" of "millions" and "hundreds of millions," and since "the struggle" is "hard and bloody" and sacrifices must be made for the sake of the brighter future, human lives do not count in the present. Sustained by this comforting theory, the Stalin high command did not count lives in wartime, sacrificed millions of men at the front and millions of prisoners taken by the Germans. The same cynical attitude prevails in the field of intelligence.

When secret Soviet agents were parachuted into Germany during the war, no actual preparations had been made for their reception, and the Nazi police destroyed them like flies. Other young 'chutists

were dropped by scores directly behind the German front, and not many of them survived. Little attention was paid to the matter of the clothing and equipment of these underground agents, with the result that many of them were recognized on the German side by the fabric and style of their uniforms. "Not until the mass arrests occurred" (1945), reports a former GB defector of the war years, "did the chiefs of Soviet intelligence abolish uniform standards and the stereotyped pattern of equipment." ¹² Thousands had perished before it was decided that the equipment of agents must be in accordance with usage in the areas in which the agents were to operate. "The huge stores of the GB are now used only when rare and expensive things are needed (expensive furs, jewels, gold, and gems), which are remodeled to suit the needs of each agent."

From time to time agents working abroad are rewarded by an advance in rank or by a medal for loyalty and meritorious service; they rise to captains, majors, colonels, and are entitled to wear their decorations on their chests. This recognition of achievement means little, however, to an underground agent in a foreign country. What he really needs is understanding, sympathy, and friendly advice, and this is precisely what the Soviet apparat fails to give him.

The life of a Soviet spy abroad is not at all like the popular image of a continuously thrilling adventure, full of danger and sensational exploits. The reality is strikingly different. After a few months of training, the workaday business of the Soviet intelligence agent begins: a sequence of dull, often meaningless meetings and conferences and writing of useless reports which are rarely read by anyone. The agent is often aware of his uselessness and the special burdens of his job, and dreams of returning to the open Communist party, or, if he has had enough of Communism, to another kind of activity beyond the Communist pale.

The waste of time, the waiting, the repetitious reporting [says Hede Massing, former member of the apparat] had already struck me and made me wonder . . . I was connected with the Russian apparatus several years but when I start recounting my activities they seem meager. And still I was considered a successful and active member of the group. . . . how can anybody understand and follow this strange routine of reporting and reporting about everything and everybody, this sifting and sifting of people, without explanation, with-

out an obvious reason? . . . There were long stretches of boring inactivity that irked me.¹³

The same feeling seizes every sincere and devoted member of the underground after a time, and the more intelligent and sincere he is the earlier the inevitable disillusionment. Conspiracy, as Whitaker Chambers says, is a dull job:

Its mysteries quickly become a bore, its secrecy a burden and its involved way of doing things a nuisance. Its object is never to provide excitement, but to avoid it. Thrills mean that something has gone wrong. The mysterious character of underground work is merely a tedious daily labor to keep thrills from happening. I have never known a good conspirator who enjoyed conspiracy. I have never known one who did not feel: If only I could perform one simple act simply and directly, unhampered by conspiratorial techniques. I have seldom known one who did not think: when will my term of service be up so that I can get on to something less peculiar? ¹⁴

On the other hand, a misdemeanor on the part of an agent, even a failure due to accident, leads to severe punishment. How many excellent intelligence officers have ended up in slave labor camps and how many have been executed nobody can tell. We do know, however, that after a quarter of a century of loyal service Alexander Rado was sent to a concentration camp. Nikolai Zabolotin was sentenced on false charges to a prison term of ten years. Leopold Trepper and Rahel Dubendorfer never returned from Russia to their families abroad. Scores of others have been tried and sentenced to prison on flimsy charges. More officers of Soviet intelligence have been killed in Russia than at operations posts abroad.

This is why defections among chiefs of espionage and secret agents have been proportionately greater than among other Soviet services abroad. During the war, as we have seen, a number of outstanding leaders of Soviet espionage in the occupied countries worked with the enemy after being captured. In the decade since the war the number of defections has increased in Japan, Australia, Austria, Germany, and wherever else the flock of tormented and disoriented, driven and frightened human beings has found a door open and the symbol of liberty visible on the horizon.

Igor Gouzenko, the former code clerk of the Soviet military at-

taché in Canada, has announced a "five-point program" for increasing the number of "Gouzenkos" in the Western nations. Inside the Soviet spy rings abroad, Gouzenko says, are "not only our enemies but some friends, too; friends who are watching our way of life with sympathy, who dream of being one of us, living in freedom and enjoying the same standard of living we do." To reach the potential defectors and appeal to them Gouzenko suggests: First, that "every escapee who brings documentary evidence which can stand scrupulous investigation leading to disclosure of Communist spy activity should become a Canadian or American citizen without complicated procedure and with the utmost speed." Second, lifelong protection for such a citizen. Third, material security in the shape of a grant or an annuity. Fourth, assistance in finding employment. Fifth, that "such a man should be given as a matter of right a document in which the government acknowledges that his service to the country entitles him to all assistance and help."

The new law, Gouzenko believes, should also apply to agents-resident who are sent secretly to Canada and the United States, who live quietly in disguise, and around whom are built separate spy rings independent of the main organization and having direct contact with principals inside the Iron Curtain countries.¹⁵

Three general conclusions may be drawn from the history of Soviet espionage. First, the Soviet spy network is formidable in size but limited in efficiency. Second, in the event of a great conflict it would be strong at the beginning but its size and striking power would rapidly diminish. Third, important and influential leaders of Soviet intelligence would be glad to join the Western powers during such a showdown, in particular after a few major defeats had been suffered by their homeland on the main battlefields.

Since Stalin's death, and in particular since the arrest of the Beria group in the summer of 1953, a number of GB men have defected. Among them were several outstanding officials, like the high-ranking police officer Grigori Burlitski, engineer of mass deportations of disloyal populations, and Nikolai Khokhlov, the GB captain. Of those who had been active abroad three important espionage leaders have defected: Juri Rastvorov, who crossed the line in January 1954 while in Japan, and the Petrov couple, Vladimir and Evdokia, who defected from the network in Australia three months later.

Petrov took with him a large number of GB documents dealing with espionage, including instructions from headquarters in Moscow, reports, and notes and names of their agents. These documents and Petrov's testimony before the Royal Commission on Espionage constitute an important collection of material on Soviet espionage.

A typical Soviet embassy of the medium class, the embassy in Canberra was actually a three-in-one office. The ambassador, official head of the Communist cell, was the representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union); his "third secretary" and "consul," Vladimir Petrov, an old hand in the secret police and espionage, in addition to his few consular duties occupied the post of chief representative of the GB; the embassy's accountant, Mrs. Petrov, was also a code clerk of the GB. The ambassador knew little about the GB operations, and did not have the privilege of reading correspondence dealing with GB affairs. For a time there were also GRU residents—attachés and repatriation officials—in the embassy; they had left, however, and were not replaced. There had always been a TASS man in Australia who had ready access to the Parliament press gallery and was in close touch with Australian journalists; a "cadre worker" (regular employee) of the GB, the TASS man was the right hand of the spy chief.

The atmosphere in the embassy was full of the plotting and intrigue usual in Soviet institutions abroad. Denunciations were abundant; "inefficiency at work" was a standard phrase; the female members of the "cell" were noteworthy for their malicious gossip and bad manners. Mrs. Petrov, for example, was accused of having thrown a pie in the face of the ambassador's wife. All these developments were, of course, reported to Moscow in full detail.

The most terrifying accusation that could be made against an official was that of being a Beria man, which called up the smell of the GB cellar and the vision of the hangman's noose. This accusation was leveled against Petrov toward the end of 1953.

Diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by Australia had been granted late in 1942; the subsequent era, full of "antifascist" sentiments and slogans that had marked the course of events in other Western capitals, was a highly favorable one for Soviet espionage operations in Australia. Like the Washington groups, pro-Soviet Australians employed in government agencies supplied re-

ports, via the Communist party, to Russian intelligence officers; the data furnished related primarily to the Department of External Affairs.

In those glorious days the GB in Australia worked under Semion Makarov and his aide, the TASS man Feodor Nosov, who in turn was at the head of a group of agents. At the same time "the Communist Party here had a group of External Affairs Officers who were giving them official information. The members of the group were bringing out copies of official documents, which they gave to a Communist Party member. The Party man gave the documents to Mr. Makarov at the Soviet Embassy. The documents described the Australian foreign policy and also contained a lot of information about American and English foreign policy."¹⁶

The situation began to deteriorate at the end of the 'forties, when anti-German and anti-Japanese emotions began to subside, and the governments of the West were becoming alert to Soviet espionage.

In the late 'forties the flow of information, especially about international affairs, began to grow thinner and poorer. The GB chiefs in Moscow, dissatisfied and always trying to blame someone else for the unhappy turn of events, ordered the Australian agents to exert more vigor and initiative. In a letter of January 1952 headquarters told its representative in Canberra:

One of the most important aspects of the work of the foreign political intelligence consists of the study and survey of the Department of External Affairs of the foreign country.

Up to the present moment the Australian section of the MVD has not been conducting such survey, and in consequence MVD Headquarters has in effect no information concerning the Australian Department of External Affairs.¹⁷

Charges, accusations, reprimands, and recall of unsuccessful officials followed. Early in 1949, when the GB man Sadovnikov stayed overnight in the house of an Australian citizen, the ambassador reported the crime to Moscow, and the culprit was summoned home to face severe punishment. He was succeeded by another GB man, Pakhomov, whose work was soon found "unsatisfactory" by Moscow and who was recalled and replaced by Petrov. Another "cadre worker," F. V. Kislitsyn, arrived in October 1952. "He did nothing," Petrov testified later, and was sent back home. In September 1952 Moscow told Petrov in a letter that N. G. Kovaliov, a new

GB man in Australia, "has dealt perfunctorily," as a result of the "absence of positive guidance on your [Petrov's] part." In June 1952 Moscow told its Australian section that "intelligence work in Australia in 1951-52 was actually at a standstill and has not produced any noticeable results."¹⁸

The Royal Commission inquired as to the real cause of the deterioration: Petrov explained that the general situation of Soviet Russia and its representatives abroad had changed in the postwar years. Summing up the conclusions of the interrogation, the commission's chairman asked witness Petrov:

The Chairman: I gather from my reading of the documents that in the last two or three years the MVD at Canberra found it very difficult, if not impossible, to get information?

V. M. Petrov: That's right.

The Chairman: Was that because the Australian Security Service had become very efficient?

V. M. Petrov: That is so.

The Chairman: And I suppose former informants had perhaps become frightened?

V. M. Petrov: That is so.

The Chairman: Or had perhaps been moved to positions in which they could do no harm?

V. M. Petrov: That is possible.

The Chairman: You received a severe reproof from Moscow, did you not, for your inability to get information?

V. M. Petrov: That's right.¹⁹

In its extensive and detailed instruction of June 6, 1952, GB headquarters ordered its Australian resident, among other things, to prepare for the possible outbreak of a world war, and told him how to take the necessary measures as far as spy activities were concerned:

The aggravation of the international situation and the pressing necessity for the timely exposure and prevention of cunning designs of the enemy, call imperatively for a radical reorganization of all our intelligence work and the urgent operation of an illegal apparatus in Australia which could function uninterruptedly and effectively under any conditions.

In this connection the workers of the Australian section of the MVD should devote special attention to the taking of

measures for the preparation of conditions for illegal work (in future referred to as NOVATORS).

The putting into effect of measures relating to NOVATORS is at the present moment one of the top-priority tasks, on the fulfilment of which should be engaged all the workers of the Australian MVD section, including persons who have been drawn in.

. . . The Australian MVD section must here and now take practical measures for the training of agents for work in extraordinary circumstances. . . . In the event of extraordinary circumstances each agent should have concrete tasks allotted in advance and firm conditions should be worked out for contact with our illegal or group leader. . . . You must now at least begin recruitment work. In the first place it is essential to avoid the recruitment of persons whose progressive activity is known to the counter-intelligence, and to concentrate attention on the study and recruitment of persons engaged on secret work of the government and occupying leading posts in political parties and organizations, capable of supplying us with valuable information. The work of recruitment should be carried out boldly, with forethought and inventiveness.²⁰

Soon after his arrival in Australia Petrov had met one of the leading members of the pro-Soviet Russian Social Club, Mikhail Bialogusky, an immigrant from Poland; their contact soon developed into a close friendship. Petrov was unaware that his friend was serving as a secret agent of the Australian Security agency and was reporting in detail on every meeting and conversation with the Soviet consul. Petrov confided in Bialogusky his troubles at the embassy, the denunciations, the unfounded charges. His bitterness was unmistakable. When the worst happened, that is, when Petrov's name was tied up with the Beria conspiracy, and when, following the ambassador's ominous reports to Moscow, Petrov was ordered to return home, contact was established for him with the Security Service, and on April 3, 1954, Petrov disappeared. Mrs. Petrov was held at the embassy and Petrov was unable to communicate with her. After three weeks he managed to reach her by telephone at the Darwin airport, where she was about to leave, under escort, for Moscow. With the help of Australian authorities she managed to free herself of her Russian escort and join her husband.

To avoid the inevitable public scandal which would result from

the then imminent investigation of the spy affair, the Soviet government ordered its official personnel to return home; Moscow broke off diplomatic relations with Australia in April 1954.

It is true that in the last few years the situation all over the world has become less favorable and more difficult for Soviet espionage. Everywhere new precautionary measures have been introduced, personnel are screened, suspects are removed, and security has been streamlined. Diplomatic and nondiplomatic arrivals from Russia and the satellites are investigated, and Communist parties have been demoralized by police agents planted in them. Under these conditions spy activity and recruiting of new agents have become immensely more difficult.

The situation is not uniform in all countries, however. While Moscow has had to recognize the stagnation of intelligence operations in certain countries as inevitable, it will refuse to do so in regard to the United States. For Moscow, the United States must remain an exception to the world-wide adverse climate. All the Soviet intelligence forces available (and they are indeed great), all the skill and talent at the disposal of GRU and GB, and all the funds required will be thrown against this country. All preparations for a potential war that can be made on the enemy's soil are being made in the United States underground. As long as the international situation remains in general what it is today, the United States will constitute the greatest obstacle to the expansion of Communist power and the main object of Soviet hatred. It is still firmly in the number one position on the roster of targets of Soviet intelligence. We may be certain that an extensive reorganization of the Soviet intelligence machine in the United States has taken place in the last few years and that this reorganization was one of those radical, sweeping actions of which the Soviet government is capable in a time of emergency.

First, all former agents and "sources" who were connected even if but loosely, with any of the notorious Washington groups of the 'thirties and 'forties, have been discarded. Whether or not they were discovered in one of the investigations, whether or not they have been merely overlooked, and whether or not they still adhere to the old faith, they are now out as tools of Soviet intelligence.

Second, all Soviet agents who maintained ties with Communist organizations have been removed.

Third, new leading men from Russia have been dispatched to reorganize the intelligence machine as a new network from bottom to top. In numbers the new apparatus is certainly smaller than it was before and its tentacles in the United States government do not reach as deeply or widely as in the golden days gone by.

Fourth, a large number of American friends, helpers, and agents of Soviet intelligence have been put in cold storage and made a "dormant apparatus": their contacts with Soviet intelligence are loose and infrequent; they have no regular duties to perform; being on the "register," however, they may be called to active duty at any time, and being vulnerable to blackmail, they cannot refuse.

Restraints and restrictions imposed on the Soviet apparatus in the United States will last only so long as the increased alertness and understanding of the American public and its official agencies make them necessary. Meantime, in addition to the active agents, scores of others wait expectantly, always on the alert; scores of yavkas operate; scores of duboks are maintained; exchange of personnel goes on constantly. Coexistence or no coexistence, intelligence tasks must be carried out and the machine must be kept in readiness. The Russian expectation is that if international tensions subside and relaxation of Soviet-American relations sets in, doors now shut will reopen and new facilities will be found, as at the height of the grand alliance in 1943-45. If, on the other hand, the clouds in the international sky should condense and produce a storm, the now dispersed elements of the Soviet intelligence machine in this country will begin to work in unison as the remarkable Red Orchestra did in Western Europe in June 1941.

Thus the relationship between the spy apparatus and Communism begins gradually to change.

That until recently the great majority of Soviet agents abroad belonged to the Communist movement and that their primary motives were ideological and not pecuniary made the Soviet government superior to many of its rivals insofar as these clandestine corps were concerned. Unlike the traditional type of spy, who was a mixture of adventurer and prostitute, the Soviet secret agent was usually a person of some intellect and education, often a government employee, sometimes a personality in the field of science or art. Besides, the Soviet authorities rejected in advance emotionally unstable persons, persons addicted to drinking, gambling, loose talk,

and boasting. As a result, the several thousand men and women who comprised the Soviet secret corps abroad were an interesting and historically significant section of the world-wide Communist movement.

This special character of the Soviet spy also served as the basis for Moscow's claim that the Soviet government does not engage in espionage; spies, it admonished its younger and more naive adherents, are mercenaries, not fighters for ideals. The contention was false but impressive. The years of experience, however, have made a deviation from the classical pattern of Communist intelligence necessary.

The close affinity between Communism and the Soviet secret service has had great advantages, but there has also been a negative side. The Communist background of a spy is like a birthmark which makes him identifiable to security organs. Such a spy can work effectively only if he can avoid screening. In this respect the traditional type of nonpolitical spy has advantages over a Communist: his past evokes no suspicion. As the political police in all countries improve their techniques and enrich their records, the *Lebensraum* of the secret agent grows smaller and smaller.

Thus the type of secret agent who has the best chances of surviving is a person with no distinct Communist background; who never, even at the beginning of his political career, visited "study circles," "professional groups," "committees," or meetings; who matured early and took a shortcut from college to the espionage apparatus. There are few such people to be found. Another type is persons supplied with new passports and new "legends"—fabricated plausible life stories—from which all traces of a Communist past have been erased. Since these documents are dangerous to depend on and can be used only rarely, Soviet intelligence must more and more revert to the old type of conventional spy. In Germany Soviet spies of this sort, examples of which have been described in this book, are already in the majority. The practice of using this type of spy will gradually be extended to other countries.

Thus the evolution of Soviet espionage and Soviet intelligence follows the general pattern of Soviet evolution. From its initial Leninist phase of a "state of a new type" which would abolish social classes, exploitation, violence, and espionage, it develops into a state of an old type, more on the Oriental side, in which tyranny and violence are permanent elements of the system, and wars and espionage are normal and constant activities.

But the further the Soviet system evolves in this direction, and the larger its intelligence system becomes, the more obvious become its weakness and inferiority compared to a modern Western nation. Neither during a period of intercontinental tension nor in time of peace nor in war can volume of espionage be decisive. Itself a product and reflection of the cultural, political, and industrial forces of a nation, the intelligence organization of a despotic and aggressive political system must in the end prove inferior to and recede before forces based on a higher conception, on achievements of modern science, on political freedom, and on the great principles of humanism.

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3. *Vossische Zeitung*, April 29, 1933.
4. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942.
5. D papers, b 341.
6. Jan Valtin, *Out of the Night*, pp. 355ff.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

8. *Morgon-Tidningen* (Stockholm), Oct. 9, 1948; *Münchener Illustrierte*, 1951; *Die Weltwoche* (Zurich), July 9, 1954.

9. D papers, b 46-8.

10. *Rapport du Ministère de l'Intérieur du Reich et du Chef de la Police Allemande* (Paris, 1941), pp. 84-6.

11. Ignatz Müller, "The Wollweber League" (unpublished), D papers, Di 37ff.

12. Bo Hansen, "It Happened Here," *Industria*, No. 5, Stockholm, 1952.

13. Müller, "The Wollweber League," D papers, Di 371-3.

7. The Hitler-Stalin Pact

1. Testimony of Ismail Ege, Oct. 28, 1953, Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, p. 1006.

2. Kurt Krupinski, *Die Sowjetunion im Spiegelbild der Rückkehrer* (Berlin), 1942.

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1. On the Eve

1. Data relating to the networks in these five countries are taken from Gestapo Reports, Dec. 21 and 24, 1942; *Der Mittag* (Düsseldorf), Feb. 11-March 15, 1953; W. F. Flicke, *Spionagegruppe "Rote Kapelle,"* Kreuzlingen, 1954; Alexander Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, New York, Doubleday, 1949; and D papers, S 11-64.

2. Also "Otto," "General," "Georges," "Herbert," "Sommer," "Winter," "Bauer," "Onkel," and other aliases.

3. D papers, b 723.

4. Also "Fritz," "Arthur," "Dupuis," "Lebrun," "Cirin," and other aliases.

5. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942, p. 3.

6. Also "Bordo," "Paul," "Pascal."

7. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942, p. 4.

8. D papers, XYZ 3.

9. Also "Fred," "Verlaine," "Romeo," "Salor," and other aliases.

10. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942, p. 4, and D papers, S 76.

11. He was also known as "Hans," "Herrmann," "Bergmann."

12. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942, pp. 2-4.

13. Also "Leo," "Piber," "André."

14. W. F. Flicke, *Die Rote Kapelle* (Kreuzlingen, 1949), pp. 80-3; Heinrich Kalthof, former Abwehr man (D papers, b 231-2).

2. The Start of the Soviet-German War

1. Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, p. 162.

2. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942, pp. 31-7; Flicke, *Die Rote Kapelle*, pp. 339-40.

3. D papers, b 70.

4. *Der Mittag*, Feb. 11-15, 1953.

5. *Ibid.*, Feb. 17-18, 1953.

6. Gestapo Report of Dec. 21, 1942, p. 3.

7. Anton Weber, former Gestapo man (D Papers, b 778-80).

3. The "Gilbert" Network in France

1. Also "Harry," "Baumann," "Bucher," "Leon," "Merlan."
2. Piotr Volodin, former member of the union; D papers, b 792, 793.
3. Gestapo Report, Dec. 24, 1942, p. 5; *Der Mittag*, March 10, 11, 1953.
4. Gestapo Report, Dec. 24, 1942, pp. 2, 5.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 5; Heinrich Hofmann, D papers, b 79, 128-34, 139, 142, 146.
6. Flicke, *Die Rote Kapelle*, pp. 156-8; *Der Stern* (Hamburg), May 27, 1951.
7. *Der Mittag*, March 5, 1953.
8. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1953.
9. Heinrich Hofmann, D papers b 136, 137.
10. Deposition of Sept. 17, 1948, of Dr. Manfred Roeder, in the Record of the Postwar Investigation of Charges against the Prosecutor Dr. Manfred Roeder, pp. 467, 468. (Referred to henceforth as The Case of Dr. Roeder.)

4. Treason en Gros

1. Heinrich Hofmann, D papers, b 88-93.
2. *Unser Kampf. 200 Beispiele aus dem antifaschistischen Kampf in Deutschland*, Prague, 1935.
3. Heinrich Kalthof, D papers, b 213, 214.
4. H. J. Giskes, *Spione überspielen Spione*, Hamburg, 1949; and Josef Schneider, *Das war das Englandspiel*, Munich, 1950.
5. Anton Weber, D papers, b 773.
6. Heinrich Kalthof, D papers, b 220, 221.
7. This story is based mainly on a report in *Kristall* (Hamburg), Nos. 5 and 6, 1951.
8. W. F. Flicke, former *Funkabwehr* man, D papers, XYZ 57.
9. Flicke, D papers, XYZ 55.
10. Gestapo Report, Dec. 21, 1942, p. 7.
11. Heinrich Hofmann, D papers, b 143, 144.
12. D papers, S 47.
13. D papers, S 47, 71.
14. *Der Stern*, June 17, 1951.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Report of Hauptmann Wedel of Jan. 1, 1945; D papers, XYZ 51, 52.
17. *Handbook for Spies*, pp. 146-7.
18. Friedrich W. Dohse, member of German intelligence in Paris; D papers, b 715-17.
19. Hauptmann Wedel, report of Jan. 1, 1945; D papers, XYZ 52.

CHAPTER 5. The Swiss Network in War

1. Alexander Rado and His Apparatus

1. Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, pp. 198-200, and D papers, b 819, 866.
2. *Gazette de Lausanne*, Feb. 4, 1949.
3. *Handbook for Spies*, p. 22.
4. Anton Lehman, D papers, XYZ 80.
5. Feb. 2, 1949.

6. Otto Pünter in D papers, b 473.
7. D papers, b 473, 474.
8. Roger Corbaz, D papers, b 506.

2. *Semilegal Soviet Espionage*. No notes.

3. *Rudolf Rössler*

1. *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), March 31, 1954; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 2, 1953; *Gazette de Lausanne*, Nov. 3, 1953.
2. D papers, b 484-7.
3. Flicke, *Die Rote Kapelle*, pp. 29-30.
4. *Handbook for Spies*, pp. 92-5.
5. The quoted messages here and further on are taken from "250 Intercepted Messages to and from Moscow," D papers.

4. *Alexander Foote and His Network*

1. *Gazette de Lausanne*, March 2, 1949.
2. *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1949.
3. D papers, b 870-2.
4. *Ibid.*, b 455-6.
5. *Basler Nachrichten*, March 3, 1949.
6. Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, p. 133, and D papers, b 218-20.
7. *Gazette de Lausanne*, Feb. 17, 1949.

5. *The Pakbo Group*

1. Foote, *Handbook for Spies*, pp. 145-7.

6. *The End of the Swiss Network*

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3. *Ibid.*, March 7, 1949.
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5. *Report of the [Canadian] Royal Commission*, p. 570.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 567, 568.
7. Charles Knecht, prefect of Geneva, and Heinrich Kalthof, D papers, b 226-8 and 578, 582, 583.
8. Alexander Foote, D papers, b 822, 823.
9. *Idem.*, D papers, b 877, 879, 881.
10. Jules Montan, formerly a high official of the Comintern, D papers, b 667-71.
11. Alexander Foote, D papers, b 884-7.

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1. *The Schulze-Boysen-Harnack Group*

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2. *Ibid.*, 97-9; Anton Lehman, D papers, XYZ 85-6.

3. Axel von Harnack, "Arvid und Mildred Harnack," *Die Gegenwart*, Jan. 31, 1947, p. 15.
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8. Hugo Buschmann, "De la résistance au défaitisme," *Les temps modernes*, Paris, Nos. 46-47, Aug.-Sept. 1949, pp. 258-9.
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13. Deposition Aug. 6, 1948, The Case of Dr. Roeder, p. 388.
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5. The Case of Dr. Roeder, p. 545.
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2. *The Iron Curtain*, pp. 182, 183.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
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3. *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 134.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 375.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 384.
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2. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
3. *Report of the Royal Commission*, pp. 645-6.
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13. *New York Times*, March 19, 1953.

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